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With corporations playing a prominent role in economies worldwide, economic activities 
sometimes result in the negligent deaths of people. Corporate criminal liability is a concept 
that is accepted in many countries including South Africa. In South Africa it is currently 
regulated by section 332 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
 
Despite the fact that corporations are juristic persons with no ability to think and act with intent, 
the concept of corporate criminal liability is in existence and several theories have been relied 
upon by various jurisdictions as their basis for corporate criminal liability. Two of these 
theories are ‘vicarious liability’ which result in the corporation being held vicariously liable 
for crimes committed by its officers and the ‘identification theory’ which result in the 
corporation being held personally liable for crimes committed by its officers. (A Pinto & M 
Evans Corporate Criminal Liability 2nd ed (2008) 24). Developments during the past twenty 
five years have shown that these theories are fraught with problems and these have led to 
corporations escaping liability, especially where there has been negligent loss of lives. To 
overcome these problems, jurisdictions such as England and Canada have recently resorted to 
having legislation that deal specifically with corporations that have negligently caused deaths. 
(England’s Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 and Canada’s Bill C-
45 which became law on March 31 2004 and is now section 217.1 of the Canadian Criminal 
Code). In South Africa the rules governing corporate criminal liability include all crimes 
generally and there is a lack of successful prosecutions for deaths negligently caused by 
corporations. 
 
In this research the concepts of corporate criminal liability and corporate homicide in the three 
jurisdictions are fully examined. It is determined that regardless of the basis that each 
jurisdiction relies on, there are various problems that one encounters when dealing with 
corporate criminal liability and corporate homicide. Problems experienced by these countries 
will be fully discussed and these will include accounts of situations that led directly to the 
acceptance of corporate criminal liability into their laws as well as the subsequent decision to 
treat corporate homicide as a separate offence. The research is intended to be a thorough 
examination of the concepts of corporate criminal liability and corporate homicide and it is 
aimed at serving as a guide to South Africa on how to deal effectively with the challenge of 
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PART ONE – INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
I INTRODUCTION 
During the night of December 2, 1984 in Bhopal, India, thousands of people lost their lives in 
a horrific way as toxic gases from a plant owned by Union Carbide Corporation spread rapidly 
around the city.1 According to the Bhopal Medical Appeal  
“The toxic cloud was so dense and searing that people were reduced to near blindness. As 
they gasped for breath, its effects grew ever more suffocating. The gases burned the tissues of 
their eyes and lungs and attacked their nervous systems. People lost control of their bodies. 
Urine and faeces ran down their legs. Some began vomiting uncontrollably, were wracked 
with seizures and fell dead. Others, as the deadly gases ravaged their lungs, began to choke, 
and drowned in their own bloody body fluids”.2  
 
Union Carbide was never formally charged for these gruesome deaths,3 despite the fact that to 
date people are still suffering as a direct result of this disaster.4 Many are still in need of medical 
attention and care.5 In 2001 Union Carbide merged with Dow Chemical and the new 
                                                          
1 S Kumar Bhopal.net http://www.bhopal.net/oldsite/sunil.html (accessed 10 December 2013).  
2 Ibid.  
3 This is despite the decision by the Indian Supreme Court to order Dow Chemical to be tried in the Bhopal 
Criminal Court for Union Carbide’s 1984 Bhopal disaster. (K Gupta Bhopal Chemical Disaster. [Thousand Oaks, 
California]. UNT Digital Library http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc31094/ (accessed 10 March 
2014).  
4 It has been noted that “more than 26 years have passed since the disaster, yet thousands in Bhopal continue to 
suffer and die from chronic illnesses, the UCC (Union Carbide Corporation) is still a highly contaminated 
industrial graveyard and justice continues to evade the people of Bhopal”. (Web Editor ‘Bhopal now: the enduring 
tragedy’ The Bhopal Medical Appeal 14 January 2011 www.bhopal.org/2011/01/bhopal-now-the-enduring-
tragedy/ (accessed 20 January 2014)). 
5 “Ailments directly linked to the disaster include blindness, respiratory difficulties, a variety of cancers and 
gynecological problems. Many survivors today cannot walk a few steps without gasping for breath, and others 
suffer sensory delusions, hearing voices in their heads”. (Saffi UA ‘The Bhopal Disaster: an ongoing tragedy’ 26 




corporation became Dow Chemical.6 In July 2009 the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Bhopal 
issued an order to the Central Bureau of Investigations for the arrest of Mr Warren Anderson,7 
who was the chairman of Union Carbide when the Bhopal disaster occurred. Mr Anderson and 
the company were charged with various crimes including culpable homicide and grievous 
assault as a result of the 1984 Bhopal disaster.8  
 
In June 2010, 26 years after the Bhopal disaster eight people were convicted by the Court of 
the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhopal.9 These were the first convictions for the Bhopal 
disaster10 of individuals who were formerly employed by Union Carbide, including people in 
senior managerial positions.11 They were convicted of ‘death by negligence’.12 It should be 
noted, however, that to date, Dow Chemical (the corporation) has failed to assume criminal 
responsibility for the Bhopal disaster.13   
 
                                                          
6 Posted by collective at December 31 2003 ‘Bhopal: A Heinous Corporate Crime, A Humanitarian Disaster’ 
www.thesouthasian.org/blog/archives/2003/Bhopal_a_heinous_corporate_cri.html (accessed 10 January 2013). 
7 Mr Anderson had been arrested soon after the disaster, but thereafter he left India. “The Indian government has 
since said that it did not know where he was, but CNN-IBN television recently reported that he was in the 
Hamptons – a wealthy area outside New York”. (Associated Press ‘Court issues arrest warrant for former CEO of 
Union Carbide in gas leak case’ The Guardian 31 July 2009 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jul/31/warren-anderson-arrest-warrant (accessed 21 January 2014)). 
8 International campaign for Justice in Bhopal ‘Arrest Carbide Chairman Warren Anderson: Bhopal Court orders 
CBI’ Association for India’s development Delhi Chapter 31 July 2009 
http://delhi.aidindia.org/bethechange/content/view/1117/430/ (accessed 21 January 2014). 
9 R Keswani ‘Bhopal gas Tragedy: Chronology of Events’ The Bhopal Post 27 June 2010 
http://www.thebhopalpost.com/index.php/2010/06/bhopal-gas-tragedy-chronology-of-events/ (accessed 21 
January 2014).  
10 Mr Warren Anderson was not one of the convicted people as he had absconded, see note 7 above.  
11 BBC news ‘Bhopal trial: Eight convicted over India gas disaster’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/s/hi/8725140.stm  
(accessed 21 January 2014).  
12 Ibid. 
13 After many years of evading criminal liability Dow Chemical is expected to appear in front of the Chief Judicial 
Magistrate, Bhopal in July 2014 to state its position regarding the Bhopal disaster. (‘Bhopal court summons Dow 
Chemicals in gas tragedy case’ http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com /2014-03-




Dow Chemical, which has been blamed for corporate crimes allegedly committed in many 
countries, operates worldwide and it is just one example out of the many corporations that have 
allegedly committed corporate crimes in South Africa.14  Corporate crimes are generally 
activities of corporations which result in the violation of criminal law.15 Corporate crimes 
include, inter alia, fraud, price-fixing, corruption and the unlawful killing of human beings.  
 
II INTRODUCING THE CONCEPT OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
South Africa recognizes corporate criminal liability and this is currently governed by section 
332 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977.16 Corporate criminal liability refers to holding 
corporations, in spite of being artificial persons, accountable for corporate crimes that have 
been committed in the name of the corporation or in furthering the interests of the corporation.17 
The effect of this section is that in South Africa a corporation may be prosecuted for a criminal 
act committed in the process of furthering the interests of the corporation. Section 332 does not 
specify the crimes that corporations may be held liable for. It refers to crime committed by 
corporations generally. This begs the question whether the provisions of section 332 of the 
CPA deal adequately and effectively with corporations that involve themselves in activities 
that result in the unlawful killing of human beings. 
                                                          
14 Greenpeace “Greenpeace exposes ‘Corporate Criminal’ Dow Chemical in South Africa: Calls for Corporate 
Liability Framework” at the Earth Summit, Johannesburg 2002. www.bhopal.net/pressrelease. (accessed 1 March 
2014). An example of Dow’s activities in South Africa is illustrated by a march by Greenpeace during which 
“activists also taped off a drain for toxic chemicals which runs through several hundred metres of veld close to 
Phomolong, Birch Acres, Thembisa and Ivory Park. Greenpeace spokesperson Von Hernandez said laboratory-
tested samples of the discharge from the factory showed several toxic chemicals, including chlorinated benzenes, 
tetrachloromethane, alkanes and the pesticide lindane...Bobby Peek, head of the SA environmental justice group 
groundWork, said the government was defending the interests of polluters by allowing Dow to discharge poisons 
into the environment close to poor communities”. (T Carnie ‘Greenpeace swoops on Chemical Factory’ 29 August 
2002 www.iol.co.za/?click_id=13&art_id-ct20020829212456699S532211&set_id1 (accessed 1 March 2014)). 
15 They have also been defined as “corporate activities which are perceived to involve a transgression of some 
aspect of criminal law”. (C Wells Corporations and Criminal Responsibility 2ed (2001) 1). 
16 The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, hereinafter referred to as the CPA. 




A plea for government to “commit to developing an international instrument for corporate 
accountability and liability in order to stop the widespread abuse of the environment and on 
human rights by multinational corporations”18 was made by Greenpeace at the Earth Summit 
in Johannesburg, 2002, as it exposed Dow Chemical, reportedly  “one of the world’s most 
notorious corporate criminals”19 for having manufactured and sold pesticide in South Africa, 
where it was allegedly responsible for many people’s health troubles.20 Should South Africa at 
some point deem it necessary for it to heed a call such as the one made by Greenpeace, it would 
have to begin by reflecting on the provisions of section 332 of the CPA as they regulate the 
accountability and liability of corporations for crimes they have committed, and it should also 
reflect on whether such laws require reform or not.  
 
In this thesis a reflection on section 332 of the CPA will be made with a view to highlighting 
the need for reform. The focus will not be on whether corporate criminal liability is a valid 
concept or not.21 This thesis is premised on the notion that corporate criminal liability is a 
relevant and valid concept which is an important point of focus in this day and age22 that is 
characterized by harmful corporate activities.23 Corporate criminal liability is a concept that is 
                                                          
18 Greenpeace (note 14). 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 This is in line with John Coffee’s observation that “during the last decade, the long-standing debate over 
corporate criminal liability has shifted dramatically – from a controversy over whether it should exist at all to a 
dialogue about how it should be defined and structured”. (JC Coffee Jr ‘Corporate Criminal Liability: An 
Introduction and Comparative Survey’ in A Eser, G Heine and B Huber (eds) Criminal Responsibility of Legal 
and Collective Entities (1998) 9, 9 www.iuscrim.mpd.de/verlag/online  (accessed15 November 2013). 
22 Snyman states that “…there is in practice a great need for this form of liability, especially today when there are 
so many corporate bodies playing such an important role in society”. (CR Snyman Criminal Law 5th ed (2008) 
253).  
23 “There is an emerging consensus among corporate criminologists, which is that corporate crime and violence 
inflicts (sic) far more damage on society than all street crime combined”. (S Singh “Corporate Crime and the 
Criminal Liability of Corporate Entities” www.unafei.or.jp/English/pdf/RS_No76/No76_10PA_Singh.pdf 
(accessed 12 July 2012)). 
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applied in many jurisdictions.24 As it deals with the relationship between individuals, 
communities or society on one side and corporations, which are not natural persons, on the 
other side, it becomes necessary to investigate this phenomenon and to have a clear 
understanding thereof. The economies of many countries are influenced by, if not dependent 
on, corporations and corporate activities. It follows therefore that corporations and corporate 
activities play an important role in society; however, in carrying out those corporate activities 
corporate crimes may be committed. When that happens, individuals, communities or the 
society are the ones who bear the brunt of this negative consequence of corporate activities. 
Corporate criminal liability then serves as a tool that a state uses to hold a corporation 
criminally accountable for crimes committed in its interest or under its auspices.  
 
It is submitted that it is important to investigate and understand the concept of corporate 
criminal liability; the rationale for subjecting corporations to criminal law; and how the concept 
of corporate criminal liability is applied in South Africa. Where the application of corporate 
criminal liability appears to be ineffective, weaknesses may be identified and possibly 
remedied. It is further submitted that this exercise may lead to a more effective use of the 
corporate criminal liability mechanisms. 
 
Like many other jurisdictions, South Africa relies heavily on its economy, and corporate 
activity regularly affects individuals, communities and the society at large. The effect of section 
332 of the CPA is that in spite of its lack of a physical existence and its inability to think and 
                                                          
24 Apart from the United States of America, England, Canada and South Africa, countries such as New Zealand, 
Denmark, France, Belgium, Japan, Korea, Macau, Hong Kong, People’s Republic of China, Qatar, Israel and the 
United Arab Emirates also recognise corporate criminal liability. (M Pieth and R Ivory ‘Emergence and 
Convergence: Corporate Criminal Liability Principles in Overview’ in M Pieth & R Ivory (eds)  Corporate 
Criminal Liability – Emergence, Convergence, and Risk (2010) 3, 8-13). 
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act, in South Africa, a corporation may be prosecuted for a criminal act committed in the 
process of furthering the interests of the corporation. It may also be convicted and may face 
punitive measures in accordance with section 332 of the CPA.  
 
It is a fact that corporations provide services and employment for many. In post–Apartheid 
South Africa the number of corporations that are in existence has increased dramatically. This 
is due to many factors, including the lifting of sanctions, the return of exiles, Black economic 
empowerment policies, more and more people opting for running their own businesses rather 
than being employed by others, etc. The increase in corporate activities has been accompanied 
by an increase in the number of crimes such as fraud, corruption, as well as incidents in which 
people sometimes lose their lives as a result of the illegal activities of the corporations.  
 
As a point of departure it is submitted that corporate criminal liability has a purpose and for 
that reason it must be retained. It is intended, as part of the findings, to show that Khanna is 
incorrect in averring that  
“some justification for corporate criminal liability may have existed in the past, when civil 
enforcement techniques were not well developed, but from a deterrence perspective, very little 
now supports the continued imposition of criminal rather than civil liability on 
corporations”.25  
 
                                                          




It is submitted that holding corporations criminally liable is an important and commendable 
aspect of South African law and that corporate criminal liability should be regarded as an 
indispensable part of the criminal law as it has a crucial role to play. It is further submitted that 
corporate criminal liability, depending on how it is regulated, can serve as a strong deterrent 
against crimes committed by corporations. The argument that is advanced in this thesis is that 
in its current form the law regulating corporate criminal liability in South Africa is lacking and 
there is a need for reform, particularly with regard to the responsibility for fatalities caused by 
corporate activities. 
 
III THE NEED TO INVESTIGATE CORPORATE HOMICIDE  
It is reiterated that the concept of corporate criminal liability is important. Corporate criminal 
liability is, however, a wide concept and it encompasses all crimes that may possibly be 
committed by a corporation. The focus in this thesis is specifically on deaths caused unlawfully 
through corporate activities. These will be referred to as corporate homicide. The reason for 
focusing on the criminal liability of corporations for deaths caused is that death has been 
described as the “most serious form of harm”26 that may be caused. Moreover, when death is 
caused it is the right to life that is infringed upon. The South African Constitution guarantees 
the right to life in the Bill of Rights27 by providing that “everyone has the right to life”.28 The 
right to life is considered to be the primary right that a person has. In the Constitutional Court 
                                                          
26 Foreword to Sentencing Guidelines Council in Sentencing guidelines generated by the Sentencing Guidelines 
Council in Feb 2010 ('Corporate Manslaughter & Health and Safety Offences Causing Death') 
http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/web__guidelines_on_corporate_manslaughteraccessible.pdf 
(accessed 10 March 2014). 
27 Constitution of South Africa Act 1996, Chapter Two. 
28 Section 11 of the Constitution. 
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case of S v Makwanyane29 the right to life was described by Langa J as “the most fundamental 
of all rights, the supreme human right”.30 In the same case Chaskalson P explains that  
“the rights to life and dignity are the most important of all human rights, and the source of all 
other personal rights in Chapter Three [the Bill of Rights]. By committing ourselves to a 
society founded on the recognition of human rights we are required to value these two rights 
above all others”.31 
 
It is submitted that it is crucial to ensure that the right to life of all who associate with 
corporations is protected. Those who associate with corporations are potential victims of deaths 
caused by corporations and they range from employees32 to people who are being rendered 
services33 by the corporations and sometimes even passers-by.34 In line with Whyte’s 
observation there is a need to focus on corporate homicide because 
“corporate crime that causes death of workers and members of the public is a huge, if largely 
invisible, problem. Rarely are those serious offences treated with the force of the criminal law 
they deserve”.35  
 
                                                          
29 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). In S v Makwanyane the death penalty was found to be unconstitutional. 
It must be noted, however, that “Chaskalson P who wrote the leading judgment concurred in by all the other 
judges in Makwanyane, did not invalidate the death sentence on the basis of its conflict with the right to life, but 
held that the death penalty was a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. A majority of the other members of 
the court nevertheless found that the death penalty also violated the right to life”. (I Currie and J de Waal The Bill 
of Rights Handbook 6th ed (2013) 260).  
30 S v Makwanyane (note 29) para 217.  
31 S v Makwanyane (note 29) para 144. The case was decided under the Interim Constitution in which the Bill of 
Rights was found in Chapter 3. 
32 R v Bennett & Co (Pty) Ltd 1941 TPD 194. 
33 S v Schindler Lifts (SA) (Pty) (Ltd) 2001 (1) SACR 372 (WLD). 
34 For instance, 5 pedestrians were injured by a truck, transporting 23 tons of metal sheeting, whose brakes failed. 
One of the pedestrians died as a result. J Breytenbach ‘Runaway Truck drove into hotel’ 13 May 2009 
www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=vn22090513051120447C876450&page_number=1 
(accessed (12 July 2012). 




In this thesis it is argued that it is time for South Africa to move towards having its own separate 
offence of corporate homicide which will specifically address the problem of unlawful killings 
caused by corporations. England has developed to the extent that in addition to laws regulating 
corporate criminal liability for crime committed by corporations generally, there is a separate 
statutory regulation of corporate homicide, the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide 
Act.36 Ireland is in the process of passing separate legislation for corporate manslaughter37 and 
in New Zealand calls have been made for corporate manslaughter legislation.38 The 
developments in these jurisdictions indicate that corporate homicide is an area of corporate 
criminal liability that deserves particular attention. In this thesis the concept of corporate 
criminal liability will form a major part of the discussion, which will then be narrowed down 
to corporate homicide as it is important to trace the development of the broader concept of 
corporate criminal liability and to discuss it before focusing on corporate homicide. 
 
a) Reasons for proposing the formation of a specific crime of corporate homicide 
It has been stated that harm caused by corporate disregard for safety has a greater impact in 
terms of deaths and injuries39 when compared with the impact of a crime committed by an 
individual. Where there is loss of life resulting from activities of corporations, in certain 
systems, as stated above,40 the corporations responsible are prosecuted for corporate homicide. 
Corporate homicide is a newly recognized crime41 which has developed from the broader 
                                                          
36 The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, hereinafter referred to as the CMCHA. 
37 The Corporate Manslaughter Bill 2013. 
38 J Wong ‘Corporate Manslaughter: A Proposed Corporate Killing Offence for New Zealand’ (2006) 12 
Canterbury Law Review 157, 174. 
39 L N Lacey and C Wells Reconstructing Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives on Crime and the Criminal Process 
2 ed (1998) 513.  
40 See footnote 36. 
41 The development of corporate homicide in South Africa will be discussed fully below in Chapter Three IV (b). 
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concept of corporate criminal liability. South African law has, however, not developed to the 
extent that it recognizes a separate crime of corporate homicide.  
 
In this thesis it will be argued that section 332 of the CPA is fraught with weaknesses; that the 
section is inconsistent with modern developments in other jurisdictions42 and that the 
subsequent deficiencies or inadequacies lead to injustice, particularly in the prosecution of 
corporate homicide. It will be further argued that due to the seriousness of corporate homicide, 
the best approach is to have a separate legal framework for corporate homicide which will 
address deaths caused by corporations more efficiently and adequately and would also be in 
line with developments in other jurisdictions. 
In this thesis corporate homicide will be approached by way of a comparative study of 
corporate criminal liability as well as corporate homicide in South Africa, England and Canada. 
Based on the comparative study, recommendations will be made as to how South Africa ought 
to go about reforming corporate criminal liability in such a way that corporate homicide is 
recognized as a specified crime. 
 
(b) Why a Comparative Study? 
It is submitted that a comparative study of South Africa and the two chosen jurisdictions that 
have made reforms in this regard is the best way one can illustrate the dire need for South 
Africa to reform its laws. In the compared jurisdictions the public outcry as a result of failed 
                                                          
42 As Jordaan observes “the conclusion is reached that the criminal liability of juristic persons in South Africa is 
not only out of touch with developments elsewhere, but may be found to be inconsistent with the South African 




prosecutions following major disasters made governments review their laws. By making use 
of the comparative study, it is hoped that South Africa will not wait for a major disaster to take 
place before it considers reform in this area. 
 
(c) Reasons for choosing the compared systems 
In South Africa corporate criminal liability has formed part of our criminal law since being 
introduced in 191743 and since then there have been a number of convictions,44 however when 
it comes to deaths caused by corporations there have been few convictions. Section 332 of the 
CPA45 generally imposes criminal liability for statutory and common-law offences. The 
legislature is to be commended for realizing the importance of corporate criminal liability and 
for formally recognizing it as part of our criminal law. However, despite the existence of 
section 332 of the CPA, corporate criminal liability in South Africa cannot be said to have 
developed to the extent where one can actually say that it satisfactorily addresses the problem 
of corporate crime, particularly the unlawful deaths of human beings. It is submitted that 
section 332 of the CPA presents challenges to the concepts of corporate criminal liability and 
corporate homicide in South Africa.46   
                                                          
43 Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 1917, section 384 (hereinafter referred to as the CPEA). 
44 See R v Van Heerden & Others 1946 AD 168, where the company was held criminally liable for the crime 
committed by its director. Even though the director “in making the representations had not been acting ‘in the 
exercise of his powers or in the performance of his duties as director’ within the meaning of s. 384 (1) of Act 31 
of 1917, he had sold the frames and made the representation ‘in furthering or endeavouring to further the interests’ 
of the company within the meaning of the section and the company was therefore criminally liable for his acts”.  
45 The CPA (note 16) section 332. 
46 Some of the main problems with section 332 are its failure to hold the corporation directly or personally liable 
for its crimes; the fault of relatively junior employees can trigger corporate criminal liability; the fault of the 
employee is imputed to the corporation even where the employee or director has acted beyond his or her powers; 
corporate criminal liability is possible in circumstances where there is no civil liability; knowledge by the 
corporation of the offence is not a factor that is considered when determining whether the corporation should be 
held criminally liable or not; it does not allow for a defence and thus allows for a conviction even in the absence 
of fault on the part of the corporation; the only punishment that may be imposed on a convicted corporation is a 
fine; and since the provision caters for all corporate crime generally, unlawful deaths caused by corporate activities 
are treated in the same manner as all other corporate crimes. These will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 




Both England and Canada have well-developed laws regulating corporate homicide. Moreover, 
they are both regarded as systems of “full corporate criminal liability”.47 Systems having full 
corporate criminal liability are those that generally impose criminal liability on corporations 
regardless of the type of corporation.48   
 
For many years, both the legal systems of England and Canada have relied on the identification 
theory49 to justify corporate criminal liability. An interesting observation is the fact that their 
interpretation of the theory has not been the same. Whilst in England a narrow interpretation 
has been applied, in Canadian law the theory was developed by the courts such that a broader 
interpretation thereof now applies.50  As will be seen below, the interpretations influenced the 
success or failure of prosecutions for corporate crimes. Despite their different interpretations 
of the identification theory, both English and Canadian law have encountered problems which 
resulted in unsuccessful prosecutions of corporations for homicide. In both countries there was 
a public outcry which eventually led to the passing of new laws dealing specifically with, inter 
alia, corporate homicide.  
 
It is interesting to what extent the new laws share similarities and also to what extent they 
differ.  The differing interpretations of the identification doctrine and the subsequent legislation 
                                                          
47 “Full corporate criminal liability developed first in a modern form in the United States and Canada, then in 
England, and more recently in the Netherlands”.  (LH Leigh ‘The Criminal Liability of Corporations and other 
groups: A Comparative View (1982) 80 Michigan Law Review 1508, 1510). 
48 Ibid. 
49 “The principle of ‘identification’ …attributes the conduct and state of mind of certain high-ranking officers in 
the corporation (representing the ‘directing mind and will’ of the corporation) to the corporate body thus rendering 
the corporate body directly liable”. (J Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 4th ed (2013) 450.  
50 This will be discussed in Chapter Five III below. 
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on corporate homicide make England and Canada jurisdictions that may contribute positively 
towards the recognition and development of the concept of corporate homicide in South Africa, 
hence the decision to do a comparative study involving these systems.  
 
IV RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS OF THIS THESIS 
 
Corporate criminal liability is both topical and relevant in all countries where there are 
corporations. The increasing number of deaths caused by corporate activities51 makes it 
necessary for the legislature to focus on corporate homicide. Currently in South Africa there is 
no separate legislation that defines corporate homicide. There is no guidance as to how to deal 
with this phenomenon and, as already mentioned section 332 of the CPA does not efficiently 
and adequately address the problem of deaths caused by corporations. As a result there is a 
need for regulation to be reformed in such a way that it will ensure that corporations are 
properly held liable for causing the deaths of people. 
The questions that the research proposes to address are: 
- Does section 332 of the CPA properly address the issue of corporate crime? 
- Does section 332 deal adequately and effectively with the issue of deaths caused by 
corporations? 
- Are corporations in South Africa adequately punished when they have caused deaths? 
Are they being punished in such a way that they are deterred in committing future 
crimes? 
- Is there a need for South Africa to reform section 332 of the CPA, the legal framework 
that deals with corporate criminal liability? 
                                                          
51 For instance, injuries and deaths caused by faulty machinery. 
14 
 
- How are the compared jurisdictions dealing with corporate criminal liability and 
particularly corporate homicide? Can South Africa learn anything from the selected 
jurisdictions that would result in a more adequate and more effective legal framework 
of corporate homicide? 
 
The hypotheses that inform the research questions are that: 
- Death caused by corporations is a serious challenge that South Africa is faced with. 
- Section 332 of the CPA deals generally with the criminal liability of corporations for 
crimes and does not deal specifically with the problem of deaths caused by 
corporations. 
- Section 332 of the CPA contains many weaknesses which render it inadequate and also 
ineffective when it comes to the protection of society from harmful corporate activities 
that may result in death. 
- Under section 332 of the CPA the punishment of a convicted corporation may only take 
the form of a fine. This gives rise to the question whether a fine provides adequate and 
effective punishment. Since criminal law and criminal sanctions were originally 
intended for natural persons, the imposition of punishment on corporations is an 
important aspect which must form part of the discussion on corporate criminal liability. 
- As the right to life needs to be earnestly protected, there is a pressing need to formulate 
a separate legal framework that deals specifically with situations where corporate 
activities have resulted in causing deaths. 
 
V THE PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
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This thesis is aimed at serving as a guide to legislators and judicial institutions in South Africa 
on how to deal effectively with the challenge of corporate crime, particularly the unlawful 
killing of human beings by corporations. It is intended to be a thorough examination of the 
concepts of both corporate criminal liability and corporate homicide. It shall consist of a 
detailed comparative analysis of the manner in which the chosen jurisdictions have gradually 
made the move to ensure that corporations are not exempted from liability in situations where 
they cause death to members of society. Problems experienced by these jurisdictions will be 
fully discussed and these will include accounts of situations that led directly to the eventual 
inclusion or acceptance of corporate homicide as a separate offence that corporations may be 
charged with.  
 
The South African position, including the history of corporate criminal liability in South Africa, 
will be fully discussed. Recent developments that have emphasized the need for South Africa 
to make reforms to section 332 of the CPA will be highlighted. A discussion of the inadequacy 
and inefficiency of section 332 of the CPA will be made with a view to proposing a new legal 
framework which will be specifically aimed at ensuring that corporations that cause deaths are 
properly prosecuted. 
 
The thesis will be structured in such a way that it provides a thorough description of the concept 
of corporate criminal liability in the three legal systems. Emphasis will be placed on each legal 
system’s historical development and its basis for the criminal liability of corporations. 
Questions regarding the relevance of the basis for the criminal liability of a corporation will be 
raised and the current regulation of corporate homicide in each jurisdiction will be discussed. 
Based on the comparative study, recommendations will be made on how South Africa ought to 
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go about reforming corporate criminal liability. Recommendations will be made for a legal 
framework for corporate criminal liability in the future. Further recommendations will then be 
made on recognising corporate homicide as a separate and specific crime having its own legal 
framework. 
 
The main purpose of the thesis is thus to: 
-  Highlight the relevance of corporate criminal liability as a way of combating the 
problem of corporate crime. 
In this thesis it will be argued that corporate crime in South Africa is rife and appears in many 
forms. It will be further argued that the notion of holding corporations criminally liable for 
corporate crimes is relevant and needs to be retained and further developed in South Africa.  
-  Show that although South Africa recognises corporate criminal liability, section 332 of 
the CPA is inadequate and inefficient. This is more so in situations where people are 
killed as a result of corporate activities. It is therefore important for South Africa to 
introduce statutory measures aimed at dealing specifically with corporate homicide. 
The provisions of section 332 of the CPA, which deal with corporate criminal liability, will be 
fully analysed. Each subsection will be discussed and the relevant case law will form part of 
the discussion. The discussion of the manner in which South Africa deals with corporate crime 
will show that the legal framework is lacking and reasons will be advanced for the reform of 
the law, particularly when it comes to deaths resulting from corporate activities. 
-  Provide a detailed comparative analysis of the English, Canadian and South African 
experiences and explain how each specific jurisdiction has dealt with corporate 
criminal liability and corporate homicide.  
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A detailed comparative analysis of corporate criminal liability in the English, Canadian and 
South African systems will be made in which challenges experienced by England and Canada 
that eventually led to recent changes to the laws in both England and Canada will be highlighted 
and the current provisions discussed. It is submitted that South Africa can derive much benefit 
from looking at the way the English and the Canadian legal systems have dealt with corporate 
criminal liability and the challenge of corporate homicide.  In this way South Africa can draw 
from the experiences of those jurisdictions. 
-  Formulate and make recommendations for reform by means of a proposed legal 
framework for corporate homicide.  
England and Canada’s recent statutes will be discussed to ascertain whether the changes have 
resulted in improvements to the laws and if so, how that can influence developments in South 
Africa with regard to corporate homicide. Lessons learnt from the compared jurisdictions can 
assist in the formulation of a new legal framework for corporate homicide in South Africa. 
Strengths of the Canadian and English legal frameworks will be drawn from recommendations 
made for a new, more adequate and more efficient legal framework for South Africa. 
 
VI METHODOLOGY  
The methodology that has been utilized in writing this thesis is a comprehensive literature 
study. Numerous relevant South African and international sources were obtained, read and 
analysed. These included books, journal articles, conference papers, newspaper articles, an 
unpublished thesis, research reports, bills, statutes, law reports (both South African and foreign 




VII A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE THESIS / CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter 1 provides the introduction, the purpose, methodology and scope of this thesis. It also 
states the reason for choosing to discuss the problem of deaths caused by corporations or 
corporate activities in South Africa. In chapter 1 the statement of the research problem as well 
as the hypotheses are made clear. The chapter also provides justification for a comparative 
study and for choosing the specific jurisdictions that will be compared. The need for South 
Africa to reform its laws in such a way that the problem of deaths caused by corporations are 
adequately and effectively dealt with is highlighted in chapter one and the structure of the thesis 
is provided.   
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis provides the rationale behind corporate criminal liability and the 
theoretical discourse underpinning corporate criminal liability. The bases for holding 
corporations criminally liable and the reasons for punishing corporations are discussed. The 
discussion concludes with emphasis on the continued relevance of the concept of corporate 
criminal liability and the importance of holding corporations liable in a separate legal 
framework for deaths caused by corporations.  
 
In chapter 3 of this thesis the South African position is critically analysed. The historical 
development of corporate criminal liability is traced and section 332 of the CPA is fully 
examined. The punishment of corporations and the specific problem of deaths caused by 
corporations are discussed. The shortcomings of section 332 of the CPA are highlighted 
throughout the chapter. The proposed provision of corporate homicide in the mining sector is 




Chapter 4 provides a discussion of the development of corporate criminal liability in England. 
The discussion includes the history of corporations as legal persons as well as the initial 
reluctance to accept the concept of corporate criminal liability. The chapter also focuses on the 
basis for the criminal liability of corporations in English law. Developments in English law 
that eventually led to changes being made to the law as well as the current legislation on 
corporate manslaughter also form part of the examination. 
 
Chapter 5 provides a study of the historical development of corporate criminal liability in 
Canada. The history of corporations as legal persons is also discussed. The basis for the 
criminal liability of corporations in Canadian law is examined and the manner in which this 
was broadened by the courts is highlighted. Factors leading to the legislature introducing 
making amendments to its laws are considered and those amendments are analysed. 
 
Chapter 6 provides the conclusion of the research. The chapter commences by reiterating the 
fact, as proved in the thesis, that there is indeed a dire need for reform of the law regulating 
corporate criminal liability to be made. Recommendations are made for a new legal framework 
for corporate criminal liability. It is then suggested that deaths caused by corporations should 
be addressed in such a way that there is a separate provision that deals with specifically with 
such deaths. The many weaknesses of the current provision are highlighted to substantiate the 
argument for a separate legal provision for corporate homicide. Thereafter recommendations 


















CHAPTER 2 – THE RELEVANCE OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND 
CORPORATE HOMICIDE 
I INTRODUCTION 
“…as the bulk of economic activity nowadays takes place through corporations, so does 
economic criminality”.52 
                                                          
52 G Stessens ‘Corporate Criminal Liability: A Comparative Perspective’ (1994) 43 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 493, 493. 
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This statement is an indication that corporate criminality is a serious challenge in today’s 
society, one that is faced by various jurisdictions and one that in many jurisdictions has resulted 
in the imposition of corporate criminal liability.53 
 
The term “corporations” in this thesis, refers to corporate bodies as they are generally known 
in company law. These are legally constituted companies that have legal personality, their own 
obligations as well as their own rights.54 They exist separately from their members, they can 
own property, they can sue and be sued and they can enter into contracts.55 The term 
corporations in this context also includes non-commercial corporate entities whose legal 
personality is derived from statute such as universities, municipalities etc., as well as legally 
constituted associations such as sport associations, trade unions etc.56 For purposes of 
corporate criminal liability, in this thesis the term “corporations” also extends to associations 
of persons that lack legal personality such as partnerships. Where corporate crime has been 
committed by such associations, corporate criminal liability is still applicable, however, it is 
directed towards those individuals who are in control of the association.57 
 
In this chapter the rationale for holding corporations criminally liable and the theoretical 
discourse underpinning corporate criminal liability will be discussed. 
                                                          
53 “The increase in corporate crime, including breaches of health and safety regulations and environmental 
degradation perpetrated by companies, as well as the failure of public authorities to protect and/or rescue persons 
in danger, have led countries to the increasing realisation that comprehensive criminalisation, based on a coherent 
theory of corporate liability is required”. (J Burchell (note 49) 448. See also V Borg-Jorgensen and  K Van Der 
Linde ‘Corporate Criminal Liability in South Africa: Time for Change? (part 1)’ (2011) 3 TSAR 452, 453).   
54 D Davis and W Geach (eds) Companies and Other Business Structures in South Africa 3ed (2013) 29. 
55 P Delport The New Companies Act Manual including Close Corporations and Partnerships Student Edition 
(2011) 11. 
56 This is in line with the application of section 332 of the CPA to corporate entities as discussed by Kentridge J 
with reference to subsection 332(5) in S v Coetzee 1997 SACR 379 CC para 103 and 104. 
57 Kentridge J, with reference to subsection 332(5) states that “the principle behind the subsection is that where 
an artificial legal person exists, the activities of which may be conducted in a criminal manner, some responsibility 




II THE RATIONALE FOR SUBJECTING CORPORATIONS TO CRIMINAL LAW  
As corporations started to play an important role in society, they also started impacting on 
those societies. Corporations as legal persons could sue and be sued; they had responsibilities 
and obligations;58 and they could also cause harm. The notion of holding them criminally liable 
is a concept that was resisted, at first,59 however as time went by corporate activities increased, 
along with corporate crime, and this led to the gradual development of the idea of holding 
corporations criminally liable for their unlawful actions. Although it took a long time to accept, 
corporate criminal liability was eventually accepted and is a concept that is currently accepted 
in many countries, including South Africa, England and Canada.  
In imposing criminal liability on corporations “courts were confronted with the problem of 
how, if at all, a corporate body could commit an offence, given that it could neither act nor 
think for itself”.60 Two competing theories for holding corporations liable under criminal law 
were formulated, namely, the nominalist theory and the realist theory.61 
 
(a) The nominalist theory 
In terms of the nominalist theory the corporation is regarded as a mere fiction consisting of a 
“collection of individuals and thus lacks a substantive independent identity”.62 It is thus an 
                                                          
58 LH Leigh The Criminal Liability of Corporations in English Law (1969) 4. 
59 See discussion below at III (a) in this chapter and also in chapter Four II b) i) aa) to (dd) below. 
60 Borg-Jorgensen and Van der Linde (note 53) 453. As Colvin states: “What is at issue is the very nature of 
corporate personality within the context of criminal law. What does it mean to say that a corporation is at fault 
and the condemnation and punishment of it are deserved? Is the corporation truly an entity that has the capacity 
for culpable conduct? Or is corporate personality a fiction, so that all propositions about corporations are 
necessarily reducible to propositions about individual members? What are the implications for criminal law of 
adopting one or the other of these conceptions of corporate personality”? (E Colvin ‘Corporate Personality and 
Criminal Liability’ (1995) 6 (1) Criminal law Forum, 1, 1). 
61 Colvin (note 60) 1. 
62 Borg-Jorgensen and Van der Linde (note 53) 453.  See also Wells (note 15) 85. 
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artificial being which owes its existence to the coming together of the individuals who have 
formed it and it does not exist independently without those individuals. Colvin explains that 
this theory regards corporations as 
“nothing more than collectivities of individuals. Speaking of corporate conduct or corporate 
fault is seen as a shorthand way of referring to the conduct and culpability of the individual 
members of the collectivity. The ‘corporation’ is simply a name for the collectivity and the 
idea that the corporation itself can act and be blameworthy is a fiction”.63  
 
According to the nominalist theory it is not acceptable that the corporation itself is capable of 
being blameworthy.64 This theory demands that for a corporation to be held liable it is 
imperative for individual liability to be present.65 The absence of individual liability means that 
the corporation will not be held criminally liable.66  
 
In South Africa as well as in England and Canada the rationale behind corporate criminal 
liability has been that even though it has its own separate legal personality, a corporation is in 
fact a legal fiction, which exists through its agents, the individuals within the corporation. For 
that reason in imposing liability the individuals within the corporations play a crucial role. 
These individuals have in fact become a conditio sine qua non for establishing corporate 
liability in that without taking the individual liability for the corporate crime into consideration, 
                                                          
63 Colvin (note 60) 2. See also E Colvin and S Anand Principles of Criminal Law 3rd ed (2007) 123. 
64 Colvin (note 60) 2.  
65 “Corporate criminal liability can therefore only be derived from the guilty conduct of individuals who form part 
of the corporate body”. (Borg-Jorgensen & van der Linde (note 53) 453). “On the nominalist approach, 
organizational culpability is derivative. It must always be located through the culpability of an individual actor. 
An individual first commits the offence; the culpability of that individual is then imputed to the organisation”. 
(Colvin & Anand (note 63) 124). 
66 “…If there is no individual culpability, there can be no organizational culpability”. (Colvin & Anand (note 63) 
124). See also Colvin (note 60) 2. 
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it is not possible to impose liability on the corporation.67 Both the derivative approach, which 
is followed in South Africa and the identification doctrine which has been followed in England 
and Canada, fall under the nominalist theory.68 Although identifying the individual within the 
corporation whose action will lead to the corporation being held criminally liable is sometimes 
a challenge, the countries which follow the nominalist theory have had some successful 
prosecutions of corporate criminals.69 
 
(b) The realist theory 
In contrast to the nominalist theory, according to the realist theory corporations have a separate 
existence that does not depend on their members and they may act and also have fault.70 As 
Colvin states 
““Realist” theories, on the other hand, assert that corporations have an existence that is, to 
some extent, independent of the existence of their members. Corporations can act and be at 
fault in ways that are different from the ways in which their members can act and be at fault”.71 
The realist theory thus accepts that a corporation has a separate legal personality and exists 
independently of its members72 and may therefore be held criminally liable directly.73 The 
realist theory makes it possible to have direct responsibility of the corporation, without having 
to rely on the fault of some natural person to establish the criminal liability of the corporation 
as 
                                                          
67 This is the case with both the derivative approach and the identification doctrine. 
68 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (note 53) 453. 
69 See discussions under the current provision of corporate homicide in chapters three, four and five below. 
70 Colvin (note 60) 2.   
71 Ibid.   
72 Wells (note 15) 85. See also Leigh (note 58) 5 -6. 
73 “A realist perspective on corporate personality makes it possible to hold corporate bodies liable for their own 
acts, omissions and fault”. (Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (note 53) 454). 
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“culpability is analysed within a realist framework by examining directly questions about 
what the organization did or did not do; what it knew or ought to have known about its 
conduct; and what it did or ought to have done to prevent harm being caused”.74 
 
 Belgium, Romania and Australia provide examples of corporate criminal liability models 
based on the realist theory. In Belgium, where corporate criminal liability was established in 
1999,75 a legal entity may be held criminally liable and even be convicted without “evidence 
that an offence has been perpetrated by an individual who works for, or is otherwise associated 
with the legal person”.76 In Romania corporate criminal liability was established through a new 
Criminal code in June 2004.77 Corporate criminal liability in Romania is direct therefore there 
is no need to identify a natural person before the corporation is held criminally liable.78 
Australia follows the corporate culture approach which entails the direct liability of 
corporations. It is an approach that is found in section 12 of the Australian Criminal Code Act 
1995.79   
 
Apart from the fact that Belgium, Romania and Australia are based on the realist theory, it is 
interesting to note that in all three jurisdictions the adoption of this approach is a fairly recent 
development and in some cases it is too soon to tell whether the approach is successful or not. 
In Belgium it has been stated that the judiciary has made significance use of the approach and 
that “by the end of April 2004, 381 judgments had been passed (in all areas of the law), using 
                                                          
74 Colvin & Anand (note 63) 124. See also Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (note 53) 454 
75 This was done through Article 2 of the Act of 4 May 1999. (M Ramkissoon ‘Country Report: Belgium’ in J 
Gobert and A Pascal European Developments in Corporate Criminal Liability (2011) 214, 214). Also see Jordaan 
(note 42) 65. 
76 Ramkissoon (note 75) 215. 
77 A Pascal ‘Country  Romania’ in J Gobert and A Pascal European Developments in Corporate Criminal Liability 
(2011) 296, 296. 
78 “In order to hold a company criminally liable, it is not required to identify or convict a natural person. The 
company itself is liable for offences which were the result , for instance, of a faulty decision, an omission in the 
way it organises its operations, or deficient safety measures”. (Ibid 298). 
79 Australian Criminal Code Act 12 of 1995. 
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various provisions of the 1999 law”.80 Since Romania has implemented it just over ten years 
ago, it is basically too soon to really determine whether the realist model is successful or not.81 
With regard to Australia Van der Linde and Borg-Jorgensen aver that  
 
“even though this fairly new approach has not yet been given much opportunity to be tested in 
prosecutions of truly criminal offences, it represents an innovative, potentially just and efficient 
method of establishing corporate criminal liability”. 82 
 
It is submitted that the realist theory provides a better approach, in comparison to the nominalist 
theory, as the prosecution of corporations is not hampered by the inability to identify a guilty 
individual within the corporation. 
 
III THE RELEVANCE OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY  
South Africa, like many jurisdictions,83 recognizes two kinds of persons: the natural person 
and the juristic or legal person.84 The term natural person refers to all human beings85 - 
individuals capable of having rights and duties. A juristic person, on the other hand, refers to 
a legally recognized artificial person86 that has its own rights and its own obligations. South 
African law recognizes corporations as juristic persons.87  
                                                          
80 Ramkissoon (note 75) 219. 
81 With regard to Romania Pascal states that “It is, however, too early to comment on how vigorously the new 
laws will be enforced. There is yet limited implementation in practice”. (Pascal (note 77) 302). 
82 K Van der Linde and V Borg Jorgensen  ‘Corporate Criminal Liability in South Africa: time for change (part 
2)’ TSAR 2011 (4) 684, 699. 
83 Including England and Canada. See Chapter Four II (a) and Chapter Five II (a) below. 
84 Davis & Geach (note 54) 29. 
85 Delport (note 55) 9. 
86 Ibid 10. 
87 “A duly registered company is a distinct legal persona, quite a separate entity from its members, either 
individually or as a body”. (P Delport, Q Vorster & D Burdette Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008, 
(2011) 82). See also Snyman (note 22) 253. In terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 ‘From the date and time 
that the incorporation of a company is registered, as stated in its registration certificate, the company 
(a)  Is a juristic person, which exists continuously until its name is removed from the companies register in 




Traditionally only a natural person was held criminally liable for his unlawful acts and 
omissions, as only a natural person has the physical ability to perform an unlawful act and to 
have a blameworthy state of mind.88 Over the years there have been developments in this 
regard. As a way of dealing with the problem of crimes committed by juristic persons, criminal 
law now allows a juristic person to be held criminally liable for its unlawful acts and omissions. 
This is despite the juristic person’s inability to act and to think.89 Holding a corporation 
criminally liable is therefore an anomaly as crimes are usually committed by natural persons 
within the corporation, human beings who have the ability to think as well as the ability to act 
with intent or negligence.  
 
Corporate criminal liability is in fact a way of ensuring that the common-law rule that an 
offender should be held liable is enforced,90 however, since a corporation is a juristic person, 
it relies on natural persons to think and act on its behalf. This begs the question: is holding a 
corporation, an entity which lacks physical existence, criminally liable for offences committed 
by those who act as its brains and hands really justifiable? For this question to be answered  the 
questions whether corporate criminal liability is relevant or not and whether there is 
justification for imposing corporate criminal liability, while civil liability remains a basis for 
liability, will first have  to be addressed. 
 
                                                          
(b)  Has all the legal powers and capacity of an individual, except to the extent that – 
(i) A juristic person is incapable of exercising any such power, or having any such capacity; or 
(ii) The company’s Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise; (section 19).  
88 Jordaan (note 42) 48. 
89 MA Rabie A Bibliography of South African Criminal Law: General Principles (1987) 29. 
90 As strictly speaking, the corporation is the actual offender, CMV Clarkson Understanding Criminal Law  4th ed 
(2005) 148.  
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a) Defining corporate criminal liability and establishing its relevance 
Corporate criminal liability is regarded by some as an odd concept.91  It is therefore not 
surprising that accepting the notion of holding a corporation, an artificial entity, criminally 
accountable for crimes has been met with resistance.92 In English law the concept of corporate 
criminal liability has been in existence for a longer period,93 however it was, at first, rejected 
by the English courts and its development was hampered by various obstacles,94  which may 
be set out as follows: 
 
First, it was mandatory for an accused person to make a personal appearance at the hearing,95 
something that could not possibly be done by an artificial person. The view was thus held that 
since a corporation was not physically able to make a personal appearance in court, it could not 
be held liable.96  Second, the form of punishment that could be imposed where a felony was 
committed was death or imprisonment,97 types of punishment that could not be practically 
imposed on a corporation.98 Third, the artificial nature of a corporation brought about another 
                                                          
91 Wells, a proponent of corporate criminal liability observes that “people rarely stop to ask why we have a system 
of criminal law. When someone is murdered all sorts of questions might be raised: what powers should be given 
to the police to find the murderer and to garner sufficient evidence to prosecute? Should there be a difference 
between murder and manslaughter, and if so, what? What is an appropriate sentence for murder? But it is unusual 
to hear anyone ask ‘what is the point of punishing a murderer? In contrast the question ‘why punish a corporation? 
is commonly put. There are those whose answer would be that there is no justification for punishment, that it 
cannot be justified as a ‘necessary evil’. Nonetheless we do find the idea of a corporation being punished more 
odd than that of a murderer or rapist being sent to prison”. (C Wells (note 15) 13). Luna, an opponent of corporate 
criminal liability, states that “…corporate criminal liability is an oddity, regardless of any approval or 
acquiescence by courts, politicians, and the public”. (E Luna ‘The Curious Case of Corporate Criminality’ (2009) 
46 American Criminal Law Review 1507, 1508). 
92 “Even in jurisdictions that have long recognised corporate criminal responsibility, this concept has been treated 
as something of an outcast, to be tolerated rather than encouraged”. (C Wells ‘Corporate criminal liability in 
England and Wales: Past, Present, and Future” in M Pieth & R Ivory Corporate Criminal Liability – Emergence, 
Convergence, and Risk (2011) 91, 93). 
93 In 1842 in the English law case of R v Birmingham and Gloucester Railway Company (1842) 3 Q.B. 223 it was 
accepted that a corporation could be indicted. 
94A Pinto & M Evans Corporate Criminal Liability 2nd ed (2008) 18. For a full discussion of the obstacles to 
corporate criminal liability see Chapter Four II b) i) aa) to cc) below. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid 19; D Ormerod Smith and Hogan Criminal Law 12th ed (2008) 246.  
97 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 18. 
98 Ibid 18. 
29 
 
challenge that was faced by the various jurisdictions. The question arose as to how a 
corporation, which is not a natural person, could possibly possess such an attribute as mens 
rea, an element required for committing an offence.99 Fourth, the ultra vires doctrine brought 
about a further challenge. Since a corporation is created by law it is only able to perform the 
acts that the law which created it empowers it to perform.100 Actions by a corporation that go 
beyond what it is empowered to do are ultra vires acts.101 Corporate crime would therefore be 
an ultra vires act. For that reason, strictly speaking, a corporation could not be held criminally 
liable for unlawful acts it has committed.102  
 
In spite of the above-mentioned challenges, corporations continued to play an important role 
in society and as they did so, the criminal activities of corporations impacted on people’s lives 
and could not be ignored. It became clear that there was a need for corporations to be held 
accountable for their criminal actions.103 
 
Commentators have provided, inter alia, the following reasons for imposing corporate criminal 
liability on juristic persons, specifically corporations. Miester observes that criminal behaviour 
by corporations puts the public at large in danger.104 This is in line with Bucy’s assertion that 
activities of corporations are potentially harmful and where harm does occur, many people are 
exposed to such harm.105 Bucy sees the criminal law route as society’s most effective tool to 
                                                          
99 Ibid. 
100 Ormerod (note 96) 247. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 19. See also Burchell (note 49) 562. 
104 DJ Miester ‘Criminal Liability for corporations that kill’ (1990) 64 Tulane Law Review 919, 920. 




deal with these harmful corporate activities by corporations106 and she avers that it is easier to 
deter corporations by means of prosecuting them,107 particularly, as the corporate veil may be 
pierced.108 She also states that sentencing options make it possible for a corporation to “remedy 
harm, make victims whole and prevent future harm”.109  
 
Pinto and Evans refer to the harmful nature of some corporate activities and aver that without 
the possibility of corporations being held criminally liable for such activities, criminal law 
would be inadequate.110 Wells observes that 
“since many of the victims of corporate wrongdoing are unaware of the source of the harm 
done to them and therefore cannot invoke the criminal enforcement system as do victims of 
burglary, there is a state obligation to provide that mechanism for them in the form of 
proactive investigation backed up by effective sanction”.111  
 
Leigh refers to corporate criminal liability as “one method by which states seek to control 
business activities”.112 It is submitted that, given the harm caused by corporations, especially 
to the public, it is essential for states to control business activities by providing mechanisms to 
ensure that corporations or businesses that cause harm are held criminally liable. It is therefore 
                                                          
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid 1437 – 1438. 
108 Ibid. Piercing the corporate veil refers to the fact that “although incorporation can provide for the limitation of 
liability of those persons behind the company, this principle may not be abused. The courts have made it clear 
that the law looks at the substance of things, rather than at mere legal form. Courts will not allow a legal entity to 
be used ‘to justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime”. (Davis & Geach (note 54) 30). 
109 Bucy (note 105) 1437 – 1438. 
110 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 4.  
111 Wells (note 15) 17. 
112 Leigh (note 47) 1508. 
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important for states to impose corporate criminal liability on corporations that commit crimes 
and are operating within their jurisdictions. 
 
Wells, Bucy, Miester, Leigh, Pinto and Evans, as well as other proponents113 of corporate 
criminal liability see corporate criminal liability as a crucial concept and provide compelling 
arguments for the imposition of corporate criminal liability on corporations. It is submitted that 
their arguments, which show that the law would indeed be defective if corporate criminal 
liability was not recognized, are deserving of support, since it is clear that corporations do cause 
harm; members of the public usually suffer that harm; and the most effective way to address 
that problem is by means of the criminal law which makes it possible to impose criminal 
sanctions on offending corporations. 
 
There are, however, commentators who are opposed to the notion of holding a corporation 
criminally liable.114 Their argument is mainly based on the fact that a corporation is incapable 
of moral blameworthiness while the purpose of criminal law is to punish those who are morally 
blameworthy.115 Some provide alternatives to corporate criminal liability and are of the view 
that corporate criminal liability should be done away with. For instance Podgor116 and 
                                                          
113 See SS Beale ‘A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability’ (2009) 46 American Criminal Law 
Review 1481. 
114 For instance Luna who unequivocally states that he is ‘not a fan of corporate criminal liability, which should 
be scrapped in favour of the jurisprudentially sound approach of prosecuting individuals for their crimes and 
holding businesses liable in tort”. (Luna (note 91) 1511). 
115 J Hasnas ‘The centenary of a mistake: one hundred years of corporate criminal liability’ (2009) 46 American 
Criminal law Review 1329, 1330. 
116 EA Podgor ‘Educating Compliance’ (2009) 46 American Criminal Law Review 1523, 1526. 
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Khanna117 argue that criminal liability is not necessary while it is possible to base liability on 
civil liability.118  
 
Alschuler sees corporate criminal liability as something that punishes innocent individuals 
since the punishment imposed on the corporation, a “fictional entity” is borne by the innocent 
such as shareholders, employees, creditors etc.119 In refuting Alschuler’s argument, it is 
submitted that the fact that there may be an extension of the consequences of corporate criminal 
liability to shareholders, employees, creditors etc., does not provide adequate grounds for not 
applying corporate criminal liability when corporate crimes have been committed.120 Corporate 
criminal liability is an essential component of the law and it is an important tool that is used, 
inter alia, to discourage corporations from putting peoples’ lives at risk of disasters121 such as 
Bhopal and to punish those corporations that have done so. 
 
Alschuler further criticizes corporate criminal liability for putting the individuals within the 
corporation in a position where there is a conflict of interest.122 He refers to a situation where 
a corporation may be sacrificed by its officers through entering a guilty plea and accepting a 
fine for the corporation as a way of averting the imprisonment of the officers themselves.123  
                                                          
117 Khanna (note 25) 1534. 
118 See discussion on the effectiveness of corporate criminal liability as opposed to corporate civil liability below 
at III (b) in this chapter. 
119 AW Alschuler ‘Two ways to think about corporate punishment’ (2009) 46 American Criminal Law Review 
1359, 1367). 
120 T Isaacs ‘Corporate Agency and Corporate Wrongdoing’ (2013) 16 New Criminal Law Review 241, 254. 
121 Ibid. Isaacs correctly points out that: “We should also recognize that these people are not being punished, even 
if they suffer the consequences of the corporation's actions. Moreover, when we think broadly about the function 
of law and punishment, not only in terms of their retributive elements but also their expressivist and deterrence 
functions, prosecuting corporations that engage in criminal acts could serve significant ends that promote 
adherence to the law rather than put the corporation and many of its innocent members at risk”. (Isaacs (note 120) 
254). 




This argument is not necessarily applicable to contexts where both corporate criminal liability 
and individual liability are applicable to the same offence. In the South African context the 
individual within the corporation who has committed a crime while furthering the interest of 
the corporation also faces prosecution in his or her private capacity. If such a person is found 
guilty he will be sentenced, regardless of whether the corporation’s plea was a guilty plea or 
not. 
 
Despite the arguments advanced against corporate criminal liability, the fact remains that harm 
caused whilst in the process of furthering the interests of corporations is a reality and many 
jurisdictions are faced with the problem of corporate activities that cause harm.124 Moreover, 
as economic activities continue to increase, so does the frequency of harm in the form of 
corporate crimes and the pressure to ensure that the responsible parties are held criminally 
accountable for their actions.125 This has led to the development of corporate criminal liability, 
as different jurisdictions attempt to find ways to prosecute and to punish corporations that cause 
harm.126 After all, corporations continue to commit offences that expose them to criminal 
liability in spite of the fact that a corporation, due to its resources, is actually in a better position 
to ensure that it avoids committing crimes.127 
 
(b) The effectiveness of corporate criminal liability as opposed to corporate civil liability  
                                                          
124 Some of the countries that recognise corporate criminal liability are listed in footnote 24 above. 
125 D Ormerod  Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law 11th ed (2005) 234. 
126 “The risks associated with industrialisation and the challenges of globalisation have prompted lawmakers of 
the civil and common law traditions to impose criminal or quasi criminal sanctions on corporate wrongdoers”. 
(Pieth & Ivory (note 24) 13). 
127 M Bowden and T Quigley ‘Pinstripes or Prison stripes? The Liability of Corporations and Directors for 
Environmental Offences’ (1995) Journal of Environmental Law and Practice 5,15. 
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Where there has been an illegal act or omission of a corporation, the corporation is exposed to 
both corporate criminal liability and corporate civil liability. Exposing corporations to both 
forms of liability for their unlawful conduct serves various purposes. These are summed up by 
Lavenue, who states that  
“The civil law provided the legal means by which the victims of crime sought pecuniary or 
other compensation from the offender for the harm or damage caused by the crime. Criminal 
law on the other hand, provided sentencing to an offender either in terms of a prison sentence, 
the payment of a fine, or both to redress society for the harm caused to the general public. 
Theoretically, the civil-criminal system maintained a balance between the demands of society, 
which were addressed by the civil law”.128 
Civil liability thus addresses the victim’s need for compensation for damages while criminal 
law or corporate criminal liability ensures that offenders are justly punished for “the harm 
caused to the general public”.129  Both forms of liability are important in that the corporation 
is held accountable for its wrongful actions and in both instances the end result is usually the 
payment of a sum of money by the corporation, either in the form of a fine or in the form of 
compensation to the victims. Furthermore, both forms of liability are aimed at (a) holding the 
corporation liable for its conduct and (b) deterring corporations from committing wrongful 
acts.130 This gives rise to the following questions: Is corporate criminal liability a necessity 
when one has the right to rely on corporate civil liability? Do civil suits against corporations 
not have the same effect as criminal prosecutions?  
 
It is submitted that instituting a civil claim is a costly exercise and in certain instances the 
                                                          
128 LM Lavenue ‘The Corporation as a Criminal Defendant and Restitution as a Criminal Remedy: Application of 
the Victim and Witness Protection Act by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organisations’ (1993) 18 (3) The 
Journal of Corporation Law 441, 446. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Khanna  (note 25) 1492. 
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aggrieved party may not be in a financial position to pursue the matter.131 Even if a party does 
actually pursue the matter there is no guarantee that the civil action will be successful. 
Furthermore, in the event of a successful civil action against a corporation it is highly unlikely 
that the corporation will suffer as a result of the action.132 Moreover, successful civil claims 
against corporations are of no serious consequence to the corporation's image.133  
 
It is further submitted that there is no true vindication and there is no hope for justice until the 
corporate criminal is formally charged and forced to face criminal proceedings for the said 
offence.134 Moreover, one cannot always rely on civil suits as there are situations where the 
victim is prohibited, by law, from suing the perpetrator.135 In such cases the victim is obliged 
to make use of the provisions of the applicable statute and must adhere to proceedings as set 
out therein.136  
 
Corporate criminal liability is thus becoming more and more important as a way of ensuring 
justice,137 as the offender is subject to prosecution, in addition to being subjected to the 
                                                          
131 Costs for civil claims are carried by the individuals concerned, particularly if their claims are unsuccessful. In 
South Africa victims of deaths and injuries caused through corporate activities are usually employees who are in 
the lowest financial positions. If they are not assisted by mechanisms such as regulatory statutes, they are usually 
not in a financial position that would enable them to get the best legal assistance. On the contrary, corporations 
are known for making use of the best legal assistance to assist them in such matters. 
132 Such corporations usually have ample resources and are capable of financing the amount of the compensation 
required, without causing havoc to the finances of the corporation. 
133 “Civil or regulatory interventions are generally nonstigmatic and conciliatory”. (SS Simpson Corporate Crime, 
Law and Social Control (2002), 20). 
134 The decision by the Indian court to order Dow Chemical to be tried in a criminal court for Union Carbide’s 
1984 Bhopal disaster is an example of the importance of having corporate criminal liability. (S. Shah ‘Dow 
ordered to appear in court to answer for deadly Bhopal gas leak’ The Independent online edition 8 January 2005 
http://news.independent.co.uk/business/news/story.jsp?story=598850) (accessed 10 January 2013). 
 
135 For instance, s. 35 (1) of South Africa’s Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993. 
136 This was made clear in Jooste v Score Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) where an employee 
who was injured in the workplace had successfully challenged the s.35 (1) provisions in the court a quo and 
attempted to sue the employer. The Constitutional Court held that s. 35(1) of the Compensation for Occupational 
Injuries and Diseases Act was not unconstitutional. 
137 “The use of the criminal sanction to punish corporations for negligence is further reinforced by the fact that 
the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, and its predecessor, precludes a common-law claim 
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possibility of being held liable for compensation for damages in civil law. It is submitted that 
in the South African context corporate criminal liability would have a greater effect than 
corporate civil liability because criminal law has the power to punish corporations and to ruin 
their reputation,138 which in turn will lead to stigma, in line with Bowden and Quigley’s 
emphasis on the corporation’s susceptibility to both stigmatization and deterrence.139 Although 
Khanna points out that it is unlikely that people would disassociate themselves from a 
corporation simply because of a prosecution,140 it is submitted that a prosecution will inevitably 
have a direct negative effect on a corporation’s image if there are appropriate sanctions in place 
that would result in stigmatisation and this is likely to result in people disassociating themselves 
with the corporation. Generally people do not want to associate themselves with corporate 
criminals and for the corporation itself “the application of a criminal sanction is thought to be 
stigmatic - that is, offenders are shamed by a ‘criminal’ label”. 141 With regard to sanctions that 
would deter a corporation through stigmatisation, it is submitted that in South Africa 
development in this regard is currently hampered by having the fine as the sole punishment for 
corporations that are convicted.142 
 
Podgor argues that civil liability can sufficiently deter corporations from committing crime143 
and he advances an argument for the promotion of compliance with the law by corporations.144 
                                                          
for damages by an employee against an employer where compensation under the Act arises, without the need to 
prove fault on the part of the employer”. (Burchell (note 49) 567). 
138 Provided that improvements are made to corporate criminal liability in such a way that in addition to or as 
alternatives to the fine there are forms of punishment that will stigmatise the corporation, so that deterrence is 
achieved in that manner. 
139 Bowden & Quigley (note 127) 15. 
140 Khanna (note 25) 1508). 
141 Simpson (note 133) 20. Simpson further avers that “the shame associated with criminal processing imposes 
additional inhibitory effects beyond (or as a consequence of) those attached to official discovery and processing” 
(Ibid). 
142 CPA (note 16) section 332. 




Podgor avers that as a result of compliance with the law by corporations, there will be no need 
for corporate criminal liability.145 It is submitted that civil liability on its own is not sufficient 
to curb corporate harm and that Podgor’s expectation that corporations will comply with the 
law, especially when there is no criminal sanction attached to non-compliance, is not realistic 
therefore this view should not be followed. 
 
Khanna looks at corporate criminal liability and other avenues such as corporate civil liability 
and advances an argument for the substitution of corporate criminal liability with an avenue 
that would bring about deterrence, but at a lower cost, as corporate criminal liability, he argues, 
no longer serves any purpose.146 Khanna’s focus is mainly on deterrence as the purpose of 
punishing a corporation.147 Although corporate civil liability may be aimed at deterring 
corporations from committing further misconduct,148 it is submitted that corporate civil liability 
does not necessarily succeed in deterring corporations from committing further misconduct, 
especially because its aim is usually compensation as opposed to “criminal law, where 
punishments can be so much more severe than the compensation awarded in the civil law”,149 
and consequently more likely to deter.  
 
Punishment that is more likely to deter corporations from committing further crimes include 
alternative forms of punishment, such as corporate probation and publicity orders150 that have 
the adverse effect of a ruined reputation. It is therefore submitted that the total disregard of 
                                                          
145 Ibid. 
146 Khanna (note 25) 1534). 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 
149 TB Barlow ‘The Criminal Liability of a Company, its Directors and its Servants’ (1946) 63  SALJ 503, 507. 
150 See discussion in Chapter Six IV (a) (iv) below. 
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corporate criminal liability as serving no purpose, would be wholly mistaken as it would bring 
about the untenable situation where corporations will not be properly punished for crimes they 
commit. 
 
Although Larkin and Boltar question the appropriateness of regulating the behaviour of 
corporations via criminal law151 it is submitted that, given the challenges that may be faced by 
victims of corporate wrongfulness, if corporate criminal liability was not recognized in South 
Africa this would have resulted in the likelihood that corporations would totally escape liability 
for the harm they cause.152 If a civil claim is unsuccessful or if it is not pursued153 the 
corporation is not held accountable for the harm it has caused. Moreover, one of the advantages 
of a prosecution, provided there is a political will to prosecute, is that the costs are borne by 
the state and in the event of a corporation being successfully held criminally liable this will 
give rise to a criminal record. 
 
It is submitted that both civil and criminal liability are important and must be used to their full 
capacity to deal with corporations’ unlawful activities, particularly their disregard for human 
safety which results in deaths. Corporate criminal liability should not lead to the exclusion of 
corporate civil liability and corporate civil liability should not lead to the exclusion of corporate 
criminal liability. It is further submitted that it is important to examine corporate criminal 
                                                          
151 “…Is resort to the criminal law the appropriate way to regulate these aspects of the behaviour of organizations 
in our society?” (M Larkin and J Boltar ‘Company Law’ (1997) Annual Survey of South African Law 403, 435). 
152 This being the direct result of the failure of the victim to institute a civil suit against the offending corporation. 
Corporate criminal liability thus ensures that corporations are compelled to assume responsibility for the criminal 
actions of their servants and or directors, and are punished accordingly. 
153 “The use of the criminal sanction to punish corporations for negligence is further reinforced by the fact that 
the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act and its predecessor, preclude a common-law claim 
for damages by an employee against an employer, where compensation under the legislation arises, without the 
need to prove fault on the part of the employer”. (Burchell (note 49) 457).  
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liability with a view to ensuring that it is in a form that will make it possible for it to adequately 
and efficiently deal with the challenges brought about by harmful corporate activities. 
 
c) The relationship between corporate and individual liability  
It has been observed that “some people worry that if we go after corporations, we allow 
individuals to get away with wrongdoing without suffering any consequences for it”.154 This 
concern is a reflection of the typical reaction from skeptics of corporate criminal liability, 
however, it is unfounded: “This misplaced concern stems from the assumption that either 
corporations are responsible or their individual members are, as if there were no viable view 
according to which we can account for and legitimately pursue both”. 155  It is a reaction that 
does not take into account the fact that in most instances, in addition to the prosecution of a 
corporation, there is usually the prosecution of those within the corporation who are personally 
responsible for the crime.156 Although there are exceptional cases,157 generally corporate 
criminal liability does not preclude individual liability.158 
 
Moreover corporate crimes are committed in furthering the interests of the corporation. For 
that reason it is submitted that holding only the individual(s) or only the corporation liable 
creates the wrong impression that it is not possible to hold both parties liable. It is important 
that both the corporation and the individual be prosecuted for crime committed in furthering 
                                                          
154 Isaacs (note 120) 249. 
155 Ibid 250. 
156 Ormerod (note 96) 247. 
157 As in the CMCHA 2007 section 18 (1) for example, see discussion in Chapter Four IV (a) below. 
158 In South Africa section 332 allows for the prosecution of both corporations and employees / directors. In 
England “if a corporation has been found to be criminally liable, the individual employee or director, etc can also 
be liable as a secondary party to the corporation’s wrongdoing under s 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 
1861… A director can also be liable for conspiring with the company”. (Ormerod (note 96) 247). 
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the interests of the corporation.159 One of the reasons for ensuring that both are held criminally 
liable is the fact that some individuals within corporations are enabled by the positions they 
occupy within the corporation to commit crimes.160 In some cases these individuals would not 
be able to commit such crimes if they did not occupy particular offices within the corporation. 
This, however, does not mean that it is only senior employees who are capable of committing 
crimes.161 Employees at lower ranks are also capable of committing crimes but it is rare that 
they commit crimes that may give rise to corporate criminal liability and this is due to the fact 
that “the less power a worker has, the less opportunity she or he has to engage in wrongful 
actions that might be understood as the actions of the corporation”.162 
 
In South Africa section 332 of the CPA allows for the prosecution of the corporation and also 
of the responsible individual within the corporation. Both the corporation and the individual 
would therefore bear criminal liability for the crime committed. This, however, is not a 
universal rule and it is submitted that completely ignoring corporations and prosecuting only 
individuals within corporations will not solve the problem of corporate crime. The pivotal point 
is that when an offence has been committed and the corporation is held criminally liable, this 
should not have any effect on the possibility of prosecuting the responsible individual(s) within 
                                                          
159 “With respect to the criminal law itself, there is no reason to think that both corporations and their members 
may not be held liable for criminal acts”. (Ibid). 
160 “Consider the range of actions that individuals are empowered to be able to perform in their roles within a 
corporation, actions that they would not be able to perform outside of the collective context. Many roles within a 
corporation confer powers on individuals that those individuals would not otherwise have, and the corporate 
context, especially in large national or multinational corporations but even in smaller companies, facilitates a 
wider scope and longer reach for individuals' actions. Indeed, those in the most powerful positions are even able 
to influence corporate policies, directions, and goals as they discharge their role-related duties. The longer reach 
and broader scope means that some individuals, particularly those in positions of power, have influence that brings 
with it increased responsibility, much in the same way government leaders and representatives have increased 
responsibility. Thus, functioning in a role within a corporate structure does not shield people from individual 
responsibility and in fact might well increase the range of criminal actions they have the opportunity to perform”. 
(Isaacs (note 120) 252). 





the corporation. As Isaacs states “corporate criminal liability does not erase individual criminal 
liability in corporate contexts. Thus, the fear that attending to corporate criminality will draw 
attention away from individual criminality is unwarranted”.163 
 
IV THE BASIS OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
(a) Categories  of the types of offences that corporations may be held liable for 
Globally the concept of corporate criminal liability has been in existence for many years.164 
Offences for which corporations have been held criminally liable fall under three main 
categories,165 namely, absolute liability offences, strict liability offences as well as offences 
requiring mens rea.166 
 
(i) Absolute liability offences 
Absolute liability offences are also known as ‘no fault’ offences.167 Burchell makes it clear that 
“absolute liability involves liability for committing a prohibited act irrespective of fault and 
the elements of unlawful, voluntary conduct and criminal capacity…”.168 The defence that the 
harm was not intended or that the corporation had taken reasonable steps to avoid it is not 
acceptable.169 Absolute liability does not feature in South African law.170 
                                                          
163 Ibid. 
164  In England as far back as the 19th century. See R v Great North England Railway Co [1846] 9 Q.B. 315 and 
R v Birmingham & Gloucester Rly. Co. (note 93) 223. 
165 G Ferguson ‘The basis for Criminal Responsibility of collective Entities in Canada’  in A. Eser, G. Heine and 
B. Huber (eds) Criminal Responsibility of Legal and Collective Entities, (1991) 153, 157. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid 158. Ormerod (note 96) 152). 
168 Burchell (note 49) 551. 
169 Ferguson (note 165) 158. 




(ii) Strict liability offences 
Strict liability offences are found in statutes and these occur where the law makes it possible 
for one to be convicted without the element of mens rea or blameworthiness being required to 
be proven.171 This means that once the actus reus has been proven by the prosecution, the 
corporation will be found guilty.172   
 
Crimes of strict liability have been defined as “crimes which do not require intention, 
recklessness or even negligence as to one or more elements in the actus reus”,173 however, 
capacity is still a requirement for strict liability.174 It must be noted that with regard to strict 
liability offences even though cautionary measures may have been taken by the accused to 
avoid committing the crime, the mere fact that the prohibited consequence has occurred is 
sufficient to render a guilty verdict.175  
 
The first clear signs of corporate criminal liability were seen in regulatory offences176 where 
corporations found themselves being held strictly liable for offences committed by their 
employees. The wording of regulatory offences was such that corporations were held strictly 
liable,177 without the question of mens rea coming into play, as fault is not a requirement for a 
                                                          
171 Clarkson (note 90) 93; Snyman (note 22) 245. 
172 Ferguson (note 165) 157. 
173 Ormerod (note 96) 150. 
174 Burchell (note 49) 434. 
175 T Storey and A Lidbury Criminal Law 2nd ed (2002) 47. Ormerod further points out that ‘it is important to 
appreciate that where an offence is interpreted to be one of strict liability, the fact that the defendant could not 
have avoided the prescribed harm even if he had tried to will not absolve him of liability”. (Ormerod (note 96) 
151). 
176 R v Birmingham & Gloucester Rly. Co (note 93) 223.  
177 N Lacey, C Wells and D Meure Reconstructing Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives on Crime and the Criminal 
Process (1990) 239. See also Wells (note 15) 67. 
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conviction for a strict liability offence.178 Doing something that is prohibited or failing to do 
something that should be done would lead to being found guilty. The basis for corporate 
criminal liability was at first strict liability.179  
 
(iii) Mens rea offences 
With mens rea offences, apart from proving the actus reus, a “culpable state of mind”, also 
known as mens rea, must also be proven.180 The rise in criminal activities committed by 
corporations has led to countries realizing the importance of imposing corporate criminal 
liability and as a way of ensuring that such liability is based on a clear and reasonable theory181 
it was necessary to develop rules of attribution which would provide a basis on which to hold 
the corporation criminally accountable for crime.182 
 
(b) Rules of attribution and their shortcomings 
Glazebrook explains rules of attribution in the following manner:  
“Whatever is done in the world is done by individual human persons (or by animals) acting 
either singly or in co-operation with others. So, when lawyers say or think that a corporate 
body has done something, this is meaningful only because there are legal rules which attribute 
(only) certain actions of (only) certain individuals in (only) certain circumstances to the 
organisation that has been given this legal identity. The juristic concept would be deprived of 
all utility if everything done by everyone associated with the organisation were attributed to 
                                                          
178 Snyman (note 22) 245. 
179 Clarkson (note 90) 93.  
180 Ferguson (note 165) 158. 
181 Burchell (note 49) 562. 
182 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 19. 
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it, for then no one would know where they stood”.183 
 
The need for rules of attribution arises due to the corporation’s inability to think and act.184 
These rules of attribution are the various theories that have been relied upon by various 
jurisdictions as their basis for corporate criminal liability.185 There are three main models of 
rules of attribution for corporate criminal liability that have been utilized to establish corporate 
guilt, namely, (a) blaming the corporation for crimes committed by its employees and agents 
(vicarious corporate liability); (b) identifying senior officers whose guilt is regarded as the guilt 
of the corporation (the identification doctrine) and (c) “treating the corporation as itself capable 
of being a criminal (and moral) actor either through the aggregation of individual thoughts and 
behaviors or an assessment of the totality of the deficiencies in its corporate culture and 
organizational systems”.186 
 
(i) Vicarious corporate liability  
This approach takes place when the corporation is held responsible for crimes committed by 
its employees and agents.187 Vicarious liability only applies to statutory crimes.188 Vicarious 
                                                          
183 PR Glazebrook ‘A Better way of Convicting Businesses of avoidable deaths and injuries’ (2002) The 
Cambridge Law Journal 405, 406. 
184 “On the assumption that a corporation could neither act nor think itself, the courts were confronted with the 
problem of how, if at all, a corporation could commit a criminal offence; if it could not act, how could it cause a 
certain event forbidden by the criminal law (the actus reus), and if it could not think, how could it form the 
requisite state of mind in relation to the causing of the event forbidden by law (the mens rea)? Over time the courts 
developed two distinct rules of attribution, first vicarious liability, and, much later, the doctrine of identification”. 
(Pinto & Evans (note 94) 19). 
185 Burchell refers to the identification theory, the principle of aggregation and an organizational model of liability. 
(Burchell (note 49) 562). Pinto and Evans also cite vicarious liability and the principle of delegation, Pinto & 
Evans (note 94) 17. 
186 Pieth & Ivory (note 24) 13. 
187 Ibid.  
188 Snyman (note 22) 250. 
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liability is a principle that originates from the law of torts189 which allows one party to be held 
responsible for the wrongful acts of another. In corporate criminal liability, vicarious liability 
occurs when the criminal acts of one party are attributed to another party, the corporation.190 
This normally occurs where there is an employment relationship between the parties.191 The 
employer (the corporation) is held liable for the wrongful acts of its employee, that take place 
within the employee’s scope of employment.  Here the employer is held liable on the basis that 
the employee was not acting in his private capacity, but in his capacity as employee of the 
corporation and on behalf of the corporation. It entails that “any actor (whether a corporate 
employee, officer or agent) who acts within his normal scope of responsibility and violates the 
criminal law with an intent to benefit the organization thereby creates liability, both for himself 
and his corporate employer”.192 With vicarious corporate liability the guilt of the corporate 
employee, agent or officer is imputed to the corporation.193 
 
An important aspect of vicarious corporate liability is that the action and mens rea that is 
imputed to the corporation need not be that of a senior officer, it can be that of any person 
within the corporation regardless how senior or junior that person may be.194 In the context of 
corporate criminal liability, vicarious liability justifies holding a corporation liable for crimes 
committed by its directors, members and even employees as long as it can be shown that they 
committed these crimes in the process of furthering the interests of the corporation.195 A 
                                                          
189 Ormerod (note 96) 140. 
190 Clarkson (note 90) 47. A corporation is thus held liable for the criminal acts of an individual within the 
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Process 2nd ed (1998) 515. 
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194 Roy et al. ‘Corporate Criminal liability: A Doctrinal Analysis’ A research paper for Greenpeace National Law 
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corporation may therefore be held criminally liable for criminal actions committed by anyone 
from the director to the senior management to the employee, provided that the crime was 
committed in the process of furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of the 
corporation.196 
 
Vicarious liability is usually (but not always) applicable to strict liability and absolute liability 
offences.197 Snyman points out the fact that there is usually the assumption that where a statute 
involves strict liability, it was the legislature’s intention to also create vicarious liability.198 He 
does caution though that “the mere fact that a particular statute provides for strict liability for 
the contravention of its provisions does not establish also that persons may be held vicariously 
liable under the statute.199 He further refers to the test that is used to determine whether 
vicarious liability has been created, and points out the fact that it is similar to the test used to 
determine whether strict liability has been created.200 
 
The concept of vicarious liability has been said to have originated as a result of the following 
(i) the employer would be in a better position to be able to provide compensation to the victim; 
(ii) the employer is also in a better position to give instructions for reasonable precautions to 
be taken to prevent the wrongful act; (iii) since the employer gains economically from the 
                                                          
196 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 18). 
197 Roy (note 194) 3. 
198 Snyman (note 22) 251. 
199 Snyman (note 22) 556. 
200 “The tests or criteria used to determine whether vicarious liability was created are reminiscent of the tests used 
to determine whether strict liability was created, namely: the language used by the legislature; the scope and 
purpose of the prohibition; the measure of punishment; whether the legislature’s intention will be frustrated if one 
assumes that no vicarious liability was created; whether the employer gains financially by the employee’s act, and 
whether only a limited number of people (eg licence holders), as opposed to the community in general, are affected 
by the provision. (If only a limited number of people are affected, it is more readily assumed that vicarious liability 
was created)”. (Ibid 251).  
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employer – employee relationship, it only makes sense to let him also bear the losses emanating 
from the relationship.201 
 
At first vicarious liability was based on the common-law notion that a principal is responsible 
for acts of agents provided that he has “commissioned” the act.202 If the principal was a 
corporation, the corporation would therefore be held vicariously liable, based on the command 
theory. Basing vicarious liability on the “command theory”203 meant that where it could not be 
proven that the corporation (principal) “commissioned” the act, the corporation (principal) 
would escape liability. This narrow interpretation of vicarious liability meant that without proof 
that the principal had commissioned the act, the principal would not be held liable. It is 
submitted that this was unsatisfactory. The scope of vicarious liability was thus too limited as 
it excluded situations where, without specific instruction, the employee committed an offence 
in the course of his or her work or whilst acting in the interest of the corporation. The 
“command theory” was eventually shunned by the English civil courts.204 
 
The English civil courts moved away from the common-law theory of vicarious liability and 
accepted that the vicarious liability of the employer  
“depended upon the nature of the relationship between the employer and his employee. The 
employer was liable for the civil wrong of his employee provided that the act was done in the 
course of his employment”.205  
 
                                                          
201 D Hanna ‘Corporate Criminal Liability’ (1988 – 1989) 31 Criminal Law Quarterly 452, 454.  
202 Pinto & Evans (note 94)19. 
203 Ibid 20. 
204 Ibid 18. 
205 Ibid. It must be noted that at this stage vicarious liability was only limited to civil wrongs. 
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The English civil courts went so far as to extend liability to situations where the employee’s 
act had a connection to his employment, regardless of whether it was committed in accordance 
with the terms of employment or not.206  This led to a point where an employer could be held 
vicariously liable for the employee’s misconduct as long as it was committed within the 
employee’s scope of work even in situations where i) the employer did not commission the 
employee to commit the wrongful act; ii) the employer was ignorant of the commission of the 
wrongful act.207 
 
The defence that the employee concerned acted against instructions,208 is not a defence that a 
corporation may rely on. An employer may therefore be held vicariously liable even if he has 
not authorized the wrongful act.209 The employer may not even be aware of the fact that a 
wrongful act is being committed, but he may still be held vicariously liable.210 This is due to 
the fact that the employer is responsible for the actions of the employee while he is doing work 
for him.211  
 
                                                          
206 “Given that the employer was unlikely to command his employee to commit a tort, still less to admit doing so, 
the courts were prepared to regard the employer as liable provided the act of the employee was sufficiently 
connected with his employment that it could be characterized as doing some authorized task in an unauthorized 
manner. Attention was focused on whether the wrong was done within the scope of the servant’s employment”. 
(Ibid). 
207 “The employer need not be proved to have commanded, participated or even known of the criminal conduct 
of his servant, provided the conduct is referable to the employment relationship, or, to put it in another way, was 
within the scope of his employment. This establishes the legal nexus on which the employer’s liability is 
constructed”. (Ibid 21). 
208 Roy (note 194) 3. 
209 “Where a statute imposes a strict duty, an employer or principal will be liable for the acts of his employees or 
agents whether he has authorized them or not”. (Pinto & Evans (note 94) 24). 
210 Clarkson (note 90) 47. 
211 Clarkson explains that the “rationale of vicarious liability is that it is the employer who is responsible for 
appointing the employee, who has control and authority over him or her and who is making the profits from the 
operation”. (Clarkson (note 90) 49). “Vicarious liability means that the company is liable whenever any of its 
employees commits an offence in the course of their work”. (Lacey and Wells (note 191) 515). 
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Vicarious liability did not, however, translate into the exoneration of the employee from 
personal liability.212 In the English case of Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Company213 the principal 
was held civilly liable for the agent’s acts; but when it came to the criminal offences the agent 
himself was held liable because there was “no encouragement or complicity” by the 
principal.214  
 
Although the doctrine of vicarious liability is a law of tort principle that has been made use of 
in the criminal law context,215 it has generally not been welcomed in the criminal law 
context.216 Hanna states that vicarious liability “has been adapted, somewhat uncomfortably, 
to the context of criminal law”.217 She refers to Williams, who sees vicarious liability as being 
justifiable in the law of torts, which is primarily aimed at compensation, as opposed to criminal 
law which is primarily aimed at deterrence.218 Colvin states that in “criminal law, it has been 
considered unjust to condemn and punish one person for the conduct of another without 
reference to whether the former was at fault for what occurred”.219 Regardless of this, vicarious 
liability has played an important role in the development of the concept of corporate criminal 
liability220 in jurisdictions such as England221 and Australia222 which relied on this rule of 
                                                          
212 “According to the doctrine of vicarious liability, the company can be responsible for the acts of its employees 
but the acts remain those of the employees”. (Pinto & Evans (note 94) 39). 
213 Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Company [1912] A.C. 716, HL. 
214 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 19. 
215 Hanna (note 201) 454. 
216 In Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v R the court discusses vicarious liability at length and provides various 
examples of cases where this basis of liability was rejected in a criminal law context. (Canadian Dredge & Dock 
Co. v R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662 (Can)). 
217 Hanna (note 201) 454. 
218 Hanna (note 201) 454 referring to G Williams Textbook of Criminal Law 2nd ed (1983) 952. 
219 Colvin (note 60) 6. 
220 Jordaan (note 42) 49. 
221 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 18 – 19. 
222 C de Maglie ‘Models of Corporate Criminal Liability in Comparative Law’ (2005) 4 Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review 547, 553. Van Der Linde & Borg-Jorgensen (note 82) 696. 
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attribution at first, but later developed other rules. The Netherlands,223 Poland224 and Finland225 
continue to rely on vicarious liability as a rule of attribution.  
 
Even though it is mostly strict liability crimes that result in vicarious corporate criminal 
liability, it must be noted that vicarious liability also applies to crimes that require fault.226 
Relying on vicarious liability as a rule of attribution made it possible to hold a corporation 
liable for the wrongful acts of its officers, without mens rea having to be proven on the part of 
the corporation, as the criminal acts of the officers are imputed.  
 
Vicarious liability as a basis for liability has been criticized by various scholars. Some regard 
it as ‘underinclusive’ in that the fault required for liability must be a particular individual’s 
fault.227 If there is failure to find fault within that individual, the prosecution fails, despite the 
clear existence of corporate fault.228 On the other hand, vicarious liability has been found to be 
‘overinclusive’ in the sense that once individual fault has been established, corporate liability 
follows automatically even if there is clearly no corporate fault.229 
 
Vicarious liability was in many legal systems eventually replaced by other rules of attribution 
as it “proved insufficient”.230 Alternative rules of attribution had to be relied on. These are 
                                                          
223 BF Keulen and E Gritte ‘Corporate Criminal Liability in the Netherlands’ (December 2010) 14.3 Electronic 
Journal of Comparative Law http://www.ejcl.org/143/art143-9.pdf 4-5 (accessed 20 July 2014). 
224 A Pascal ‘Country Report: Poland’ in J Gobert and A Pascal European Developments in Corporate Criminal 
Liability (2011) 282, 284. 
225 J Gobert ‘Country Report: Finland’ in J Gobert and A Pascal European Developments in Corporate Criminal 
Liability (2011) 234, 235. 
226 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 25. 
227 Colvin (note 60) 8. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid. 
230 WH Jarvis ‘Corporate Criminal liability – Legal Agnosticism’ (1961) 1 Western Law Review 1, 4. 
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basically forms of direct liability whereby the guilt of individuals within the corporation is 
imputed on to the corporation.231 
 
(ii) The identification doctrine 
This is the doctrine whereby the guilt of senior officers of the corporation is regarded as the 
guilt of the corporation. It is referred to as the identification theory or the ‘alter ego’ doctrine 
or the ‘directing mind’ theory232 and in terms of this theory the corporation is blamed for 
criminal acts committed only by its senior members233 in furthering or endeavouring to further 
the interests of the corporation. These senior members are regarded as ‘the mind of the 
corporation’ and the corporation will be held liable only for the wrongful acts of its senior 
members.234 The crux of the identification theory is thus that certain senior officials are 
identified within the corporation and since they are regarded as the mind of the corporation, 
the corporation will only be held liable if a senior official who is blameworthy for the offence 
is identified.235 Application of this theory “provided prosecutors with the means to convict 
corporations for intent-based crimes”.236  
 
The identification doctrine regards the actions of the senior officers as actions of the 
                                                          
231 Ibid. 
232 LJ Harbour & NY Johnson ‘Can a corporation commit manslaughter? Recent Developments in the United 
Kingdom and the United States’ (2006)  Defense Counsel Journal 226, 227. 
233 Jordaan (note 42) 54. See also Coffee (note 21) 9.  
234 Lennards Carrying Co. Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd [1915] AC 705, 713. They do the thinking on behalf of 
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Coffee (note 21) 9.  
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236 Harbour & Johnson (note 232) 227. 
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corporation237 because the senior officers are the only people who are considered to be the 
‘mind’ of the corporation, and for that reason they are in fact regarded as the corporation.238 
With vicarious liability the corporation is held liable for the actus reus and mens rea of the 
servant or agent, whereas with the identification theory the actus reus and the mens rea are 
imputed to the corporation and thus become the actus reus and mens rea of the corporation.239 
The senior officer, and the corporation are then held liable for the actus reus and the mens rea 
of the corporation.240 The senior officer must, however, have acted within his scope of 
employment and in furthering the interests of the corporation.241 
 
The identification theory originates from the civil case of Lennards Carrying Co. Ltd v Asiatic 
Petroleum Ltd.242 This was an appeal based on the conviction of a company arising from the 
loss of cargo resulting from a fire on its ship which was caused by its unseaworthiness. In casu, 
the court held that in the law of torts it is the act of the most senior individuals within a 
corporation that will be regarded as the act of the corporation.243 In Lennards Carrying we see 
the first instance in which the offence of a person who holds authority within the company is 
                                                          
237 Coffee (note 21) 15. 
238 Coffee explains the difference between vicarious liability and the identification in the following manner: “one 
did not impute liability from agent to principal; rather, one decided that agent and principal were the same person”. 
(Ibid). 
239 Ibid. 
240 “When these high ranking agents engaged in the requisite elements of a crime with the requisite intent, then 
the corporation would also be held criminally liable”. (Ibid 15). 
241 Ibid. 
242 Lennards Carrying Co. Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd (note 234) 705; HL Parsons ‘The Doctrine of Identification, 
causation and Corporate Liability for Manslaughter’ (2003) 67 The Journal of Criminal Law 69, 69. 
243 Viscount Haldane stated that “a corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own any more than it has a 
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general meeting; that person may be the board of directors itself or it may be, and in some companies it is so, that 
that person has an authority co-ordinate with the board of directors given to him under the articles of association, 
and is appointed by the general meeting of the company, and can only be removed by the general meeting of the 
company”. (Lennards Carrying Co. Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Ltd (note 234) 713). 
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directly imputed to the company itself so that the corporation suffers the consequences of the 
actions.  
 
Ormerod sees the identification doctrine as a way which solves the company’s lack of mind 
and body in that although a corporation has no body and mind, the mens rea and the acts of 
those senior individuals are regarded as those of the corporation.244 Leigh cautions, however, 
that where mens rea is a requirement a successful conviction is highly unlikely unless there is 
proof that a senior individual should have been aware of what was happening and failed to 
exercise his/her duty to act accordingly.245 This is supported by Ashworth who criticizes the 
identification doctrine as being narrow in the sense that a successful prosecution would not be 
possible without firstly, pinpointing a senior person who may be regarded as the mind of the 
corporation and secondly, providing proof that that person had the required mens rea.246  
 
Clarkson points out that a difficulty posed by the identification doctrine is that when crimes 
have been committed by huge corporations it becomes extremely difficult to identify the 
individual who is personally responsible for the conduct or omission and whose 
blameworthiness is the blameworthiness of the corporation.247 This proved to be an obstacle to 
the successful prosecution of huge corporations as the identification theory constantly led to 
the unsatisfactory situation of corporations escaping criminal liability due to the fact that it is 
usually difficult to pinpoint a senior officer who is to blame for the crimes.248  
                                                          
244 Ormerod (note 96) 149. 
245 “…If the offense requires mens rea, however, it would be difficult to convict, in England at least, if it could 
not be shown that a high managerial officer ought to have known of the circumstances triggering the duty to act 
and culpably failed to do so”. (Leigh (note 47) 1518).  
246 A Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law 4th ed 2003 118.  
247 Clarkson (note 90) 145. 




In Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Natrass249 an appeal in the House of Lords brought by Tesco 
Supermarkets after being convicted for having allegedly committed an offence under the 
Trades Description Act 1968 was heard. The company had posted an advertisement stating that 
they were selling Radiant washing powder at a specific lower price (2s 11d) instead of the 
normal price (3s11d). A customer, William Natrass, wanted to buy the washing powder. After 
not succeeding in getting the one with the marked down price, he proceeded to take the 
available one to the counter and was charged the normal price. He paid and later complained. 
The company was then prosecuted under the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 in terms of s. 11 
(2)250 which made it an offence to advertise at a lower price and actually charge a higher price. 
It later transpired that at some stage an employee responsible for putting stock out, had realized 
that the washing powder on display was finished. She had then taken out stock marked with 
the normal price and put it there. Tesco relied on a defence in terms of of s 24 (1) b of the Trade 
Description Act251 by stating that it had taken all reasonable steps to avoid commission of the 
offence and that “another person” had committed the offence,252 this person being the manager 
of one of its supermarkets.253 The trial court did not accept Tesco’s argument and convicted 
the corporation.  
                                                          
they were in capsized because its bow doors had not been closed. There was no senior officer who could be 
pinpointed and blamed for the deaths therefore liability could not be imputed on the corporation. 
249 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Natrass [1972] AC 153, HL. 
250 Section 11 (2) of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 which states that: “If any person offering to supply any 
goods gives, by whatever means, any indication likely to be taken as an indication that the goods are being offered 
at a price less than that at which they are in fact being offered he shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be 
guilty of an offence”. 
251 The defence entailed proof by the accused that the accused “had taken all reasonable steps to avoid the 
commission of the offence and that it was due to the act or default of ‘another person’”. (RJ McGrane & IM Gault 
“Corporate Manslaughter in Major Disasters” (1991) International Company and Commercial Law Review 166, 
168). 
252 Tesco’s defence was thus “that the commission of the offence was due to the act or default of another person 
and that they had taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the 
offence by themselves or any person under their control”. (Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Natrass (note 249) 2). 




This led to the appeal. That is where Lord Reid provided an explanation that in terms of the 
identification doctrine a corporation will only be held liable for the acts of senior members or 
controlling officers and in applying the identification doctrine Lord Reid explains clearly how 
the doctrine functions. He distinguishes the identification doctrine from vicarious liability and 
explains that under the identification doctrine it is as though the senior individual concerned is 
actually the corporation,254 hence his guilt being imputed to the corporation. In their judgments 
both Lord Reid and Viscount Dilhorne quote Denning LJ who stated in a previous case255  that  
“a company may in many ways be likened to a human body.  It has a brain and nerve centre 
which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the tools and act in accordance with 
directions from the centre. Some of the people in the company are mere servants and agents 
who are nothing more than hands to do the work and cannot be said to represent the mind or 
will. Others are directors and managers who represent the directing mind and will of the 
company, and control what it does. The state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of 
the company and is treated by the law as such”.256 
 
It is thus clear that what the identification doctrine does is to hold the corporation liable for the 
conduct, the mens rea and even the negligence of the corporation’s senior individuals as these 
                                                          
254 “He is an embodiment of the company or, one could say, he hears and speaks through the persona of the 
company, within his appropriate sphere and his mind is the mind of the company. If it is a guilty mind that guilt 
is the guilt of the company”. (Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Natrass (note 249) 171). 
255 H L Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v T J Graham & Sons Ltd [1957] 1 Q.B. 159.; Also reported as 3 All E.R., 
624 (C.A.) 1956. 
256 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Natrass (note 249) 7 in which Viscount Dilhorne also quotes Viscount Haldane 
LC’s statement in Lennard’s Carrying (note 234).“'My Lords, a corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of 
its own any more than it has a body of its own; its active and directing will must consequently be sought in the 
person of somebody who for some purposes may be called an agent, but who is really the directing mind and will 
of the corporation, the very ego and centre of the personality of the corporation. That person may be under the 
direction of the shareholders in general meeting; that person may be the board of directors itself, or it may be, and 
in some companies it is so, that that person has an authority co-ordinate with the board of directors given to him 
under the articles of association, and is appointed by the general meeting of the company, and can only be removed 
by the general meeting of the company”. (Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Natrass (note 249)). 
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are considered to be the conduct, mens rea or negligence of the corporation.257  
 
The identification theory clearly originated as a civil law concept,258 however, it was 
subsequently applied in criminal cases. In 1944 the identification theory was applied for the 
first time in criminal matters and it became the basis for corporate criminal liability in England. 
Although the identification doctrine started off as a way of imputing a mental state to a 
corporation,259 in applying the doctrine, the courts have treated corporations as though they 
have their own mental state and intention.260 As will be seen below though, the identification 
doctrine has proven itself to be weak in the sense that it has hampered convictions against large 
corporations for manslaughter.261 
 
As in English law, the basis of corporate criminal liability in Canada was the identification 
doctrine.262 Canada’s interpretation of the doctrine differs from that of England.263 In Canadian 
Dredge & Dock Co. v R,264 the Supreme Court embraced the identification theory, however, it 
certainly did not interpret it in the same way as the English Court in Tesco Supermarkets. The 
idea of a directing mind was accepted, however, the Supreme Court did not accept the idea of 
a corporation having a single directing mind.265 It extended the definition of ‘directing mind’ 
in such a way that it includes not only a board of directors, but also managing directors and 
                                                          
257 Parsons (note 242) 70. 
258 In Lennard’s Carrying (note 234). 
259 Leigh (note 47) 1514. 
260 Ibid. 
261 See discussion in Chapter Four III (c). 
262 Stessens (note 52) 510. 
263 Whyte (note 35) 4.  
264 Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v R (note 216) 662. 
265 Colvin (note 60) 10. 
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those individuals who have been delegated authority by the board.266 
 
(iii) Aggregation as a rule of attribution 
Aggregation as a rule of attribution refers to “the cumulative effect of a number of different 
negligent acts by different persons, so as to amount, in total, to gross negligence”.267 As 
opposed to relying on the identification of a single senior officer, this rule of attribution entails 
accepting that a corporation is morally blameworthy “through the aggregation of individual 
thoughts and behaviors or an assessment of the totality of the deficiencies in its corporate 
culture and organizational systems”.268  
 
Although proposed as a rule of attribution, aggregation has not been supported with regard to 
offences that require mens rea in the form of intention and it is mainly for offences of gross 
negligence that aggregation has been advanced as a possible rule of attribution.269 The 
argument that “a corporation ought to be open to prosecution for manslaughter by gross 
negligence on the aggregation principle”270 was rejected by the English Court of Appeal in 
Attorney General’s Reference (No 2 of 1999).271 In Canada, however, attributing liability by 
                                                          
266 Stessens (note 52) 510. 
267 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 220. 
268 Pieth & Ivory (note 24) 13. 
269 Ormerod states that “it is submitted that it is not possible artificially to construct the mens rea in this way. Two 
(semi) innocent states of mind cannot be added together to produce a guilty state of mind. Any such doctrine could 
certainly have no application in offences requiring knowledge, intention or recklessness. It is in relation to 
offences of negligence (particularly gross negligence) that the aggregation principle has been most forcefully 
advocated”. (Ormerod (note 96) 252). 
270 Ibid. 
271 Attorney General's Reference (No 2 of 1999) Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Lexis UK CD M364, [2000] 
2 Cr App Rep 207; Also reported as [2000] 3 All ER 182, CA. See discussion in Chapter Four III (g) below. 
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means of the aggregation principle has been accepted for crimes based on negligence and it is 
one of the significant changes brought about by Bill C-45 to the Criminal Code.272 
 
V CORPORATE HOMICIDE IN THE COMPARED SYSTEMS 
(a) Corporate homicide in South Africa 
As already mentioned, corporate criminal liability, generally, is regulated by section 332 of the 
CPA, however, there is no separate statute nor separate provisions within the CPA dealing 
directly with corporate homicide. This begs the question whether the current statutory 
provisions adequately address the problem of corporate homicide or whether there is a need for 
reform. The absence of separate laws that address the issue of corporate homicide suggests that 
South Africa has yet to focus its attention on corporate homicide and must seriously consider 
reforming its laws in this regard. It will be argued that in South Africa currently, corporations 
that cause deaths are not being properly held liable as section 332 of the CPA is both ineffective 
and inadequate. 
 
                                                          
272 See discussion in Chapter Five III (a) below. 
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(b) Corporate homicide in England  
The development of corporate criminal liability in England is rather interesting. When 
corporate criminal liability was first recognized in that system the basis for liability for crimes 
committed by corporations was strict liability.273 The corporation as an employer was regarded 
as the accused where its employee had committed a crime.274 At first, English law accepted 
corporate criminal liability for several crimes, but did not accept the fact that a corporation 
could possibly commit manslaughter.275 
The English law, however, developed further and since 1956 it has been accepted that 
corporations are capable of committing manslaughter.276 This acceptance was brought about 
by the application of the identification doctrine.277 In terms of this doctrine when deciding 
whether a corporation is criminally liable or not, courts are only allowed to consider the conduct 
of certain people who hold senior positions within the corporation.278  In the English system, 
therefore, the blame for crimes committed only by senior members of the corporation was 
attributed to the corporation. It has been stated that the identification principle “provided 
prosecutors with the means to convict corporations for intent-based crimes”.279 There are 
successful prosecutions that have taken place where the identification principle was applied.  
The identification doctrine, however, has its own shortcomings. In certain instances it has led 
to the unsatisfactory situation of corporations being let off the hook due to the fact that it is at 
times difficult to pinpoint a senior officer who is the mind of the corporation, to blame for the 
crimes.280 Following the public’s dissatisfaction with the failure of several high profile 
prosecutions for deaths caused by corporations, there were calls for reform. It has been stated 
that  
“The reason for the prosecutorial failures in the work-related deaths’ cases was that under the 
directing mind theory two elements had to be shown beyond reasonable doubt (1) that a 
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person within the company was personally guilty of manslaughter through his or her own 
gross negligence and (2) that that person was the “directing mind” of the company”.281 
The legislature responded and this eventually culminated in the passing of legislation which 
deals specifically with corporate manslaughter and corporate homicide.  
 
(c) Corporate homicide in Canada 
The Canadian system also recognizes corporate criminal liability. Corporations have been held 
accountable for crimes they commit. The first traces of corporate criminal liability in Canada 
is seen with corporations being held liable for statutory offences.282 
Similar to the English law the basis for liability in Canada has been the identification doctrine. 
Canada has, however, widely interpreted the doctrine and does not limit liability to crimes that 
have been committed by directors or senior management. Following the failure of the 
prosecution of a company and its three directors for the deaths of 26 miners in Westray in 1992, 
there was a public outcry that led to the establishment of the Royal Commission of Inquiry. 
The findings of the Commission led to amendments being made to the Criminal code through 
the addition of section 217.1 of the Criminal Code in 2004. It is federal legislation and one of 
its major features is the fact that it takes into account the conduct of “representatives” of the 
company. The term representative includes employees, agents and contractors of the 
                                                          
273 Harbour & Johnson (note 232) 227.  
274 Ibid. 
275 R v Cory Bros & Co. 1 K.B. 810 (1927). 
276 H.L Bolton Co. V T.J. Graham & Sons (note 255). 
277 Ibid 630. 
278 Stessens (note 52) 493. 
279 Harbour & Johnson (note 232) 232. 
280 R v P & O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd  (note 248) 93. When applying the identification doctrine in this case 
there was no senior officer who could be blamed for the deaths and for that reason, liability could not be imputed 
to the corporation. 
281 Harbour & Johnson (note 232) 232. 
282 Stessens (note 52) 497. 
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organization. Canadian law therefore makes it clear that corporate liability for homicide can be 
a result of the wrongful conduct of any employee, including junior employees.283 
 
(d) Corporate homicide – considering a new basis of liability 
Shortcomings of both vicarious liability284 and the identification doctrine,285 which have made 
it possible for corporations to escape liability where they should have been held criminally 
liable, coupled together with the rejection of the doctrine of aggregation286 have led to 
proposals being made to changing the form according to which corporate criminal liability is 
applied.  
 
Reasons have been advanced for the reform of the law, particularly in cases of homicide. With 
regard to vicarious liability it has been averred that “it has been difficult for prosecutors to use 
criminal conduct of servants of the company to prove manslaughter against its directors”.287 
The identification doctrine makes it difficult to impose criminal liability on a corporation as it 
requires a connection between the conduct and culpability of the corporation and of a senior 
individual within the corporation.288 A senior individual who is regarded as the mind and will 
of the corporation and who is guilty of manslaughter must first be identified before that guilt 
is imputed to the corporation.289 Failure to identify such an individual means that the 
                                                          
283 Whyte (note 35) 4.  
284 “Vicarious liability is regarded as too rough and ready for the delicate task of attributing blame for serious 
harms. It has been criticised for including too little by demanding that liability flow through an individual, however 
great the fault of the corporation, and for including too much by blaming the corporation whenever the individual 
employee is at fault, even in the absence of corporate fault”. (Wells (note 92) 109). 
285 J Gobert ‘Corporate Criminality: New crimes for the times” Criminal law Review (1994) 722, 723.  
286 R v H.M. Coroner for East Kent, ex parte Spooner (1989) 88 Cr.App.R.10. 





corporation escapes liability for manslaughter.290 The principle of aggregation has been 
rejected due to the fact that the aggregation of the conduct of several individuals would make 
the corporation liable, while in actual fact none of those are individually liable.291 
 
It is stated that on their own, none of these rules of attribution are suitable to circumstances 
where a company has caused deaths, particularly the larger companies. All three theories have 
in common the fact that for the corporation to have fault there must be reference to ‘individual 
liability:292 
“Theories of vicarious liability, identification, and aggregation require the court to proceed by 
a two-step process. The court first determines whether one or more persons within the 
company is guilty of a criminal offence. If the answer is yes, the court then must ask whether 
the perpetrator is an individual for whose acts the company should be responsible”.293 
  
Instead of basing liability on doctrines that focus on the guilt of an individual, basing corporate 
criminal liability on corporate culture has been proposed. Corporate culture would put the focus 
on the corporation itself and it refers to “an attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct, or practice 
existing within the body corporate generally or in the part of the body corporate in which the 
relevant activities takes place”.294 Basing corporate criminal liability on corporate culture 
                                                          
290 In addition, “difficulties created by the identification principle are such that the more diffuse the structure of 
the corporation and the more devolved the powers that are given to semi-autonomous managers, the easier it will 
be for corporations to avoid liability under the current legal regime”. (Ibid 8). 
291 Ibid 7. 
292 Gobert (note 285) 723. 
293 Ibid. 
294 Wells (note 92) 109. 
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would entail imposing liability where there is “tacit authorization or toleration of non-
compliance or failure to create a culture of compliance”.295  
The proposed new form of attributing liability would mean that corporate fault is founded in 
the corporation itself, without reliance on individual liability to establish corporate liability296 
as “the company is treated as a distinct organic entity whose ‘mind’ is embodied in the policies 
it has adopted”.297 
The question whether reforming the basis of liability will provide a better solution to South 
Africa’s problems will be considered after examining the concepts of corporate criminal 
liability and corporate homicide in South Africa, England and Canada. 
 
VI THE PURPOSE OF PUNISHMENT OF CORPORATIONS 
 
When a corporation has been prosecuted and found guilty of a crime, as in the case of a 
convicted natural person, there is some form of punishment prescribed by law that the court is 
obliged to impose. The question arises as to whether it is justifiable to impose punishment on 
a corporate entity, an artificial being, whilst knowing that that artificial being relies on another 
(a natural person) to act on its behalf.  
 
This is particularly the case since “criminal law sentencing literature primarily focuses on the 
individual and not corporations”,298 thus showing that corporations were not taken into 
consideration when theories of punishment for convicted offenders were developed. This is 
                                                          
295 Ibid. 
296 Gobert (note 285) 723. 
297 Ibid. 
298 N Keith “Sentencing the corporate offender: From deterrence to corporate social responsibility” (2010) 
Criminal Law Quarterly 294, 296. 
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confirmed by Wells’ assertion that “blaming and punishing individuals inevitably has a longer 
history than talk of corporate liability”.299 It is therefore not surprising that with the concept of 
punishment and the theories of punishment having been originally developed for natural 
persons, when corporations have to be punished there are challenges that are encountered. For 
instance, due to its nature a corporation cannot be incarcerated, consequently a sanction 
involving finances appears to be a more appropriate form of punishment for corporations. 
However, as Wells correctly points out it is a “common misconception…that corporate 
sanctions can only be exacted in the form of financial penalty”.300  
 
As the adequacy and effectiveness of a criminal sanction has a direct bearing on whether 
corporate criminal liability is effective or not, it is submitted that when dealing with corporate 
criminal liability it is essential for the issue of the punishment of corporations to be included. 
This entails a discussion of the reasons / theories of punishment and putting them in the context 
of punishing corporations as opposed to natural persons. It is submitted that the inclusion of 
such a discussion will make it possible for corporate criminal liability to be better understood 
and it will also enable one to determine whether corporate criminal liability is applied in an 
effective and adequate manner.  
 
 
(a) Reasons for imposing punishment  
Terblanche states that “any form of pain or discomfort an offender suffers as a result of his 
committing a crime can be seen as punishment”.301 According to Clarkson “the real distinctive 
                                                          
299 Wells (note 15) 31. 
300 Ibid. 
301 SS Terblanche The Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 2nd ed (2007) 4. 
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hallmark of the criminal law, however, is that convicted offenders become liable to censure 
and stigmatic punishment”.302 Criminal law is therefore aimed at punishing offenders who have 
been convicted. In South African law courts punish convicted criminals by imposing sentences 
on them.303 Since corporations are recognized as juristic persons, with rights and duties, they 
are also capable of committing crimes. It follows, therefore, that those corporations which have 
been found guilty of crimes are included in the definition of “convicted offenders” and may be 
subject to applicable sentences.  
 
In deciding on a suitable sentence to impose on a convicted offender, in South Africa the court 
when sentencing takes into account “the triad consisting of the crime, the offender and the 
interests of society” as laid down in S v Zinn.304 It has been stated that theoretically when taking 
into account the ‘interests of society’ part of the triad, theories of punishment should form part 
of that enquiry.305  
There are various theories of punishment and they have been in existence for a long time.306 
Snyman refers us to the absolute theory, the relative theory as well as the combination theory.307 
                                                          
302 Clarkson (note 90) 6. He goes on to explain that “it is the State that is exacting retribution or incapacitating a 
dangerous criminal and so on. In doing this the State is publicly condemning and censuring the defendant’s 
actions. This results in a special stigma not attaching to defendants in civil actions – hence the phrase ‘Stigmatic 
punishment”. (Clarkson (note 90) 6 - 7). 
303 Terblanche (note 301) 3. Terblanche goes on to explain though that some sentences are not punishment though 
as they do not result in the suffering of pain or discomfort for instance a “formal caution”, a wholly suspended 
sentence, “the forfeiture of property and the suspension of privileges, such as a driver’s licence”. (Ibid). 
“Punishment works through official sanctions calculated to interfere with the life, liberty or property of the 
offender; it is the authoritative infliction of suffering for an offence”. (Burchell (note 49) 68).  
304 S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A), in which Rumpff J articulated what was already being practised by the courts 
by stating “It then becomes the task of this court to impose the sentence which it thinks suitable in the 
circumstances. What has to be considered is the triad consisting of the crime, the offender and the interests of 
society”. (S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A) para 540 G). 
305 “Usually the purposes are simply seen as considerations additional to the Zinn triad and there is no real 
indication of how they should affect the sentence which has otherwise been determined with the aid of the Zinn 
triad only. Theoretically, however, the purposes of punishment should be dealt with as part of the interests-of-
society component of the Zinn triad”. (Terblanche (note 301) 155). 
306 “The ideas of retribution, deterrence, prevention and (to a lesser extent) rehabilitation are ancient. Frequent 
references to these notions can be found in the writings of the Roman-Dutch writers, and our courts were bound, 
at some stage, to take note of them”. (Ibid 156). 
307 Snyman (note 22)10.  
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The absolute theory refers to the retributive theory, while the relative theory refers to the 
preventive theory, the deterrent theory and the reformative theory.308  
 
Although Snyman refers to the position in South African law, what he states is echoed by 
Martin and Storey, on English law, who provide reasons for imposing punishment as the 
“punishment of offenders; the reduction of crime (including its reduction by deterrence and by 
the reform and rehabilitation of offenders); the protection of the public and the making of 
reparation by offenders to persons affected by their offences”.309 It is also echoed by Roach 
with regard to Canadian law, who states that 
“Despite the fundamental principles that a sentence fit the crime, there are other legitimate 
purposes of sentencing, including deterring others from committing crimes; deterring the 
particular offender from reoffending; incapacitating the particular offender from committing 
more crimes; rehabilitating the particular offender; and providing reparation for harm done to 
victims or the community”.310 
 
It is clear that in the three jurisdictions in which corporate criminal liability and corporate 
homicide will be investigated in this thesis, there is agreement with regard to the rationale for 
punishing convicted criminals, including convicted corporations. 
 
It is important to note that when it comes to imposing a sentence, in addition to the various 
factors that the judge takes into account, he is allowed to use his discretion. Even where a judge 
                                                          
308 Ibid. 
309 J Martin & T Storey Unlocking Criminal Law (2004) 18. 
310 K Roach Essentials of Canadian Law - Criminal Law 2nd ed (2000) 18. 
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is limited in terms of the type of sentence he may impose he uses his discretionary powers to 
determine, for instance, the length of imprisonment or the amount of a fine, etc. Clarkson refers 
to these as “tremendous discretionary powers” and explains that the type of sentence and the 
length or amount imposed is determined by what the judge regards as the purpose of 
punishment.311 It is therefore clear that the purpose of punishment is important and for that 
reason the theories of punishment have to be given special attention. The importance of the 
theories of punishment is echoed by Snyman who states: 
“The theories of punishment are of vital importance. They seek to answer not only the question 
as to the justification of punishment (and, by extension, the justification of the whole existence 
of criminal law) but also what punishment ought to be imposed in each individual case. These 
theories even have a direct impact on the construction of the general principles of liability and 
of the defences afforded an accused”.312 
 
These theories of punishment will be discussed with a view to clarifying the need for a 




(i) The retributive theory 
                                                          
311 “It is thus clear that tremendous discretionary power is vested in the sentencing judge. Which sentence is 
chosen, and its length depends very much on what the sentence sees the purposes of punishment and the criminal 
law to be”. (Clarkson (note 90) 7-8).  
312 Snyman (note 22) 10. 
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When one follows the retributive theory the purpose of punishment is to ensure that the accused 
pays for having committed the crime.313 This is a theory of punishment that is reflected in all 
sentences.314 Snyman states that “retribution restores the legal balance that has been disturbed 
by the commission of the crime”.315 The legal balance that he refers to are the rights and duties 
that the law gives to persons for instance by giving people the right to life and imposing a duty 
not to infringe upon that right by killing others. Once that balance has been shaken, if the 
retributive theory of punishment is applied, the aim of punishment is to make the accused pay 
for the crime committed. When the accused is punished for the crime committed it is said that 
that legal balance is restored. Snyman explains that when it comes to the absolute theory the 
main focus is on the past, on the crime that has already been committed.316  
 
In explaining the retribution theory Snyman differentiates it from vengeance, which carries 
connotations of an eye for an eye.317 He explains that interpreting the term retribution as 
vengeance refers to a situation where the accused is punished by being subjected to the same 
harm that was inflicted by the accused.318 The interpretation of retribution as vengeance is an 
ancient way of interpreting retribution.319 Retribution does, however, entail punishing the 
                                                          
313 Ibid 11. 
314 “Retribution forms the current foundation of every sentence, and is present in this form in every sentence. It 
gives shape to every sentence and limits each sentence to the bounds of the blameworthiness of the offender, to 
his “just deserts”. People’s moral outrage at the commission of the crime is an important factor determining the 
seriousness of the crime and the blameworthiness of the offender. Thus, the courts have to take it into 
consideration”. (Terblanche (note 301) 178). 
315 Snyman (note 22) 11. 
316 Ibid 15. 





accused in a way that is proportionate to the crime.320  Snyman argues that retribution should 
not be classified as a theory of punishment, but rather, as a vital element of punishment.321  
 
(ii) The preventive theory  
The preventive theory is based on the notion that the aim of punishment is to prevent crime.322 
Snyman observes that the preventive theory ‘overlaps’ with the deterrent as well as the 
reformative theories.323 This is echoed by Terblanche who states that 
“In the wider sense it includes deterrence and rehabilitation. Sometimes it is even used as a 
synonym for general deterrence, when courts state that the sentence should “prevent” others 
from committing similar crimes”.324 
 
Snyman further observes that on the contrary there are situations where the preventive theory 
does not have a deterrent or reformative purpose and in this regard he cites examples such as 
life imprisonment and the death penalty.325 When it comes to the relative theory, Snyman states 
that the focus is on “the object (eg prevention or reformation) that one wishes to achieve by 
means of the punishment”.326  
 
                                                          
320 Ibid. 
321 “The retributive theory therefore does not seek to justify punishment with reference to some future benefit 
which may be achieved through punishment (such as deterrence or prevention). Strictly speaking it is, therefore, 
not correct to describe retribution as a ‘purpose of punishment’. It is rather the essential characteristic of 
punishment”. (Snyman (note 22) 12). 
322 Wells (note 15) 19. 
323 Snyman (note 22) 15. 
324 Terblanche (note 301) 162. 
325 Snyman (note 22) 15. See also Terblanche (note 301) 162. 




(iii) The deterrent theory 
Wells describes deterrence, which forms part of the relative theory as being “forward 
looking”.327 According to Burchell 
“The theory of deterrence is that since punishment involves pain or suffering, rational people 
will avoid engaging in conduct that will expose them to punishment. Since punishment can 
only be inflicted in respect of crimes, it follows that the conduct that will be avoided is that 
which has been defined as a crime. In the result then, punishment works to prevent persons 
from committing crime.”328 
It is submitted that Burchell’s explanation captures clearly the concept of deterrence, 
particularly with regard to deterring corporations from committing crime. The idea is for 
corporations to avoid committing crime as crime is that which will cause the corporation to 
suffer financially through having to suffer the consequence of paying substantial fines, that 
may even cause the company to collapse. 
 
The deterrent theory is twofold in that on the one hand it entails the deterrence of that particular 
accused who has been convicted, from committing further crimes, and on the other hand it 
generally deters would-be offenders from committing the crime.329 As will be seen in the 
                                                          
327 Wells (note 15) 19. 
328 Burchell (note 49) 74. 
329 “The belief is that the imposition of punishment sends out a message to society that a crime will be punished 
and that, as a result of this message, members of society will fear that if they transgress the law they will be 




discussions below, “generally, there appears to be an increasing acceptance that deterrence may 
not be so effective”.330 
 
(aa) The theory of individual deterrence 
Individual deterrence as a theory refers to the deterrence of the particular offender from 
committing more crimes.331 Terblanche states that the 
 
 “theory behind individual deterrence  is that the offender will be deterred from re-offending 
because he has learnt from the unpleasant experience of his punishment, or because he is 
fearful of what may happen if he re-offends…In the case of repeat offenders, courts often 
regard a sentence more severe than the previous one as the only appropriate measure since, it 
is argued, the offender has not learnt his lesson.  It is, therefore, common practice to impose 
increasingly more severe sentences on an offender in an attempt to deter him…”332 
  
Unfortunately, with regard to natural persons, the theory of individual deterrence in South 
Africa has proved to be an ineffective tool.333 With regard to natural persons Snyman observes 
that 
“In South Africa the premise of this theory is undermined by the shockingly high percentage of 
recidivism (offenders who continue to commit crime after being released from prison) – this 
lies in the region of 90% and suggests that this theory is not very effective, in any event not in 
South Africa”.334 
                                                          
330 Terblanche (note 301) 159. 
331 “The object is to teach the offender a lesson so that he will be deterred from repeating his offence”. (Burchell 
(note 49) 74). See also Snyman (note 22) 15. 
332 Terblanche (note 301) 161 – 162. 
333 Snyman (note 22) 16. 
334 Ibid. Burchell also observes that “the validity of this theory is, of course, weakened every time a convicted 




Burchell’s observation is similar to that of Snyman and Burchell concludes that “research 
indicates that with each conviction there is a greater chance of recidivism. This suggests that 
first offenders ought to be treated with leniency rather than suffer a severe (and thus deterrent) 
punishment”.335 It is submitted that for the corporate offender the suggestion that first offenders 
should be treated with leniency should not be followed. Several factors ought to be taken into 
account: some of the corporate crime involves death and serious injury and in some cases the 
number of people affected is more than one; corporations depend on their finances to survive; 
in countries such as South Africa, the only punishment they are threatened with is a fine. By 
imposing fines only, the courts may be inadvertently encouraging corporations to put aside a 
budget for fines and this may also result in the offending corporation becoming a repeated 
offender, with the knowledge that the amount to pay for the crime is readily available. 
Moreover, a fine may not usually have the desired effect as the corporation is not likely to feel 
the punishment.336 It is therefore submitted that the punishment imposed on the corporation 
should be such that it will deter the corporation from committing crime and in that way lessen 
the number of corporations that become repeat offenders.337 It is further submitted that this may 
be achieved not only by imposing a high fine, but by also making it possible for courts to 
impose other forms of punishment, particularly if the crime has caused serious injury or death. 
                                                          
crime. If the recidivism rate among offenders is thus fairly high (second or third convictions) then it is clear that 
punishment does not have a deterrent effect”. (Burchell (note 49) 75). 
335 Ibid. 
336 “A fine against an enterprise has roughly the same effect as a fine for a parking offence against a rich individual: 
it is merely an inconvenience with a very limited deterrent effect”. (B Schunemann “Placing the Enterprise under 
Supervision (Guardianship) as a Model Sanction against Legal and Collective Entities” in Criminal Responsibility 
of Legal and Collective Entities International Colloquim, www.iusrim.mpd.verlag/online 294  (accessed 15 
November 2013)).  
337 Kruger says the “Correct application of the Zinn triad will avoid such aberrations: how serious is the offence 
really (even if it is a repetition), what are the accused’s personal circumstances (even if it is aggravating that the 
offender was not deterred by previous punishments) and what are the true interests of the community? If the 
offence does not cause the community great harm, what is the sense of imposing a very expensive sentence – 
particularly if, in the light of previous sentences, it has little chance of preventing repetition?” (A Kruger 
Hiemstra’s Criminal Procedure (2008) 28-28 and 28-28(1)). 
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It is hoped that the convicted offending corporation will, in future, avoid action that may result 
in the serious injury or death of another person. 
 
(bb) The theory of general deterrence 
The theory of general deterrence is mainly applied when the offence is serious and when the 
offence has become increasingly widespread.338 Terblanche avers that when it comes to 
“general deterrence, the sentence is used as an example to other potential offenders and the 
belief is that the threat of similar punishment will cause such potential offender to refrain from 
committing crime”.339 Snyman points out that the focus is on the effect that the imposed 
judgment will have on society generally and the aim of punishment is to keep society as a 
whole away from committing crime.340  
 
Burchell states that  
“the theory of general deterrence requires that all persons who commit crimes should suffer 
punishment and, where particular types of crime are prevalent, that ‘exemplary’ punishments 
should be meted out on particular offender so as to suppress the incidence of the crime in 
question”.341 
It is submitted that this is an effective way of deterring others from committing the same kind 
of crime, however such deterrence will be achieved when there are more effective forms of 
punishment in place.  
                                                          
338 Terblanche (note 301) 158. Burchell states that “the theory of general deterrence requires that all persons who 
commit crimes should suffer punishment and, where particular types of crime are prevalent, that ‘exemplary’ 
punishments should be meted out on particular offender so as to suppress the incidence of the crime in question”. 
(Burchell (note 49) 75). 
339 Terblanche (note 301) 157.  
340 Snyman (note 22) 16. 




Moore argues that “the implications for general deterrence are more far-reaching. This is so 
because general deterrence relies, in addition to certainty and severity of punishment, on the 
uniformity of punishment”.342 This is seen by Snyman as a ‘misconception’.343 Snyman goes 
on to explain that for the theory to succeed it does not depend on how severe the sentence is, 
but rather “on how probable it is that an offender will be caught, convicted and serve [out – 
sic] his sentence”.344 According to Snyman  
“the theory is accordingly successful only if there is a reasonable certainty that an offender 
will be traced by the police, that the prosecution of the crime in court will be effective and 
result in a conviction, and that the offender will serve his sentence and not be freed on parole 
too early, or escape from prison”.345  
It is submitted that Snyman offers a sound argument for general deterrence. He, however, 
proceeds to contextualize this theory of general deterrence and shows that in the South African 
context there are challenges that thus far have made it difficult for the criminal justice system 
to deter society, generally, from committing crime.346  The view expressed by Snyman in this 
regard is of the general deterrence of crime committed by natural persons. With regard to crime 
committed by a corporation, an inquiry needs to be made as the outcome of general deterrence 
may be different. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
                                                          
342 CA Moore ‘Taming the Giant corporations? Some Cautionary Remarks on the Deterability of Corporate Crime’ 
(1987) July  Crime and Delinquency 379, 382. 
343 Snyman (note 22) 16. 
344 Ibid. 
345 Ibid. 
346 “It is well known that a variety of factors, such as an understaffed police force, some police officers and 
prosecutors lacking the required skills, possible corruption and bad administration (factors which may all be traced 
back to a lack of funds) considerably weaken the probability of a real offender being brought to justice and 
punished. In fact, in the light of statistics showing how few offenders are ultimately apprehended, prosecuted, it 





(iv)  The reformative or rehabilitation theory 
The reformative theory focuses on the offender by aiming at the reformation or rehabilitation 
of the offender to a point where he abides by the law.347 Snyman makes it clear that the 
reformative theory is based on the premise that there is something wrong with the personality 
of the convicted offender.348 This theory is therefore more suitable for dealing with natural 
persons349 as they go through programmes aimed at rehabilitating them during their 
incarceration.  
 
As it is not possible for a corporation to be incarcerated, due to its juristic personality, the 
discussion of the reformative theory is not necessary for purposes of punishment of 
corporations. As Wells puts it, “corporations already enter the criminal justice process with the 
advantage that they cannot have imposed upon them the hardship and degradation which 
incarceration entails”.350 
 
(v) Restorative justice 
                                                          
347 Terblanche (note 301) 163; Snyman (note 22) 18; Burchell (note 49) 78. 
348 “According to this theory an offender commits a crime because of some personality defect, or because of 
psychological factors stemming from his background”. (Snyman (note 22) 18). “It is easy to understand that a 
person whose crimes are caused by a drug or alcohol dependency will be unlikely to repeat these crimes if the 
dependency is successfully addressed. Some personality disorders also result in a predisposition to commit crime 
and, even though they may be more difficult to cure, further crime is unlikely if they can be managed successfully”. 
(Terblanche (note 301) 163). 
349 As among other things, “before courts can properly apply the reformation theory they must have sufficient 
information before them regarding the offender’s personality and the treatment to which he is likely to respond”. 
(Burchell (note 49) 80). 
350 Wells (note 15) 20. 
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Another manner in which convicted offenders are dealt with is by means of restorative justice. 
Kruger explains that restorative justice  
“attempts to restore the relationship between the offender and the community by means of the 
promotion of reconciliation, restitution and responsibility. The victim plays a bigger role. 
Whereas retributive justice looks backwards, reacting to something which has been done, 
restorative justice looks forward”.351 
 
With restorative justice punishment is therefore not the aim, but rather, reconciliation.352 
Burchell states that this “reconciliation is achieved by a process of deliberation involving the 
victim, offender and representatives of the community”.353 As with the reformative or 
rehabilitation theory, restorative justice is directed towards an offender who is a natural person, 
rather than a corporate offender.  
 
It is submitted that it may be applied to a corporate offender by means of a sentence such as 
community service directed toward the victims of the corporate crime that the corporation is 
being sentenced for, as it “gives the victim something by means of compensation or restoration 
of relationships”.354 Kruger points out however, that with regard to punishing the perpetrator 
for serious offences “which evoke strong feelings of outrage and revulsion in society” 
restorative justice is not recommended.355  
                                                          
351 Kruger (note 337) 28-28(1). 
352 Burchell (note 49) 82. 
353 Ibid. 
354 Kruger (note 337) 28-28(1). 
355 Ibid. Kruger refers to Bosielo JA’s statement in Director of Public Prosecutions, North Gauteng v Thabethe 
2011 (2) SACR 567 (SCA) par 20 that he feels the need to “caution seriously against the use of restorative justice 
as a sentence for serious offences which evoke profound feelings of outrage and revulsion amongst law abiding 
and right-thinking members of society. An ill-considered application of restorative justice to an inappropriate case 
is likely to debase it and make it lose its credibility as a viable sentencing option”. Kruger (note 337) 28-28(1). In 
casu the offence was that of rape and Bosielo JA considered the appropriateness of the sentence for that “type of 
crime, given its prevalence, seriousness and its deleterious effect on society”. (Director of Public Prosecutions, 





(b) Corporations and the theories of punishment  
Reasons for sentencing corporations may be determined by examining the concept of a 
corporation vis-à-vis the theories of punishment. The corporation is a juristic person with no 
physical body that may be personally punished. It is an artificial entity that relies on natural 
persons who make decisions on its behalf and carry out tasks on its behalf. Even when facing 
charges against it, the corporation relies on a natural person to face prosecution on its behalf. 
Since a corporation differs from a natural person the sentences that may be imposed on a 
corporation will not always be the same as those that may be imposed on a natural person. This 
is emphasised by Wells who points out that corporations have the benefit of not being exposed 
to imprisonment. 356   
 
Furthermore the arguments for and against the various theories of punishment may also not 
necessarily be applicable in the same way when it comes to the punishment of corporations. 
For instance one of the main criticisms of the retributive theory is its failure to take into account 
the fact that a large number of criminals go without being prosecuted as they are not caught.357 
 
                                                          
356 Wells (note 15) 20. 
357 “Just deserts theory has been criticized on the ground that it ignores the essential reality of the criminal justice 
process, which is that only a minority of offenders is ever caught. This is particularly true of white collar crime 
which leads Braithwaite and Pettit to conclude that to apply just deserts to it is neither desirable nor feasible”. 
(Wells (note 15) 20). 
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In arguing that corporate deterrence is not a straightforward theory that may be implemented 
simply by making the punishment more severe, Moore states that 
“However, modern transnational corporations differ greatly from ordinary actors in their 
capacity to respond to changes in their legal and political environment. Even white-collar 
criminals have little direct influence over the legal penalties to which they are subject. 
Corporations do. Their purely legal persona, their vast political and economic resources, and 
their ability to cloak the actions of human agents in organizational anonymity make 
corporations formidable contenders in struggles over the uses to which a society’s formal social 
control apparatus is to be put. And this is especially true when it is the behavior of a specific 
industry or industries that is being targeted for more punitive or comprehensive regulation”.358 
 
It is clear that when the theories of punishment were formulated or arrived at, the only type of 
person in mind was the natural person. The juristic person was not considered and with 
development of corporate criminal liability one finds a situation where it is necessary to provide 
justification for punishing corporations by referring to already existing theories, some of which 
fail to provide suitable arguments for the punishment of corporations. With regard to the 
reformative or rehabilitation theory, the corporation was clearly not considered when this 
theory was developed. 
 
 Keith avers that with regard to sentencing corporations deterrence has been the theory that has 
been focused on and he argues that “sentencing the corporate offender should look beyond 
deterrence and seize the opportunity for corporate rehabilitation and the broader public 
interest”.359 Instead of relying heavily on the deterrence theory Keith proposes that when 
                                                          
358 Moore (note 342) 379. 
359 Keith (note 298) 294. 
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sentencing corporations various factors need to be taken into account. He avers that “a broader 
set of principles that consider the nature of the corporate offender, the nature of the offence, 
the effect on the victim and its broader social impact is critical for a principled approach in 
sentencing corporations” will lead to corporations being properly punished, particularly for 
corporate homicide. It is submitted that the approach proposed by Keith is the best approach 
as it entails taking into account all the theories when deciding on the proper way to punish 
corporations and even additional factors. It is further submitted that we should reflect on Wells’ 
view that “the theories of punishment have to take account not only of the legal and political 
context with which they intimately relate, but also of the argument that corporate crime has to 
be brought into the criminal justice story and not left as an awkward afterthought”.360  
 
It is submitted that the fine as punishment for convicted corporations, particularly for corporate 
homicide is not suitable on its own as it does not extend to some of the theories of 
punishment.361 It is further submitted that the solution may be found in supplementing the fine 
by imposing effective punitive measures that will translate into the stigmatization and public 
humiliation of the corporation, as these are more likely to result in lowering the corporation’s 
reputation which ‘can impose greater punishment and deterrence than mere economic 
sanction’.362 These may be in the form of sanctions such as ‘publicity orders’. 
 
Having outlined the theories of punishment and having discussed them vis-à-vis the 
punishment of corporations, the concept of corporate criminally liability and the question 
                                                          
360 Wells (note 15) 20. 
361 “In recent history there is evidence that many offenders see the penalty as a risked “add on” cost to their 
criminal enterprise and, if the prospective gain from crime is sufficiently high, are undeterred; if caught, paying 
the fine will be seen by the offender simply as a form of taxation on crime”. (G Slapper ‘Corporate Punishment’ 




regarding its effectiveness or adequacy may now be examined with the issue of sentencing 
being included in determining whether corporations are being effectively and adequately dealt 
with in South Africa. In the chapters dealing with the compared jurisdictions the applicable 
sentences for corporate crime generally, as well as for corporate crime resulting in death or 
serious injury will be discussed. The discussion will include additional sanctions that are 
imposed in the compared jurisdictions. The possibility of South Africa moving away from 




In the discussion above it has been made clear that corporate criminal liability is a concept that 
should be taken seriously as it has a crucial role that it plays in our society. Its relevance has 
been emphasised and it has been suggested that since it is the proper way to deal with corporate 
criminality it ought to be retained.  
 
The discussion on the development of the concept of corporate criminal liability and the 
rationale behind applying criminal law to corporate entities highlight the importance of 
ensuring that corporations are held properly accountable for their criminal activities. It has also 
been further explained that corporate criminal liability as opposed to corporate civil liability is 
the better option and will ensure that there is justice. It is also shown that there is a need for 
corporate criminal liability as corporate individual liability on its own will not result in 
corporations that commit crimes being punished for their crimes. The different bases for 
liability, the purposes and theories of punishment have been put into perspective before being 
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dealt with in the specific contexts of the compared jurisdiction. Corporate homicide in the three 
jurisdictions that will be the object of the comparative study has also been introduced briefly.  
From the discussion in this chapter it is clear that corporate criminal liability in South Africa 
has not been developed further since the coming into being of section 332 of the CPA, yet there 
have been further developments in other areas such as Constitutional law, which has a direct 
effect on section 332 of the CPA. This lack of development has led to section 332 of the CPA 
becoming a provision that is both inadequate and ineffective. Moreover, while corporations 
continue to engage in harmful corporate activities that sometimes lead to fatalities, South 
Africa has not developed to a point where there is a separate legal framework for corporate 
homicide. Clearly there is a need for reform and it is submitted that from the in-depth 
comparative study of corporate criminal liability and corporate homicide in South Africa, 














PART TWO: THE COMPARATIVE STUDY 
CHAPTER 3 - SOUTH AFRICA AND CORPORATE HOMICIDE  
I INTRODUCTION 
“South Africa experiences vast corporate activity and development. An adverse consequence 
of this is the proliferation of severe corporate criminality. There is rising consensus among 
corporate criminologists and academics that corporate crime inflicts more damage on society 
than all street crime combined”.363 
This quotation highlights the fact that like other countries, South Africa is faced with the 
challenge of dealing with crimes committed by corporations, including those that result in 
people’s deaths. It is therefore in the interest of South Africa to see to it that there are adequate 
measures in place that are intended to deal with corporations that commit crimes, particularly 
those that result in the deaths of people. 
 
As already stated, corporate criminal liability in South Africa is regulated by section 332 of the 
CPA and the punishment for corporate crimes is a fine.364 South Africa does not have separate 
legislation that deals specifically with fatalities resulting from the conduct of corporate bodies. 
Corporations that kill are therefore prosecuted in accordance with section 332 of the CPA, 
which regulates corporate criminal liability generally.  
The problem with the application of the current approach is that even though there have been 
many occurrences of fatalities caused by corporate activities, there have been very few cases 
                                                          
363 Borg-Jorgensen & Van Der Linde (note 53) 452. 
364 CPA (note 16) section 332(2). 
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in which corporations have been convicted for such deaths.365  This gives rise to two issues:  
(i) The question whether the manner in which corporate criminal liability is currently applied 
makes it possible for corporations that kill and injure people to be properly held liable for this 
unlawful conduct with regard to corporations;366 and (ii) The question of the appropriateness 
of a fine as the sole possible punishment for corporations,367 even where there is death. 
 
It must be noted that it was only during the 20th century that it started to become common 
practice in South Africa to hold a corporation criminally liable.368 At first the common law 
played an important role in regulating corporate criminal liability in South Africa.369 However, 
the legislature gradually developed a legal framework for corporate criminal liability and the 
current position is that corporate criminal liability is mainly regulated by statute.370 The 
legislature first addressed the issue by enacting section 384 of the Criminal Procedure and 
Evidence Act, 1917.371 Section 384 was later amended by section 117 of the Companies 
Amendment Act, 1939.372 The amended section 384 was later replaced by section 381 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, 1955.373 The wording of section 381 remained basically the same as 
it was under section 384. Section 381 was also later replaced and the current position is found 
                                                          
365 A Rycroft ‘A Corporate Homicide’ (2004) 17 SACJ 141, 141 – 142. “In South Africa about 1400 people are 
killed yearly in occupational accidents”. (OHS Academy http://www.ohsacademy.co.za/didyouknow.asp 
(accessed March 2014). With regard to the frequency of prosecutions see discussion in chapter 6 part I below. 
366 This will be addressed in this chapter at V below.  
367 This will be addressed in this chapter at V(g) below.. 
368 In answering the question whether a juristic person could be held criminally liable, Pittman in 1940 stated that 
“A hundred years ago the answer to this question would have been in the negative, an artificial person not being 
regarded as doli capax”. (W Pittman Criminal Law in South Africa (1940) 38).  
369 S Selikowitz ‘Corporations and their Criminal Liability’ (1964) Responsa Meridiana 21, 21. 
370 That is section 332 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
371 The CPEA (note 43).   
372 The Companies Amendment Act 23 of 1939, hereinafter referred to as the CAA. “In the course of enacting the 
Companies Amendment Act in 1939 Parliament took the opportunity of redrafting section 384 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act and setting out clearly the law relating to the criminal liability of a company, its directors and 
servants”. (Selikowitz (note 369) 21.  
373 The Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955, hereinafter referred to as the CPA 1955. 
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in section 332 of the CPA.374 As with the previous provision, the wording of section 332 was 
also retained basically in the same form. Under these statutory provisions case law shows that 
corporations and members of associations which are not corporate bodies may be held 
criminally liable for their unlawful actions and some have been convicted.375 
 
In terms of section 332 a corporation may be prosecuted and subsequently convicted for the 
criminal acts of its officers, as these individuals’ acts are regarded as acts of the corporation 
itself.376 In addition to that, the current position is that an officer of a corporation may also be 
held criminally liable for acts of the corporation377 but this will be the case only if he or she 
took part in the commission of that crime378. 
 
The criminal act of the director or servant is deemed to be an act of the corporation itself, as 
long as the act was performed in exercising powers or in the performance of duties as a director 
or servant, or if the director or servant was furthering or endeavouring to further the interests 
of the corporation.379 The guilt of the director or servant is imputed to the corporation.380 For 
this reason, in South African law, the basis of liability extends beyond the vicarious liability 
that natural persons are subject to.381 Corporations may thus be held liable for common-law 
                                                          
374 It has been said that “s. 332 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 aims to avoid the necessity of the 
development of the common law of criminal liability of legal persons”. (Rycroft (note 365) 150).  
375 For instance  R v Levy & Others 1929 AD 312 - 1917 Act; R v Bennett & Co. (Pty) Ltd & another (note 32) – 
1934 Act; and S v Banur Investment 1969 (1) SA 231 (T) – 1955 Act; S v Deal Enterprises1978 (3) SA 302 (T) – 
1977 Act.  
376 Snyman (note 22) 254. 
377 The Constitutional Court in S v Coetzee (note 56) declared section 332(5) unconstitutional as it provided for a 
reverse onus whereby the servant or director bore the burden of proving his/her innocence. The Coetzee judgment 
will be discussed in more detail in this chapter at IV(a)(v)(aa) below. 
378 Burchell (note 49) 567.  
379 Snyman (note 22) 254. 
380 Burchell (note 195) 475. 
381 Ibid 476. See discussion below on the basis for liability. 
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offences such as theft382 and culpable homicide.383 They may also be held liable for statutory 
crimes.384 These will usually be in the form of non-compliance with a regulatory statutory 
provision. Corporations may also be held liable for crimes which require intention,385 crimes 
which require negligence,386 as well as strict liability offences.387  
 
Despite the statutory regulation of corporate criminal liability, it is submitted that the concept 
of corporate criminal liability in South Africa has not sufficiently developed to the extent where 
it can be said that it satisfactorily addresses the problem of corporate crime.388 It is further 
submitted that there is an urgent need for reform,389 particularly where deaths occur as a result 
of corporate activities. There ought to be a separate legal framework for corporate homicide.390  
 
In this chapter the concept of corporate criminal liability in the South African context will be 
examined closely. It will be argued that the law as it stands does not cater adequately for 
situations involving the loss of life caused by corporations. The need for a separate legal 
framework of corporate homicide will be highlighted. The appropriateness of a fine as the only 
penalty for deaths and injuries caused by corporations will also be closely examined. The 
discussion will include, inter alia, the basis for corporate criminal liability in South Africa, 
                                                          
382 R v Markins Motors (Pty) Ltd 1959 (3) SA 508 (AD). 
383 Snyman (note 22) 254 and R v Bennett (note 32). 
384 S v International Computer Broking and Leasing (Pty) Ltd 1996 (3) SA 582 (W) - Contravention of section 
2(1)(a) of the Usury Act 73 0f 1968. 
385 R v Frankfort Motors (Pty) Ltd 1946 OPD 255 - fraud. 
386 R v Bennett (note 32) - culpable homicide. 
387 “…if, however, regard be had to the embodying statute, the liability is strictly that of the corporate body itself, 
because the acts of the directors, servants or agents are deemed to be those of the corporate body”. (Delport (note 
87) 5). Also see Snyman (note 22) 254. An example would be the holding of the corporation liable for the 
employee’s negligent killing of another in R v Bennett (note 32). 
388 As stated above, Wells defines corporate crime as “corporate activities which are perceived to involve a 
transgression of some aspect of criminal law”. (Wells (note 15) 1). 
389 See discussion on criticisms or shortfalls of section 332 of the CPA in this chapter at V below. For corporate 
criminal liability to be adequate and efficient in South Africa these need to be remedied. 
390 See discussion below on corporate homicide in this chapter at IV(b) below. 
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the development of the statutory regulation thereof, the mens rea of the corporation, applicable 
sanctions and the need to regulate corporate homicide separately.  Throughout, the focus will 
be on criminal conduct that results in the deaths or injuries of people. It is submitted that if 
more attention is given to this area this may lead to further development of the concept of 
corporate liability in such a way that it extends to corporate homicide. 
 
II THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
There is very little evidence of the existence of corporate criminal liability in South Africa 
prior to the early 20th century.391 In sketching the development of corporate criminal liability 
in South Africa, the common law392 regulation of corporate criminal liability will be 
discussed. This will be followed by a discussion of the development of corporate criminal 
liability as a result of the enactment of statutory regulations thereof. In the discussion of the 
statutory regulations, similarities and differences between the statutes will be highlighted. 
 
(a) Common law 
Corporate criminal liability is a concept that belongs to both company law and criminal law. 
Given the hybrid nature393 of South African corporate law and criminal law, when attempting 
to identify the originality of the concept of corporate criminal liability it is important to 
establish if this concept existed under Roman law, Roman-Dutch law394 as well as English law. 
                                                          
391 Selikowitz (note 369) 24. 
392 Snyman defines common law in the following way: “…those rules of law not contained in an Act of parliament 
or of legislation enacted by some other subordinate legislature, but which are nevertheless just as binding as any 
legislation”. (Snyman (note 22) 6).  
393 HR Hahlo and E Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background (1973) 330. 
394 “The legal system known as Roman-Dutch law resulted from the reception of Roman law in the Netherlands 
and the fusion of Roman law and local customary law”. (Snyman (note 22) 9). For a full discussion of the historical 
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South African company law is derived from English law.395 Criminal law in South Africa began 
as a hybrid system that was derived from both Roman-Dutch and English law.396 It has since 
evolved to a point where the current “system of criminal law in South Africa is a truly mixed 
system, blending Roman-Dutch, English, German and uniquely South African elements”.397   
 
It is thus important to see if there are any traces of entities that are analogous to a modern-day 
corporation in Roman law, Roman-Dutch law and English law. In addition to that it is important 
to determine whether those entities were held criminally liable for their unlawful actions. The 
discussion on the development of the common-law regulation of corporate criminal liability 
will begin with a discussion of the Roman law position. 
 
(i) Roman law 
The earliest traces of a corporation under Roman law are that of a family under the rule of its 
patriarch398 or paterfamilias. In Maine’s words: 
 
 “the family, in fact, was a corporation; and he was its representative or…its public officer. 
He enjoyed rights and stood under duties, but the rights and the duties were, in the 
contemplation of his fellow-citizens and in the eyes of the law, quite as much those of the 
collective body as his own”.399  
                                                          
development of corporate criminal liability in South Africa see II (b) below in this chapter; England see Chapter 
Three II (b) and Canada see Chapter Four II (b) and (c) below. 
395 JT Pretorius, PA Delport, M Havenga & M Vermaas Hahlo’s South African Company Law through the cases 
– A source book 6 ed (1999) 1. 
396 Burchell (note 195) 9. 
397 Ibid. 
398 Maine specifically states that “the family had the distinctive characteristic of a corporation”. (HS Maine  




The family unit resembles a company, in that it had a particular individual, the patriarch, 
through whom it acted.400 The patriarch represented the family, publically.401 The rights and 
duties of the family, as a collective, were borne by the patriarch, on behalf of the family,402 as 
“the head of the household”.403 
 
As commercial trading increased, an entity known as a commenda 404 came into being. It was 
basically a joint venture whereby traders and shipowners made contributions towards trade 
expeditions with a view to sharing the resulting profits.405 It has been stated that the commenda 
is probably “the earliest formalized system of commercial joint enterprise”.406 The rules of the 
commenda made it possible for the liability of an investor in a joint venture to be limited to 
the financial contribution he had made to the joint venture.407 
 
A further development in Roman law, which led to the coming into being of corporations  was 
the societas408 which was an association of persons that was a separate legal person in its own 
right.409 Since the societas had legal personality it had its own rights and obligations which 
were separate from those of its members.410 It has been stated that it is the societas “with legal 
rights and duties independent from its individual members which laid the foundation of the 
                                                          
400 Ibid. 
401 The paterfamilias “had extensive power (patria potestas) over the other members of the family and represented 
the family in all affairs, political or otherwise”. (B Edwards The History of South African Law – An Outline (1996) 
5). 
402 Maine (note 398) 153.  
403 DH Van Zyl History and Principles of Roman Private Law (1983) 9.  
404 Maine (note 398) 8. 
405 Ibid. 
406 Ibid. 
407 Ibid 9. 
408 Van Zyl refers to the societas as the contract of partnership. (Van Zyl (note 403) 287). 




modern idea of the company as a separate legal entity”.411 
 
At this early stage of Roman Law, criminal law was still developing and it was mainly 
concerned with matters affecting or threatening the security of the state.412According to 
Selikowitz “when we look to the Roman Law for guidance as to the criminal liability of 
corporations it appears that there is an absence of such liability or where it exists there is no 
clear doctrine on which such liability is based”.413 In Roman law a legal entity could not be 
held criminally responsible.414 This assertion is supported by Kahn, who states that “a 
corporation cannot commit an unlawful act (actus reus) or have a wrongful state of mind (mens 
rea). Thus it cannot be saddled with criminal liability. So it was with Roman law and probably 
in classical Roman-Dutch law”.415 Maine attributes that to the fact that the criminal law at that 
time was more concerned with matters that posed a threat to state security.416 With regard to 
civil action the Roman law principle was that a corporation did not have the capacity to commit 
any offence that required intention as one of the elements.417 This explains the apparent 
reluctance to hold a corporation criminally liable. 
 
                                                          
411 Ibid. 
412 This is mainly due to the fact that “in the infancy of the commonwealth, every offence vitally touching its 
security or its interests was punished by a separate enactment of the legislature. And this is the earliest conception 
of a crimen or crime”. (Ibid 310). 
413 Selikowitz (note 369) 22. 
414Although South African criminal law is derived from Roman-Dutch law and English law it appears as  though 
in Roman law there was no clear criminal liability of corporations. (JC De Wet & HL Swanepoel Strafreg (1949) 
18). Selikowitz is of the opinion that “The Romans seem to have realized the fact that a corporation was not a 
human being which could be subject to a section of the law which has as its general aim, the prevention of certain 
kinds of human activity”. (Selikowitz (note 369) 22). Also see Coffee (note 21) 13. 
415 E Kahn ‘Can a Company Be Guilty of Murder? The Criminal Liability of a Corporation -I’ (1990) 19 
Businessman’s Law 146. 
416 Maine (note 398) 310. 
417 M De Villiers The Roman and Roman Dutch Law of Injuries: A Translation of Book 47, Title 10 of Voet’s 





(ii) Roman-Dutch law 
In Roman-Dutch law a corporation was recognized as a legal persona capable of being a party 
to a civil suit.418 The development under Roman-Dutch law seems to be in favour of a 
corporation being held liable for delictual wrongs committed by its servants.419 It is, however, 
doubtful whether a legal entity was regarded as being capable of committing a crime and of 
being punishable for criminal conduct under Roman-Dutch law.420 Selikowitz421  and Kahn422 
confirm that under Roman-Dutch law there appeared to be a reluctance to accept that a 
corporation could possibly be criminally liable.  
 
(iii) English law 
English law accepted the notion of a corporation as a legal person in the seventeenth century.423 
Prior to that, corporations did exist but in a simplistic form and at that point in time they did 
                                                          
418 “A corporation or collective body does seem in some degree identified with the members thereof, though by a 
fiction of law the acts of the majority acting in their corporate capacity are attributed, not to them, but to the 
corporation itself in such matters as it is competent to perform”. (Ibid 61). 
419 De Villiers’ avers that “it is undoubtedly true that a corporation cannot entertain an animus injuriandi…; but 
just as by the Roman law regulating the relations between a slave and his owner, the latter (unless he surrenders 
the slave to the injured party) could be held liable for the act committed animo injuriandi by the slave, so a 
corporation, where the law relating to corporations is such, may be held liable for the act committed animo 
injuriandi by the persons for whose acts it is by such law accountable”. (M de Villiers Supplement to Roman and 
Roman Dutch Law of Injuries: A Translation of Book 47, Title 10 of Voet’s Commentary on the Pandects, with 
Annotations (1915) 21). 
420 De Wet & Swanepoel (note 414) 18.  
421 Selikowitz (note 369) 22. 
422 Kahn (note 415). 
423 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 6. 
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not have legal personality in the same form as it is today.424 It took time before the acceptance 
of the concept of corporate criminal liability.  
 
For corporate criminal liability as we know it today, to be accepted in English law, certain 
obstacles first had to be overcome.425 These hurdles were eventually overcome and by 1944 
corporations were being held criminally liable even for crimes that require mens rea.426 
Corporate criminal liability in English law has developed to such an extent that now there is 
specific legislation aimed at protecting individuals from injuries and deaths caused by 
corporations or corporate activities.427 It is one of few jurisdictions that has developed this 
concept to such an extent that it specifically legislates against the negligent killing of people 
by corporations.  
 
(iv) The South African common law  
“The common law of criminal liability of corporations may be described as holding a 
corporation ‘criminally responsible for its acts and omissions, and in the same way as an 
ordinary principal or master for its agents or servants acting on behalf of it or in its service’”.428  
 
This statement by Selikowitz summarises the way in which the common-law regulates 
corporate criminal liability in South Africa. The common law position relies on vicarious 
                                                          
424 “Courts have recognized that corporations have some sort of legal personality since the seventeenth century. 
Initially such recognition was limited to certain situations, for example in order to own property”. (Ibid). 
425 For a full discussion see The historical development of corporate criminal liability in English law in Chapter 
Five at IV(b)(i) below. See also the discussion in Chapter Two at III(a) above. 
426 See discussion of the 1944 cases in Pinto & Evans (note 94) 39 - 44. 
427 The CMCHA (note 36). 
428 Selikowitz (note 369) 24. 
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liability as the basis for corporate criminal liability.429 In terms of the common-law where a 
corporation has committed an offence it is held criminally liable due to the fact that the 
corporation is the master of those individuals who committed the offence.430 However, where 
the criminal act was such that it was physically impossible for a juristic person to commit such 
an act,431 the corporation would escape criminal liability.432 It was mainly through the 
common law that corporate criminal liability was accepted.  
Under common law, a corporation will not be held criminally liable where the legislature has 
confined the application of the law to human beings.433 This particular exception refers to 
those instances where the statute specifically states which people or group of people are 
subject to that specific rule or regulation.434 For instance in R v R.S.I (Pty) Ltd and Another435 
a limited company escaped liability for the contravention of section 135 (3) (a) of Act 24 of 
1936 as it was found that it could not “in law be guilty of committing such an offence”.436  
 
Furthermore, under the common law a corporation will not be held criminally responsible 
                                                          
429 “At Common Law a corporation was criminally responsible for its acts and omissions, and, in the same way 
as an ordinary principal or master, for the conduct of its agents or servants acting on its behalf or in its service, 
unless  
a) the conduct was of such a character that an artificial person was incapable of it; or 
b) the Legislature had restricted to natural persons the application of the law alleged to have 
 been contravened; or 
 c) the penalty provided for the alleged contravention was such as could not be suffered by an 
 artificial person”. (CWH  Lansdown, WG Hoal & AV Lansdown South African Criminal Law and 
Procedure vol 1, 6 ed (1957) 78). 
430 Mkize v. Martens 1914 AD 382, 382. 
431 Lansdown et al. (note 429) 78. Lansdown et al. further state that “a corporation stood at common law in an 
exceptional position in relation to the criminal law: there were many criminal acts which, from their nature, it 
was incapable of performing, and in some cases although it might be capable of committing the crime, the 
application of the law in question was restricted to natural persons”. (Lansdown et al. (note 429) 79). “Where the 
conduct was of so personal a character that an artificial body is incapable of committing it, here such matters as 
murder, assault, arson, theft, or family or sexual crimes are excluded”. (Selikowitz (note 369) 24). 
432 This refers to the fact that in terms of the common-law there are certain crimes (such as incest, bigamy etc) 
which a corporation cannot commit as their nature is such that they can only be committed by human beings. 
433 As can be seen in R v Sutherland 1972(3) SA 385 (N).  
434 Selikowitz (note 369) 24, refers to “the case of a statute imposing duties on solicitors or doctors”.  
435 R v R.S.I  (Pty) Ltd and Another  1959 (1) SA 414 (E); See also R v Smith and Others 1960 (4 )SA 364 (O). 
436 R v R.S.I  (Pty) Ltd and Another  (note 435).  
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where the only punishment that may be imposed for the said alleged offence “could not be 
suffered by an artificial person”.437 In situations where a crime committed could only be 
punishable via imprisonment, without the option of a fine, a corporation could escape 
liability.438 It is submitted that this is a short-coming. Surely it is not sound law to recognize 
artificial persons as legal persons and then allow a corporation to escape prosecution merely 
due to the fact that the nature of the punishment prescribed for that particular offence is such 
that an artificial person is incapable of being punished in that particular way. The statutory 
regulation of corporate criminal liability solves this problem by specifically prescribing a fine 
as punishment for corporations that commit crime.  
 
Finally, the common law currently regulates the criminal liability of the directors and servants 
for the crimes committed by the corporation.439 In the past there was statutory regulation of 
the directors’ and servant’s criminal liability,440 however, that provision was declared 
unconstitutional in S v Coetzee.441 The current common-law position is thus that a director 
may be held liable for offences committed by the corporation442 “only if he took part in that 
other’s crime, or on the basis of vicarious liability or agency”.443 This differs from the position 
                                                          
437 Lansdown et al. (note 429) 78. 
438 Selikowitz states that “For the purposes of a conviction the corporation was generally regarded as a “human” 
yet in connection with the question of sentence, the limitations of the humanising fiction were too great to 
overcome and therefore crimes with a punishment other than a fine or automatic loss of licence, etc., were held to 
be incapable of commission by a corporation”. (Selikowitz (note 369) 24). 
439 “the common law provides for a director to be liable for the crime committed by another director if he or she 
participated in the other director’s crime or on the basis of vicarious liability or agency”. (M Kidd ‘Liability of 
Corporate Officers for Environmental Offences’ (2003) 18(2) S.A. Public Law 277, 278). “a director, or anyone 
else for that matter, whose conduct satisfies the requirement of common law accomplice liability would, as 
Ackermann J points out in S v Coetzee, be liable in his or her own right under the common law”. (Burchell (note 
49) 568). 
440 The CPA (note 16) section 332 (5). 
441 In Coetzee the Constitutional court held that this provision is unconstitutional because it created a reverse onus 
which infringed the presumption of innocence in section 35(3)(h) of the Constitution and that this violation could 
not be justified in terms of the limitation clause in section 36(1), S v Coetzee (note 56).  




prior to section 332 (5) being declared unconstitutional. That provision allowed for a director 
or servant to be liable for crimes committed by other directors / servants where the director 
had not taken part in the offence, even where vicarious liability was not applicable.444 
 
(b) Statutory regulation  
In the South African context, the common-law position was followed by the courts until the 
enactment of regulation of corporate criminal liability through section 384 of the CPEA, 1917. 
Since then corporate criminal liability in South Africa is a concept that is statutorily regulated. 
In South Africa both the common-law and the statutory provision have played vital roles in the 
development of the concept of corporate criminal liability. They have also widened the scope 
of corporate criminal liability in South Africa, however, much more still needs to be done as 
corporate activities continue to pose dangers to the South African society. 
 
In terms of the statutory regulation it is acknowledged that whilst acting on behalf of or in 
the interest of a corporation, the directors or servants may commit statutory and or common-
law offences. For this reason, the statutory regulation specifically states that the criminal 
liability of a corporation is directed at any criminal act (or omission) committed on behalf of 
the corporation, regardless of the nature of the offence. 
 
(i) Section 384 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 1917 
                                                          
444 “In terms of s. 332 (5), however, one director was guilty of another director’s crime even though he would not 
normally have been vicariously liable therefore, unless it was proved that he did not take part in the other’s crime 
and that he could not have prevented it”. (Burchell (note 49) 567). 
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Section 384 (1) of the CPEA is the original statutory regulation that made provision for a 
corporation to be held liable for crimes committed by its directors or servants in furthering the 
interest of the corporation.445 This section has, however, been criticized for having being poorly 
drafted446 and for being a procedural provision which does not address substantive law in 
corporate criminal liability.447 In fact, Murray, J in R v Bennett448 states that “sec. 384 of Act 
31 of 1917 in its original form was a procedural provision”.  Section 384 simply reflected the 
common law position.449  
 
It is submitted that with the promulgation of section 384 the legislature for the first time showed 
that it is not only aware of the importance of corporate criminal liability, but that it endorses 
the concept. This view is echoed by Selikowitz’s correct assertion that “this provision was 
merely procedural, but it did imply an approval by the State of the concept of criminal liability 
of a corporation”.450 Had it not been for this implied approval by the State, one wonders how 
the development of this area of the law would have progressed in South Africa. As it is, with 
the existence of statutory regulation, the development of this area of the law has been slow. It 
is thus submitted that if the state had not given its implied approval, chances that corporate 
criminal liability would have remained virtually static are quite high. 
 
                                                          
445 Prior to the enactment of this provision in South Africa the common law position prevailed. 
446 “…it was a poor piece of draftsmanship”. (Kahn (note 415) 146). 
447 It has been stated that it “did not deal with the substantive law in the matter of criminal liability of corporations 
but merely sought to deal with the procedural position and remove some of the difficulties attendant upon the 
question of the method of enforcing criminal sanctions where liability existed”. (Lansdown et al. (note 429) 79). 
Another criticism of s. 384 is that it “it only dealt with procedure: it did not deal with substantive liability of a 
corporation, and the courts had a struggle in applying the legislation”. (Kahn (note 415) 146). 
448 R v Bennett (note 32). 
449 According to Selikowitz “the common law approach was helped along its path of justification in South Africa 
by the Criminal law and Procedure Act of 1917, section 384 (1), which referred to who shall represent the company 




Section 384 is a relatively short section and its wording is rather simple and clear.451 Its effect 
is to ensure that the corporation is held criminally liable for the unlawful acts of its directors 
and servants. This includes situations where the director or servant was trying to further or 
was furthering the interests of the corporation.452 A representative of the corporation, usually 
a director or servant thereof, was the person charged and tried as ‘the corporation’. After 
conviction, once a sentence is imposed the corporation was obliged to pay the money payable 
as a fine, from its coffers. This due to the fact that the ‘director or servant’ merely stood trial 
on behalf of the corporation as a result of the corporation’s lack of physical existence. 
 
In terms of the provision, as long as the state was able to show that the crime committed was 
allegedly committed by an individual or individuals in the process of advancing or attempting 
to advance the said corporation, that corporation would be prosecuted.453 Moreover, the 
                                                          
451 Section 384 of the CPEA states the following: 
“(1) In any criminal proceedings under any statute or statutory regulation or bye-law or at common law 
against a company, the secretary and every director or manager or chairman thereof in the Union may, 
unless it is otherwise directed or provided be charged with the offence and shall be liable to be punished 
therefore, unless he proves that he was in no way a party thereto. 
(2) In any such proceedings against a local authority, the mayor, chairman, town clerk, secretary or other 
similar officer shall, unless otherwise directed or provided, be liable to be so charged with, and in like 
circumstances be punished for the offence. 
(3) In any such proceedings against a partnership, every member of such partnership who is in the Union 
shall, unless it is otherwise directed or provided, be liable to be so charged, and in like circumstances 
punished for the offence. 
(4) In any such proceedings against any association of persons not specifically mentioned in this section, 
the president, chairman, secretary, and every other officer thereof in the Union shall, unless it is 
otherwise directed or provided, be liable to be so charged, and in like circumstances, to be punished for 
the offence. 
5) Provided that nothing in this section contained shall be deemed to exempt from 
liability any other person guilty of the offence”. See also PC Anders & SE Ellson The Criminal Law of South 
Africa vol. 2 (1917) 185. 
452 According to Pittman “the effect of these provisions is to impose upon the company liability for the criminal 
acts of its directors or servants, and so, even when such acts was done merely in furtherance or attempted 
furtherance of the company's interests”. (Pittman (note 368) 43). The phrase “furtherance or attempted furtherance 
of the company's interests” highlights the fact that for the corporation to be convicted it must be evident that the 
interests of the corporation were at the forefront at the time of the commission of the alleged offence. It is 
important, therefore, to make a distinction between the acts of an individual in his personal capacity (in his own 
interest) and the acts of the individual in advancing the interests of the corporation. 
453 This will be discussed under s. 332 of the CPA in IV(a) of this chapter below.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
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individual concerned could also be charged and be personally punished for the offence.454 A 
reading of section 384 (1) makes it clear that corporate criminal liability in the South African 
context has been “twofold” in that it also encompasses the personal criminal liability of the 
individuals within the corporation who were responsible for the commission of the offence.455  
 
Section 384 (1) had a number of shortcomings and for that reason, it has been widely 
criticized,456 as mentioned above. One of the main criticisms of section 384 is that “it was not 
clearly drafted and difficulty was experienced in interpreting it”.457 It is submitted that this 
view by Barlow is correct, particularly when one attempts to interpret the wording of section 
384(1). When reading the section, it refers to criminal proceedings against a company, then it 
proceeds to state that in such proceedings, the secretary and every director or manager shall 
be liable. This can also be seen in the judge’s remarks in R v Hewertson458 where the court 
had to interpret section 384 (1). Davis J remarks that “the Lawgiver used words which, on 
(my) reading of the section, signify that these individuals shall be liable for the crimes of (for 
instance) the company, but expressed it as though that was a mode of bringing proceedings 
against the company itself”.459 It is submitted that the wording of section 384(1) may create 
confusion regarding whose liability the provision is concerned with. It is further submitted 
that since the legislature does not clearly exclude any of the mentioned parties, the section 
should be interpreted as dealing with both the criminal liability of the corporation and the 
                                                          
454 CPEA (note 43) S. 384 (1). 
455 Kidd refers to corporate criminal liability, in the South African sense, as a twofold concept in that it 
encompasses the liability of the corporation as a legal person as well as the liability of the individuals whose 
responsibility it is to act on behalf of or in the interest of the corporation. (M Kidd The Protection of the 
environment through the use of criminal sanctions: A comparative analysis with specific reference to South Africa 
(2002) University of Natal. unpublished PhD thesis, 350). 
456 “Hierdie artikel het meer probleme as wat dit opgelos het en is uiteindelik in 1939 vervang met ’n voorskif wat 
die vorige posisie radikaal verander het”. (I Du Plessis ‘Die strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid van regsperson[e]: ’n 
mensliker benadering’ TSAR (1991) 635). 
457 Barlow (note 149) 502. 




criminal liability of the individuals within the corporation for the criminal acts of the 
corporation. It is agreed though that the provision was indeed, not clearly drafted.  
 
Based on the above, De Wet and Swanepoel make the observation that the wording of section 
384 creates ‘doubt that a legal entity could commit a crime’.460 They further explain that 
‘although the legislator is talking here of a criminal process against a corporation, it is not the 
corporation per se that is guilty but her organ(s)’.461  It is submitted that this view is not entirely 
correct as it is clearly stated in the provision that it is referring to criminal proceedings against 
a company. In addition to that, the provision refers to charging and punishing the organs of 
the company. Nowhere is it implied that the company is excluded from liability. It is submitted 
that the correct interpretation ought to be one that includes the company and its organs. 
 
The provision is further criticized for its presumptive nature in that the servant or director's 
guilt is presumed without being legally established. From the outset, the legislature makes the 
error of presuming that people are guilty, unless they are able to prove otherwise.462 This 
reverse onus, as will be seen, is inherited by the subsequent provisions regulating corporate 
criminal liability.463 The problem with the reverse onus, in this particular provision, is that 
instead of the prosecution bearing the onus to prove the guilt of the accused, the accused is 
presumed guilty and the burden of proving his innocence is borne by him.464  
                                                          
460 De Wet & Swanepoel (note 414). 
461 Ibid. 
462 “the secretary and every director or manager or chairman thereof…may…be charged with the offence and shall 
be liable to be punished therefore, unless he proves that he was in no way a party thereto”. (CPEA (note 43) 
Section 384 (1)). 
463 This will be discussed further below. 
464 The reverse onus, as found in the statutory regulation of corporate criminal liability is discussed in this 




It must be noted that section 384 was not only confined to proceedings relating to crimes 
‘committed’ by corporations. It also dealt with those relating to crimes committed by local 
authorities, 465  partnerships466  and other associations that lacked juristic personality. Where a 
local authority, a partnership and other associations with no juristic personality were concerned 
provision was made for the criminal liability of its organs. When a local authority was held 
liable for a crime, the mayor, chairman, town secretary, or other similar officer would also be 
charged with the same offence.467 Where the prosecution was against a partnership all the 
partners, present in the country, would be held liable and subsequently be punished for the 
same crime as the partnership.468 Dissolving the partnership in order to escape liability was a 
futile exercise as each of the partners could still be apprehended and could still face 
prosecution. It is submitted that in this way the legislature ensured that there would be a just 
reward for the people responsible for committing the crimes. Where any other association of 
persons, not specifically mentioned in the provision, committed a crime in the name of the 
group there would still be the possibility of criminal liability and its president, chairman, 
secretary and every other officer of such an association would also face prosecution for the 
same offence.469 
 
It is submitted that the poor drafting of the provision is misleading with regard to entities that 
are not incorporated and that lack juristic personality. Although crimes could be committed in 
furthering the interests of such an entity, the provision is framed in such a way that it gives the 
                                                          
465 The CPEA (note 43) Section 384(2). 
466 Ibid section 384(3). 
467 Ibid section 384(2). 
468 Ibid section 384(3). 
469 Ibid section 384(4). 
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impression that the entity itself could be prosecuted, together with its organs. In actual fact, 
due to the absence of juristic personality in these cases the entities could not be prosecuted. In 
such cases the individuals concerned would be personally prosecuted, acquitted or convicted 
and sentenced.   
 
(ii) Section 117 of the Companies Amendment Act 23 of 1939 
Corporate criminal liability was further developed by the enactment of section 117 of the 
CAA,470 which provided a substitution for section 384 of the CPEA. The heading of the new 
provision was “The Prosecution of corporations and members of associations”. Section 117 of 
the CAA revamped the previous provision. The new provision was a broader provision that 
consisted of eleven subsections.  
 
Apart from being held liable for acts or omissions ‘performed by or instructions given’ or ‘in 
the performance of his duties, the corporation could also be held liable for crimes committed 
‘in furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of that corporate body’. Moreover, 
section 384 as amended by section 117 made clearer provisions for the criminal liability of the 
corporation. In subsection 1 circumstances under which a corporation would incur criminal 
liability for the acts or omissions of its directors and servants, were provided.  The section also 
provided clearly for the personal criminal liability of the responsible director or servant of the 
corporation. Subsection 5 provided that the director or servant would incur personal criminal 
liability for the crime. He or she would only escape liability if he or she was able to prove that 
                                                          
470 The CAA (note 372) section 117. According to Barlow “In the course of enacting the Companies Amendment 
Act in 1939 Parliament took the opportunity of redrafting section 384 of the Criminal Procedure Act and setting 




he/she had not taken part in the commission of the offence and would not have been able to do 
anything to prevent the commission of the offence.  
 
Compared to the previous section 384, this provision reflected a stricter approach to the 
liability of directors or servants. Under the previous provision they bore the onus of proving 
that they were ‘in no way a party thereto’. Having done that, they would escape liability. A 
director or servant was therefore punished for his/her own involvement in the commission of 
the crime. The amended provision provided that a director or servant ‘shall be deemed guilty, 
unless it is proved that he/she did not take part in the commission of the offence, and that he 
could not have prevented it’. Firstly, the onus borne by the director or servant under the 
amended section 384 was clearly a heavier onus, in that one would easily be able to prove that 
he or she had nothing to do with the commission of a crime, however, providing proof that he 
or she could not have been able to do anything to prevent it, would be far more difficult. 
Secondly, the director’s / servant’s failure to prove that the director or servant could not have 
prevented the offence from being committed, in essence meant that the section allowed for a 
director or servant to be held criminally liable for the unlawful action of another director or 
servant. The section had thus been described as “a legal straitjacket from which even a Houdini 
of the law could not escape”.471  
 
The new provision contributed greatly to the development of corporate criminal liability in 
South Africa. In R v Bennett Murray, J states that the common law position “has been radically 
altered by sec. 117 of Act 23 of 1939”.472 Murray J’s observation that the modifications to the 
                                                          
471 Kahn (note 415) 146. 
472 He says this on the basis that “the new section not only deals with matters of procedure but makes 
provisions of substantive law”. (R v Bennett (note 32) 198). 
102 
 
common law that were brought about by the enactment of section 117 were radical is probably 
due to the fact that the twofold liability of both the corporations and the directors is even more 
clearly worded in this statute.473 In other respects section 117 continued to reflect the common-
law position. 
 
On the other hand, Selikowitz has an interesting view of section 117, that is, “this act did not, 
I suggest, alter or enact the Common Law but must be seen as an attempt by the legislature to 
give the corporate body (as a legal personality) rights and duties not under the existing 
Criminal Law which catered for the behaviour of human beings, but rather to create a Criminal 
Law for Corporations. Section 117 is in fact the Criminal Code of Corporations”.474   
 
Section 117 explained when a corporation would be held liable for the acts performed by its 
directors or servants. It was applicable to statutory as well as common law offences. It also 
specifically provided for strict liability by including the words “with or without a particular 
intent”.475 Strict liability is also included under the present section 332 and will be discussed 
in detail below. Since the wording of the amended section 384 does not differ much from the 
current section 332, the individual subsections will be discussed below, when section 332 is 
analysed. 
(iii) Section 381 of the Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955 
                                                          
473 “Briefly, the new legislation imposes a two-fold liability to criminal prosecutions. It holds a company liable 
for the criminal conduct of its directors and servant within a wide but specified field of activity. This liability is 
an absolute one and cannot be rebutted. Conversely, a director or servant of the company is held liable for the 
crimes of the company, but such liability is merely presumptive and may be rebutted”. (Barlow (note 149) 503). 
474 Selikowitz (note 369) 25. 
475 The CAA (note 372) section 117 (1)(a) and (b). 
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Section 381 was a comprehensive section in the CPA 1955,476 wherein the legislature made 
provisions for the criminal liability of corporations and members of associations.477 Section 
381 had 11 subsections and was very similar to section 384 (1) of the CPEA, as amended by 
section 117 of the CAA.478 In terms of section 381 again we had a situation where the fault of 
a director or a servant would be regarded as the fault of the corporation. The director or servant 
was also held liable for offences which had been committed by the corporation, if he could 
prove that he had not taken part in the commission of the offence and could not have prevented 
the offence from being committed.479 
 
In section 381 subsection 6 had been extended and contained part (b) which added 
significantly to what the previous subsection stated. It reads as follows 
(6) In any proceedings against a director or servant of a corporate body, in respect of an 
offence – 
                 (a) any evidence which would be or was admissible against that corporate body in 
prosecution for that offence, shall be admissible against the accused; 
                  (b) whether or not such corporate body is or was liable to prosecution for the said offence, 
any document, memorandum, book or record which was drawn up, entered up or kept 
in the ordinary course of that corporate body’s business, or which was at any time in 
the custody or under the control of any director, servant, or agent of such corporate 
body, in his capacity as director, servant or agent, shall be prima facie evidence of its 
contents and admissible in evidence against the accused, unless and until he is able to 
                                                          
476 The CPA 1955 (note 373) section 381. 
477 The section is entitled “Prosecution of corporations and members of associations”. 
478 The CAA (note 372) section 117. 
479 Due to the similarity between section 381 of the CPA 1955 (note 373) and the current legislation a full 
discussion of each provision will be given below under section 332 of the CPA (note 16). 
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prove that at all material times he had knowledge of the said document, memorandum, 
book or record, in so far as its contents are relevant to the offence charged, and was 
in no way party to the drawing up of such document or memorandum or making any 
relevant entries in such book or record. 
 
The addition made by subsection 6(b) provided clarity regarding documents that would be 
admissible as evidence. This subsection was adopted by the subsequent provision,480 and will 
be discussed below under section 332. 
 
III THE MENS REA OF THE CORPORATION AND THE BASIS FOR LIABILITY 
(a) The mens rea of the corporation 
It is a basic principle of South African criminal law that when an unlawful act or omission has 
occurred, before the person who was responsible for that act or omission is held criminally 
liable, it must be established that he had the necessary mens rea or culpability.481 Snyman 
defines culpability as the fact that “there must, in the eyes of the law, be grounds for blaming 
X personally for his unlawful conduct”.482 Culpability deals with the mindset of the person at 
the time of the commission of crime. When dealing with natural persons this issue is not 
problematic.483  
When it comes to corporations, the corporation’s inability to have a particular mindset, does 
however, make it difficult to hold a corporation criminally liable for its criminal acts. A way 
                                                          
480 This will be discussed below in the discussion of section 332(6) at IV(a)(vi) below. 
481 Snyman (note 22) 149. 
482 Ibid. 
483 “The question here is whether that particular person (X), in the light of his personal aptitudes, gifts, 
shortcomings and knowledge, and of what the legal order may fairly expect of him, can be blamed for his 
wrongdoing. If this is the case, it means that the wrongdoing can be attributed to X personally; he is “charged with 




had to be found to make a corporation liable. In South African law this is made possible by 
seeing to it that the corporation is somehow able to have this attribute of mens rea. This is done 
by imputing the mens rea of the responsible director or servant to the corporation.484 By so 
doing the juristic person is placed in a position where the juristic person, despite its inability to 
think and act, is able to comply with all the elements of a crime.  
 
(j) The basis for liability 
With regard to the basis for liability in South African corporate criminal liability there are two 
schools of thought. The proponents of the first school of thought regard the basis as vicarious 
liability, whilst the proponents of the second school of thought see the basis as going beyond 
the type of vicarious liability that is applicable to natural persons. The latter refer to the 
derivative approach as the basis for liability.  
 
(i)  Vicarious liability  
In South Africa corporations are held criminally liable for the criminal actions of their directors 
or servants. The statutory regulation of corporate criminal liability is mainly based on vicarious 
liability.485 Vicarious liability arises as a result of the relationship between persons, usually 
employer and employee. Snyman explains the rationale behind vicarious liability in the 
following way: 
“The policy underlying the creation of vicarious liability is that it will encourage the employer 
to ensure that his employees’ conduct complies with the provisions of the law; he should not 
be allowed to hide behind his employees’ mistakes; their mistakes are imputed to him; he has 
                                                          
484 “The culpability of the director or servant is similarly ascribed to the corporate body”. (Ibid 254). 
485 Jordaan (note 42) 49-50. 
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delegated his powers to them and more often than not gains financially from their activities. 
Therefore, their actions are deemed to be his actions”.486 
 
A reading of section 332 of the Criminal Procedure Act makes it clear that as an employer, the 
corporation is held liable for the wrongful acts of its employees. Jordaan487 and Nana488 are 
among commentators who regard vicarious liability as a basis for corporate criminal liability 
in South Africa. They are indeed correct, but, it is submitted, only to a certain extent. Vicarious 
liability is applicable where the principal (the corporation) is being held liable for acts 
‘authorised’ by the principal. After stating that the mens rea of the accused must be imputed 
to the corporation, White J in S v Dersley states that the accused “is therefore vicariously 
liable”.489  
 
It is submitted that this is not an entirely true reflection of the basis of liability for corporate 
criminal liability in South Africa,490 because although it does entail vicarious liability, a close 
examination of section 332 shows that it goes further than vicarious liability. 
 
When it comes to corporate criminal liability in South Africa section 332(1) states that a 
corporation will be held criminally liable even where an offence has been committed without 
the express or implied instructions from the ‘managers’ of the corporation and even where the 
                                                          
486 Snyman (note 16) 251. 
487 Jordaan (note 42) 50. 
488 CN Nana ‘Corporate Criminal Liability in South Africa: The Need to look beyond Vicarious Liability’ (2011) 
55, 1 Journal of African Law 86, 92. 
489 S v Dersley 1997 (2) SA 951 (T) 263. 
490 Murray J in R v Bennett (note 32) 200 in passing judgment makes the observation that the accused “in carrying 
out his duties as a servant of the appellant company was negligent. His negligence must in terms of sec. 384 (1) 
(a) and (b), as amended, be deemed to be the company’s negligence and must be imputed to the company”. 
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‘officers’ are not in the process of exercising their powers or performing their duties. This 
clearly is liability beyond vicarious liability. Kidd provides a clear explanation of how section 
332(1) goes further than vicarious liability. He states that  
 
“the principal distinction between the liability imposed by section 332 (1) and vicarious liability is 
that this section imposes liability in cases where the director or servant acts beyond his or her 
powers or duties but while ‘furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of’ the corporation. 
Vicarious liability applies only to cases where the servant is acting within the course and scope of 
his or her employment”.491  
 
Based on Kidd’s argument, it is submitted that it is not entirely correct to refer to the basis of 
liability for corporate criminal liability as vicarious liability, as such an explanation excludes 
situations where the director or servant has exceeded his powers. A full picture of corporate 
criminal liability in South Africa includes situations where the director / servant exceeded his 
powers. By referring to the basis of liability as vicarious liability, one excludes situations where 
the director or servant has exceeded his powers but was still in pursuit of furthering the interests 
of the corporation, which may render the corporation criminally liable.  
 
Burchell also supports the view that the basis for corporate criminal liability in South Africa 
goes beyond vicarious liability for natural persons.492  Kahn also states that the corporations’ 
“criminal responsibility is much more extensive than the vicarious liability of natural 
                                                          
491 M Kidd ‘Corporate Liability for Environmental Offences’ (2003) 18 S.A.Public Law 3, 3. 
492 Burchell (note 49) 563.  
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persons”.493 It is submitted that Kidd, Burchell and Kahn provide a more accurate reflection of 
the South African situation.  
 
(ii) The derivative approach 
It is submitted that the approach followed in South Africa is the derivative approach. Burchell 
avers that “the current approach to criminal liability of corporations in South Africa is, in fact, 
based on derivative liability (i.e. the conduct and fault of the agent or servant of the corporation 
is imputed to the corporation)”.494 It entails imputing the guilt of the director or servant to the 
corporation. Unlike vicarious liability, where the corporation is held liable for the unlawful acts 
of the individual, under the derivative approach the act and the mens rea of the servant or 
director are considered as the guilt of the corporation.495 Burchell explains that from the outset 
“the criminal liability of a corporate body in South Africa went wider than that of the vicarious 
liability of natural persons; and it rested upon the imputation to the corporation of the crimes 
of persons acting on their behalf, rather than upon vicarious liability, which required conduct 
in the course and scope of employment”.496 
Although Kidd states that “S.332 (1) imputes the fault of its directors or servants on the 
corporation rather than making the company vicariously liable for the crimes of its directors or 
servants”,497 it is submitted that the South African approach entails liability that includes 
                                                          
493 E Kahn ‘Can a Company Be Guilty of Murder? The Criminal Liability of a Corporation – II’ (1990) 19 
Business Man’s Law 175, 175. 
494 Burchell (note 49) 563. 
495 “An act by the director or servant of a corporate body is deemed to be an act of the corporate body itself, 
provided the act was perfomed in exercising powers or in the performance of duties as a director or servant, or if 
the director or servant was furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of the corporate body”. (Snyman 
(note 22) 254).  
496 Burchell (note 49) 563. 
497 Kidd (note 455) 355. 
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vicarious liability498 but also goes even further than vicarious liability.499 It is further submitted 
that the South African approach is the derivative approach500 and the imputation of liability 
where the acts fall within the scope of the duties of the director or servant also amounts to 
vicarious liability. The derivative approach however, goes further than vicarious liability as it 
includes the wrongful acts of the directors and employees of the corporation, even if these were 
beyond the powers of the director or servant. As long as they were committed while in the 
process of furthering the interests of the corporation, these are imputed to the corporation.501  
 
Regardless of the basis that a jurisdiction relies on, there are various problems that one 
encounters when dealing with the concept of corporate criminal liability. These include, inter 
alia, the issue of attributing mens rea to a corporation502 as well as the question as to whether 
the current punishment imposed on corporations is sufficient to punish and deter corporations 
from committing crimes. As will be seen below, these issues as well as the efficiency of the 
derivative theory as the basis for corporate criminal liability in South Africa are in need of 
attention. This is supported by Burchell’s assertion that “in South Africa, the theory behind 
corporate responsibility and the translation of this theory into a realistic form of corporate 
responsibility is in desperate need of review”.503 
 
IV THE CURRENT REGULATION OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND 
CORPORATE HOMICIDE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
                                                          
498 The corporation is held liable for actions and omissions that take place within the scope of duty. 
499 The corporation is also held liable for acts and omissions that occur beyond the scope of duty, as long as they 
take place while furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of the corporation. 
500 “The current approach to criminal liability of corporations in South Africa is, in fact, based on derivative 
liability (i.e. the conduct and fault of the agent or servant of the corporation is imputed to the corporation)”. 
(Burchell (note 49) 563). Kahn states that the corporation’s “criminal responsibility is much more extensive than 
the vicarious liability of natural persons”. (Kahn (note 493)175).  
501 Kidd (note 455) 355. 
502 It is submitted that there is still an obstacle in that a human attribute of fault is imputed to an artificial entity.  
503 Burchell (note 49) 565. 
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(a) The current regulation of corporate criminal liability in South Africa: Section 332 of 
the CPA  
Corporate criminal liability is currently regulated by section 332 of the CPA which bears the 
heading ‘Prosecution of corporations and members of associations’. From the heading it is 
clear that the section is not only aimed at juristic persons, but it also regulates the prosecution 
of crimes committed by persons belonging to an association that lacks juristic personality.504 
The statute regulates the criminal liability of both groups in the same section.505 In section 332 
the legislature imputes the guilt of the individual within the corporation who committed the 
offence, to the corporation itself,506 it in fact “embodies the…principle…that the guilt of the 
natural person is the guilt of the corporate body”.507  
 
Where the association of persons lacks juristic personality, the members or natural persons who 
are involved in running the association are personally held criminally liable.508 If members of 
an association of persons with no juristic personality were excluded from criminal liability, 
people would commit crimes in the name of an association with the knowledge that they would 
escape liability. Section 332 thus ensures that members of entities that do not have juristic 
personality are held responsible for crimes committed in furthering or endeavouring to further 
the interests of such entities. 
                                                          
504 The original statute also included the prosecution of entities that were not corporations. It can be said that the 
main concern of the legislature is dealing with corporate crime, regardless of the nature of the business entity that 
is responsible for the crime.  
505 The statute regulates these in a similar manner and having a separate provision or statute is not necessary. 
506“In terms of the subsection, where a corporation is charged with such a crime the fault of the director or servant 
who committed the crime will be imputed to the corporation”. (Burchell (note 49) 565-566). 
507 D Bailes ‘Watch Your Corporation’ (1995) 3, 1 JBL 24. “This subsection imputes the fault of its directors or 
servants on the corporation, rather than making the company vicariously liable for the crimes of its directors or 
servants”. (Kidd (491) 3). 
508 It must be noted here that due to the absence of legal personality the entity itself cannot be charged, found 




As discussed above, in its original form509 the section imposed a dual liability to criminal 
prosecutions. This entailed the corporation being held liable for the crimes of its directors or 
servants in terms of section 332 (1), and, in turn, the directors or servants being held liable for 
the crimes of the corporate body in terms of section 332 (5). In S v Coetzee section 332 (5) 
was constitutionally challenged and was found to be unconstitutional.510 The common law 
position is thus applicable.511 The position under the current statutory regulation is that 
corporations are criminally liable for crimes committed by their servants and or directors. 
It must be noted that in the discussion of the subsections of section 332 some of the case law 
emanating from the previous provisions which are relevant to the discussion will be referred 
to. 
 
(i)   Section 332 (1) 
According to s. 332 (1) 
For the purpose of imposing upon a corporate body criminal liability for any offence, whether 
under any law or at common law - 
a) any act performed, with or without a particular intent, by or on instructions or with 
permission, express or implied, given by a director or servant of that corporate body; 
and 
b) the omission, with or without a particular intent, of any act which ought to have 
                                                          
509 Prior to the decision in S v Coetzee (note 56) which declared section 332 (5) unconstitutional. 
510 The judgment was not unanimous. The findings of the various judges are briefly discussed below. 
511 As stated above, in terms of the common law a director may be held liable for offences committed by the 
corporation “only if he took part in that other’s crime, or on the basis of vicarious liability or agency”. (Burchell 
(note 49) 567). 
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been but was not performed by or on instructions given by a director or servant of 
that corporate body,  
in the exercise of his powers or in the performance of his duties as such director or servant or 
in furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of that corporate body, shall be deemed 
to have performed (and with the same intent, if any) by that corporate body or, as the case 
may be, to have been an omission (and with the same intent, if any) on the part of that 
corporate body.512 
 
Section 332 (1) is a replica of section 381 (1) of the CPA 1955, its predecessor. The original 
provision, section 384 (1) of the CPEA, was a brief provision which served merely to regulate 
in a statute, that which was already regulated by the common law.513 Its substitution by section 
117 of the CAA resulted in the provision being much longer and it is clear that an attempt was 
made at clarifying issues which could possibly give rise to confusion and misinterpretation. 
The latter provisions reflect a development in the area of corporate criminal liability, as the 
legislature explains in a clearer manner whose actions the corporation is to be held liable for 
and under what circumstances the corporation will be held liable. Like section 381(1) of the 
CPEA 1955, section 332(1) of the CPA provides more clarity about the ‘criminal imputability 
of a corporate body’.514  
 
In terms of subsection 1 a corporation may be held liable for ‘any offence’.515 This may be 
under any legislation or under common law. Corporations have been held liable for many 
                                                          
512 The CPA (note 16) Section 332 (1). 
513 The CPEA (note 43) section 384(1). 
514 E Du Toit Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act service 43 (2009) 33-5.  
515 Own emphasis. 
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offences that have arisen from other legislation. In S v Banur Investments516 a conviction of a 
company and its managing director for the contravention of the Liquor Act517 was confirmed 
by the then Transvaal Supreme Court. The conviction of three companies and their director for 
the contravention of section 31(1)(a) of the Road Transportation Act was confirmed in S v 
Longdistance (Natal) (Pty) Ltd and Others.518 In the highly publicised case of S v Shaik and 
Others519 ten corporations together with Shabir Shaik, who directly controlled them as sole or 
majority shareholder were convicted of the contravention of section 1(1)(a)(i) or (ii) of the 
Corruption Act.520 Corporations have also been convicted of common-law crimes including 
culpable homicide,521 theft522 and fraud.523 It is important to note that the term ‘any offence’ 
refers to offences that corporations are capable of committing.524 Where the legislature has 
confined the application of the law to human beings, the corporation will escape liability.525  
The specific mention of the phrase ‘under any law or at common law’526 serves to eliminate 
confusion regarding the laws that can be contravened by corporations. At the same time the 
legislature has avoided prescribing a list of specific offences that can be committed by a 
corporation. It is submitted that doing so would be counterproductive as the provision would 
require constant revision to suit the ever-changing and increasing corporate activities.  
 
                                                          
516 S v Banur Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another (note 375). 
517 The Liquor Act 30 of 1928. 
518 S v Longdistance (Natal) (Pty) Ltd and Others 1990 (2) SA 277 (A). 
519 S v Shaik and Others [2005] 3 All SA 211 (D). The proceedings of this case were televised and broadcast on 
national television and radio as a result of the fact that it also dealt with the ‘alleged corrupt’ relationship between 
Mr Shaik and the then Deputy President of South Africa, Mr Jacob Zuma. 
520 The Corruption Act 94 of 1992. 
521 As illustrated by R v Bennett (note 32); Rycroft (note 365) 150. 
522 In R v Markins Motors (Pty) Ltd (note 384) an appeal against a conviction for theft was upheld under the 1977 
Act . 
523 R v Frankfort Motors (note 385). 
524  “It is submitted that acts or omissions by directors or officers for which they only are made punishable under 
the Companies Act are not intended to be dealt with under s 332(1) so as to make the company punishable as well, 
ie s 332(1) refers only to an offence which the company itself can commit”. (Delport (note 87) Appx III-5). 
525 S v Sutherland (note 433) 385.  
526 Section 332(1). Own emphasis. 
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Subsection l (a) of section 332 refers to any ‘act performed’527 and subsection (b) refers to an 
‘omission’.528 From these subsections it is clear that a corporation will be held liable for any 
act or omission that is regarded as an offence regardless of whether it is regarded as such by 
legislation or by common law. Substantive law provides the acts and omissions that are 
regarded as offences. All offences regardless of whether they fall under common law or 
statutory law have been included. The corporation can thus be held liable for any act or 
omission that is by law regarded as a crime. In this section the legislature made an all-inclusive 
provision which makes it clear that corporations may be prosecuted for criminal activities 
regardless of the nature of the offence. As long as it is clear that a crime has been committed 
and that the corporation is answerable, the corporation may be prosecuted.529 The submission 
that “acts or omissions by directors or officers for which they only are made punishable under 
the Companies Act are not intended to be dealt with under section 332(1) so as to make the 
company punishable as well”530 is supported.531 The reason is that those are offences made by 
those individuals, in their own interest and the aim is to punish those individuals only as they 
are the only possible wrongdoers, not corporations. 
 
Section 332 (1) specifically refers to acts and omissions that take place ‘with or without a 
particular intent’. This clause refers to culpability532 and it makes it clear that a corporation 
will be held liable for acts committed with either intention or negligence,533 attributes which 
are confined to natural persons. This is important in that it “removes the obstacle to imposing 
                                                          
527 Own emphasis. 
528 Own emphasis. 
529 “This section renders the corporate body liable for any act or omission of a director or servant that constitutes 
an offence under any law or at common law”. (Bailes (note 507) 24). 
530 Delport (note 87) Appx III-5. 
531 Ibid. 
532 “By “culpability” is meant that there must, in the eyes of the law, be grounds for blaming X personally for his 
unlawful conduct”. (Snyman (note 22) 149). 
533 “The act or omission, whether intentional or negligent, is deemed to have been performed by the corporate 
body”. (Bailes (note 507) 24). 
115 
 
criminal liability upon an artificial person that could not be found guilty of a crime requiring 
fault since it has no mind”.534 In terms of section 332(1)(b) once it has been established that an 
offence has been committed, mens rea or blameworthiness is an element that must be proven535 
before the accused can be blamed for the offence.536 Section 332 (1) does not purport to give 
corporations human attributes537 and the section should be understood to mean that mens rea, 
as a human attribute, is imputed to the corporation. In S v Dersley538 it was held that in 
accordance with section 332(1) (b) the mens rea of the responsible individual, at the time of 
the commission of the offence is considered to be the mens rea of the corporation.539 In this 
case the director’s mens rea was imputed to the corporation. It is thus clear that in South Africa 
the corporation is held liable for offences committed by individuals on the basis that the 
individual’s mens rea is regarded as the mens rea of the corporation.540  
This was also the case in R v Bennett.541 It must be noted that R v Bennett was based on the 
previous provision, section 384 of the CPEA. In casu the wrongful act and the negligence of 
the corporation’s servant was deemed to be the wrongful act and the negligence of the 
corporation. An employee of the accused company had negligently operated machinery and 
this caused the death of another employee. The negligent workman was convicted of culpable 
homicide. The company was also charged with and convicted of culpable homicide.  
In S v Joseph Mtshumayeli,542 the driver of a bus owned by the accused company allowed a 
                                                          
534 Burchell (note 49) 565. 
535 As Burchell puts it “the question here is whether a particular person, in the light of his personal aptitude, gifts, 
shortcomings and knowledge, and of what the legal order may fairly expect of him, can be blamed for his 
wrongdoing”. ( Ibid 144). 
536 Snyman (note 22) 149 states that “the question of culpability arises only once it has been established that there 
was an unlawful conduct. 
537 “a corporation …possesses no mens rea of its own, and any mental element can exist on the part of some other 
individual such as a director”. (R v Bennett (note 32) 200). 
538 S v Dersley (note 489) . 
539 Ibid 951. 
540 Du Toit (note 514) 33-5. 
541 R v Bennett & Co (note 32) 194.   
542 S v Joseph Mtshumayeli (Pvt)Ltd 1971 (1) SA 33 (RA). 
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passenger to drive the bus. The passenger lost control of the bus, which in turn overturned, 
causing the death of another passenger. The negligence of the employee was imputed to the 
company and the company was found guilty of culpable homicide. It must be noted that S v 
Joseph Mtshumayeli is not a South African court case. The reason for including it in this 
discussion is that liability was based on a provision in what was Rhodesian law at the time, 
which has the same wording as section 332(1).543 
 
Holding a corporation criminally liable by imputing the fault of its directors or servants to the 
corporation544 has led to a situation where a corporation may also be convicted of crimes which 
could only be committed by natural persons. This is a contentious issue, though, because, some 
offences are such that they can only be committed by natural persons.545 Due to the nature of a 
corporation, questions regarding whether it really is possible for corporations to be held liable 
for any crime, have been raised. Bailes points out that “on the face of it, section 332 (1) seems 
to refer only to intentional acts or omissions”.546 In interpreting this provision, however, case 
law has shown us that it is possible for a corporation to be convicted for crimes requiring mens 
rea in the form of negligence, such as culpable homicide. This was seen in R v Bennett Co. 
(Pty.) Ltd., and Another 547 and in S v Joseph Mtshumayeli,548 as stated above.  
The interpretation of this provision has led to problems though, as can be seen in S v Suid 
                                                          
543 Section 401(1) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, Chapter 31 (R). In making its decision the court 
also relied on several South African cases, including R v Bennet (note 32) S v Cairns and Another 1969 (3) SA 
523 (N) and R v Phillips Dairy (Pty) Ltd 1955 (4) SA 120 T.  
544 Kidd (note 491) 3. 
545 Lansdown et al. (note 429) 79 state that “thus a corporation could not be convicted of treason, murder, assault, 
arson, theft or such like offences”. 
546 Bailes (note 507) 24. 
547 Here the court had to apply section 384 (1) of the CPEA, as amended by section 117 of the CAA and Murray 
J averred that “the language of section 384 (1) (a) and (b) as amended is so clear that it is not competent for any 
Court of Law to refrain from giving the section the effect of its plain meaning”. (R v Bennett (note 32) 200). 
548 S v Joseph Mtshumayeli (note 542) 33. 
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Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie549 where the court interpreted section 332 (1) as excluding 
crimes committed negligently.550 In that particular case the court interpreted the section as 
meaning that “section 332 (1) is not applicable where only negligence on the part of a director 
or employee is proved and not on the part of the juristic person itself”.551 From the outset this 
decision was not seen as a correct interpretation of the provision.552 
 
This decision was later overruled by the Appellate Division in Ex parte Minister van Justisie: 
In Re S v Suid Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie.553 The Appellate Division approved the decision 
in R v Bennett and in answering the question of whether section 332 (1) was applicable to 
negligent acts or omissions, the court correctly held that, “on a proper investigation of section 
332 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 a juristic person can be held liable for crimes 
of negligence committed by its directors and officers”.554 In this way even if there is no 
corporate fault, a corporation may still be held criminally liable.555 
 
Section 332 (1) refers to acts and omissions ‘by or on instructions or with permission, express 
or implied, given by a director or servant of that corporate body’. This refers to those wrongful 
acts that have been committed with the director or servant’s permission and wrongful acts 
                                                          
549 S v Suid Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie 1991 (2) SA 698 (W). 
550 In this case “the respondent was acquitted on the basis that it could not be held vicariously liable for the crime 
charged as s. 332 (1) did not apply to crimes of negligence”. (Jordaan  (note 42) 52). 
551 S v Suid Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie (note 549) 699. 
552 “Daar kan dus, met respek, nie met die hof in hierdie verband saamgestem word nie. Op grond van die bewese 
feite moes die respondent eintlik skuldig gewees het. Tog sou so ’n skuldigbevinding nie die regsgevoel bevredig 
nie. In die sin het ’n mens dus simpatie vir die gevolgtrekking waartoe die hof kom. Die enigste oplossing vir 
hierdie problem lê in die wysiging van die huidige regsposisie”. (Du Plessis (note 456) 642-643). 
553 Ex parte Minister van Justisie: In Re S v Suid Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie  1992 (4) SA 804 (AD). 
554 Ibid 804. 
555 Snyman (note 22) 254. “The SABC case illustrates that a corporation may be convicted of a crime requiring 
negligence even if it can show that it had exercised due diligence. In other words corporate criminal liability may 
follow despite the absence of corporate fault”. (Jordaan (note 42) 53). 
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performed on their instructions.  
The wording makes it clear that in terms of subsection (1) a corporation may be held 
vicariously liable556 for wrongful acts of its directors or its servants. In addition to that, it may 
even be held vicariously liable for an offence committed by a third party, who is neither a 
director nor a servant of the corporation, provided that such person received instructions or 
permission from a director or servant of the corporation, in the scope of their duties. An 
example of a corporation being held vicariously liable for the wrongful act of a third party, 
who had been granted permission by the employer, is that of the third party who drove the bus, 
in S v Joseph Mtshumayeli557 after having been allowed to do so by the employee. 
 
The permission granted to the third party by the director or servant may be express or implied. 
This means that a corporation may be held criminally liable for the offence of a third party, 
even where the offence has been committed without the express instructions from the directors 
or servants of the corporation. Such instructions may be implied. It is therefore important for 
the court to look at the surrounding circumstances in each case.     
 
Section 332(1) further makes an important proviso by stating that the corporation will be held 
liable where the director or servant commits an offence ‘in the exercise of his powers or in the 
performance of his duties’ or if the offence was committed while the director or servant was 
‘furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of the corporation’.558  It is thus important 
                                                          
556 Vicarious liability plays an important role in corporate criminal liability in South Africa, however, as will be 
seen below, corporate criminal liability in South Africa goes further than that and allows a corporation to be 
prosecuted for crimes committed outside the scope of duty. 
557 S v Joseph Mtshumayeli (note 542). 
558 “It is submitted that a distinction should be drawn between a director or servant of a corporation who is acting 
solely for his own personal interests and one who is acting in furtherance, or attempted furtherance, of the 
corporation’s interests. The former individual should not render the corporation liable for any crimes committed 
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to establish and prove that the offenders were indeed acting within their powers or scope of 
employment or that they were furthering or trying to further the interests of the corporation. 
Failure to prove this beyond a reasonable doubt will result in the corporation escaping liability.   
 
Where a bread-baking company appealed against its conviction for its servant’s unlawful 
selling of bread at prices below the minimum price, the appeal failed because the servant was 
found to have been acting within the scope of his employment when he sold the bread.559 Selke 
J stated that the servant had indeed acted within his powers and scope of duty, it was just that 
he had “exercise(d) his powers and perform(ed) his duties in an unlawful manner”.560   
 
In S v African Bank of South Africa Ltd and Others561 the corporation, a bank, did escape 
liability due to the fact that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
guilty individuals within the corporation, in committing the offence had done so in ‘furthering 
or endeavouring to further the interests’ of the corporation.562 The court found that the parties 
who had committed the criminal acts had done so in order to “further their own interests and, 
in the process, had had to further interests of bank for without doing so, they would have been 
unable to further their own interests”.563 
 
In R v Barney’s Super Service Station (Pty) Ltd a salesman who worked for the appellant 
                                                          
in furtherance of his own interests, while the latter should render the corporation liable under s. 332 (1)”. (Burchell 
(note 49) 566). 
559 Durban Baking Co Ltd v Rex 1945 NPD 136.  
560 Ibid 141. 
561 S v African Bank of South Africa Ltd and Others 1990 (2) SACR 585 (W). 
562 The accused were prosecuted for the contravention of Regulation 14A of the Exchange Controls Regulations, 
which prohibited dealings with the financial Rand without the permission of the Treasury. 
563 S v African Bank of South Africa Ltd and Others (note 561) 589. 
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company had entered into a contract of sale with a third party for his own benefit.564 The third 
party had been charged a price which exceeded the fixed price and the corporation was 
convicted by the court a quo together with the salesman for that offence. Since there was no 
indication that this was done in the process of furthering the interests of the corporation, the 
court hearing the appeal dismissed it as it found that “the company at all stages was a stranger 
to the transaction”.565 
 
In R v Phillips Dairy (Pty) Ltd566 it was argued that a limited company was not in a position to 
be held liable for contravening section 384(1) since an employer could not be held criminally 
responsible for the criminal acts of his employees.567 It was held that the criminal acts had been 
committed in the process of furthering the interests of the corporation.568 The court further 
accepted the Attorney General’s argument that the provision “is substantive law, and makes a 
limited company criminally liable as an employer, even in cases where a private employer 
would not be so liable”.569  
 
In R v Van Heerden & Others570 the company was held criminally liable for the crime 
committed by its director. In casu an appeal by the corporation against its conviction for 
making false representations to its clients failed as its director had made false representations 
whilst furthering the interests of the corporation. The director’s unlawful acts were deemed to 
                                                          
564 R v Barney’s Super Service Station (Pty) Ltd 1956 (4) SA 107 (T).  
565 Ibid 108. 
566 R v Phillips Dairy (Pty) Ltd (note 543). 
567 Ibid 122. 
568 Price J states that “the facts in the present case indicate, beyond any doubt that the transaction out of which the 
prosecution arose was in furtherance of the interests of the appellant company”. (Ibid 124). 
569 Ibid 120. 
570 R v Van Heerden & Others 1946 AD 168, 168.  
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be the corporation’s unlawful acts, hence the conviction. In his judgment Davis AJA states: 
 
It was the company which was selling the frames: the 2nd appellant admitted that the frames 
were a source of income to the company, that everything done to get orders or make delivery 
was in the interests of the company and that it was his duty to sell as many frames as he could. 
In these circumstances, what he did was done not only for himself, but also “in furthering or 
endeavouring to further the interests of the corporate body”, that is, of the company. The 
company is liable for his acts…571 
 
In interpreting the words “in the exercise of his powers or in the performance of his duties as 
such director or servant, or in furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of that 
corporate body”572 Barlow reaches the conclusion that there are three classes of offences.573 
These are: 
i) Those committed by directors through the exercising of their powers.574 
ii) Those committed by servants while acting within their scope of employment.575 
iii) Those committed by directors or by servants in the process of furthering or endeavouring 
to further the interests of the company.576 
 
This interpretation by Barlow takes into account the terms that are used when referring to the 
activities of servants and of directors. The section mentions both parties without clearly stating 
the circumstances under which each may be liable. It is submitted that Barlow’s interpretation 
                                                          
571 Ibid 171. 
572 This is based on the forerunner to section 332, which is section 384 of the CPA 1955. 
573 Barlow (note 149) 504. 





is correct as, strictly speaking, when one looks at the common law definitions and duties of 
both directors and servants, it is clear that they differ significantly from each other. A clear 
explanation of the circumstances under which each may be held liable, is thus important and 
necessary, as it provides clarity. 
Where a company has been registered for a purportedly lawful purpose, it will be treated in the 
same way as companies registered for lawful purposes.577 This was made clear in R v Meer578 
where it was submitted that the accused corporation was “a non-existing thing, a phantom, and 
not a body corporate, and consequently that it cannot be guilty of the crimes charged against 
it”.579 The court found that a legal entity did indeed come into existence and for that reason, it 
could be convicted of the crimes with which it was charged.580 It was held that since there was 
a valid registration of the company, the fact that it had been registered for an unlawful purpose 
could not set it free from liability.581  
 
It is important to note that the liability envisaged by the legislature in terms of subsection 1 is 
intended for corporate bodies only. A trust created by a notarial deed is not a juristic person 
therefore it cannot be held liable under subsection 1. In S v Peer582 the accused was a trust that 
had been created by a notarial deed. Henning J stated that a trust created by a notarial deed 
does not have legal personality, therefore it could not be held liable for the unlawful acts of 
its trustee.583 
                                                          
577 Du Toit (note 514) 33-6. 
578 R v Meer & Others 1958 (2) SA 175 (N). 
579 Ibid 176. 
580 Ibid 181. 
581 Ibid 180 – 181. This was later approved in S v Ismail & Others (2) 1965 (1) SA 452 (N) 458. 
582 S v Peer 1968 (4) SA 460 (N). 




Based on what is stated in the above discussion, in essence a corporation may be held liable 
for crimes committed with or without particular intent by:584 
 Its director in exercising his/her powers or within the scope of duty or in furthering or 
endeavouring to further the interests of the corporation as in R v Van Heerden585  and 
Others; R v Markins Motors (Pty) Ltd.586 
 Its servant in exercising his/her powers or within the scope of duty or in furthering or 
endeavouring to further the interests of the corporation as in R v Bennett.587 
 A third party who does so on instructions of a director  
 A third party who does so on instructions of a servant as in S v Joseph Mtshumayeli.588 
 A third party who does so with express or implied permission of a director 
 A third party who does so with the express or implied permission of a servant.  
 
These acts or omissions must have occurred within the director or servant’s scope of duty or in 
furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of the corporation. As long as it is clear that 
any one of the above listed parties has committed a crime under the stated circumstances, a 
corporation may be held liable, regardless of whether ‘it’ was aware of the commission of the 
crime or not. Section 332(1) raises several areas of concern, most of which give rise to the 
questions regarding the constitutionality and the effectiveness of section 332 as a whole. These 
issues will be discussed below, when all the subsections have been explained. 
                                                          
584 This breakdown is based on the breakdown made by Delport et al.  (note 87) Appx III – 5-6. 
585 R v Van Heerden (note 570). 
586 R v Markins Motors (Pty) Ltd (note 384). 
587 R v Bennett (note 32). 




(ii) Section 332 (2) 
Section 332(2) states as follows: 
In any prosecution against a corporate body, a director or servant of that corporate body shall 
be cited, as representative of that corporate body, as the offender, and thereupon the person so 
cited may, as such representative, be dealt with as if he were the person accused of having 
committed the offence in question: provided that- 
(a) If the said person pleads guilty, other than by way of admitting guilt under section 57, the 
plea shall not be valid unless the corporate body authorized him to plead guilty; 
(b) If at any stage of the proceedings the said person ceases to be a director or servant of that 
corporate body or absconds or is unable to attend, the court in question may, at the 
request of the prosecutor, from time to time substitute for the said person any other person 
who is a director or servant of the said corporate body at the time of the said substitution, 
and thereupon the proceedings shall continue as if no substitution had taken place; 
(c) If the said person, as representing the corporate body, is convicted, the court convicting 
him shall not impose upon him in his representative capacity any punishment, whether 
direct or as an alternative, other than a fine, even if the relevant law makes no provision 
for the imposition of a fine in respect of the offence in question, and such fine shall be 
payable by the corporate body and may be recovered by attachment and sale of property 
of the corporate body in terms of section 288; 
(d) The citation of a director or servant of a corporate body as aforesaid, to represent that 
corporate body in any prosecution instituted against it, shall not exempt that director or 
servant from prosecution for that offence in terms of subsection (5). 
 
Holding a corporation criminally liable has not always been part of South Africa’s corporate 
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or criminal law and it is an extraordinary phenomenon.589 For that reason when this became a 
practice there were bound to be certain problems.590 These include questions such as who 
ought to stand trial on behalf of the corporation and whose actions and faults should be 
imputed on the corporation. Naturally there is a need for a human being to represent the 
corporation as a party in the criminal case, as the corporation is incapable of being physically 
present in court and of being able to speak for itself. The original section, as well as those that 
follow, make provision for certain officers of the corporation to stand trial on behalf of the 
corporation. Section 384 referred to a director or servant of the corporation. Section 332 also 
refers to the director or servant of the corporation.  
 
It must be noted that the corporation may not be summonsed in its own name.591 The 
individual who stands trial on behalf of the corporation is cited as the offender and is tried on 
behalf of the corporation in the same way that he would be if he was the actual accused 
person.592 As Du Toit puts it “the court must deal with the representative as if he was the 
person accused of having committed the offence in question”.593 In Ex Parte Prokureur 
Generaal, Transvaal594 the court clearly set out the obligations and personal liability of a 
person who is summoned and tried on behalf of a corporation by stating that such a person  
 
(a) Was personally liable and obliged to respect and comply with the judicial process and or 
                                                          
589 Extraordinary in the sense that natural persons have historically been the ones to bear the blame for their 
actions. 
590 See discussions in Chapter One IV and in Chapter Two VI above. 
591 Du Toit (note 514) 33-6. 
592 “This means, although he appears in court technically in a representative capacity, the director or servant is 
dealt with during the proceedings as if he were the accused”. (NA Matzukis “Corporate Crimes Who must Pay 
for them?” (1987) Businessman’s Law 216). 
593 P Du Toit “Sentencing the Corporate Offender in South Africa: A Comparative Approach” (2012) 2 SACJ  
235, 235.  
594 Ex Parte Prokureur Generaal, Transvaal 1984 (2) SA 283 (T). 
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court orders relating to the institution and furtherance of the proceedings, particularly as 
regards appearing and or remaining present at the court concerned on the appointed date(s) 
of the trial and / or postponed hearing; 
(b) Liable to the arrest of his person in terms of a warrant validly sought and granted under s 
55 (2) or - as the case may be …on the grounds of his omission to appear and or remain 
present as aforementioned. 
(c)  Personally responsible and liable to conviction for a contravention of s 55(1) or…on the 
grounds of his unlawful omission as aforementioned… 
(d)  Remained personally responsible and liable as set out in the preceding paragraphs. 595 
 
From this, it follows that the person who stands trial on behalf of the corporation is obliged to 
take his or her responsibility seriously. In instituting criminal proceedings it must be clear in 
what capacity the accused is being prosecuted, i.e. in his / her personal capacity as a director 
or servant or as representative of the corporation. In fact it is a requirement as provided by 
section 332(2) that “in any prosecution against a corporate body, a director or servant of the 
corporate body must be cited as the offender in his representative capacity”.596 In Herold, N.O. 
v Johannesburg City Council597 the charge was ambiguous and there was lack of clarity 
regarding the capacity in which the accused was being charged.598  In casu the court stated 
that the capacity in which the accused was being charged had to be clear, as the court had to 
decide whether the charge was directed against the accused in his personal capacity or in his 
capacity as representative of the corporation.599 It went further to explain precisely how the 
accused ought to be charged in such a way that it is clear in which capacity he is being 
                                                          
595 Ibid. 
596 Du Toit (note 593) 235. 
597 Herold, N.O. v Johannesburg City Council  1947 (2) SA 1257 (A). 
598 Ibid 1257.  
599 Ibid 1266. 
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charged.600 The court in Herold NO v Johannesburg City Council also stated that in the event 
that on the summons, a wrong party is cited, it is possible for an amendment to be made, as 
long as it is clear who should have been cited as the accused.601 
 
R v Hammersma602 was a review of a matter in which two individuals had been charged in 
their capacity as representatives of the company. It was held that there had not been a need for 
both of them to be charged as representatives of the company.603 The decision in Hammersma 
highlights the fact that the company remains the accused, those individuals cited as the accused 
merely act as representatives of the company, since the company cannot be charged in its own 
name. 
 
In R v Campbell604 the conviction and sentence from the court a quo were both set aside as the 
accused had been charged in his personal capacity instead of in his capacity as representative 
of the corporation. The question of clarity as to the capacity of the accused is important 
because it has to be clear whether it is an individual or the corporation that is being held 
criminally responsible. Where an individual is erroneously charged in his personal capacity, 
the corporation ends up not being held responsible for crimes committed in the furtherance of 
that corporation’s interests. Such a state of affairs defeats the ultimate aim of corporate 
criminal liability, which is to see to it that corporations face criminal responsibility for their 
                                                          
600 “It is clear that when criminal proceedings are instituted under sub-sec. (2) the director or servant should be 
cited as representative of the corporate body, and it is equally clear that, if it is sought to charge a director or 
servant under sub-sec. (5) he should be cited as an individual, and the fact that he is a director or servant should 
be alleged in the body of the charge as one of the essential facts to be proved, and it would be an advantage if sub-
sec. (5) were mentioned in order to show that he is being prosecuted under the provisions of that subsection”.  
(Ibid 1266 -1267). 
601 Ibid 1257; R v Barry [1950] 1 All SA 250 (N). 
602 R v Hammersma and Another 1941 OPD 39. 
603 Ibid 42. 





R v Darwin Supply Stores (Pvt) Ltd 605 was an appeal against the conviction of a company, 
where an offence had been committed by a company but an individual was charged . The 
charge was subsequently amended and the individual accepted the amendment. The company 
was, however, not issued with summons and there was no proof that the company had given 
authorization to that individual to agree to the company’s prosecution.606 The conviction and 
the sentence were set aside.607 
 
In S v Lark Clothing (Pty) Ltd608 the court set aside a conviction and sentence that had been 
passed against the accused as there was no compliance with the provision in the then section 
381(2) which stated that a guilty plea made on behalf of the corporation was not valid unless 
the corporation had authorized the accused (appearing on its behalf) to plead guilty.609 In casu, 
                                                          
605 R v Darwin Supply Stores (Pvt) Ltd 1957 (2) SA 519 (E). 
606 Murray CJ stated:  
“There appears to have been a substantial disregard of the consequences of the essential 
distinction between an incorporated company and the individuals who constitute it or manage 
its affairs. The appellant company has been convicted without observance of the statutory 
requirement as to the formulation of the charge. The summons has never been served on the 
company. The company has not been given notice that by the amendment it was placed in the 
position of an accused. There is neither allegation nor evidence that as a matter of fact 
Christopoulos is a director or servant of the company, much less that he had any authority from 
the company to agree to its being prosecuted in the particular manner adopted. If the Crown 
desired to continue against the company the prosecution initiated against Christopoulos it was, 
I think, necessary to establish the authority of the latter to agree to that course…by proof of his 
powers under the articles of association or a resolution of the board of directors”. 
    (Ibid 520-521). 
607 Ibid 521. 
608 S v Lark Clothing (Pty) Ltd 1973 (1) SA 239 (C). 
609 Section 381 (2) provided that 
“In any prosecution against a corporate body, a director or servant of that corporate body, shall be cited 
as representative of that corporate body, as the offender, and thereupon the person so cited may, as such 
representative, be dealt with as if he were the person accused of having committed the offence in 
question: Provided that – 
a) if the said person pleads guilty, the plea shall not be valid unless the corporate body authorized 
him to plead guilty”. 
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the second accused, the sole director of a company made an appearance in his own personal 
capacity and also as a representative of his co-accused, (the first accused) the limited liability 
company which he was the sole director of. He made a guilty plea on behalf of both accused 
but was not able to provide proof that he had received authorization to plead guilty on behalf 
of the corporation, as prescribed by the then section 381(2). That led to the conviction and the 
sentence imposed on the corporation being set aside. The importance of the decision in S v 
Lark Clothing (Pty) Ltd lies in the fact that the peremptory nature of the provision is 
emphasized. The court is not supposed to accept a guilty plea on behalf of the corporation 
without getting some kind of proof that the corporation has given authorisation for such a plea. 
 
In R v Fruit Growers Distributors (Pvt) Ltd610 the Rhodesian court was faced with a similar 
situation.611 The accused who was representing the corporation pleaded guilty. On review he 
failed to prove that he was given authority by the company to plead guilty. It was held that a 
magistrate could not sentence a company where the accused had pleaded guilty on behalf of 
the company, without proof of the required authority.   
 
Where the accused is being charged in his capacity as a representative of the corporation, the 
form of punishment that may be imposed is a fine. The aim of section 332 is to ensure that 
corporations that commit crimes are duly punished for those offences. The fine that is imposed 
is therefore aimed at the corporation and not at the accused in his representative capacity. That 
                                                          
610 R v Fruit Growers Distributors (Pvt) Ltd 1966 (2) SA 181 (R).     
611 This pertained to section 401 (2) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act of Rhodesia 1955 (equivalent to 
section 381 of the South African Act, 1955) which provided that where an accused was representing a company, 




fine is imposed on the convicted corporation and it is payable by that corporation.612 In R v 
Hammersma,613 where two individuals were charged as representatives of the company, the 
court looked at the fact that the punishment imposed upon them, was a fine which was payable 
by them jointly and severally.614 It was held that this was wrong as the punishment is supposed 
to be borne by the company, as the individuals had been charged in their capacity as 
representatives of the company.615  
 
Imposing a fine as punishment is not unusual for corporations. In fact other jurisdictions also 
punish corporations by imposing a fine, for instance England and Wales.616 It must be noted 
though, that section 332 only allows punishment in the form a fine to be imposed on the 
corporation.  In subsection 2(c) it is stated that even where the applicable law provides for 
alternative punishment and does not provide for a fine as a form of punishment, where the 
accused is a corporate body a fine shall be made payable. In R v Hammersma617 an alternative 
sentence of imprisonment was imposed by the magistrate.618 This was held to be incorrect, as 
subsection 2 does not allow any punishment other than a fine to be imposed on the accused.619 
This is echoed in R v Connock620 where Steyn, J in amending the applicable sentence and 
limiting it to a fine stated that: 
                                                          
612 “The reason why a fine is the only punishment which can be imposed is of course the fact that an entity which 
has no physical existence cannot be thrown in gaol”. (Snyman (note 22) 255).  
613 Rex v Hammersma and Another (note 602). 
614 Ibid 42. 
615 Ibid 42. 
616 Wells (note 15) 32. 
617 Rex v Hammersma and Another (note 602). 
618 Ibid. 
619 Fischer JP in R v Hammersma (note 602) 42. In the event of a conviction of the person standing trial on behalf 
of the corporation “the court convicting him shall not impose upon him in his representative capacity any 
punishment, whether direct or as an alternative, other than a fine in respect of the offences in question, and such 
fine shall be payable by the corporate body in terms of s 288”. (CPA (note 16) section 332(2)(c)). 
620 R v Connock  1949 (2) SA 295 (C). 
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 “in so far, however, as the magistrate imposed a term of imprisonment as an alternative, the 
sentence was not a competent one, in view of the provisions of section 384 (2) (d) of Act 31 of 
1917 as amended, as appellant was found guilty in a representative capacity as director of a 
corporate body with limited liability”.621  
 
Having a fine as the only punishment that may be imposed on a convicted corporation is 
problematic and inadequate. The challenges posed by the fine as the sole punishment for a 
convicted corporation are discussed in more detail below.622 
 
Since many corporations are huge business enterprises that generate a lot of money, it may be 
said that a fine is a just punishment for corporate criminals, after all, the corporation is hit 
where it hurts the most, its coffers. On the converse, the convicted corporation may have an 
abundance of money, which means that the punishment imposed on it will not have a 
significant impact on the corporation and its future activities.623 Nothing hampers such a 
corporation from keeping a budget for crimes.624 The corporation would then be in a position 
to commit further offences with the knowledge that it will be able to afford the fine. Imposing 
a fine will thus in many cases not have a deterrent, preventive, reformative or even retributive 
effect on the corporation.625 
 
Section 332(2)(c) further states that: 
                                                          
621 Ibid 302. 
622 See discussion in this chapter at V (g) below. 
623 See discussion in this chapter at V (g) below. 
624 See discussion in this chapter at V (g) below. 
625 This will be discussed below in section IV(c) of this chapter. 
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“The citation of a director or servant of a corporate body as aforesaid, to represent that 
corporate body in any prosecution instituted against it, shall not exempt that director or servant 
from prosecution for that offence in terms of subsection (5)”. 
In terms of this subsection the director or servant of the corporation, as ‘the minds of the 
corporation’,626 could be held liable simultaneously with the corporation for crimes committed. 
By adding this, the legislature has ensured that these “controlling officers”627 do not escape 
personal criminal liability. Although the acts of the individuals in charge are regarded as acts 
of the corporation, provision is specifically made for those individuals to be held liable together 
with the corporation as they are the people whose hands and minds were literally used to 
commit the offence.628 The said individuals can only escape personal liability, if they can prove 
that they were not party to the offence.629 
 
Although section 384(1) was worded differently, the legislature made it clear from the outset 
that “the secretary, every director or manager or chairman thereof”…may be charged…and 
shall be liable to be punished therefore”.630 This phrase encompasses management and 
employees. The legislature in confirming the common-law position631 also emphasized the fact 
that the concerned individuals would also be held criminally liable in their personal capacities.  
 
                                                          
626 They are otherwise referred to as controlling officers, Kidd (note 439) 277. 
627 Ibid. 
628 This is in line with Arlen’s assertion that “corporate crimes are not committed by corporations, they are 
committed by agents of the corporation. These agents are rational self-interested utility maximizers who commit 
crimes in order to benefit themselves. In pursuit of his own self-interest an agent may commit a crime that 
incidentally benefits the corporation…”. (J Arlen ‘The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal 
Liability’ (1994) 23 Journal of Legal Studies 833, 834). 
629 This will discussed fully below under section 332 (5) of the CPA 1977. 
630 Section 384 (1) of the CPEA.  
631 That despite the artificial nature of the corporation, it could be held liable and could be punished as a legal 
entity for crimes committed by its agents. 
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It is submitted that the rationale behind holding both the corporation and the individuals liable 
is possibly the fact that as the ones who do the thinking and the acting on behalf of the 
corporation they may not use the corporation as a scapegoat and thus escape personal liability. 
A criminal offence is a criminal offence and all parties responsible must face the full wrath of 
the law. If these individuals were exempted from criminal liability, nothing would keep them 
from committing offences in furthering the interest of the corporation and turning their backs 
on the corporations when the corporations are charged. Moreover, nothing would prevent them 
from, thereafter, forming other corporations and committing further offences which the 
corporations will be held liable for.  
 
(iii) Section 332 (3)  
“In criminal proceedings against a corporate body, any record which was made or kept by a 
director, servant or agent of the corporate body within the scope of his activities as such 
director, servant or agent, or any document which was at any time in the custody or under the 
control of any such director, servant or agent, shall be admissible in evidence against the 
accused”.632 
The subsection relates to documents and records that may be relied on as admissible evidence 
against the accused. The accused is the director or servant who is standing trial on behalf of the 
corporation.  Records that were made as well as records that were kept by a director, a servant 
or an agent of the corporation are admissible evidence against the accused. It is interesting to 
note that even documents made / kept by an agent of the corporation are included in this 
category. It is submitted that the reason may be the fact that agents may be privy to certain 
information that may be helpful in determining the guilt of the accused. The subsection further 
                                                          
632 The CPA (note 16) section 332(3) 
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requires that these records must have been made or kept within the scope of the director, servant 
or agent’s scope of activities. The net is cast wider as the subsection also allows for ‘any 
document which was at any time in the custody or under the control of such director, servant 
or agent’.  
 
The term document is not defined, so it is submitted that any relevant document that was 
made or kept by a director, servant or agent, which is brought forth, may be used as evidence. 
In S v Harper and Another633 Milne J accepted computer printouts as admissible documents 
that may be used as evidence. 
 
(iv) Section 332(4) 
In terms of section 332(4): 
 
For the purposes of subsection (3) any record made or kept by a director, servant or agent  of a 
corporate body or any document which was at any time in his custody or under his control shall 
be presumed to have been made or kept by him or to have been in his custody or under his 
control within the scope of his activities as such director, servant or agent, unless the contrary 
is proved. 
This subsection also deals specifically with the issue of records that may be relied on as 
admissible evidence. It refers to records that were, at any time, in the custody or under the 
control of the director, servant or agent. It states that for the purpose of the admissibility of 
                                                          
633 S v Harper and Another 1981 (1) SA 88 (D). 
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such records, a presumption that such records were kept or made or were in his custody or 
under his control, within the scope of his activities as director, servant or agent of the 
corporation. The leading case is S v Harper and Another634 where servants of a company which 
was under liquidation compiled documents after the liquidation of the company. The court 
accepted these documents as admissible. 
 
In terms of section 332(4) a presumption against the director, servant or agent is made “unless 
the contrary is proved”. It is submitted that if constitutionally challenged section 332(4) will 
not survive, as it creates a reverse onus, whereby the director, servant or agent is expected to 
bear the burden of proving the contrary.635  
 
(v) Section 332 (5) 
S. 332(5) states as follows: 
Where an offence has been committed, whether by the performance of any act or by the failure 
to perform any act, for which any corporate body is or was liable to prosecution, any person 
who was, at the time of the commission of the offence, a director or servant of the corporate 
body, shall be deemed to be guilty of the said offence, unless it is proved that he did not take 
part in the commission of the offence, and that he could not have prevented it, and shall be 
liable to prosecution therefor, either jointly with the corporation or apart therefrom, and shall 
on conviction be personally liable to punishment therefor. 
                                                          
634 Ibid  88. 
635 This would be in line with the decision in S v Coetzee (note 56) where section 332(5) was successfully 
challenged for the reverse onus that it created. 
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Although repealed636 as of 6 March 1997,637 section 332 (5) forms an important part of the 
development of corporate criminal liability in South Africa. The crux of section 332 (5) is that 
it provided for the conviction of a director or servant of a corporate body for a crime committed 
by the corporate body (i.e. other directors / servants) unless he/she could prove that he/she did 
not take part in the commission of the crime and that he/she could not have prevented it. The 
director or servant could be prosecuted jointly with the corporation or could be charged and 
prosecuted in a separate criminal action,638 for the same offence and upon failure by him/her 
to prove that he/she did not participate in the offence and could not have prevented it, the 
director or servant could be found guilty of the offence. Section 332 (5) read together with s. 
332 (1) is clearly an anomaly as under normal circumstances the onus is on the prosecution to 
prove that an offence was committed by the accused.  
 
The predecessors of this section are s. 384(5) of the CPEA and s. 381(5) of the CPA 1955. 
The wording of the proviso has in each statute remained basically the same.639 This provision 
has operated very harshly on directors / servants who had nothing to do with offences, but 
were not able to prove that. The fact that the provision imposes a reverse onus640 on the 
accused i.e. the accused is presumed guilty and bears the burden of proving that he did not 
take part in the commission of the crime and also that he could not have prevented it, is rather 
problematic as it goes against the premise that an accused ought to be presumed innocent until 
                                                          
636 In S v Coetzee the order made by Langa J for the majority was that the provisions of “s. 332 (5) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 are inconsistent with the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 200 of 1993 and 
are, with effect from the date of the judgment, invalid and of no force or effect”. (S v Coetzee (note 56) 397). 
637 Delport (note 87) Appx 11. 
638 Bailes (note 507) 25. 
639 “The provision has since been part of successive Criminal Procedure Acts in substantially the same form”. (S 
v Coetzee (note 56) 446G). 
640 Instead of being presumed innocent, the accused is presumed guilty and the accused bears the onus to prove 
unless he/she is able to prove that s/he did not take part in the commission of the offence, and that s/he could not 
have prevented it.  
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proven guilty. The accused could therefore be found guilty despite the fact that there was a 
reasonable doubt about his guilt.641 In S v Coetzee the majority ruled that section 332 (5) was 
an infringement of the right to be presumed innocent.642 It further found that the infringement 
was not a justifiable limitation.643 
 
S. 332(5) has many areas of concern. As stated above, the impact it has on a director or servant 
who is in no way to blame for an offence which has been committed, is too harsh. The 
provision is worded in such a way that it was inevitable that it would be challenged. It thus 
comes as no surprise that even prior to being declared unconstitutional, section 332 (5) has 
been the subject of various court cases. The most important ones will be discussed below: 
 
In S v Poole644 an individual in charge of a swimming pool was held liable in terms of 
subsection 5 for culpable homicide after the death of a child in the swimming pool. The child 
had drowned after being stuck in the outlet of the pool, as it was being drained.645 In the court 
a quo, the person in charge of the general maintenance and supervision of the pool, an engineer, 
was convicted of culpable homicide. This was an appeal against the conviction as an employee 
of the engineer had been given the specific responsibility of emptying and supervising the 
draining of the pool. The question here was thus regarding the vicarious liability of a corporate 
                                                          
641 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (note 53) 459. 
642 This provision has been criticized and challenged over the years and finally, in the Constitutional court case of 
S v Coetzee (note 56) the majority of the court found that s.332(5) is unconstitutional642 as it, inter alia, created a 
reverse onus. 
643 As Snyman states a reverse onus is a direct violation of the presumption of innocence in section 35(3)(h) of 
the Constitution, hence the Constitutional court’s finding that “this violation could not be justified in terms of the 
limitation clause in section 36(1)”. (Snyman (note 22) 255).   
644 S v Poole 1975 (2) All SA 194 (N). 
645 Ibid 195. 
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body’s servant for the negligence of another servant in terms of sec. 381 (1) and (5) of the CPA 
1955.646  
The engineer, who had been convicted as a result of the death of the child, appealed 
successfully against the finding as it was not him, but his employee who had been negligent. 
In S v Poole it was further held that “the requirement of section 381 (5) of the CPA 1955, 
realistically construed, required an accused to place objective facts before the court (unless 
they emerged from other evidence) proving on a balance of probabilities that reasonable steps 
had been taken to prevent the commission of the offence”. 
 
In S v Moringer and Others647 there had been a contravention of Exchange Control 
Regulations. It was argued before the court that only the dealer could be held liable for the 
offence, not the servant of the dealer.648 In applying section 332 (5) the court found that 
“because of the provision of s. 332(5) of the CPA a servant of the corporation was deemed to 
be guilty of the offence unless it was proved that he did not take part in commission of the 
offence”.649 The onus is thus on the servant and it would be on a balance of probabilities.650 It 
is submitted that this is still a heavy burden of proof, regardless of the fact that it is on a 
balance of probabilities because it has the effect of ensuring the conviction of a person who 
finds himself in this position merely as a result of the office he holds within the corporation. 
                                                          
646 “Finally, the provisions of sub-sec. (5) of sec. 381 are invoked to hold the appellant vicariously liable for the 
offence committed - or more accurately, deemed to have been committed - by the corporate body. Thus, by the 
application of the provisions of the two subsections, the appellant, being a servant of the corporate body, is liable 
for an independent act of negligence on the part of another one of its servants (Amos) unless appellant proves 
“that he did not take part in the commission of the offence and that he could not have prevented it”. (Ibid 204). 
647 S v Moringer and Others 1992 (4) SA 452 (W). 
648 Ibid 476H. 
649 Ibid 454G. 
650 In Herold, N.O. v Johannesburg City Council  which was decided based on the earlier provision which was 
similarly worded it was stated that “the onus was upon the appellant to prove upon a preponderance of probability 
that he did not take part in the commission of the offence and that he could not have prevented it”. (Herold, N.O. 
v Johannesburg City Council (note 597) 1257). 
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The effect of s. 332 (5) is that where an innocent director or servant is unable to prove that he 
did not take part in the commission of the offence and that he could not have done anything 
to prevent it, such director or servant would be found guilty without further ado. 
 
 R v Limbada651 dealt with a challenge against s. 381 (7) of the CPA 1955 which, similarly, 
deemed an accused, to be guilty of an offence committed by another, if he could not prove 
that he had no part in that offence and could not have prevented it. Delport emphasizes the 
fact that “Section 332(5) does not create a new offence: it merely deems a director or servant 
to be guilty of an offence for the commission of which the corporate body is or was liable to 
prosecution unless he proves the facts envisaged as constituting the defence”.652 
 
Steyn JA in R v Limbada states that   
what it does is to deem an accused in the circumstances described therein, to be guilty of an 
offence committed by another, if he does not prove that he had no part in that offence and 
could not have prevented it. In the circumstances so described it casts an onus of proof upon 
the accused and in effect directs the Court to find him guilty if he does not discharge that 
onus.653   
Both Moringer and Limbada show that the onus is placed on the accused, and the accused’s 
failure to discharge it results in a conviction. 
 
                                                          
651 R v Limbada [1958] 2 All SA 493 (A). 
652 Delport (note 87) Appx 12. This was stated by Steyn JA in Limbada (note 651) 486, with reference to the 
predecessor of section 332(7), section 381(7) of the CPA 1955.  
653 R v Limbada (note 651) 496. 
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S v Klopper654was an appeal against the conviction of a director of a company based on section 
381 (5) of the CPA 1955. It was argued that the accused had not been aware of the commission 
of fraud. Even though the accused’s ignorance had been caused by his failure to act with 
reasonable care, the director was successful with the appeal. The court applied a subjective 
test655 and came to the conclusion that the accused need not be held liable if he successfully 
proves that he had no knowledge of the commission of the crime. This is in spite of the fact 
that his/her failure to become aware of the offence, was in itself negligent.656 Kahn states that 
“the test is a subjective one: actual ignorance of the offence carries with it nonparticipation in the offence 
and inability to prevent it. (Ignorance flowing from deliberate abstention from making inquiries will, 
however, probably not avail the accused.) For the prosecution to establish that he had been negligent in 
not knowing of the commission of the offence will not, on its own be sufficient for conviction…”657  
The finding in Klopper resulted in the onus in section 381 (5) of the CPA 1955 being 
somewhat reduced and it is submitted that Kahn’s view that the court’s interpretation of this 
subsection in Klopper “provides an escape hatch”658 is correct. This is because simply not 
having knowledge of the commission of the crime will absolve the accused director or servant 
from liability, in spite of his negligence in not knowing about it. Klopper was a half victory 
for directors and servants, however the continued existence of subsection 5 resulted in the 
further infringement of the right of the directors or servants not to be presumed guilty.  
 
(aa) S v Coetzee659and the reverse onus 
                                                          
654 S v Klopper 1975 (4) SA 773 (A). 
655 Du Toit (note 514) 33-7. 
656 “For the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court held in S v Klopper that so long as the accused can prove 
that he did not know of the commission of the crime, however negligent he was in not knowing of it, he gets out”. 
(Kahn (note 493) 176). 
657 Ibid 176. 
658 Ibid. 
659 S v Coetzee (note 56). 
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The coming into existence of the Constitution has inevitably led to many conflicts between 
certain provisions that existed prior to the Constitution and the Constitution itself. Langa J 
suggests that the legislature should be the one to make the necessary amendments to ensure 
that the provisions are in line with the Constitution.660 The reality though is that the courts are 
often faced with disputes regarding provisions which are in direct conflict with Constitutional 
provisions. With specific regard to corporate criminal liability this became evident in the 
important case of S v Coetzee.661 
 
S v Coetzee was a Constitutional Court case that dealt with, inter alia, the question whether 
section 332 (5) of the CPA was constitutional. In casu the section was challenged in the 
Constitutional Court because it contravened the constitutional right to be presumed innocent, 
section 25 (3) (c).662 The applicants were facing charges of fraud etc., in the Witwatersrand 
Local Division and they made a request to challenge the constitutionality of two sections of the 
CPA, one of which was section 332 (5). The trial of the accused was thus suspended to enable 
them to challenge the said provisions.663 
 
Although the provision was found to be unconstitutional and declared invalid this was not a 
unanimous decision and in passing judgment the judges made important observations and 
statements.  
                                                          
660 “Important provisions of old legislation, and in particular the (Criminal Procedure) Act, are being struck down 
because they are inconsistent with the Constitution, leaving gaps in the law which only the Legislature can fill. It 
is primarily the task of the Legislature, and not the courts to bring old legislation into line with the Constitution”. 
(S v Coetzee (note 56) 442 I).  
661 Ibid. 
662 Ibid 447 D-E. This refers to section 25(3) (c) of the Interim Constitution (note 31). 




The Constitutional Court was faced with the question whether the constitutionally entrenched 
fundamental right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty664 was infringed or not 
infringed by section 332(5) of the CPA. As stated above, section 332(5) allowed for a 
presumption of guilt to be made against a servant or director of the corporation that has 
committed a crime. In terms of the presumption, a director of a corporation that has committed 
a crime is deemed guilty of that crime. For the director to be exonerated, he or she is required 
to provide proof, on a balance of probabilities, that he or she did not take part in the offence 
and that he or she could not have done anything to prevent the crime from being committed. 
One of the arguments against subsection 5 was its violation of the constitutionally guaranteed 
right to be presumed innocent. The presumption made it possible for a director / servant to be 
found guilty, without the establishment of the guilt. It was therefore possible to have a 
conviction in spite of the existence of reasonable doubt that the director / servant is indeed 
guilty.665  
 
Langa J delivered the majority judgment. He begins by pointing out the fact that the 
Constitutional Court constantly finds itself having to bring provisions of certain legislation, 
which have been carried over from the previous regime, in line with the Constitution.666 He 
emphasizes the fact that this is actually the job of the Legislature, however, it is the judiciary 
that ends up having to do it as the prosecution tends to rely on these provisions, which infringe 
upon other peoples’ fundamental rights.667 An important remark made by Langa J is the fact 
that despite its relevance, the CPA is actually a product of “a different constitutional era in 
                                                          
664 The Constitution (note 27) section 25(3) (c). 
665 S v Coetzee (note 56) 445D.  




which the legal validity of its provisions could not be questioned”.668 This statement is 
supported by the fact that in the previous cases discussed above, where section 332(5) was at 
issue, the courts were clearly reluctant to challenge its validity and felt duty bound to enforce 
it as it was. 
 
Langa J proceeds to provide an examination of section 332 (5).669 His starting point is the 
origin of the subsection, which is section 384 (5) of the CPEA. He mentions the subsequent 
statutes in which the provision appears virtually in its original form until it became known as 
section 332 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Act. He then explains the basis on which the 
subsection is being challenged – that is the “reverse onus” which it places on the accused.670  
 
Langa J looks at the argument that the reverse onus in section 332(5) was, in practice, a 
justifiable limitation,671 as the prosecution still bore the onus of proving that the accused was 
aware of the commission of the crime. He points out that the section does not place the onus 
of proof on the prosecution.672 He then explains that the ‘plain meaning’673 of section 332(5) 
is that it provides for the conviction of a person who was a director or servant at the time of 
the commission of the crime, as soon as the prosecution proves that a crime has been 
                                                          
668 Ibid. 
669 Ibid 446G and 447A, B and C. 
670 “It was argued that the onus cast upon the accused relates to an essential element of the offence created by the 
section and that the reversal of the onus meant that the accused could be convicted despite the existence of a 
reasonable doubt with regard to his or her guilt. This reverse onus was therefore said to violate the right to be 
presumed innocent as enshrined in s. 25 (3) (c) of the Constitution as well as the ‘cluster of rights associated with 
it’”. (Ibid 447D and E).  
671 Ibid 448A. 
672 Ibid 448B. 
673 “the plain meaning of the words is that once the prosecution proves that an offence has been committed by a 
corporate body of which the accused was a director or servant at the time of commission, the latter can escape 
conviction only by proving that he or she did not take part in and could also not have prevented the commission 
of the offence”. (Ibid 448B and C). 
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committed by a corporate body. In order to escape being convicted such director or servant is 
obliged to prove that he or she did not take part in the offence and could not have done anything 
to prevent it. He refers to the cases relied on by the government to support its contention674 
and states that in those cases the plain meaning was found to be the same as he had stated it. 
He goes on to clarify the meaning of the relevant passages in those cases and concludes that 
the cases that the Government relied on did not provide any support for its contention.675   
 
With regard to the extension of liability to include both directors and servants, all the justices 
were in agreement and did not support the extension of liability to servants.676 Langa J then 
continued on the premise that the inclusion of ‘servant’ to the subsection is not justifiable677 
and in the rest of the judgment he dealt with its reference to directors. 
 
In dealing with the question of the constitutionality of the reverse onus, Langa J examines 
previous cases of the Constitutional Court and mentions the fact that the “Court has left open 
the question of the effect which a provision, which requires the accused to prove an exemption, 
exception or defence, has on the presumption of innocence”.678   
As the applicants and the Government relied heavily on Canadian decisions, Langa J looks at 
how Canadian courts have dealt with the question of the constitutionality of a reverse onus. He 
begins by providing an extract of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which provides 
for a presumption of the innocence of an accused person is guilty.679 He then examines the 
                                                          
674 These included Limbada  (note 651) and Klopper (note 654 ). 
675 S v Coetzee (note 56) 449B. 
676 Ibid  449H. 
677 Ibid 449H. 
678 Ibid 451A and B. 
679 Section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which states that: 
 “11. Any person charged with an offence has the right. . . 
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decisions referred to in casu in defence of the reverse onus and points out the fact that the 
provisions referred to in those cases, “did not impose a reverse onus and that there was no 
danger that the accused could be convicted despite the existence of a reasonable doubt”.680 He 
concludes that section 332(5) is an infringement of the constitutional right to be presumed 
innocent particularly because it “involves elements which have to be proved by the accused 
and which form the substance of the offence”.681 He mentions the fact that section 332(5) places 
a burden on the accused to “prove an element which is relevant to the verdict”682 and goes on 
to explain that section 332(5) does provide a reverse onus by requiring the accused to prove 
that he or she did not take part in the offence and could not have prevented it, failing which, 
the accused will be convicted, even if there is reasonable doubt regarding that.683 In finding 
section 332 (5) to be unconstitutional he states that “the objection which is fundamental to the 
reversal of onus in this case is that the provision offends against the principle of a fair trial 
which requires that the prosecution establish its case without assistance from the accused”.684 
 
Langa J refers to the Government’s argument that section 332(5) is a regulatory provision, 
therefore it does not infringe upon the presumption of innocence. Here, Langa J takes into 
account cases in foreign jurisdictions where courts had to distinguish between “truly criminal” 
and “regulatory” offences and comes to the conclusion that regardless of the category of a 
crime, where a reverse onus provision has the effect that an accused may be convicted even 
though there is reasonable doubt of guilt or innocence, the presumption of innocence is 
                                                          
 (d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal”. S v Coetzee (note 56) 451G. 
680 Ibid  454A. 
681 Ibid 454B. 
682 Ibid. 
683 Ibid 454E. 
684 Ibid 454F and G. 
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infringed upon.685 In this regard he quotes La Forest J in Wholesale Travel Group Inc686 in 
which he states that “…what is ultimately important are not labels (though they are 
undoubtedly useful), but the values at stake in the particular context”.687 
 
 Having pointed out what the section means, Langa J states that section 332 (5) is not aimed at 
creating liability without fault on the part of the accused,688 but rather at ensuring the conviction 
of directors who take part in the commission of crimes or who are in a position to prevent the 
commission of a crime, but fail to do so.689 For that reason, fault is an important element of 
section 332 (5) and it has to be proven.690 Langa goes on to state that  
 
“what causes the provision to fall foul of the presumption of innocence here is the effect of 
merely changing the form of the provision to require the accused, rather than the prosecution, 
to prove elements which are essential to his or her guilt or innocence. There is manifest 
unfairness where the legislature, having created an offence potentially entailing very grave 
penalties, goes on to subvert an important constitutionally protected right by requiring crucial 
elements of the offence to be proved or disproved by the accused on pain of conviction should 
the onus not be discharged”.691 
 
With regard to whether the infringement of the presumption of innocence by section 332(5) is 
a justifiable limitation in terms of section 33(1) of the interim Constitution, he acknowledges 
                                                          
685 Ibid 455H. 
686 Wholesale Travel Group Inc 342 US 246, 254-256 (1952). 
687 S v Coetzee (note 56) 455I to 456A. 
688 Ibid 456C. 
689 Ibid 456C and D. 
690 Ibid 456D. 
691 Ibid 456G and H. 
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the need to protect the society and corporations from directors who fail to prevent the 
commission of crimes. However, this could be done without making use of the reverse onus. 
He then goes on to suggest alternative measures which can be employed in order to fulfil the 
objectives of section 332 (5) without having to impose a reverse onus.692  
 
In a nutshell the majority judgment was that section 332(5) was unconstitutional and that 
severance was not the solution,693 as was recommended by O’Regan J. According to O’Regan 
J there are good parts of section 332(5) and the best solution is to save the provision by severing 
that which is bad, while maintaining that which is good.694 She recommends curing the 
provision by deleting the word ‘servant’ and the phrase ‘it is proved that he did not take part in 
the commission of the offence and that’.695  
 
In her judgment Mokgoro J agrees with O’Regan J with regard to severance as a way of curing 
or fixing section 332(5).696 She also points out that in spite of her concerns about what she 
                                                          
692 “I can see no reason, however, why the State could not, for example, impose appropriate statutory duties on 
directors and other persons associated with the corporate body, aimed at ensuring that its affairs are honestly 
conducted and that it is itself protected against dishonest conduct. This could be done in a variety of ways by 
means of appropriate legislative provisions which might, for instance, impose the duties of disclosure and 
reporting on the corporate body, its directors, servants and other persons involved with its affairs. There has been 
no suggestion that such measures, enforced through appropriate sanctions, could not accomplish as effectively the 
ends sought to be achieved by s 332(5) of the Act. It has further not been contended that such objectives could not 
be achieved without placing an onus on the accused to prove any aspect of his or her innocence in a criminal 
prosecution for a breach of such duty. I am accordingly not persuaded that the reverse onus provisions in s 332(5) 
are necessary”. (S v Coetzee (note 56) 457H and I to 458A). 
693 Langa J, Chaskalson P, Mahomed DP, Kriegler J, Sachs J, Ackermann J and Didcott J. 
694 S v Coetzee (note 56) 516. 
695 Ibid 516. 
696 “As regards the order in this case, I concur with O’Regan J that severance of certain words from section 332 
(5), so that the legal burden of proof is removed from the accused, is an appropriate remedy in this case”. (Ibid 
497 C).  
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refers to as “the dangers of corporate activity”,697 the infringement of the presumption of 
innocence is not justifiable.  
 
In his minority judgment Madala J did not find section 332(5) to be unconstitutional.698 He 
acknowledges the importance of the presumption of innocence but states that it is not an 
absolute right.699 Sachs J concurred with the majority but also gave a separate judgment in 
which he raises various issues, including the history behind the coming into being of section 
332(5). He explains the fact that there was a feeling that a mere fine as punishment for 
corporations that committed crimes was not an adequate way of dealing with such crimes.700 
There was a need to punish the individuals within the company, as it was through them that 
companies committed crimes.701  
 
It is submitted that the judgments in Coetzee provide a clearer understanding of the intended 
purpose of section 332 (5). They also highlight the harshness of its operation, particularly on 
innocent directors who fail to provide the required proof. In coming to their judgments, the 
judges take into account foreign law on similar matters and also look at how the Constitutional 
Court has dealt with the presumption of innocence on previous occasions. It is clear that the 
                                                          
697 Ibid 497 A. 
698 He states that “the mere fact that a section provides that an accused person may be convicted in circumstances 
in which there is a reasonable doubt is not in itself a sufficient reason for regarding such sections as 
unconstitutional. There may be circumstances in which the reverse onus provision is necessary and justifiable”.  
(Ibid 491H). 
699 “I have no doubt in my mind that the presumption of innocence is a fundamental right which plays a pivotal 
role in our criminal justice system. However, in my view, like all other rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Constitution, this right is not absolute, but that its value and weight will differ according to a variety of factors 
and circumstances against which it is pitted on the scales”. (Ibid 493H-I). 
700 Ibid 516D-F. 
701 Sachs notes that “as the eyes, ears and spokesperson of the corporation…it would not be unreasonable to hold 
them personally to account for the misdeeds of those obliged to do their bidding, provided that this was done by 
penalizing them for culpable lack of concern for keeping the company on the straight and narrow, rather than by 
attributing equal guilt when such could not be proven in the ordinary way”. (Ibid 518A-B). 
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judgment was not lightly taken and in making the final ruling, the judges took into account 
various factors in balancing the competing rights.  
  
It is important to note that section 332 (5) had been inherited from a pre-Constitution era when 
the legislature made laws and such laws could not be freely challenged. The time and the 
context of the promulgation of the CPA are important as it was prior to the existence of the 
Constitution in South Africa. In his judgment Langa J makes this important observation and 
draws our attention to the fact that the section came into being at a time when there was no 
Constitution in South Africa.702 This also explains why a section of this nature managed to last 
as long as it did, as part of our law.  
 
In conclusion, the implications as well as the effect of section 332 (5) and its predecessors 
operated in such a way that innocent directors, who were not aware that their colleagues were 
committing offences, were held criminally liable despite their innocence, if they were unable 
to disprove the presumption of guilt against them. Even if Coetzee had not challenged this 
section it is submitted that it would have been challenged by another aggrieved director or 
servant and subsequently declared unconstitutional. The common law position is applicable 
and it allows for a director to be held liable for the corporations’ crimes provided that that 
specific director satisfies the requirements for the common-law offence of being an 
accomplice.703  
                                                          
702 “The Act plays a crucial role in the criminal justice system of this country; it is nonetheless legislation which 
was drafted and enacted in a different constitutional era in which the legal validity of its provisions could not be 
questioned”. (S v Coetzee (note 56) 442G). 
703 “The judgment was given on 6 March 1997 but no amendment has been forthcoming. Presumably the 
government accepts that the liability of directors and employees for offences of their companies is determined in 
accordance with the common-law principles of vicarious liability”. (Kruger (note 337) 33-7).  “In my view there 
would be a duty on the director to act to prevent the commission of acts which would render the company to 
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(bb) The Constitutional Court and its antipathy towards the reverse onus 
S v Coetzee is just one of many cases in which the Constitutional Court has shown that 
provisions which allow for a reverse onus have no room in South African law. In the discussion 
below it is shown how the Constitutional Court has demonstrated its strong aversion against 
reverse onus provisions. In S v Zuma and Others704 the court found that the reverse onus created 
by section 217(b)(ii) of the CPA was invalid.705 Kentridge JA stated that the reverse onus 
“seriously compromised and undermined”706 the rights in question. These are “the right to 
remain silent after arrest, the right not to be compelled to make a confession and the right not 
to be a compellable witness against oneself”.707  
 
In S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso708 the Constitutional Court declared section Section 21(1)(a)(i) 
of Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act709 unconstitutional because of its reverse onus. In finding 
the reverse onus provision inconsistent with the constitution and therefore invalid, O’Regan J 
pointed out that “there is a risk that a person may be convicted of dealing in dagga despite the 
existence of a reasonable doubt as to his or her guilt”.710 Indeed a conviction when there is 
reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be avoided at all costs as it goes 
against the basic principle of the prosecution’s duty to provide proof of guilt beyond reasonable 
doubt in a criminal case. 
 
                                                          
criminal prosecution and his intentional failure to prevent the commission of these acts, if he were in a position 
to do so, would render him criminally liable as a socius criminis”. (Ackermann J in S v Coetzee (note 56) 464B). 
See also Burchell (note 195) 478 – 479. 
704 S v Zuma and Others 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (CC). 
705 “Accordingly section 217(b)(ii) does not meet the criteria laid down in section 33(1) of the Constitution. It is 
inconsistent with the Constitution and in terms of section 98(5) of the Constitution it must be declared invalid”. 
(Ibid para 39). 
706 Ibid para 33. 
707 Ibid. 
708 S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso [1996] 1 All SA 11 (CC). 
709 Section 21(1)(a)(i) of Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992. 
710 S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso (note 708) para 30. 
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In S v Mbatha; S v Prinsloo711 section 40(1) of the Arms and Ammunition Act, 1969712 was 
challenged for creating a reverse onus through its presumption of possession which arose from 
the mere fact that the item had at a certain time been on the premises. Langa J found that the 
provision infringed upon the right to be presumed innocent and mentioned that “it would be 
undesirable for the courts to continue applying a provision which is not only manifestly 
unconstitutional, but which also results in grave consequences for potentially innocent persons 
in view of the serious penalties prescribed”.713 
 
Another provision  of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act was successfully challenged in S v  
Julies.714 This was section 21(1)(a)(iii) which provided for a reverse onus by means of a 
presumption of dealing if there is proof that the accused had been in possession of “undesirable 
dependence-producing substance other than dagga”.715 
The provision was also found to be inconsistent with the Constitution and declared invalid716 
by the Constitutional Court. In this case the decision in S v Bhulwana,717 in which section 
21(1)(a)(i) of the same act had been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court was 
one of the cases that the judge cited. 
 
 
                                                          
711 S v Mbatha; S v Prinsloo 1996 (3) BCLR 293 (CC). 
712 Arms and Ammunition Act 75 of 1969. 
713 S v Mbatha; S v Prinsloo (note 711) para 30. 
714 S v Julies 1996 (7) BCLR 899 (CC). 
715 Ibid 899. 
716 Kriegler stated that “Die bepalings van a 21(1)(a)(iii) van die Wet op Dwelmmiddels en Dwelmsmokkelary Nr 
140 van 1992 is onbestaanbaar met die tussentydse Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika No 200 van 
1993 en word met ingang van die datum van hierdie uitspraak ongeldig en kragteloos verklaar“. (Ibid para 5). 
717 S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso (note 708). 
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Section 20 of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act718 also contained a presumption of guilt719 
and was challenged in S v Mello and Another.720 The Constitutional Court found that section 
20 takes away the prosecution’s burden of proving an “essential element”721 of the offence. 
Mokgoro J referred to S v Mbatha; S v Prinsloo722 and averred that just like “the presumption 
embodied in section 40(1) of the Arms Act, the effect of the presumption in section 20 of the 
Act is that it shifts the onus to the accused to prove his or her innocence”.723 The shifting of the 
onus to the accused while in South African law all accused are presumed innocent until proven 
guilty by the prosecution does give rise to an unsatisfactory state of affairs. 
 
In Van Nell and Another v S724 the Constitutional Court referred the challenge against the same 
section (Section 20 of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act) back to the lower court to make a 
ruling in accordance with the ruling in S v Mello and Another.725 S v Mello and Another had 
been decided by the Constitutional Court earlier during the same day that Van Nell and Another 
v S was heard by the same court.   
 
 
The above are just a few examples of the many cases where the Constitutional Court has ruled 
that a provision containing a reverse onus is inconsistent with the South African Constitution 
and is therefore invalid. These examples  are a clear indication that a provision which allows 
for a reverse onus, particularly in circumstances where this would lead to the possible 
                                                          
718 Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act (note 709). 
719 Presumption relating to possession of drugs. – If in the prosecution of any person for an offence under this Act 
it is proved that any drug was found in the immediate vicinity of the accused, it shall be presumed, until the 
contrary is proved, that the accused was found in possession of such drug.” 
720 S v Mello and Another 1998 (7) BCLR 908 (CC). 
721 Ibid  para 5. 
722 S v Mbatha; S v Prinsloo (note 711). 
723 S v Mello and Another (note 720) para 5. 
724 Van Nell and Another v S [1998] JOL 2378 (CC). 




conviction of an accused when there is a reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused is 
highly unlikely to stand a constitutional challenge in the Constitutional Court. It is therefore 
crucial to ensure that, in reforming the law pertaining to corporate criminal liability and 
corporate homicide, provisions that allow for a reverse onus as well as provisions that may 
have the effect of allowing for a conviction even though there is a reasonable doubt as to the 
guilt of the accused are totally eliminated. 
 
(vi) Section 332 (6) 
Section 332 (6) deals with the evidence that is admissible in criminal proceedings against the 
director / servant. It specifically allows for the use of evidence that was either admissible or 
would have been admissible in the prosecution of the corporation, to be admissible against the 
director or servant. The subsection further states that in criminal proceedings against the 
servant or director 
    
“Whether or not such corporate body is or was liable to prosecution for the said offence,  
any document, memorandum, book or record which was drawn up, entered up or kept in the 
ordinary course of business of that corporate body or which was at any time in the custody or 
under the control of any director, servant or agent shall be prima facie proof of its contents and 
admissible in evidence against the accused, unless he is able to prove that at all material times 
he had no knowledge of the said document, memorandum, book or record, in so far as its 
contents are relevant to the offence charged, and was in no way party to the drawing up of such 
document or memorandum or the making of any relevant entries in such book or record”.726  
 
                                                          
726 Section 332(6)(b). 
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In terms of the judgment in S v Harper & Another727 a document containing summaries of the 
company’s affairs as well as computer printouts that had been made by servants of the 
company, who had done so under the supervision of the company’s director were admissible 
evidence.  
 
(vii) Section 332 (7) 
Another section that may not withstand Constitutional scrutiny is section 332(7) of the CPA. 
This section operates in the same manner as the repealed section 332 (5). In terms of section 
332 (7): 
“When a member of an association of persons, other than a corporate body, has, in carrying on 
the business affairs of that association or in furthering or endeavouring to further its interests, 
committed an offence, whether by the performance of any act, any person who was, at the time 
of the commission of the offence, a member of that association, shall be deemed to be guilty 
of the said offence, unless it is proved that he did not take part in the commission of the offence 
and that he could not have prevented it: Provided that if the business or affairs of the 
association are governed or controlled by a committee or other similar governing body, the 
provisions of this sub-section shall not apply to any person who was not at the time of the 
commission of the offence a member of that committee or other body”.728 
 
It is a fact that crimes may be committed in furthering or endeavouring to further interests of 
associations that do not have juristic personality, and when that happens, someone must be 
held accountable. Section 332 (7) thus provides that any person who was a member of an 
                                                          
727 S v Harper & Another (note 633). 
728 The CPA (note 16) section 332(7). 
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association of persons (an association does not have juristic personality) when a crime was 
committed by the ‘association’, will be convicted of that crime, in the same way as was 
prescribed by section 332(5). This will be the case unless such person discharges the onus of 
proving that he or she did not take part in the commission of the offence and that he or she 
could not have prevented it. According to R v Levy and Others729 partnerships fall under the 
ambit of section 332(7).730 
 
As can be seen from the previous paragraph, section 332(7) provides for a reverse onus, in the 
same way as the now, invalidated section 332(5). In R v Kekane and Others the accused 
persons were convicted as the court concluded that they had not succeeded in discharging the 
onus of proving that they had not taken part in the offence and that they could not have 
reasonably prevented it.731 In S v Klopper the court found that in terms of subsection 5 and 7 
of the then section 381 of the Criminal Procedure Act a subjective test is used to determine 
liability.732  
 
In enacting section 332 (7), the legislature was, however, more sympathetic to a member of 
an association of persons than it was to a director of a corporation. The section contains a 
proviso that if the corporation was governed by a committee or governing body, if that 
member was not a member of that committee or governing body at the time of the commission 
                                                          
729 R v Levy and Others (note 375). 
730 “When, therefore, a partner commits a criminal act in furtherance of the interests of the partnership each 
member of the partnership who is in the Union, becomes liable, in proceedings against the partnership, to be 
charged with the offence and to be punished for it unless he proves that he was in no way a party thereto”. (Ibid 
312).  
731 R v Kekane and Others 1955 (4) SA 773 (A). 
732 “Sub-section 5 (and also sub-section (7)) of section 381 does not lend support to an argument that only an 
objective interpretation would give meaning to the second proviso – even a subjective interpretation establishes 
criminal liability which did not exist under the common law”. (S v Klopper (note 654) 774). 
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of the crime, he would escape liability. It is understandable where there is a governing body, 
for a person who was a member thereof to be held criminally liable. The governing body is, 
after all, the decision-making body of the association and a member of such a body who claims 
to be unaware of the fact that a crime was being committed is punished for his/her negligence. 
Although it is possible that the proviso in this section has kept the section from being 
constitutionally challenged, it has been pointed out that the proviso 
 
“contains only exempting provisions, i.e. it exempts from the deeming (main) provisions of 
the subsection, if the business or affairs of the association are governed or controlled by a 
committee or other similar governing body, any member of the association who was not a 
member of such committee or other body at the time of the commission of the offence”733  
 
In S v Ismail and Others it was held that a ‘regional command’ could not be equated with a 
committee or a governing body as the regional command had appointed itself and was neither 
known to nor approved by some members.734 In S v Ismail it was further held that where an 
association has been formed for an unlawful purpose, members of such an association will be 
held liable under section 332(7).735 In making this pronounciation Milne, J stated that the 
accused only had himself to blame for becoming a member of an association that had been 
                                                          
733 Delport et al (note 87) Appx 13 – 14. 
734 “The regional command was in no way representative of the members, nor were they leaders which the 
members had appointed or approved or in some cases even knew of. I take the view, then, that sec. 381(7) does 
not apply”. (S v Ismail and Others (note 581) 459). 
735 “It would be anomalous, indeed, if it were held that members of a lawful association could be made liable 
under this sub-section in the absence of proof of non-participation and inability to prevent the crime though 
committed by another and that members of an association formed for unlawful purposes should be better off. The 
fact that the burden of showing that he could not have prevented the crime would be virtually impossible to 




formed with the aim of committing criminal acts.736  
 
It is interesting that this section forms part of section 332 which deals with the criminal 
liability of corporations (juristic persons) when an association of persons lacks legal 
personality. Although this has been the case since the first statutory provision regulating 
corporate criminal liability in South Africa came into being, one would expect a separate 
provision for individuals within entities lacking juristic personality. 
  
The criticism against section 332 (7) is that the presumption of innocence is infringed. It is 
also submitted that the legislature, has gone too far with its presumptive clauses within the 
section. In R v Limbada737 one of the appellants was given a suspended sentence mainly due 
to the fact that “her guilt arises from the provisions of section 381 (7) and is presumptive rather 
than positively established”.738 It is submitted that Snyman’s averment that, given the decision 
in S v Coetzee, it is doubtful that the provisions of section 332 (7) are consistent with the 
Constitution,739 is correct.  
 
(viii) Section 332 (8) and section 332 (9) 
Section 332 (8) and section 332 (9) operate in the same manner as section 332(3) and section 
332 (4) respectively.740 Subsection 8 deals with the admissibility of documents that are 
presented as evidence when members of associations are being prosecuted. In terms of 
                                                          
736 Ibid 458. 
737 R v Limbada & Another (note 651). 
738 Ibid. 
739 Snyman (note 22) 256. 
740 See discussions on section 332(3) and on section 332(4) above. 
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subsection 9 records or documents made or kept by a member, servant or agent of an 
association are presumed to have been kept or made in the scope of the activities of the member, 
servant or agent of the association. S v Harper, which allows for the admissibility of computer 
printouts, is also the leading case here.741  
 
(ix) Section 332 (10) 
Section 332 (10) provides us with the meaning of the word ‘director’ as used in section 332. 
According to section 332 (10) the word ‘director’ refers to “any person who controls or governs 
a corporate body or who is a member of a body or group of persons which controls or governs 
a corporate body or where there is no such body or group of persons, who is a member of the 
corporate body.”  
 
The meaning of the word director as provided in this section is open to broad interpretation as   
any person who controls or governs the corporation may be regarded as a director, without 
taking into account how the person gets the powers to control or govern.742 The effect is that a 
person who at the time of the commission of the offence controlled or governed the corporate 
body will be regarded as a director743 and will be held criminally liable in terms of section 332 
of the CPA. 
 
In R v Mall and Others744 it was stated that the subsection is clear and its plain language is 
                                                          
741 S v Harper and Another (note 633). 
742 “The word director has an extended meaning and connotes any person who governs or controls the 
company”. (Du Toit (note 514) 33-7). 
743 Ibid. 
744 R v Mall and Others 1959 (4) SA 607 (N).  
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applicable to any person who controls or governs the corporation.745 Such person does not 
have to be legally granted the authority to control or govern the corporation.746 Caney, J., in 
Mall’s case further states that 
“…any outsider who usurps the functions of a director, by taking part in controlling the acts 
of a company, would bring himself within the scope of the criminal responsibility placed upon 
a director by sub-sec. (10) of sec. 381 of the Code. In my opinion the accused more than merely 
usurped the function of a director of the three companies. He was tacitly accepted by the boards 
of directors of the companies as the person who in fact controlled or at least predominantly 
influenced the conduct of the affairs of the companies and I have no doubt that the control and 
governance envisaged by the sub-section was exercised by the accused”.747 
 
In S v Marks748 Hill J approves of and cites the decision in R v Mall and Others.749 He also 
states that “the connotation of the words “control” and “govern”, as used in the definition of 
“director” in sub-section (10) of Act 56 of 1955, is wide enough to include the control of the 
company in any of its activities.”750  
 
Where the Companies Act or any other Act imposes criminal liability on a director, the 
definition of director in section 332(10) is not applicable. In S v De Jager & Another751 an 
appeal against the conviction of company directors for theft was heard. According to the facts, 
two of the directors had resigned from their positions. The court, however, established that 
                                                          
745 Ibid 607. 
746 Ibid. 
747 Ibid. 
748 S v Marks 1965 (3) SA 834 (W), 843. 
749 R v Mall and Others (note 744). 
750 S v Marks (note 748) 834. 
751 S v De Jager & Another 1965 (2) SA 616 (A). 
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these were purported resignations as they “continued to control the position of directors and 
fell within the definition of ‘director’ in section 229 of the Companies Act”.752 The two 
company directors whose resignations were ostensible, were for that reason, regarded by the 
court as directors. Another important point from De Jager, is the fact that where a person was 
purported to be a director when he in fact was not, the court said such a person can be ignored 
“because it is common cause that despite the minutes, he was never a director”.753 
 
It is stressed in S v Van den Berg & Others754 that the meaning of the term director as envisaged 
by section 332(10) is only limited to the application of section 332. Where other statutes refer 
to the term director, the meaning cannot be regarded as the one stated in subsection 10.755 In 
S v Van den Berg & Others756 three individuals were charged with fraud, theft and 
contravening section 90Bis of the Companies Act.757 Of the three only one was a ‘duly 
appointed’758 director and the contravention that they were accused of could only be 
committed by directors.759 It was held that the definition of director that is found in section 
332(10) is not applicable to offences created by the Companies Act.760 Hefer J in making this 
judgment states that  
“There are, in my view, very clear indications that the Legislature never intended to recognize 
persons as directors who are not appointed to that position, whether, it be for the purpose of 
according them the powers and authority which directors are entitled to exercise, or for the 
                                                          
752 Ibid 623. 
753 Ibid. 
754 S v Van den Berg & Others 1979 (1) SA 208 (D); [1979] 3 All SA 133 (D) 140 . 
755 With reference to the Companies Act, Hefer, J states that “It follows that when a penal provision in the Act 
imposes criminal liability on directors, only those who qualify as directors in terms of the Act’s own definition 
can commit the offence in question”. (Ibid 140). 
756 Ibid. 
757 The Companies Act 46 of 1926. 
758 S v Van den Berg & Others (note 754) 214. 
759 Ibid 214. 
760 Ibid 216. 
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purpose of imposing civil or criminal liability on them”.761 
It is submitted that Hefer J is correct in stating that the definition in section 332(10) excludes 
offences in terms of the Companies Act and any other legislation that deals specifically with 
companies. The application of the definition in section 332(10) to such offences would indeed 
create a situation where individuals who were not intended to be regarded as directors by the 
Companies Act, would be regarded as such. It follows therefore that in the event of the 
contravention of the Companies Act the definition of director as provided in section 1 of the 
Companies Act will be applicable.762 The definition in section 332(10) of the CPA will not 
apply. 
 
It is interesting to note that section 332 does not provide us with the definition of servant, as 
used in this section.  
 
(x) Section 332 (11) 
S. 332 (11) provides that “The provisions of this section shall be additional to and not in substitution 
for any other law which provides for a prosecution against corporate bodies or their directors or servants 
or against associations of persons or their members”. The legislature has taken into account the fact that 
the CPA is not the only source of law dealing with the prosecution of corporations. As stated above, 
unlawful corporate activities range from the disregard of statutes regulating the maintenance of safety 
in the workplace, to corruption, theft, fraud, etc. These are regulated by common law and by various 
                                                          
761 Ibid 216. 
762 Section 1 of the Companies Act (note 757) which states that “director means a member of the board of a 
company, as contemplated in section 66, or an alternate director of a company and includes any person occupying 
the position of a director or alternate director, by whatever name designated”. 
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statutes. This subsection ensures that the provisions of section 332 are not applied to the exclusion of 
any other laws that may be relevant.  
 
A corporation that is prosecuted under section 332 can, therefore, not escape liability under 
another law. An example of the application of this subsection can be seen in S v Dersley where 
‘the accused was charged with contravening section 38(3) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973’.763 
However, in R v RSI (Pty) Ltd and Another764 a limited company was found not to be able to 
contravene section 135 (3) (a) of Act 24 of 1936765 and in R v Smith and Others766 a company 
was found not to be capable of contravening section 185bis (3) of the Companies Act 46 of 
1926 and section 135 (3) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
 
(xi) Section 332 (12) 
In terms of section 332 (12) ‘where a summons under this Act is to be served on a corporate 
body, it shall be served on the director or servant referred to in subsection (2) and in the manner 
referred to in section 54(2)’. This subsection is a procedural provision which serves to ensure 
that consistency is maintained. As the corporation consists of several people, some of whom 
are directors and some of whom are servants, it is important to ensure that the State deals with 
one individual, who is prosecuted on behalf of the corporation. It is thus necessary for the State 
to determine beforehand who that individual is, so that in the event of issuing a summons, it 
will be served on the correct person. Non-adherence to this subsection may lead to confusion. 
In Ex Parte Prokureur-Generaal, Transvaal 767 the court set out the obligations and personal 
                                                          
763 S v Dersley (note 489) 254. 
764 R v RSI (Pty) Ltd and Another (note 435). 
765 Ibid 414. 
766 R v Smith and Others (note 435). 
767 Ex Parte Prokureur-Generaal, Transvaal (note 594). 
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liability of a person against whom the summons is issued, in the event that the person fails to 
act in accordance with the summons.  
(b) Corporate homicide in South Africa 
(i) The challenge caused by terminology 
In South African law, where the death of a person has been negligently caused by another, this 
crime is referred to as culpable homicide. It is defined as “the unlawful, negligent causing of 
the death of another human being”.768 It is a common-law crime and the elements that must be 
proven are i) causing the death ii) of another human being iii) unlawfully and iv) negligently.769 
These elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, before one can be found guilty of 
culpable homicide.  
 
It has been suggested that the same circumstances may lead to the perpetrator being charged 
with murder if dolus eventualis can be proved.770 In this context this would mean that where 
death was caused by a corporation, depending on the circumstances, the corporation may be 
prosecuted for murder. Whiting states that the type of risk that is taken is also important in 
determining whether there was dolus eventualis,771 and whether the offence was not a positive 
act but rather an omission or failure to comply with a legal duty.772 Whiting points out that “in 
the great majority of conscious risk-taking, the person concerned will be guilty of dolus 
eventualis if he foresaw the happening of the result in question as a substantial possibility”.773 
                                                          
768 Snyman (note 22) 451. 
769 Ibid. 
770 R Whiting ‘Thoughts on dolus eventualis’  (1988) 1 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 440, 442. 
771 He states that a “specific concrete risk…may tip the scales in favour of a finding of dolus eventualis”. (Ibid 
441 – 442). 




Burchell is also of the view that under such circumstances a corporation may be prosecuted for 
murder,  
“As far as homicide is concerned, there is no logical or policy-based objection to a juristic 
person being found guilty of culpable homicide where corporate negligence is evident (or 
even possibly liable for murder in the extreme situation where the death that occurs was 
foreseen as a real possibility by officials in the corporation)”.774 
 It is submitted that corporations do sometimes take risks consciously and even though they 
foresee death as a substantial possibility, they nevertheless carry on with the risky activity. An 
example is the Ford Motor Company case where the company was charged for manslaughter 
in the United States under circumstances that would possibly allow for murder in South Africa: 
“Evidence suggests that the Ford Motor Company knew of the danger in the 
Bridgestone/Firestone tyres fitted to its Ford Explorers, a car in which 88 people in the US and 
46 people in Venezuela were killed in incidents linked to the tyres”.775  Another example is the 
Ford Pinto case776 in which the company was prosecuted for manslaughter after the death of 
three teenagers in a Ford Pinto vehicle. Their deaths were caused by the petrol tank burning 
after a slight impact caused by a minor accident. Apparently the company had been aware of 
the fact that a slight impact would cause the vehicle to burn:  
“it had been revealed that the company had known that the Pinto’s design was faulty but had 
decided not to instigate a recall because an actuarial calculation indicated that it would be 
more costly to do so that to meet damage claims resulting from accidents”.777  
 
                                                          
774 Burchell (note 195) 477. 
775 G Slapper ‘Corporate Manslaughter: The Changing Legal Scenery” 10(2) Asia Pacific Law Review (2002) 161.  
776 State v. Ford Motor Co., 47 U.S.L.W. 2514, 2515. 




From these two examples it is clear that corporations should not be excluded from the 
possibility of possessing fault in the form of dolus eventualis and being convicted with murder. 
It is submitted that prosecuting corporations for murder under such circumstances would be 
commendable as it may lead to corporations being more vigilant about avoiding situations 
where risks are taken in spite of loss of life being ‘a substantial possibility’. 
 
The definition of culpable homicide does not state that the perpetrator should be a natural 
person. It could be any person, including a corporation, which is a juristic person. In this 
section, the discussion is that of culpable homicide perpetrated by a juristic person. A juristic 
person may be charged with culpable homicide together with the director or servant who 
committed the crime in the process of furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of a 
corporation. For the sake of clarity and as a way of advancing the call for a separate legal 
framework for deaths caused by corporations, as mentioned above, these deaths will be referred 
to as corporate homicide.778 
 
Deaths caused by corporations occur regularly in South Africa and in many cases these are 
caused negligently. Such negligence may be on the part of the corporation779 or on the part of 
the employees.780 There is, however, the challenge that prosecutions for such deaths do not 
occur often.781 It is submitted that with regard to deaths of employees, the main reason for the 
lack of prosecutions is that such deaths are usually regarded as an infringement of a regulatory 
                                                          
778 See Chapter One III(a) above.This is in spite of the fact that in South Africa we do not currently have a specific 
crime called corporate homicide. 
779 This may be the case where failure to maintain equipment in a good working condition may lead to fatalities. 
780 For instance, where the employee fails to operate machinery correctly. 
781 With regard to workplace deaths, Rycroft states that “Despite the seriousness of this…only occasionally does 
a death result in a criminal prosecution”. (Rycroft (note 365) 141 – 142). 
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statute and are dealt with in accordance with the penal provisions of that applicable regulatory 
statute.782 Moreover, where there are deaths caused by machinery or equipment, the difficulty 
in attaining evidence of the negligence of a particular person,783 may be one of the reasons for 
the lack of such prosecutions. Furthermore, families usually accept compensation from the 
corporation and where none is forthcoming, they opt for civil action against the corporation. 
This, however, should not make it difficult or impossible for the State to institute criminal 
proceedings against the corporation.  
 
One of the challenges to corporate homicide is that the term homicide is associated with natural 
persons, while there is the traditional reference to deaths and injuries caused by corporations 
as ‘accidents’, rather than homicide.784 The South African Oxford School Dictionary defines 
accident as “an unexpected happening, especially one causing injury or damage”.785 The use 
of the term ‘accident’ creates the attitude that corporations’ accountability for such deaths and 
injuries should be minimal, as the deaths and injuries are merely accidental.786 It is noted that 
the media plays a role in strengthening and possibly even perpetuating this attitude towards 
deaths caused by corporations, in their reporting of cases of corporate homicide. For instance, 
in the reporting of the death and injury of workers in a store, caused by the falling of shelves 
with corrugated iron, the media reported that “The Limpopo labour department, in conjunction 
                                                          
782 For instance the Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 and the Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 
1996. 
783 If attained, this negligence would be imputed to the corporation. 
784 Wells states that “if the deaths are called accidents then they are less likely to be seen as potentially unlawful 
homicides”. (Wells (note 15) 11 - 12). This is echoed by Rycroft who avers that “The  most obvious reason why 
workplace deaths have traditionally been viewed and treated differently from culpable homicide outside the 
workplace is that they are viewed as ‘accidents’ – somehow inevitable, somehow the price we must pay for the 
mines and factories that will make the economy thrive”. (Rycroft (note 365) 142). 
785 J Hawkins The South African Oxford School Dictionary (2003) 3. 
786 Burchell states that “the use of terminology such as ‘accidents’ and ‘environmental spills’ reveals the 
underlying bias of the common law; crimes are committed by blameworthy individuals, accidents happen to 
corporations”. (Burchell (note 49) 562 - 563).  
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with the SAPS in Tzaneen, has launched an investigation into the cause of a tragic accident787 
that left a worker dead and two others slightly injured at a mega store”.788 In reporting that a 
locomotive operator was found dead under a locomotive it was stated that “A woman died in 
a mining accident789 outside Rustenburg on Thursday”.790 I-Net Bridge reported that “BHP 
Billiton Energy Coal South Africa says an employee died during an accident791 at Khutala 
Colliery near Witbank...The fatality occurred during the performance of maintenance work on 
a conveyor belt in the underground operations…”.792  
 
These are just a few examples of how the media depict deaths caused by corporations or 
corporate activities, thus influencing people’s reaction or attitudes. It is submitted that such 
terminology is, to a certain extent, responsible for society’s seeming complacency and apparent 
acceptance of the fact that such deaths and injuries are part and parcel of corporate activity.  
 
It is further submitted that the terminology used by the media does not only influence the public 
perception of such deaths but it also influences the prosecution process. In 1996, with reference 
to the fact that at that time there had only been one conviction of a company for culpable 
homicide in England, Clarkson cites one of the reasons for this as the 
                                                          
787 Own emphasis. 
788 Michael Sakuneka ‘Falling shelves kill worker’ 25 Jun 2009.  
http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/sowetan/archive/2009/06/25/falling-shelves-kill-worker  
(accessed on 17 February 2014). 
789 Own emphasis. 
790 Sapa ‘Woman dies in Lonmin platinum mine in Rustenburg’ August 19 2010 
http://www.iol.co.za/business/companies/woman-dies-in-lonmin-platinum-mine-in-rustenburg-1.807476. 
(accessed on 17 February 2014). 
791 Own emphasis. 
792 I-Net Bridge ‘Fatality at BHP's Khutala Colliery’ January 13 2012. 




“public attitudes moulded by the media, state and companies themselves. When persons are 
killed or seriously injured at work (even when they are not employees), the typical response 
is to describe this as an ‘accident’ – which in turn structures the official response.”793 
What Clarkson is conveying is that the terminology that is used impacts on prosecutions in that 
a death caused by a corporation is considered as an accident and this is so even when it comes 
to prosecution. It is submitted that the terminology structures the official response in the 
following manner: as the death is already viewed as ‘accidental’ the charge against the 
corporation may be less than it ought to be and the court itself may be more sympathetic 
towards the corporation as there is already the perception that the death was ‘an accident’, as 
opposed to a death that was possibly foreseen. Clarkson’s view is echoed by Wells, who 
correctly observes that 
“The legal impediments to prosecutions for manslaughter following negligent work place 
deaths or other negligent deaths caused by corporate activity are reinforced by such 
constructions. If the deaths are called accidents then they are less likely to be seen as 
potentially unlawful homicides,794 
 
It is submitted that the terminology further impacts negatively on prosecutions in that with the 
general perception that such deaths are accidental, it becomes easier for the defence to create 
doubt as to the guilt of the corporation by arguing that the deaths were accidental. If the defence 
is strong, the prosecution will not succeed in proving the guilt of the corporation beyond 
reasonable doubt, thus hampering the prosecution of the accused corporation.  
 
                                                          
793 CMV Clarkson “Kicking Corporate Bodies & Damning their Souls” (1996) 59, 1 The Modern Law Review 
557, 558. 
794 Wells (note 15) 11 - 12 
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It is further submitted that such terminology gives the impression that accountability, if any, 
should be minimal, as accidents are in many cases regarded as unavoidable acts of God. 
Referring to deaths that may have been caused by corporations as accidents ought to be 
avoided, and with each death case an inquest should be made with the possibility of corporate 
homicide or corporate murder being considered.  
 
(ii) The prosecution of corporate homicide in South Africa 
There are many instances where deaths have occurred in the workplace or where people have 
died while being rendered a service, such as boat riding or travelling in a bus or train. These 
incidents are normally published in the media and form part of news reports. At times these 
deaths or injuries are reported in such a way that the employer or service provider appears to 
have negligently caused the deaths of those people. It is, however, rare that such allegations 
end up in criminal courts. Moreover, the few that do reach the criminal courts usually end in 
acquittals. 
 
The other problem is that in many cases, particularly where the deaths are due to motor 
accidents, it is usually the employee driver who faces prosecution. An example is the recent 
Fields’ Hill carnage which took place in September 2011 when a truck plunged into four full 
minibus taxis and a motor vehicle, leaving more than 20 people dead, in Field’s Hill, KwaZulu-
Natal. The truck driver is being prosecuted for culpable homicide.795 What is of concern is that 
Sagekal Logistics, the company that owned the truck, has not been charged with culpable 
                                                          
795 He was initially charged with 22 counts of culpable homicide then these charges were upgraded by the National 
Prosecuting Authority to murder. It is not yet clear why the charges of culpable homicide against the driver were 
upgraded to murder. Charges have since been reverted to culpable homicide. 
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homicide. This is despite the fact that allegations have been made against the owner of the truck 
regarding the truck’s brakes and licence.796  The question that arises is why allegations against 
the company owning the truck are not tested in court in the same way as allegations against the 
driver of the truck. 
 
(aa) Holding the master liable for the negligence of the servant 
As culpable homicide requires mens rea in the form of negligence to be proved, as an element 
of the crime, before dealing with the corporate homicide cases, it is important to show that 
courts allow for an employer to be held liable for the negligence of the employee. In the 1914 
case of Mkize v Martens,797 the Appellate Division confirmed that a master could be held liable 
for the negligence of its servant. In this case two boys who were employed by a transport driver 
caused a fire which caused damage. On that particular day they completed their work and lit a 
fire in order to prepare a meal, as they were hungry. As a result of the boys’ negligence, the 
fire spread and damaged trees and herbage belonging to another. In a civil case against the 
boys’ employer, it was held by the court a quo that the fire had been made within the scope of 
the boys’ employment.798 This was confirmed by the Appellate Division, which further stated 
that as they acted negligently, the employer is responsible for their negligence where in passing 
judgment De Villiers JA stated that  
“In the present case the boys had had their breakfast before 7 o'clock that morning; there is no 
evidence they had any food left; towards noon… The defendant must, therefore, have left them 
at the latest at about 8 o'clock under these circumstances it seems to me it may fairly be said 
                                                          
796 Sapa ‘Field’s Hill crash driver arrested’ Independentonline 6 September 2013 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/field-s-hill-crash-driver-arrested-1.1573873 (accessed 17 February 
2014). See also Pretoria News ‘Anger in KZN over crash carnage’ Pretoria News 7 September 2013 
http://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-news/anger-in-kzn-over-crash-carnage-1.1574528 (accessed 17 February 2014). 
797 Mkize v Martens (note 430) 382. 
798 Ibid 383. 
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that towards noon, when the defendant had not yet put in an appearance, the boys were entitled, 
and could reasonably have been expected, to start preparing food; and if that is so they must be 
said to have lit the fire in the course of their employment by the defendant. They were at the 
time engaged upon his business, and they were entitled to take all reasonable measures to 
discharge their functions properly”. 799 
 
Holding an employer liable for the negligence of the employee is an established principle in 
South African law and it paves the way for the development of a legal framework for corporate 
homicide. This is evidenced in R v Shikuri800 which was an appeal against the conviction of 
an employer for culpable homicide and for contravening section 31(2) of Ordinance 17 of 1931 
in that he had ‘aided and abetted the driver in killing the deceased’.801 In Shikuri the employer 
was an individual, who had been sitting beside the driver who caused an accident which 
resulted in death. Though the employer in Shikuri was not a corporation, the case is still 
relevant to this context as it sets a precedent for the conviction of an employer for culpable 
homicide committed by its employee. 
 
(bb)  Holding corporations liable for culpable homicide 
R v Bennett802 is the first recorded case where a corporation was charged with and convicted 
of culpable homicide. An employee’s negligent causing of another’s death was imputed to the 
corporation.803 The importance of the case lies in the fact that a corporation was successfully 
prosecuted for a crime, which, until then, had been treated as if only natural persons could be 
                                                          
799 Ibid 401 - 402. 
800 R v Shikuri 1939 AD 225. 
801 Ibid 225. 




held liable. The court in passing judgment considered and applied the principle laid down in 
Mkize v Martens804 and in Shikuri,805 that a master is responsible for negligent acts of its 
servant, including culpable homicide.  
 
In R v Jopp and Another806 an explosion had taken place at the accused company causing the 
deaths of two people. The director and the company were committed for culpable homicide, 
but following a preparatory examination, they instead, were charged in the Magistrates’ court 
for having contravened certain regulations under the Factories, Machinery and Building Work 
Act.807 This resulted in a conviction in the lower court for the contravention of the regulatory 
statute. The appeal court heard an appeal against the conviction on count 2808 and count 3.809 
The conviction on count two was confirmed, while the one on count 3 was set aside.810 An 
important issue that arises out of this case is that even though human beings have lost their 
lives, the corporation and its directors were not prosecuted for culpable homicide. Instead the 
lesser offences that appear in a regulatory statute are the ones that the corporation and its 
directors were charged with. It is submitted that when deaths occur, instead of prosecuting the 
corporation for lesser offences, corporations must be charged with culpable homicide. The 
statutory contraventions should be cited as additional charges or alternative charges.  
 
                                                          
804 Mkize v Martens (note 430). 
805 R v Shikuri (note 800). 
806 R v Jopp and Another [1949] 4 All SA 153 (N). 
807 Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act 22 of 1941. 
808 Contravening Reg. 38 (d) “in that they did not cause every inexperienced person called upon to operate a 
machine, to wit the hydrogen plant there situated, which is liable to cause injury, to be fully instructed as to the 
dangers likely to arise from its operation and the precautions to be observed”. (R v Jopp and Another (note 806) 
155). 
809 Contravening Reg. 38 (e) “in that they did not cause all plant, material and other things . . . to be provided and 
maintained in good order and repair, to wit did fail to have a proper circulating water cooling system connected 
to a flow of water on a compressor in the hydrogen plant there situated”. (Ibid 157). 
810 Ibid 159. 
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In S v Cairns and Another811 a corporation and its director were charged with culpable homicide 
in the Magistrates’ Court. They were, in the alternative charged with the contravention of 
certain regulations in terms of the Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act.812 The court 
hearing the appeal had to answer the question whether the accused had been rightfully charged 
with culpable homicide.813 After a thorough examination of the evidence presented in the court 
a quo, on appeal the conviction on culpable homicide was set aside, on the basis that the judge 
was of the opinion that the prosecution in the Magistrates’ court had not proven a reasonable 
person in the position of the accused “foresaw or ought reasonably to have appreciated the 
possibility of harm to the deceased”.814 Despite the failed appeal, the case is important in that 
it is an illustration of the court’s willingness and acceptance of the concept of corporate 
homicide. 
 
S v Joseph Mtshumayeli815 which, as mentioned above was a Rhodesian case based on a 
provision worded similarly to the South African provision regulating corporate criminal 
liability at the time, was an appeal against a conviction in a magistrates’s court for culpable 
homicide. An omnibus belonging to the accused corporation was involved in a fatal accident. 
The driver of the omnibus, who was an employee of the corporation, had become very tired, 
and agreed to let a passenger (third party) drive the vehicle. The passenger was not licensed to 
drive an omnibus, but was licensed to drive a heavy vehicle. After driving for a while, he lost 
control of the omnibus and it overturned, causing the death of one of the passengers. The 
passenger who was driving was found by the magistrate’s court to have been doing so in 
                                                          
811 S v Cairns and Another (note 543). 
812 Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act (note 807). 
813 S v Cairns and Another (note 543) 194. 
814 Ibid 195. 
815 S v Joseph Mtshumayeli (note 542). 
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furthering the interest of the corporation. The corporation and that person were convicted of 
culpable homicide. The court hearing the appeal had to answer the question whether the 
corporation was criminally liable for the negligent driving of a third party. In affirming the 
decision of the lower court, Beadle CJ states that “the third accused drove the omnibus with 
the permission of the second accused, who was a servant of the appellant, and the third accused 
undoubtedly drove the omnibus while ‘endeavouring to further the interests of” the 
appellant”.816  Beadle goes on to state that in accordance with the clear wording of the criminal 
liability provision in the criminal procedure act, there should be no distinction between acts 
perfomed by an employee and acts performed by a third party who has been granted permission 
by an employee as “all these acts, if done in furtherance of the interests of the company, are 
deemed to be the acts of the company”.817 He continues and states the important fact that the 
company is criminally liable, even though the company’s employee had acted totally against 
the company’s command by allowing the third party to drive.818  
 
S v Joseph Mtshumayeli is one of the leading cases on corporate homicide and has been 
referred to by South African courts and academics as authority for holding corporations 
criminally liable for culpable homicide. Together with S v Bennet, it is of importance in that 
the negligence of a third party, given permission to perform an act by the corporation’s 
employee is imputed to the corporation and the corporation is found guilty on that basis.  
 
                                                          
816 Ibid 34. 




S v Bochris819 was also a conviction of a corporation for culpable homicide which was 
overruled by the appeal court. The accused were charged with culpable homicide for the death 
of a nine-year old boy. According to the facts, the family had been swimming in the swimming 
pool at the Wilderness Pleasure Resort and as they were about to leave the swimming pool the 
young boy who was described as a good swimmer, dived to the bottom of the pool.820 When 
he did not come up after about ten seconds, his father went in and found him stuck in the pool’s 
outlet pipe near a corner of the pool. The Wilderness Pleasure Resort was owned by a 
corporation, Bochris Investments (Pty) Ltd (“Bochris”). In the court a quo Bochris Investments 
(Pty) Ltd was charged together with Mr Joubert, the resort’s manager who was also a director 
and the majority shareholder of Bochris, as well as his wife, Mrs Joubert, who was a director 
and a shareholder of Bochris, and also an employee of the resort. The three accused were 
charged with culpable homicide. They had all pleaded not guilty. The court convicted Bochris 
and Mr Joubert of culpable homicide in that they “wrongfully and negligently killed Ryan 
Edward Andresen, in life a nine-year old male”.821 
The appeal court identified the most important question that needed to be answered as whether 
Joubert ought to have realized that the “unguarded opening was dangerous – more specifically, 
ought he to have foreseen that, unless steps were taken to guard it, death could result to a user 
of the pool”? In reversing the court a quo’s findings, Nicholas AJA states: 
“Nor do I think that the diligens paterfamilias would have appreciated the magnitude of 
the forces involved, or the mechanism by which an accident of this kind could happen. 
                                                          
819 S v Bochris Investments (Pty) Ltd. and Another [1987] ZASCA 140; [1988] 4 All SA 207 (AD) (27 November 
1987). 
820 Ibid 207. 
821 Ibid 209. 
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Without such appreciation the possibility of death could not reasonably have been 
foreseen”.822 
Although the conviction was set aside, the importance of the S v Bochris lies in the fact that it 
serves as further confirmation that in spite of minimal convictions, South African courts do 
accept the idea of holding a corporation criminally liable for the negligent death of a human 
being. 
 
S v Schindler Lifts823 was an appeal against the conviction of a corporation for culpable 
homicide. An adult and a one-year old child had been in a lift (elevator) when it got stuck in 
between 2 floors. While attempting to get help, the inner door of the lift had been opened, but 
the outer door was closed. The child was between the inner door and the door post when the 
power suddenly came back on and the inner door closed, crushing the child. Schindler Lifts 
was prosecuted on the basis that it was responsible for the inspection and the maintenance of 
that specific lift. The magistrate had found that the company had been negligent and convicted 
it of culpable homicide. This was overturned in the Witwatersrand Local Division, which 
classified the incident as a freak accident. It found no negligence on the part of the corporation 
and explained that the same force with which the door of the lift had closed, would not have 
caused fatal injuries on an adult. It further stated that since a similar incident had not occurred 
prior to this one, the corporation could not foresee that that would occur, and for that reason 
could not have done anything to prevent it from happening.824  
                                                          
822 Ibid 211. 
823 S v Schindler Lifts (SA) (Pty) (Ltd) (note 33). 
824 “…the State failed completely to establish any breach of a duty of care owed by appellant and, accordingly, 
any negligent conduct which caused the death of the child. It was a unique incident which could not reasonably 





Despite the fact that the conviction of a corporation for culpable homicide was set aside, it is 
clear that South African courts do accept that corporations are capable of committing culpable 
homicide and they are willing to convict a corporation where it has been proven that the death 
was caused by its negligence.  Here the court convincingly showed that since such an incident 
could not possibly have been foreseen, the corporation could not have been in a position to take 
any preventative measures, therefore, it should not have been found negligent.  
 
(iii)  Recent developments on corporate homicide in South Africa 
Although provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act continue to govern corporate crime, there 
has been a move towards the recognition of corporate homicide as a separate crime that 
corporations may be held liable for. This came in the form of a proposal that was limited to the 
mining sector. It came as a result of the fact that South Africa has seen an increase in the 
number of mine- related deaths, injuries and illnesses. This prompted the legislature to advance 
a call for the criminalisation of certain activities that result in the deaths of people while they 
are working in the mines.  
 
The Mine Health and Safety Amendment Bill825 was introduced and later enacted as the Mine 
Health and Safety Amendment Act.826 The Act has increased the regulatory powers that the 
Department of Minerals and Energy used to enjoy under the Mine Health and Safety Act.827  
                                                          
825 Mine Health and Safety Amendment Bill 54D of 2008. 
826 Mine Health and Safety Amendment Act 74 of 2008. 
827 I Rawoot “Corporate Homicide Bill Causes tremors” (12 March 2009) Mail and Guardian. 
http://mg.co.za/article/2009-03-12-corporate-homicide-bill-causes-tremors (Accessed 16 March 2014). 
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The department now has the powers to, inter alia, impose fines for non-compliance that range 
between R200 000 and R1 million; ensure that deadlines set for companies to produce accident 
reports are complied with; decide whether health and safety permits should be issued or 
revoked; see to it that minefields that have become sites of accidents are shut down until such 
time that the department is satisfied that the safety standards have been complied with.828 The 
senior officers within a corporation face the possibility of spending at least five years in prison 
if there is a death and they are found to have been negligent.   
 
Despite the coming into being of the Act, there is still a need for a way to be found to ensure 
that the deaths, injuries and illnesses resulting from mining activities are dealt with adequately 
and properly.829 One of the proposals that was included in the Bill was a provision for corporate 
homicide. The Bill proposed the insertion of section 86A to the Act. Although this proposal 
later became section 26 of the Mine Health and Safety Amendment Act830 which inserts section 
86A to the Mine Health and Safety Act,831 the insertion was not approved and does not form 
part of the amendments that were effected by the Amendment Act.832 The insertion is a 
provision for criminal liability for the deaths, injuries and illnesses of people within the mining 
sector. It provides as follows: 
                                                          
828 Ibid.  
829 “In May 2009, the Inspectorate introduced critical amendments to the Mine Health and Safety Amendment 
Act, 74 of 2008, which enhanced the ability of the State to address the challenges of the high rate of injuries, ill-
health and deaths in the industry. The Act also introduced stricter sanctions for non-compliance with health and 
safety standards. While positive and encouraging milestones have been achieved in this regard, the fatalities and 
injuries remain unacceptably high, with recurring fatal accidents at some mines. It is evident that significant effort 
is still needed to effectively address this situation”. (Department of Minerals and Energy Annual Report 
www.dmr.gov.za/AnnuaReport/Documents/DME%20Annual20Report%2009_10%20hr.pdfAnnualreport2009 
(accessed 20 March 2014)). 
830 Mine Health and Safety Amendment Act (note 826). 
831 Mine Health and Safety Act (note 782). 
832 Webber Wentzel attorneys ‘The intended risks and perils of mine management under the Mine Health and 
Safety Amendment Act 74 of 2008’ Mine Health and Safety e-alert 
http://mailstreams.cambrient.com/mailstreams/admin/mailer_instance/view.jsp?mailerid=1268&mid=2016 




86A (1) An employer, chief executive officer, manager, agent or employee commits an offence 
if he or she contravenes or fails to comply with the provisions of this Act thereby causing -  
(a) a person’s death; or 
(b) serious injury or illness to a person. 
(2) If a chief executive officer, manager, agent or employee of the employer commits an 
offence by performing or omitting to perform an act and such performance or omission 
would have constituted an offence had it been done by the employer, that employer is 
equally committing an offence if the act or omission fell within the scope of the authority 
or employment of the chief executive officer, manager, agent or employee concerned and 
the employer – 
(a) connived at or permitted the performance or an omission by the chief executive   officer, 
manager, agent or employee concerned ; or 
(b) did not take all reasonable steps to prevent the performance or an omission. 
 (3) For the purposes of subsection (1) the – 
(a) fact that the person issued instructions prohibiting the performance or an omission is 
not in itself sufficient proof that all reasonable steps were taken to prevent the performance 
or an omission; 
(b) defence of ignorance or mistake by any person accused cannot be admitted; or 
(c) defence that the death of a person, injury or illness or endangerment was caused by the 
performance or an omission of an act falling within the scope of authority or employment 
of any individual within the employ of the employer may not be admitted. 
 
The proposed insertion provides for the criminal liability for death, injury and illness of a 
person as a result of failure to comply with the provisions of the Mine Health and Safety Act. 
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The parties that may be held criminally liable are employees, chief executive officers, agents 
as well as employers. The provision envisaged a situation where both the employer or 
corporation and individuals within the mining sector are held criminally liable. The provision 
goes further than the Criminal Procedure Act in that it specifically refers to employer, 
employee, chief executive officer, agent and manager. By stating clearly all the parties that 
may be held liable, the provision prevents a situation where a person escapes liability because 
he cannot be pinpointed as the culprit. Moreover, clarity regarding parties that may be held 
criminally liable has the potential of making it easier to identify and prosecute persons who 
ought to be held responsible. 
 
Employers would not only be held liable for acts and or omissions that took place within the 
scope of the other party’s employment, but also for those where the employer “connived at or 
permitted the performance or an omission”; and where reasonable steps to prevent the offence 
had not been taken. Subsection 3 of the provision makes it difficult for the accused to rely on 
possible defences, as it indicates clearly the defences that cannot be relied on: the issuing of 
instructions forbidding the particular offence is not an indication that all reasonable steps had 
been taken to prevent the offence; ignorance or mistake may not be relied on as a defence; and 
the defence fact that the act causing the death, injury or illness is an act that falls within the 
scope of employment is unacceptable. 
 
When the Act was passed section 26 was not approved therefore section 86A has not been 
inserted to the Mine Health and Safety Act. It is submitted though, that this provision is a 
milestone in the development of corporate homicide in South Africa. For the first time, we have 
a proposal that specifically calls for the introduction of the concept of ‘corporate homicide’ to 
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South African law. An avenue for open discussion regarding this matter was made available 
and the response was negative as there were fears regarding corporate homicide.833 When the 
Chamber of Mines commented on the Bill the fact was raised that employers were extremely 
worried about what they referred to as a “shift away from a system that is finely balanced 
between preventative and punitive measures, to a system strongly emphasizing punitive 
measures”.834 The employers were also not pleased about the wording of the proposed 
provision as it seemed to focus more on the criminal liability of employers.835  
 
The proposed section 86A has been described as one of the “most problematic and 
controversial”836 amendments in the Act and the liability proposed in section 86A has been 
referred to as “far-reaching draconian liability”.837 Unfortunately, the negative response 
towards the proposal may be an indication that there is no political will to institute corporate 
homicide. Public awareness of developments in countries such as England and Canada may 
make it possible for people to understand the need for corporate homicide. It is submitted that 
even though at the end of the day section 86A did not come into being, this provision is a 
milestone in the development of corporate homicide in South Africa as for the first time, we 
have a proposal that specifically calls for the introduction of the concept of ‘corporate 
homicide’ to South African law.  
Although in this case, the proposal is specifically aimed at mines, the proposal is an indication 
that the legislature does take deaths caused by corporations seriously and there is a realization 
that the current law is inadequate and ineffective. The rejected proposal may still be revived 
                                                          
833 Rawoot (note 827). 
834 Chamber of Mines ‘Comments on the Mine Health and Safety Amendment Bill as published on 16 May 2008’, 
30 May 2008. 
835 Ibid 14. 




and reformulated in such a way that (a) it is not limited to the mining sector, but is rather an 
all-encompassing provision that will deal with all deaths, injuries and illnesses caused by 
corporations; (b) it addresses all the shortcomings of the current provision, and (c) it makes it 
possible for corporations to be properly and adequately punished for deaths, caused by them. 
 
(c) Punishing corporate criminals in South Africa 
As already mentioned section 332(2)(c) prescribes the fine as the only form of punishment that 
can be imposed on an offending corporation. This means that there is no alternative punishment 
that is permissible. This begs the question whether a fine as the only available form of 
punishment that can be imposed on a corporation can be said to be an appropriate, adequate 
and effective sanction for corporate crime. 
 
Before dealing with the fine as the sole sanction for corporations, it is important to determine 
why a fine is imposed as punishment for an offence. Terblanche makes it clear that punishment 
is the most important purpose of a fine and it is intended “to punish the offender by reducing 
the offender’s financial ability and, in this manner, to worsen the quality of her life for some 
time”.838 It is submitted that the rationale behind imposing a fine on a corporation is that 
corporations are dependent on their financial stability for their continued existence. Punishing 
a corporation by imposing a fine, is intended to have a negative impact on the corporation’s 
finances, which should in turn deter the corporation from committing corporate crimes. It is 
submitted that it is envisaged that in this way the quality of a corporation’s business will be 
                                                          
838 Terblanche (note 301) 261. 
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worsened for some time and that will result in the corporation avoiding committing corporate 
crimes in the future. 
 
Terblanche points out that as a form of punishment, a fine ought to be a deterrent, however, 
questions have been raised about a fine being a deterrent.839 One such critic of a fine as a 
deterrent is the magistrate who presided over the case in the court a quo in S v Seoela840 who 
argues that the fine is not a deterrent at all.841 This begs the question whether the solution lies 
in increasing the amount of the fine, particularly where there has been loss of life or injury, as 
suggested by Clarkson.842 It is submitted that Clarkson’s suggestion of an increased fine is 
problematic in the sense that the financial ability of corporations varies so much that an amount 
that seems to be exorbitant for one convicted corporation, may turn out to be too little for the 
next corporation. Moreover, as Schuneman points out, fining a corporation is just the same as 
imposing a fine for a parking offence on an individual who is rich, instead of deterring the 
individual from committing further parking offences it simply is “merely an inconvenience 
with a very limited deterrent effect”.843 Unfortunately, as corporations normally have ample 
finances, even if the fine imposed is exorbitant, this kind of punishment does not necessarily 
deter certain corporations844 from becoming repeat offenders and some may even go to the 
extent of keeping aside money for purposes of paying fines when they have committed 
offences. It is submitted that a fine is unlikely to deter such corporations, even if it is exorbitant. 
                                                          
839 Ibid 262. 
840 S v Seoela 1996 (2) SACR 616 (O), 619d. 
841 “Die boetevonnisse het geen afskrikwaarde nie. En indien landdroshowe absoluut beperk word tot boetes, sal 
handelaars lustig voortwoeker”. (Ibid 619d). 
842 Where a corporate crime has resulted in the death or injury of a person Clarkson puts forth the following reason 
for increasing the fine “higher levels of fines and a wider range of sentencing options would greatly help persuade 
the media and the population at large that corporate violence is a serious matter that needs to be treated seriously 
with rigorous enforcement and punishment and not marginalized as ‘accidents’”. (Clarkson (note 90) 155).  
843 Schunemann (note 336) 294. 
844 “The explanation for the low deterrent effect of exorbitantly high fines, from the perspectives of the enterprise, 





In other jurisdictions a fine is not the only possible sanction.845 There are ways of punishing 
corporations other than directly through its finances. Wells refers to sanctions ranging from 
“incapacitation in the form of corporate dissolution, corporate ‘imprisonment’, through to 
probation, adverse publicity, community service, direct compensation orders, and punitive 
injunctions”.846 It may be useful for the South African legislature to consider making use of 
some of these alternative punishments.  
 
According to Terblanche847 there are possible alternative punitive measures for punishing 
natural persons. The forfeiture of assets used to commit the crime is one such alternative or 
even additional punishment that may possibly be considered for the punishment of convicted 
corporations. This is regulated by section 35 (1) (6) of the Criminal Procedure Act which allows 
a court, in certain circumstances “after convicting the offender, to declare certain articles used 
in the commission of her offence forfeit to the state”.848 This alternative punishment is aimed 
at offences such as “theft, housebreaking and the possession of or dealing in drugs and precious 
minerals or stones”.849 It is submitted that this type of punishment may be altered in such a way 
that it is suitable for corporate crimes and may be imposed on a convicted corporation. It is 
further submitted that instead of applying it to assets used in the commission of the crime, it 
should also be extended to assets gained through committing the crime. 
 
                                                          
845 Wells mentions Canada’s probation orders, the U.S.’s corporate imprisonment, etc. Wells (note 15) 37. These 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five at V below. 
846 Ibid. 
847 Terblanche (note 301). 
848 The CPA (note 16) section 35(1)(6). 
849 Ibid Schedule 2 part 1. 
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When it comes to sanctions for corporations who have committed offences, South Africa must 
rid itself of the stereotype view that a fine is the only suitable form of punishment.850 Other 
jurisdictions also make use of the fine as punishment for corporations, but in addition to that 
they make use of additional sanctions that are far more effective. Moreover, our own legal 
scholars have made sound suggestions851 as well as warnings852 regarding alternative sanctions. 
All these need to be taken seriously by the legislature as they will definitely enhance the 
regulation of corporate criminal liability and corporate homicide in South Africa.853 
 
V CRITICISMS OR SHORTFALLS OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND 
CORPORATE HOMICIDE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
It is submitted that section 332 of the CPA is defective, inadequate854 and also unjust as it is 
fraught with weaknesses which present challenges to the concept of corporate criminal liability 
and corporate homicide in South Africa. This is echoed by Nana, who states that “the South 
African model (although similar to those applicable in some other influential jurisdictions) was 
poorly conceived, given that specific consideration was not given to the general principles of 
corporate criminal liability”.855  
Section 332 of the CPA is a provision that has been in existence for more than thirty five years 
and as will be seen from the discussion of corporate criminal liability in England and in Canada 
                                                          
850 As Clarkson suggested, “while the fine is the only penalty currently employed against companies in England,  
there is no reason why other penalties could not be introduced. Such possible sentence could include corporate 
probation whereby the company would be forced to change those policies and procedures that allowed the offence 
to be committed…”. (Clarkson (note 90) 155). 
851 “Recent legislation providing for asset forfeiture can apply equally to individuals and corporations”. (Burchell 
(note 49) 569).  
852 Rycroft warns that punishing a corporation by making use of community service may have the effect of giving 
the offending corporation positive publicity, Rycroft (note 365) 154.  
853 Alternative or additional punishment that involves naming and shaming policies may also be considered for 
convicted corporations. 
854 (Jordaan (note 42) 49.  
855 Nana (note 488) 89. 
186 
 
the South African provision has not kept abreast with developments in this area of the law. 
Since its inception corporations have become far more important in society and play a central 
role in the economy of the country and that has come together with a higher frequency of 
workplace deaths and other deaths caused by corporate activities, yet there have been no 
changes made to the law.  
 
It is submitted that the following criticisms against section 332 of the CPA, serve as evidence 
that section 332 is defective and inadequate. In addition to that the criticisms also show that 
section 332 is, to a certain extent, an unjust provision. It must be noted that even though some 
of the characteristics of section 332 that are discussed in this section result in section 332 being 
unjust, they simultaneously tend to make it easier to prosecute corporations. It is submitted that 
disregarding unjust characteristics simply because they make it easier to prosecute 
corporations, is not the correct route to follow. It is further submitted that these unjust 
characteristics also need to be eliminated. This should be done with a view to ensuring that 
whatever model of corporate criminal liability South Africa ends up with is effective, adequate 
and also just. It should be a model which will lead to an effective, adequate and just application 
of corporate criminal liability. 
 
(a) Although it has limited application, vicarious liability in section 332 goes against the 
principles of criminal law 
As stated above the basis for corporate criminal liability in South Africa is the derivative 
approach.856 In the South African corporate criminal liability provision this approach does 
contain elements of vicarious liability,857 though it extends even further than that. As Nana 
                                                          
856 See discussion in this chapter at III (b) above. 
857 See discussion in this chapter at III (a) and (b) above. 
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notes, “where a director or servant, in committing a crime, acts beyond his powers or duties 
but endeavours to further the interests of the corporation, the latter is held vicariously liable”.858 
Vicarious liability is a law of tort principle that has been adopted by the criminal law for 
purposes of holding corporations criminally liable. Its effect is to hold one party criminally 
liable for crimes committed by another party. 
 
 Holding one party vicariously liable for crimes committed by another party is generally not 
recognised in common law.859 As Burchell avers “the general rule of the common law of crime 
is that a person is not liable for the crime of another unless he or she procured its commission 
or took part in it”.860 This means that by applying vicarious liability to corporate criminal 
liability, albeit to a limited extent, corporate criminal liability in South Africa is such that it 
goes against the general principle of not imposing on one party criminal liability for criminal 
acts of another party.861 Nana observes that vicarious liability 
 
“militates against the general principle of not imposing liability on one party for a crime 
committed by another and that any conviction obtained on this ground is unfair and tantamount 
to a miscarriage of justice”.862 
  
It is submitted that vicarious liability is an unjust way of applying corporate criminal liability 
and South Africa should move away from vicarious criminal liability to holding a corporation 
directly liable for crimes committed in its name or on its behalf.  
 
                                                          
858 Nana (note 488) 93. 
859 Burchell (note 49) 439. 
860 Ibid. 
861 “Vicarious liability which is commonly applied in the civil law of torts, has generally been rejected in the 
criminal law, as criminal liability is usually based on a person’s personal acts rather than those of another”. (Borg-
Jorgensen & Van der Linde (note 82) 687). 
862 Nana (note 488) 103. 
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(b) Reliance on the nominalist approach 
In South Africa corporations are not held directly or ‘personally’ criminally liable for their 
unlawful acts and omissions, since South Africa follows the derivative approach.863 The 
wording of section 332 (1)864 is such that it entails ascribing the guilt of an individual to the 
corporation in such a way that the actions and the mens rea of directors and employees of 
corporations are imputed to corporations.865   In this way, those actions and mens rea of the 
directors or servants become the acts and mens rea of the corporation.866  
 
With regard to corporate homicide an example is R v Bennett where the negligence of the 
corporation’s employee, whilst furthering the interests of the corporation, was imputed to the 
corporation and the corporation was prosecuted and convicted of culpable homicide.867 The 
current wording of section 332 of the CPA therefore relies on individual fault for corporate 
criminal liability to arise. It is submitted that this reliance on the nominalist approach fails to 
take into consideration the fact that many large corporations operate in such a way that there 
may be fault, but instead of it being individual fault, it may be fault arising, for instance, from 
the manner in which the corporation is managed.  
 
It is submitted that the current basis of liability hampers the prosecution of corporations as the 
imputation of liability to the corporation makes the criminal liability of corporations to be 
reliant on the fault of individuals in such a way that where individuals who are at fault cannot 
be identified, there will be the untenable result that the corporation escapes liability, in spite of 
                                                          
863 Jordaan (note 42) 49. 
864  The CPA states that the wrongful actions of the director or employee “…shall be deemed to have been 
performed (and with the same intent, if any) by that corporate body or, as the case may be, to have been an 
omission (and with the same intent, if any) on the part of that corporate body”. (The CPA (note 16) section 332 
(1)). 
865 Du Toit (note 514) 33-5. 
866 Ibid 33-5. 
867 R v Bennett (note 32). Also see Du Toit (note 514) 33-5 as well as Burchell (note 49) 565. 
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the corporate crime having been committed.868 Similarly, it may be impossible to identify a 
specific individual where it is the separate acts or omissions of a number of employees and or 
directors that are the cause of death.  
 
 
As Jordaan observes, “although broader in scope, this type of liability developed from the 
doctrine of vicarious liability”.869 For that reason, it is important to consider the difference 
between vicarious liability870 and direct liability with a view to considering whether direct 
liability can address this particular shortfall of the derivative approach. The difference between 
the two is that with vicarious liability the corporation is held liable regardless of the fact that 
the wrongful act was committed by a director or an employee,871 whereas with direct liability 
“the person committing the act does not himself commit the offence because it can only be 





                                                          
868 Borg-Jorgensen and Van der Linde further state that “a problem may consequently arise where a single 
individual’s conduct on its own does not meet the standards required for criminal liability with the result that 
neither the individual nor the corporation can be held criminally liable”. (Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (note 
53) 462). 
869 Jordaan (note 42) 48. Also see discussion on the derivative approach in Chapter Two III (b) (ii) below. 
870 Though the contrast is made between vicarious liability and personal liability, it is submitted that it is relevant 
to the South African context as the derivative approach is an extended form of vicarious liability since it goes 
even further than vicarious liability. Nana explains that with section 332 (1) “where a director or servant, in 
committing a crime, acts beyond his powers or duties but endeavours to further the interests of the corporation, 
the latter is held vicariously liable”. (Nana (note 488) 93). 
871 Pinto and Evans state that “it is necessary to distinguish between liability for the acts of another (true vicarious 
liability) and liability for breach of a personal duty. In the latter category, although the act may be committed by 
an employee, it is the employer’s own failure to prevent the harm that renders him liable”. (Pinto & Evans (note 
94) 24). 
872 Ibid 24. 
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(c) The low number of prosecutions of corporations 
Another challenge is that under the derivative approach the number of prosecutions or 
convictions of corporations is low. The issue of low prosecutions has also been raised with 
regard to the application of section 332(1) to the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt 
Activities Act.873 South Africa is a signatory to the Convention on Combating Bribery of 
foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (Anti-Bribery Convention) of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.874 The Anti-Bribery 
Convention is implemented in section 5 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities 
Act.875 Section 5 makes provision for an “Offence in respect of corrupt activities relating to 
foreign public officials”.876 Section 332(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act regulates the liability 
of corporations for the offence in section 5 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt 
Activities Act. In its Phase 2 Report on South Africa the OECD working group on bribery in 
international business transactions criticised section 332 (1). One of those criticisms is the 
scarcity of prosecutions or convictions of corporations for economic offences that are 
committed intentionally, in spite of the existence of legislation dealing with corporate criminal 
liability.877 It is submitted that this criticism also applies to corporate homicide. The legislation 
is there (section 332), however, the number of prosecutions is low.878 This is a challenge that 
                                                          
873 Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004. 
874 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereinafter referred to as the OECD). South 
Africa is not a member of the OECD, however it became a signatory to the Anti-bribery Convention in 2007. The 
OECD was formed in 1961 and it is an organisation which is “committed to democracy and the market economy, 
providing a platform to compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practices, 
and co-ordinate domestic and international policies of its members”. OECD (http://www.internetsociety.org/what-
we-do/policy/regionally-focused-bodies (accessed 12 July 2012). 
875 Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities (note 873) section 5. 
876 Ibid. 
877 The concerns are in the OECD South Africa: Phase 2 Report on the Application of the Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 2009 
recommendation for further combating bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions by 
the Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions on 17 June 2010; updated on 13 July 2010, 
to reflect newly released information in OECD Economics Surveys: South Africa, Volume 2010/11. 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/45670609.pdf (accessed 12 July 2012). See also Borg-Jorgensen & Van der 
Linde (note 51) 464. 
878 It is submitted that one of the reasons for low prosecutions and convictions is the fact that the derivative 
approach is reliant on individual fault as “For a corporation to be prosecuted in terms of section 332(1), it is 
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needs to be overcome otherwise the country runs the risk of having corporations committing 
crimes with the knowledge that it is highly unlikely that they will be prosecuted or convicted.  
 
(d) The limitation of the provision to corporate bodies hampers corporate criminal 
liability 
Currently section 332(1) makes it clear that the corporate criminal liability provision is directed 
at corporate bodies. The authors of Henochsberg points out that “not only companies but, inter 
alia, local government bodies, universities, registered building societies and, of course, 
specially constituted corporations such as the South African Broadcasting Corporation, are 
corporate bodies”.879 Moreover, section 332(7) extends liability to members of associations, 
but not the associations themselves. These associations include partnerships,880 clubs881 etc. 
Although it has been stated that “there is no imposition of liability on the association as such 
but only on its other members, subject to the proviso”,882 the question that arises is whether 
there is any justification for the exclusion of entities other than corporate bodies from corporate 
criminal liability. The answer to this question is not provided in the provision. It is submitted 
that it is strange that these entities are excluded even though they also play a role in society, 
and like corporate bodies, they are capable of committing corporate crimes.  
 
In S v Peer883 even though it was “clear from the magistrate’s reasons that he regarded the trust 
as the accused in the case before him, and that he did not regard A. C. Peer, in his capacity as 
a trustee, as a second accused” the conviction and sentence that had been handed down by the 
                                                          
required that an offence committed by a director or servant must be proved”. (Borg-Jorgensen & van der Linde 
(note 53) 462). See also S v Dersley (note 489) 951. 
879 Delport et al. (note 87) Appx 7. 
880 Du Toit (note 514) 33-7. 
881 Delport et al. (note 87) Appx 13. 
882 Ibid. 
883 S v Peer 1968 (4) SA 460 (N). 
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magistrate were set aside as it was held that a trust created by a notarial deed is not a corporate 
body.884 For that reason it could not fall under the ambit of the corporate criminal liability 
provision.885 In casu the prosecution had been made in terms of section 381, the predecessor to 
section 332.  
 
As section 332 is the corporate criminal liability provision, its exclusion of other entities means 
that such entities may commit corporate crimes and escape liability. Even if the individuals 
within such entities are held liable under other provisions, it is submitted that there is no 
justification for not prosecuting an entity if it has allegedly committed a crime. The mere fact 
that it is not a corporate body does not justify absolving it from prosecution. It is further 
submitted that the exclusion of unincorporated bodies or associations of persons from corporate 




(e) The inability to summons the corporate body in its own name.  
 “a director or servant of that corporate body shall be cited, as representative of that corporate 
body, as the offender, and thereupon the person so cited may, as such representative, be dealt 
with as if he were the person accused of having committed the offence in question…”.886  
 
This extract from section 332(2) shows that the South African situation differs from the 
situation in England where the accused corporation “appear(s) before the magistrates court 
either by a representative as defined, or, more usually, by a legal representative”.887 Moreover, 
                                                          
884 See also Du Toit (note 514) 33-6. 
885 Ibid. 
886 Section 332(2) of the CPA. 
887 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 107. 
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section 332(2) does not allow for the corporate body to be summonsed in its own name.888 This 
is in contrast with England and Canada where the accused corporations are summonsed directly 
and their names are included in the case citation.889 In South Africa under section 332 the case 
name will not include the name of the corporation, but rather that of the representative and as 
a result many may end up being unaware of the prosecution against the corporation. The 
inability to summons the corporate body in its own name affects the effectiveness of corporate 




It is submitted that this subsection results in the public being deprived of details concerning the 
identity of the offending corporation. Instead the representative, at first sight, appears as though 
he or she is the actual accused. It is further submitted that such a deprivation of vital information 
concerning the actual accused, protects the corporate body from exposure as an alleged 
offender. Such exposure leads to stigma and in South Africa, while natural persons who are 
alleged offenders are stigmatised by the revelation of their identities, corporate offenders do 
not suffer the same stigma. Even when the corporate body has been convicted the case citation 
remains with details of its representative and not the details of the guilty corporation. People 
usually do not want to associate with criminals, however, if such information is not readily 
available they will continue to do so.  
 
It is submitted that part of what makes corporate criminal liability effective is the negative 
exposure and where exposure is made impossible, the efficiency of the corporate criminal 
                                                          
888 Du Toit (note 514) 33-6. 
889 With regard to England, “once the magistrate, District Judge or his clerk, has issued a summons from the 
information, it must be served on the accused”. (Pinto & Evans (note 94) 104. 
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liability provision is diminished. Anyone with access to the law reports is able to identify that 
there has been a criminal case against a specific corporate body. 
 
(f) The obligation to prove that the offence was committed in “furthering the interests of 
the corporation” hampers the effectiveness of corporate criminal liability. 
Under section 332 as long as it can be shown that the offence in question was committed in 
furthering or in trying to further the interests of the corporation, the corporation will be held 
criminally liable.890 The prosecution bears the burden of proving that the crime was committed 
whilst “furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of the corporation”. It is submitted 
that this is not an easy burden to bear and that has a bearing on the effectiveness of corporate 
criminal liability. The question of whether the director or servant was furthering the interests 
of the corporation usually has a bearing on whether the corporation benefitted or stood to 
benefit from the action of the individual concerned.  
 
It is submitted that where a crime has been committed there is a likelihood of the corporation 
escaping liability simply because there is no proof that the individual concerned was furthering 
the interests of the corporation as it is not clear whether the corporation benefitted or stood to 
benefit or not. It is submitted that the proviso that the crime must have been committed in 
furthering the interests of the corporation hampers the effectiveness of corporate criminal 
liability and needs to be revisited as it may lead to a corporation not being prosecuted, when it 
ought to be.  
   
                                                          
890 “A corporate employer may incur criminal liability for its employee’s acts although they fall outside the scope 
of his employment, as long as the employee was endeavouring to further the interests of the company when he 
acted”. (Jordaan (note 42) 51). 
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(g) The current provision allows for corporate criminal liability even in circumstances 
where there is no civil liability 
By allowing the corporation to be held liable where the servant or director has exceeded his 
scope of employment section 332(1) has become “so wide that it can often result in criminal 
liability where no civil liability exists (an unusual situation, and one which raises the eyebrows 
of many lawyers)”.891 This means that a set of facts may result in a criminal prosecution taking 
place, but the same set of facts may not allow for the corporation to be held civilly liable as 
there can be no civil liability where the servant has exceeded his scope of employment. It is 
submitted that this results in the provision being unjust. In explaining this Matzukis refers to  
“R v Booth Road Trading Co (Pty) Ltd (1947 (1) PH K48 (N) where a servant of the company 
– who had been expressly forbidden to make any sales whatsoever – sold certain goods to a 
customer at a price in excess of the controlled price. In convicting the company of 
contravening the price control regulations, the court held that, although the servant had acted 
outside the scope of his duties, the company was guilty of the offence because the servant, in 
making the sale, had been endeavouring to further its interests. The company would not, 
however, have been civilly liable because the servant had not acted within the scope of his 
employment”.892  
 
It is submitted that this is a defect of section 332 as it is illogical to have the same facts 
disallowing a civil action against the corporation while the same facts allow for criminal action 
against the corporation. A criminal action, if successful results in punishment and possible 
stigma to the corporation, while a successful civil action may mean compensation to the victim 
of the family of the victim. It is submitted that for corporate criminal liability to be just, it must 
be in such a way that both criminal and civil liability should be accessible to the victims.  
                                                          
891 Matzukis (note 592) 215. 




(h) The lack of alternative sanctions 
Another weakness of section 332(2)(c) is having the fine as the only form of punishment that 
corporations may be subject to.893  This means that there is no alternative punishment that is 
permissible. This begs the question whether a fine as the only available form of punishment 
that can be imposed on a corporation can be said to be an appropriate, adequate and effective 
sanction for corporate crime. It is submitted that Wells’ assertion that the notion of punishing 
a corporation through its finances as being the only option is a misconception,894 is correct. 
 
Moreover, even though Snyman explains that the rationale behind having the fine, as the only 
applicable punishment for corporations, is the fact that corporations cannot be imprisoned,895 
it is submitted that Rycroft’s observation that “the stipulation in s 332 that a fine is the only 
sanction that may be imposed on a convicted company indicates a very restricted view of 
corporate sentencing”896 is also correct. 
 
In terms of section 332(2) the fine is the applicable punishment for corporations, even in 
circumstances where the statute that has been contravened does not provide for the imposition 
of a fine as an applicable sanction. Jefferson outlines the disadvantages of the fine as follows:  
                                                          
893 Rycroft (note 365) 152.  
894 Wells (note 15) 31, cited above in Chapter Two VI. 
895 Snyman (note 22) 255. 
896 Rycroft (note 365) 157. This is in line with Burchell’s assetion that “One of the traditional stumbling blocks to 
imposing a broader form of corporate criminal liability has been the rather narrow-minded focus on custodial 
punishment and the facile conclusion that corporations cannot be imprisoned like a human being. In conservative 
theory, the only remaining penalty appropriate for the sanctioning of corporations is the fine. Fines for corporate 
criminal responsibility have been subjected to criticism, and the imposition of such pecuniary sanctions might 
well prejudice innocent employees along with the delinquent corporation”. (Burchell (note 195) 480). 
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(a) “overspill or spillover; that is, that it is not the company which pays the fine but 
shareholders (whose dividends may be reduced), employers (whose wages or jobs may be 
affected) and consumers (prices for whom may be increased);897 (b) “…a fine may have no 
effect on the company. ‘A fine on the corporation alone can be absorbed merely as a cost of 
doing business…’”;898 (c) “…overkill…they may be so large as to put the company out of 
business”;899 (d) “Fines are contingent on the fault of the company. They are not based on the 
result of the company’s fault. In other words, fines are assessed on, say, the death of an 
employee. The effect is that the fine may be a nominal amount in comparison with the death 
of the worker”.900 
South Africa must rid itself of the stereotype view that a fine is the only suitable form of 
punishment for corporate offenders.901 Other jurisdictions also impose the fine, but in addition 
to that they have come up with additional / supplementary sanctions to the fine that are far more 
effective and our own legal scholars have come up with sound suggestions902 as well as 
warnings903 regarding alternative sanctions. South Africa needs to examine the theories of 
punishment904 and ensure that it allows for more forms of punishment, in addition to the fine, 
that will fulfill the other theories of punishment.  It is submitted that doing so will definitely 
enhance the regulation of corporate criminal liability and corporate homicide in South 
Africa.905 
 
                                                          
897 M Jefferson ‘Corporate Criminal Liability: The Problem of Sanctions’ (2001) 65 The Journal of Criminal Law 
235, 238 – 239. 
898 Ibid 241 – 242. 
899 Ibid 242.  
900 Ibid 243. 
901 Clarkson (note 90) 155. 
902 “Recent legislation providing for asset forfeiture can apply equally to individuals and corporations”. (Burchell 
(note 49) 569).  
903 Rycroft (note 365) 154 warns that punishing a corporation by making use of community service may have the 
effect of giving the offending corporation positive publicity.  
904 See discussion in chapter Two VI (a) and (b) above. 




(i) Section 332 includes provisions that amount to Constitutional infringements  
One of the criticisms levelled against section 332 of the CPA is that some of its provisions will 
not survive a constitutional challenge. The legislation in which the provision is found predates 
the Constitution of South Africa and some parts of it have been successfully challenged for 
being inconsistent with the Constitution. It is submitted that there is a need to make changes to 
subsections that infringe the Constitution. 
 
In terms of section 332(1) 
“A corporation may be held vicariously liable for a crime even though it had reasonable 
precautions in place to prevent the occurrence of a crime and exercised due diligence. It is not 
entitled to raise a defence relating to the fact that it acted with due diligence. Consequently a 
corporate body may be held vicariously liable, without fault, on the basis that an individual is 
guilty, even though reasonable doubt exists as to the corporation’s own blameworthiness”.906  
It is submitted that the liability in section 332(1) infringes upon the right to be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty, which is a Constitutional right that is meant for both natural and 
juristic persons. Given the outcome of S v Coetzee in which the infringement of the right to be 
presumed innocent was found to violate the Constitution, it remains to be seen whether with 
regard to the question of the corporation’s liability without fault, s. 332(1) will survive a 
constitutional challenge.907 It is submitted that it is highly unlikely that the section will survive 
such a challenge, especially since, unlike section 332(5) which provides a defence to the 
director or servant, section 332(1) does not do likewise.  
 
                                                          
906 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (53) 458. 
907 “It may very well be challenged on the ground of being over-broad”. (Jordaan (note 42) 53).  
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Moreover, section 332(4) and section 332(7) need to be revisited in light of the Constitution 
and of S v Coetzee908 as they also both infringe upon the presumption of innocence. With regard 
to evidence that is admissible, in terms of section 332(4) the onus of proving that “the making 
of such notes took place outside the scope of that person’s activities is on the accused”.909 This 
is a reverse onus and as already illustrated above, such a provision is highly unlikely to survive 
a constitutional challenge in the Constitutional Court.  
Section 332(7) also contains a reverse onus provision which is similar to the one that was in 
section 332(5), but with regard to ordinary members of associations. Kruger points out that the 
“the objections to subsection (5) apply to an even greater extent to subsection (7) and the latter 
will probably not survive constitutional scrutiny”.  
 
The criticisms that have been discussed above serve as an indication that section 332 is an 
ineffective, inadequate and unjust provision. It is a provision that needs to be reformed. The 
criticisms also point towards the broad application of section 332. It is submitted that the 
broadness of the provision may also lead to its failure to survive a constitutional challenge.910 
This further strengthens the argument for reform. 
 
VI CONCLUSION 
Corporate criminal liability is a concept which needs to be taken seriously and South Africa is 
commended for having made an effort, through section 332 of the CPA, to ensure that 
corporations are held criminally liable for offences committed in their name. The current 
                                                          
908 S v Coetzee (note 56). 
909 Kruger (note 337) 33-7. 
910 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (note 53) 457 and Jordaan (note 42) 48. 
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statutory provision, however, leaves much to be desired as can be seen from the shortfalls 
which have been highlighted in the discussion above.   
 
In South Africa corporate criminal liability has not developed steadily911 and South Africa is 
in need of a new model of corporate criminal liability which will result in an effective, adequate 
and just form of corporate criminal liability. In addition to that, it is submitted that unless there 
is a move towards the more punitive system of dealing with corporate deaths and injuries, it 
will continue to be difficult to deal adequately with deaths and injuries caused by corporations. 
It is further submitted that although the proposed corporate homicide clause was rejected, South 
Africa would benefit greatly from having a provision which will deal specifically with the 
criminal liability of corporations for deaths and injuries caused by corporations.  The 
introduction of corporate homicide as a separate offence will emphasise the need for the right 
to life to be protected. In addition to that a separate legal framework of corporate homicide 
which will address problems such as the inappropriateness of a fine as the sole punishment will 






                                                          
911 A comparison of the 1955 and the 1977 provisions shows in that the latter Act, for the most part, the earlier 
provision was merely restated without any further / serious developments being included. Moreover it is almost 
thirty years since the present provision was enacted, but even though so many corporations have continued to 
















CHAPTER 4 - ENGLISH LAW AND CORPORATE HOMICIDE  
I INTRODUCTION 
“Corporations are a ubiquitous feature of modern life and are frequently engaged with their 
employees and the public in hazardous ways. The criminal law would be seriously deficient if 
harmful conduct carried on by those entities could not be prosecuted and punished”.912 
                                                          
912 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 4. 
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The above quotation sums up the positive attitude of English law towards corporate criminal 
liability. English law accepts the notion of holding corporations criminally liable for their 
crimes and has reached a stage where corporate criminal liability is an integral part of the 
English corporate and criminal Law. Unlike in South Africa, where corporate criminal liability 
has not developed much over the years, in English law development in this area of the law has 
been far more regular and more rapid.  
 
Currently, in English Law the contentious issue is not whether corporate criminal liability 
should be accepted or not. Despite the fact that it is not everyone who accepts corporate 
criminal liability,913 developments in English law are some way past the stage of questioning 
whether corporate criminal liability should be accepted or not. At present, the contentious issue 
is, rather, the form that corporate criminal liability should take. 
 
Though corporate criminal liability is accepted in English law it must be understood that this 
was not an easy path. Developments were hampered, at first, by several obstacles that made it 
difficult to embrace this concept.914 English law gradually overcame these impediments and 
has now reached a point where there is no doubt that England is one of the jurisdictions which 
has fully embraced corporate criminal liability. The recognition as well as the development of 
                                                          
913 This is evident in the objections to corporate criminal liability that the Law Commission was faced with, Law 
Commission, The Criminal Liability of Corporations, Working Paper No. 44, London (1973) 29 - 36. Objections 
are also found in Law Commission no 237 where there “the responses of the minority of the respondents who 
were opposed to the proposal included arguments that involved both questions of principle and practical 
considerations”. (Law Commission no. 237, Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter (1996) 91 
- 94). Moreover, in the 10th edition of Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law Prof Smith questions the concept of 
corporate criminal liability and after looking at the reasons advanced for corporate criminal liability he states that 
“none of these reasons seems to be very compelling and the necessity for corporate criminal liability awaits 
demonstration”. (JC Smith Smith and Hogan Criminal Law 10th ed (2002) 207). 
 
 
914 These will be fully discussed below at II (b) (i) (aa) – (cc). 
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corporate criminal liability in English law has been relatively fast compared to developments 
in South Africa.  
 
With regard to deaths that have been negligently caused by corporate activities, English law 
has moved from holding the corporations liable for common-law gross negligence 
manslaughter to having a separate statutory crime of corporate manslaughter that is aimed at 
corporations (and other entities) that negligently cause death. Corporations that cause deaths 
are now held liable and punished in accordance with the CMCHA. 
 
Although England now has the CMCHA, as with corporate criminal liability, England’s road 
to the recognition and acceptance of corporate manslaughter / corporate homicide as an offence 
regulated in its own separate statute was not an easy one. Actual deaths at the hands of 
corporations played a vital role in the development of corporate criminal liability. These were 
as a result of various disasters which had claimed several lives. These disasters had resulted in 
unsuccessful prosecutions of the accused corporations for common-law gross negligence 
manslaughter.915 English society became concerned about this and it is the public outcry that 
eventually led the government to ensure that there were developments in this area which would 
make it possible for corporations to be appropriately held accountable for deaths of people 
caused by the corporations’ negligence. After several attempts at reforming the law and after 
public consultations the CMCHA became a reality and it has now been in existence for more 
than half a decade. 
 
                                                          
915 The Zeebrugge disaster; the Clapham rail disaster; the Piper Alpha oil rig, etc. 
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In this chapter the recognition and the development of corporate criminal liability and 
eventually that of corporate manslaughter / corporate homicide in English law will be traced. 
The discussion will include the history of corporate criminal liability; factors that hampered 
the development of corporate criminal liability when it was still a relatively new concept; 
vicarious liability and the identification doctrine as bases for liability for corporate criminal 
liability; the challenges and obstacles encountered under the identification doctrine; the notion 
of holding a corporation criminally liable for manslaughter; the common-law crime of gross 
negligence manslaughter; reasons leading to the development of the new legislation; challenges 
encountered  when attempting to bring separate legislation for deaths caused by corporations; 
and the challenges as well as commendations of the new legislation. The concept of corporate 
manslaughter in English law will therefore be fully examined with a view to drawing parallels 
between the way in which England addresses corporations that kill and the way in which South 
Africa addresses them. In addition to that the contentious issue of what form corporate criminal 
liability should take will also be discussed. 
 
 II HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
(a) The recognition of corporations as separate legal entities  
The first form of corporations in English law was the peace guilds916 that were in existence as 
early as the 13th century.917 Individuals with the same goals joined each other and formed these 
associations.918 Several types of guilds were in existence919 and in England it was possible for 
                                                          
916 These were brotherhoods formed by groups such as neighbours with the intention to protect each other. (S 
Williston ‘History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800’(1888) 2 (3) Harvard Law Review 107 – 
108).  
917 G Richardson “Brand Names Before the Industrial Revolution. Monopolies and Craft Guilds in Medieval 
England and Modern Imagination.” (2001) Journal of the History of Economic Thought. 
http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/richardson.guilds  (accessed 26 march 2014)). 
918 Ibid. 
919 Ibid. There were social, political, religious as well as merchant guilds. 
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them to acquire property.920 Prior to the 16th century guilds were popular and they played an 
important role in the communities.921 Towards the end of the 16th century the existence of 
guilds in England gradually came to an end.922 
 
In 1599 a group of traders decided to form a joint trading venture923 and in December 1600 the 
East India Company came into being.924 When it first came into being, the East India Company 
was very different from the concept of a company as we know it today. Unlike the modern day 
company, the traders who were members of the East India Company continued to trade 
individually.925 When it came to overseas expeditions they would embark on these jointly and 
the term used to refer to the joint venture was ‘company’.926 Despite having the status of a 
company, the East India Company only acted as a company when it came to trading overseas.927 
Upon returning from overseas trading voyages, the joint stock was divided among its individual 
                                                          
920 Ibid. 
921 Ibid. “For nearly two centuries after the Black Death, guilds dominated life in medieval towns. Any town 
resident of consequence belonged to a guild. Most urban residents thought guild membership to be indispensable. 
Guilds dominated manufacturing, marketing, and commerce. Guilds dominated local politics and influenced 
national and international affairs. Guilds were the center of social and spiritual life”. (Ibid). 
922  “The Reformation weakened guilds in most newly Protestant nations. In England, for example, the royal 
government suppressed thousands of guilds in the 1530s and 1540s. The king and his ministers dispatched auditors 
to every guild in the realm. The auditors seized spiritual paraphernalia and funds retained for religious purposes, 
disbanded guilds which existed for purely pious purposes, and forced craft and merchant guilds to pay large sums 
for the right to remain in operation. Those guilds that did still lost the ability to provide members with spiritual 
services. In Protestant nations after the Reformation, the influence of guilds waned. Many turned to governments 
for assistance. They requested monopolies on manufacturing and commerce and asked courts to force members 
to live up to their obligations. Guilds lingered where governments provided such assistance. Guilds faded where 
governments did not. By the seventeenth century, the power of guilds had withered in England. Guilds retained 
strength in nations which remained Catholic. France abolished its guilds during the French Revolution in 1791, 
and Napoleon’s armies disbanded guilds in most of the continental nations which they occupied during the next 
two decades”. (G Richardson ‘Medieval Guilds’ in R Whaples EH. Net Encyclopaedia (2008) 
http://www.eh.net/?s=guilds. (accessed 26 March 2014). 
923 “On September 24, 1599, at the Founders hall in London, an illustrious group of merchants and adventurers 
resolved to form a company to be known as the East India Company. It was decided to entrust the day-to-day 
running of the company to 15 directors whose immediate task was to organize an expedition to the East Indies to 
buy spices, nutmeg in particular”. (Pinto & Evans (note 94) 7). 
924 The company was “formed for the exploitation of trade with East and Southeast Asia and India”. 
(http://www.victorianweb.org/history/empire/eic.html). See also Pinto & Evans (note 94) 7. 
925 Pinto & Evans  (note 94) 7. 




members and they could carry on trade on their own, as individuals.928 At first the members 
would join stock on a trip-by-trip basis,929 however, from 1614 to 1653 members would do so 
for a fixed period.930  
 
In 1692 a prohibition was made against the individual trading of the members and a permanent 
joint stock was established.931 It was only then that the East India Company became a real 
company, as Pinto and Evans observe, “only then did the company become a true joint 
commercial enterprise”.932  
 
Although it is clear that in the 1600s English law recognized the concept of a corporation as an 
entity with limited legal personality,933 it must be noted that at that time the corporation was a 
very simple entity and not as complicated an entity as it has become.934 It has been stated that 
the corporation at this point in time did not differ much from a partnership935 and “early 
corporations were more like guilds, exercising control over the right to engage in specific 
business activities”.936  
                                                          
928 Ibid. “Till 1614 the joint stock was subscribed for each voyage separately, and at the end of the voyage was 
redivided”. (Williston (note 916) 110). 
929 Ibid 110. 
930 Ibid. 
931 Ibid. “After 1692 no private trading of any kind was allowed except to the captains and seamen of the 
Company’s ships”. (Williston (note 916)110). 
932 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 8. 
933 Ibid 6. 
934 “A corporation at the beginning of the eighteenth century was a significantly different legal creature to that 
which it had become by the beginning of the twentieth century”. (Ibid 7). “But the corporation was far from being 
regarded as simply an organization for the more convenient prosecution of business. It was looked on as a public 
agency, to which had been confided the due regulation of foreign trade, just as the domestic trades were subject 
to the government of the guilds”. (Williston (note 916) 110). 
935 “Before 1862, there was, in practical terms, little to distinguish between unincorporated partnerships and 
incorporated companies”. (Pinto & Evans (note 94) 8). 




It must be noted though that it is also during this period that we see the first traces of the courts’ 
recognition of a company’s legal personality as can be seen in Lord Coke’s explanation of what 
a corporation is in the Sutton’s Hospital case:937  
“…the corporation itself is only in abstracto, and rests only in intendment and consideration 
of the law; for a corporation aggregate of many is invisible, immortal, and rests only in 
intendment and consideration of the law...They cannot commit treason, nor be outlawed, nor 
excommunicate, for they have no souls, neither can they appear in person but by attorney.. A 
corporation aggregate of many cannot do fealty, for an invisible body can neither be in person, 
nor swear…”.938 
 
The characteristics of a corporation, as explained by Coke, include legal personality, however, 
based on what he said, at this point in time the criminal liability of corporations was something 
which did not seem possible.939  
 
In 1710 the South Sea company was formed.940 It, however, sold far more stock or shares than 
it had941 and this led to its collapse. A serious problem which was caused by the collapse of the 
South Sea Company was that it led to the development of many unincorporated business 
                                                          
937 Coggs v Bernard [1558-1774] All ER Rep 1 (also known as the Sutton’s Hospital case (1612) 10 Rep 32. 
938 Ibid. 
939 As will be seen below, this was mainly due to Sir John Holt’s declaration that a corporation cannot be found 
guilty of criminal offences for which death or imprisonment is the only penalty or which by their nature can only 
be committed by natural persons.  
940 LW Hein ‘The British Business Company: Its Origin and its Control’ (1963) 15(1) The University of Toronto 
Law Journal 134, 134. 
941 T Hadden, RE Forbes & RL Simmonds Canadian Organisation Law (1984) 12. 
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undertakings which lacked legal capacity, thus hampering the development of corporate 
criminal liability, as they could neither be sued nor prosecuted.942  
 
Following the actions of the South Sea Company, in 1719 parliament passed the Bubble Act 
which declared unincorporated joint stock companies illegal.943 In terms of section 21 of the 
Bubble Act “brokers dealing in securities of illegal companies”944 were held criminally liable. 
This is the first instance in which we see the first traces of the concept of corporate criminal 
liability in English law, although it was not the company per se that was being held liable.945 
Even though the Bubble Act was subsequently repealed in 1825,946 it is submitted that the 
importance of section 21 of the Bubble Act lies in the fact that it was a step towards the eventual 
proper recognition and acceptance of the notion that a corporation itself, and not just its 
members, is capable of committing crimes and for that reason it ought to be held criminally 
liable.  
 
It has been noted that, during that period, incorporation was not an easy exercise and that it 
was expensive to incorporate.947 This was apparently the case until the coming into being of 
the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 which allowed for the registration of corporations. 948 
This in turn gave the companies the right to sue and to be sued.949 In addition to that, 
incorporation made it possible for a corporation to exist as a legal entity on its own and it also 
                                                          
942 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 9. 
943 Hein (note 940) 145. 
944 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 8. 
945 Ibid 9. 
946 Hein (note 940) 145. 
947 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 8. 
948 Hein (note 940) 143. 
949 Ibid 143. 
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allowed the corporation to have perpetual existence.950 The Act thus gave full recognition to 
the concept of joint stock companies951 and, as already stated, those companies that were 
registered attained legal personality.952 It has been stated that business enterprises normally 
sought incorporation in order to attain “monopolistic rights or special powers”.953  It must be 
noted, however, that the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 did not include the concept of 
limited liability for corporations.954 
  
It was only in the nineteenth century that corporations were regarded as entities having full 
legal or juristic personality.955 Wells points out, however, that several factors led to the 
recognition of the legal personality of corporations and it is not possible to state exactly when 
such recognition occurred.956 The acceptance of the term ‘person’, as a term that also describes 
a corporation, developed over a period of time.957 The judiciary endorsed this in Royal Main 
Steam Packet Co. v Braham.958 Wells notes, however, that the courts did not refer to this until 
it was repeated in the Interpretation Act, 1889.959  
 
                                                          
950 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 8. 
951 Hein (note 940) 145. 
952 Ibid 145-146 as well as Pinto & Evans (note 94) 9. 
953 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 8. 
954 “Although the limited liability of corporations had been recognized since the eighteenth century, recognition 
of the benefits it bestowed upon the members was slow to develop. The 1844 joint stock Companies act did not 
introduce limited liability; that did not become generally available until 1856. Even after the Limited Liability 
Act 1855 there were in fact instances where investors in major corporations were exposed to unlimited liability 
for the corporation’s debts; this frequently resulted in the investors’ ruin”. (Ibid 10). 
955 “By the end of the nineteenth century courts were quite familiar with the idea that, for some purposes, the word 
‘person’ in a criminal statute might include a corporation”. (Wells (note 15) 86). “ …the idea of companies as 
separate legal entities from their shareholders and their management was established in the nineteenth century”. 
(Ashworth (note 246) 114). 
956 “The recognition of the corporation as a legal person is not a fact whose provenance can be pinpointed, but 
rather it is a tidemark subject to the ebb and flow of many different factors”. (Wells (note 15) 86). 
957 As stated above, in terms of section 14 of the Criminal Law Act 1827 the term ‘person’ in legislation also 
referred to corporations. See also Wells (note 15) 86. 
958 Royal Main Steam Packet Co. v Braham (1877) 2 App. cas. 381. See also Wells (note 15) 86. 
959 Wells (note 15) 86. 
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During the nineteenth century a further important development that was made towards the 
recognition of companies as legal persons was the handing down of the judgment in Salomon 
v Salomon & Co Ltd. 960 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd has since been and continues to be a 
leading company law case on the separate existence of a company, apart from its members.961 
This was an appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal. Salomon was a major 
shareholder of a company, while his wife and five of their six children held one share each.962 
Salomon had raised the capital by personally becoming a debenture holder, but due to strikes 
as well as a great depression affecting the shoe and boot market the company failed.963 During 
liquidation it became clear that it had insufficient assets to repay its debentures and if the 
existing assets were used for that purpose, that would leave nothing for the unsecured 
creditors.964  
 
Lord Herschell points out that the Court of Appeal had refused to reverse the court a quo’s 
decision that the formation of a company by Salomon was “a mere scheme to enable the 
appellant to carry on business in the name of the company with limited liability, contrary to the 
true intent and meaning of the Companies Act, 1862”.965 
 
This was not accepted by the court. In his judgment Lord Macnaghten draws attention to the 
fact that the company is separate from the subscribers to the company’s memorandum: 
                                                          
960 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] A.C. 22, 35. 
961 This is not only confined to the Company law of England, but even in South Africa Salomon v Salomon & Co 
Ltd is regarded as a leading case on the concept of the separate legal existence of a company. 
962 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd (note 960) 41. 
963 Ibid 49. 
964 Ibid 41. 
965 Ibid 46. 
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“The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the 
memorandum; and, though it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely the same 
as it was before, and the same persons are managers and the same hands receive the profits, 
the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or trustee for them. Nor are the 
subscribers as members liable, in any shape or form except to the extent and in the manner 
provided by the Act”.966  
The House of Lords’ decision was therefore that from the time a company is incorporated it 
becomes a legal entity, separate from its members967 and the fact that Salomon held the majority 
of the shares in the company had no bearing on the fact that the company had been duly 
incorporated.968 The court also found no ground for accepting that the debts of the company 
were the debts of Salomon.969 
 
Accordingly, the decision in Salomon v Salomon and Co. entrenches the principle that upon 
formation a company becomes recognized by law as an entity with its own legal personality, 
which exists separately from its members, and which has the capacity to have its own 
obligations and rights; “once a company is legally incorporated, it must be treated like any 
other independent person with its rights and liabilities appropriated to it; the motives of a 
company during the formation of the company are irrelevant when discussing the rights and 
liabilities of such a company”.970 This important decision was taken by the House of Lords in 
1897 and the principle entrenched is still applicable and relevant in company law today and it 
is “almost universally cited for the proposition that the corporation is a separate legal entity”.971 
                                                          
966 Ibid 49 - 50. 
967 As Lord McNaughten states “The company attains maturity on its birth”. (Ibid 49). 
968 Ibid 36. 
969 “There is no ground for the reasoning of Vaughan Williams J that…the company’s debts are those of an 
undisclosed principal namely the appellant”. (Ibid 36). 
970 Davis & Geach (note 54) 29. 
971 B Welling, L Smith & LI Rotman Canadian Corporate Law 3rd ed 127. 
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It is this separate legal personality that makes it possible for a corporation to be held liable in 
its own capacity. Without this principle it would be the shareholders that would bear liability 
in the event of any wrongdoing.  
 
Although the case dealt with the liability for debts of a company, from the decision, it follows 
that the obligations of a company are those of the company and not of its shareholders. 
Moreover, as these are legally recognized obligations, such obligations are enforceable by 
means of the applicable law, whether that is civil or criminal law. The separate personality of 
corporations is an important concept and it has led to corporations becoming an integral and 
essential part of society.972 
 
(b) The historical development of corporate criminal liability in England 
During the period between the coming into existence of companies and the coming into being 
of the Joint Stock Companies Act, there was hardly any difference between unincorporated 
partnerships and incorporated companies as the companies resembled guilds.973 With the 
coming into being of the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 difference between companies 
and partnerships became clear. In fact, factors distinguishing the unincorporated partnerships 
from the incorporated companies were that (a) the companies had perpetual existence, (b) they 
had the ability to own property and (c) they were able to sue in the company’s name. 974  Pinto 
and Evans further point out the fact that incorporation allowed a corporation to “invite 
                                                          
972 “In the Common Law we call artificial persons corporations. Their existence is necessary to avoid the tedious 
and cumbrous processes which would otherwise be required for the carrying on of joint undertakings in which a 
large number of citizens are or may be interested”. (F Pollock A First Book on Jurisprudence for Students of the 
Common Law (1918) 120). 




investment from the public”.975 They further point out that this particular feature was “in due 
course, the reason for the first interest shown by the criminal law in the operation of 
corporations”.976  
 
The legal personality of a company has been accredited with being “the foundation of the 
development of principles of corporate criminal liability”.977 It is submitted that this statement 
is correct. After the recognition and acceptance of corporations as legal persons, corporations 
continued to play an increasingly prominent role in the economy978 and one of the 
consequences of corporate activities is that these affected human beings in many ways as 
“corporations began to cause damage and injury both to property and person”.979 The need for 
corporations to be held criminally accountable for their actions thus became an inevitable 
consequence of accepting or recognizing them as legal persons980 and as more business entities 
opted for incorporation,981 the need for corporate criminal liability became distinct.  
 
It must be noted though that “many European jurisdictions initially refused to recognize 
corporate criminal liability because the notion that a juristic fiction such as a corporation could 
possess guilt in the sense necessary for the application of criminal law seemed far-fetched”.982 
In fact, the development of corporate criminal liability in English law was hindered mainly by 
                                                          
975 Ibid. 
976 Ibid. 
977 Ibid 14. 
978 “The one-person entrepreneur was being replaced by more complex business arrangements, and in terms of 
activity, the development of the railways transformed the landscape, the economy and mobility”. (Wells (note 15) 
87). 
979 Ibid. 
980 Corporations serve as employers, service providers, etc. and corporate activities impact on society, for instance 
death or injury while on duty or while using public transportation. 
981 “The one-person entrepreneur was being replaced by more complex business arrangements”. (Wells (note 15) 
86). 
982 Khanna (note 25) 1490. 
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the fact that the idea of holding a corporation criminally liable was not welcomed at first.983 
The concept of corporate criminal liability thus began in a very simple form as the legislature 
enacted regulatory offences and corporations were punished for the contravention of the 
provisions of such legislation.984  
 
Before the acceptance of corporate criminal liability, civil liability against corporations that 
caused harm to people had already emerged.985 This was an important step towards the 
development of corporate criminal liability.986 It is submitted that the acceptance of the civil 
liability of corporations paved the way to the acceptance of the fact that it is possible for 
corporations to commit crimes and as legal persons, to be held accountable for those crimes. 
As Leigh states “statements enunciated in the field of torts were…to become accepted as 
principles applicable to the field of criminal law, with but isolated protests”.987  
 
During the early days of the nineteenth century the first traces of corporate criminal liability 
were found in cases where courts were holding corporations criminally liable for 
nonfeasance988 in cases of public nuisance.989 Before the middle of the nineteenth century there 
                                                          
983 “English courts originally rejected the very idea of corporate liability”. (Stessens (note 52) 495). 
984 Wells describes statutory regulation as “the most common forum in which corporations are confronted by 
criminal sanction”. (Wells (note 15) 3). 
985 “Plaintiffs discovered that the individual at fault might not be capable of being sued or worth suing. It emerged 
that what was the simplest for the injured party was also the safest for management: to treat the corporation as the 
actor”. (Wells (note 15) 87). “In the meantime the courts had held that civilly, intent and malice could be imputed 
to the corporation”. (Leigh (note 58) 15). 
986 “The emergence of civil claims against corporations provides only part of the background to the development 
of corporate criminal liability”. (Wells (note 15) 87 - 88). 
987 Leigh (note 58) 15. 
988 Nonfeasance is defined as the omission of some act that ought to have been performed. Dictionary 
(http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/nonfeasance?s=t  (accessed 16 November 2013).  In this case it refers to 
the omission of the removal of a public nuisance. 
989 Khanna (note 25) 1481. 
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was doubt as to whether a corporation could be held liable also for misfeasance990 (positive 
acts).991 A milestone was then reached in 1840 when an indictment against a corporation, which 
had been ordered to remove a bridge it had erected, was upheld in R v Birmingham & 
Gloucester Railway Co.992 The importance of the ruling in R v Birmingham & Gloucester 
Railway Co. is that it indicated clearly that even corporations “could be held criminally liable 
for misfeasance”.993 In upholding the indictment the court stated that “the liability of 
corporations was to be equated, so far as possible, with that of natural persons”.994 As seen 
from R v Birmingham & Gloucester Railway Co.995 the English courts played a pivotal role in 
the recognition as well as the development of corporate criminal liability.996  
 
 It was, however, not until towards the beginning of the twentieth century that it was accepted 
that corporations could commit crime.997 Although progress made by the courts in this regard 
was slow at first,998 since the last century there have been regular prosecutions of corporations 
and corporations have reportedly been convicted for crimes, including manslaughter.999  
 
(i) Difficulties encountered with the introduction of corporate criminal liability in 
England 
                                                          
990 Misfeasance is defined as a wrong, actual or alleged, arising from or consisting of affirmative action. Dictionary 
(http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/misfeasance?s=t ((accessed 16 November 2013)).   
991 Khanna (note 25) 1481. 
992  Ibid. R v Birmingham & Gloucester Railway Co. (note 93) 223. 
993 Khanna  (note 25)1481. 
994 Ibid; LH Leigh ‘The Criminal Liability of Corporations and Other Groups’ (1977) 9 Ottawa Law Review 247, 
249.  
995  R v Birmingham & Gloucester Railway Co. (note 93) 223. 
996 Ashworth (note 246) 5. 
997 R v Birmingham & Gloucester Railway Co. (note 93) 223. 
998 “…the courts moved slowly in this direction in the mid-nineteenth century”. (Ashworth (note 246) 117). 
999 R v Jackson Transport (Ossestt) Ltd 1996 and R v Kite and Others 1994 are the first two recorded convictions 
for manslaughter (both unreported cases). 
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There were factors that barred the introduction of the criminal liability of corporations. At first, 
corporations were originally not held liable for criminal offences as they were deemed 
incapable of committing offences.1000 Several reasons have been given for such a 
conclusion:1001  
 One of the reasons, which relates to procedure, was that personal appearance at the trial 
was a requirement and this could not be fulfilled by a corporation.1002  
 Another reason had to do with the fact that the punishment for felonies was death, a 
form of punishment which could not be meted out on a corporation. 1003  
 Another reason was that it was not possible for a corporation to have mens rea, an 
element that was required for committing a crime.1004 
 The fact that the corporation could not be held liable for criminal acts as these were 
considered to be ultra vires,1005 was another challenge to the acceptance of corporate 
criminal liability. 
 The corporations’ lack of personal attributes such as criminal intent1006 was also another 
hindrance to holding corporations criminally liable.  
 
 
(aa) Personal appearance at trial 
                                                          
1000 Ormerod (note 96) 257. 
1001 Leigh (note 58) 3. 
1002 “As a matter of procedure, personal appearance was necessary at court in the assizes and quarter-sessions. 
Since the corporation has no physical person, it could not appear”. (Ormerod (note 96) 257). 
1003 Miester (note 104) 925. “As a general rule, the sentence on conviction for a felony was imprisonment or death, 
neither of which could be visited upon by a corporate. A fine could only be imposed on conviction for a felony if 
such powers were expressly provided by a statute”. (Pinto & Evans (note 94) 16). 
1004 Ibid. 
1005 Leigh (note 58) 3. 
1006 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 16 and Leigh (note 58) 15. 
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At first it seemed unimaginable that a company, an artificial being, lacking a brain and physical 
attributes, could make a court appearance and as this was a procedural requirement for 
liability,1007 the prevailing view was that it was not possible to hold a corporation criminally 
liable.1008 The corporation’s inability to meet the requirement of making a personal appearance 
at a trial has been cited as a corporation’s “most fundamental bar to liability”1009 as this fact 
made it difficult to take action against a corporation.1010 
 
It must be noted though that as early as 1705 in R v Saintiff1011 a corporation was indicted for 
“failure to perform a public duty resulting in nuisance”.1012 This early acceptance that a 
corporation could be held liable for omissions resulting in public nuisance is seen by Leigh as 
the driving force towards the acceptance of the concept of holding corporations liable.1013 He 
explains, however, that this was not regarded as a true criminal prosecution and mens rea was 
not required.1014 Moreover, since the prosecution was particularly aimed at seeing to it that the 
nuisance would be removed, as opposed to aiming at punishing the defendant, there was no 
need for the defendant to make a personal appearance in court when judgment was made.1015 
 
Leigh makes it clear that with regard to offences that were “punishable on summary 
conviction” there was no problem as the Summary Conviction Act1016 explained that 
                                                          
1007 Leigh (note 58) 10. This was a requirement for indictable offences. (Ibid 10). 
1008 Ibid 9. 
1009 Leigh (note 994) 247. 
1010 Ormerod (note 96) 246. 
1011 R v Saintiff (1705) 6 Mod. 255. 
1012 Leigh (note 58) 16. 
1013 “An indictment lay against a corporation in respect of failure to perform a public duty resulting in a 
nuisance…The liability of corporations however derives its real impetus from liability for nonfeasance in cases 
of public nuisance”. (Ibid). 
1014 Ibid. 
1015 Ibid. 
1016 The Summary Conviction Act, 1848. 
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appearance could be made by the accused’s counsel or attorney.1017 The Quarter Session Act1018 
was also clear in this regard as it allowed the accused or the attorney of the accused to sign a 
notice of appeal.1019 The problem was with regard to indictable offences, due to a requirement 
that a personal appearance had to be made by the accused.1020 This was impossible for a 
corporation, which could only do so via its attorney and this resulted in the corporation not 
being able to be tried at assize.1021  
 
It is submitted that the acceptance of a corporation as being incapable of committing offences, 
due to its inability to be physically present in court, was problematic in that it gave the 
impression that a corporation was not in a position to commit criminal offences.  
 
(bb) Death as a penalty 
Death was the punishment meted out for felonies and since such a punishment could not be 
imposed on corporations, 1022 corporations could not be held liable for such felonies. These 
sentiments had already been expressed in the Sutton Hospital case where it was stated that “a 
corporation cannot be found guilty of criminal offences for which death or imprisonment is the 
only penalty or which by their nature can only be committed by natural persons”.1023 With no 
                                                          
1017 Leigh (note 58) 16. 
1018 The Quarter Session Act, 1849. 
1019 Leigh (note 58) 10. 
1020 Ibid. 
1021 Ibid. 
1022The prevailing view was that “at common law corporations simply could not be held criminally liable…This 
notion was based in part on the practical consideration that most early punishments involved death or 
dismemberment and were thought to be inapplicable to corporations”. (Miester  (note 104) 923 – 924). 
1023According to Sir John Holt a corporation cannot be found guilty of criminal offences for which death or 
imprisonment is the only penalty or which by their nature can only be committed by natural persons. (Coggs v 
Bernard Sutton's Hospital Case (note 937) 1). 
219 
 
physical body to suffer the punishment, prosecuting a corporation whilst knowing that if 
convicted the death sentence would be passed, would have been a futile exercise.  
 
Meting out the death sentence to individuals who stand trial on behalf of corporations was also 
not going to resolve the issue, as Leigh explains: 
“We cannot draw an inference by analogy that the body of the human or humans who 
constitute its controlling organs, constitutes the body of the corporation. Clearly, in terms of 
existing legal concepts, that is not so. We do not sentence the corporation to death and carry 
out the sentence by hanging the controlling person in the corporate structure. The corporation 
is an abstraction and survives the death of those who act on its behalf”.1024 
 
The corporation’s inability to be handed the death sentence was clearly an obstacle to holding 
corporations criminally liable for felonies committed in furthering the interests of the 
corporation. 
 
(cc) The corporation’s lack of mens rea 
The fact that a corporation was regarded as a fictional entity also made it difficult to impose 
criminal liability on a corporation.1025 Since a corporation was not a natural person it had to 
rely on certain natural persons to make decisions on its behalf.1026 When such decisions were 
made and they resulted in the corporation being held criminally liable, the question arose as to 
                                                          
1024 Leigh (note 58) 7. 
1025 Ibid 5. 
1026 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 17. 
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how a corporation could possibly possess such an attribute as mens rea, an element required 
for committing an offence.1027  
“It could not act for itself. Physical acts had to be performed not by the corporation, but in its 
name. Criminal liability, if imposed upon the corporation, had therefore to be vicarious 
liability. Vicarious liability had no place in English criminal law”.1028 
This meant that even though there was a possibility of imposing corporate criminal liability by 
holding the corporation vicariously liable for the criminal acts of those natural people who 
acted on its behalf, this was, at first not possible. Over the years, vicarious liability was 
eventually accepted as a rule of attribution, thus making it possible to hold corporations 
criminally liable.1029 Vicarious liability was subsequently followed by the doctrine of 
identification, as a rule of attribution.1030 
 
(dd) Crime by a corporation is an ultra vires act 
Another reason set forth for a corporation’s inability to commit a crime is the fact that the 
commission of a crime by a corporation was thought to be an ultra vires act by a corporation.1031 
Since the commission of a crime could not possibly be something which companies have the 
mandate to do, criminal actions were considered to be ultra vires. The view was that a 
corporation could therefore not be held liable for criminal acts as these were considered to be 
ultra vires acts.1032 An act of a corporation is considered to be ultra vires when a corporation 
has acted beyond its capacities.1033  
                                                          
1027 Ibid. 
1028 Leigh (note 58) 5. 
1029 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 19). 
1030 Ibid. 
1031 Ormerod (note 96) 258. 
1032 Leigh (note 58) 3. 
1033 Leigh (note 994) 258. 
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In brief, the doctrine provided that a company could not pursue objects other than those 
specified in its objects clause. Activities falling entirely outside the ambit of those specified in 
the objects clause were said to be ultra vires the company and, in respect of such activities, the 
company could not be made liable.1034 
The reasoning here was based on the fact that as an artificial being a corporation is only able 
to act in accordance with its powers, therefore any act beyond its powers, such as committing 
a crime, is an ultra vires act.1035 The ultra vires argument was advanced in Ashbury Railway 
Carriage v Riche1036 in which Lord Cairns stated that the contract was 
“beyond the objects in the memorandum of association. If so, it was thereby placed beyond 
the powers of the company to make the contract. If so, my Lords, it is not a question whether 
the contract ever was ratified or was not ratified. If it was a contract void at its beginning, it 
was void because the company could not make the contract”.1037 
In casu Lord Cairns states that he is in agreement with Mr Baron Bramwell in the Court of 
Exchequer1038 and he makes it clear that the mode of incorporation: 
“states affirmatively the ambit and extent of vitality and power which by law are given to the 
corporation, and it states, if it is necessary so to state, negatively, that nothing shall be done 
beyond that ambit and that no attempt shall be made to use the corporate life for any purpose 
other than that which is so specified”.1039 
                                                          
1034 Leigh (note 58) 8. 
1035 It was argued that “since a corporation is a creature of the law, it can only do such acts as it is legally 
empowered to do, so that any crime is necessarily ultra vires; and that the corporation, having neither body nor 
mind cannot perform the acts or form the intents which are a prerequisite of criminal liability”. (Ormerod (note 
96) 258). 
1036 Ashbury Railway Carriage v Riche (1875) LR 7 HL 653. 
1037 Ibid 672. 
1038 “My Lords, I agree entirely, both with the description given here by Mr Baron Bramwell, of the nature of the 
contract and with the conclusion at which he arrived, that a contract of this kind was not within the words of the 
memorandum of association”. (Ibid 666). 
1039 Ibid 670. 
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In Abrath v North Eastern Railway Company,1040 the ultra vires doctrine was also applied to 
torts. Lord Bramwell stated that a corporation could not act with malice or motive.1041 He went 
further to state that: 
“If the directors even, by resolution at their board or by order under the common seal of the 
company … if they did it from an indirect or improper motive no action would lie against the 
corporation, because the act on the part of the directors would be ultra vires; they would have 
no authority to do it. They are only agents of the company; the company acts by them, and 
they have no authority to bind the company by ordering a malicious prosecution”.1042 
Lord Bramwell’s assertion regarding the ultra vires doctrine was, however, later rejected by 
the court in Citizens Life Assurance Company v Brown.1043 In casu the question facing the court 
was the liability of a corporation for libel which had been published by one of its officers.1044 
The court held that the company was legally responsible for the libel that had been published 
by its officer.1045 In passing judgment Lord Lindley stated that the officer “had no actual 
authority, express or implied, to write libels nor to do anything legally wrong; but it is not 
necessary that he should have had any such authority in order to render the appellant company 
liable for his acts”.1046 The ultra vires doctrine was therefore not upheld in this tort case and in 
this regard Leigh states that in tort “the courts thus adopted the view that the relevant enquiry 
                                                          
1040 Abrath v North Eastern Railway Company (1886) 11 App. Cas 247. 
1041 Ibid 251. 
1042 Ibid. 
1043 Citizens Life Assurance Company v Brown [1904] AC 423. Leigh points out that in Citizens Life Assurance 
Company v Brown it was stated that “a corporation civilly was to be placed in the same position as a human 
employer with respect to liability for the torts of his employees. All employees were liable for torts involving 
malice committed by their employees in the course of their employment. The corporation was in the same position. 
The courts thus adopted the view that the relevant inquiry was not directed towards the nature of the act in 
question, but to whether it was done in pursuit of objects competent to the corporation”. (Leigh (note 58) 9). 
1044 Citizens Life Assurance Company v Brown (note 1043) 424. 
1045 Ibid. 
1046 Ibid 427. 
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was not directed towards the nature of the act in question, but to whether it was done in pursuit 
of objects competent to the corporation”.1047  
 
With the ultra vires argument rejected in the law of torts it is not surprising that with regard to 
the criminal liability of corporations, the argument that a corporation could not commit a crime 
since that would be an ultra vires act did not enjoy support.1048 Leigh specifically refers to this 
as a limitation that was “universally rejected”.1049 It was accepted that a corporation is capable 
of committing crimes1050 and the rule is that a corporation may be held liable for crimes 
committed “where its activity falls within the class of activities permitted by its object 
clause”.1051 In this way, the ultra vires argument was overcome by making use of the vicarious 
liability doctrine to hold the corporation liable.1052 
 
(ii) Factors that paved the way for the recognition / acceptance of corporate criminal 
liability 
In spite of the fact that the concept of a corporation as a legal person has been part of English 
law for several centuries,1053 it took time for the idea of holding a corporation criminally liable 
to be fully accepted. The common-law rule was that criminal liability could not be imposed on 
corporations.1054 This was emphasized by the court in Anon in 1701 where Sir John Holt 
                                                          
1047 Leigh (note 58) 9.  
1048“The ultra vires doctrine, however, seems to have been ignored in both the law of tort and crime and to apply 
only in the law of contract and property”. (Ormerod (note 96) 258). 
1049 “The ultra vires limitation was therefore almost universally rejected”. (Leigh (note 994) 248). 
1050 Leigh (note 47) 1511. “It now seems clear that ultra vires will be taken as referring solely to capacity and that, 
if a criminal act is performed in pursuance of an activity intra vires the corporation, the corporation will be held 
liable in respect of it”. (Leigh (note 58) 9). 
1051 Leigh (note 47) 1511. 
1052 See discussion on the vicarious liability doctrine in Chapter Two IV (b) above. 
1053 “Courts have recognized that corporations have some sort of legal personality since the seventeenth century”. 
(Pinto & Evans (note 94) 6). 
1054 Leigh (994) 247. 
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declared that “a corporation is not indictable but the particular members of it are”.1055 Leigh 
attributes Sir John Holt’s declaration to (a) the fact that a corporation could not have mens rea 
(b) the corporation’s inability to physically act and (c) the fact that it was impossible for a 
corporation to appear in court in person.1056 With regard to Sir John Holt’s declaration, having 
such a declaration being made by a court of law had the potential of closing doors to the further 
development of corporate criminal liability. 
 
Leigh points out the fact that there was one exception to the declaration made by Sir John Holt 
and that is that “an indictment lay against a corporation in respect of failure to perform a public 
duty resulting in a nuisance”.1057 This exception played an important role in the development 
of corporate criminal liability as confirmed by Leigh, who observes, as stated above, that 
holding corporations criminally liable for their offences was stimulated by the corporations’ 
“liability for nonfeasance in cases of public nuisance”.1058 Leigh goes on to show how holding 
corporations liable for public nuisance basically laid the foundation for corporate criminal 
liability.1059 He states that the prosecution was not strictly regarded as a criminal proceeding, 
but rather as a way of “enforcing a public duty”.1060 He goes on to explain that mens rea was 
not a requirement, because the main issue was the failure to remove the nuisance1061 and “policy 
required that the corporation be made amenable for the duty to repair lay upon the corporation, 
and not upon its individual members”.1062 The corporation was held liable, however, the main 
                                                          
1055 Anon (1701) 12 Mod. 560, 88 E.R. 1518. 
1056 Leigh (note 58) 15. 
1057 Ibid 16. 
1058 Ibid. 
1059 “Corporations were indictable for non-performance of duties laid down upon them by charter, prescription or 
statute when non-performance resulted in a public nuisance”. (Leigh (note 58) 16). 
1060 Ibid. 





aim of the prosecution was removing the nuisance, as opposed to the punishment of the 
corporation.1063 For that reason there was no need for the corporation to be physically present 
in court when judgment was given,1064 which made it possible for the corporation to be held 
liable for the nonfeasance. 
 
Already in the seventeenth century corporations were being held liable for nonfeasance,1065 
which would eventually make it possible for corporations to be held criminally liable for other 
offences.1066 As Williston points out “it was held that a corporation could not be guilty of a true 
crime that is it could not have a criminal intent, but it could be indicted for a nuisance or for a 
breach of a prescriptive or statutory duty, and, in general, where only the remedy was criminal 
in its nature”.1067 
 
It must be noted that despite the potential of the declaration of Sir John Holt to hinder the 
development of corporate criminal liability,1068 English law continued to develop gradually and 
in 1827 it was already clear that a corporation could be held liable for criminal conduct.1069 In 
terms of section 14 of the Criminal Law Act1070 a corporation was included in the term ‘person’ 
and could therefore be liable for certain crimes.1071 Leigh points out that at this point in time 
the common law had already reached a stage where it regarded a corporation as a person.1072 It 




1066 Wells avers that “local authorities’s liability for public nuisance provided a model for the application of the 
juristic person concept to the newly developing collective body, the corporation”. (Wells (note 15) 88). 
1067 Williston (note 916) 124. 
1068 This declaration has been described as appearing “to close the door to criminal liability”. (Pinto & Evans (note 
94) 6). 
1069 Ibid 3. 
1070 Criminal Law Act 1827 (note 957). 
1071 Ibid. 
1072 Leigh (note 58) 20. 
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is submitted that section 14 reinforced this concept. It is further submitted that the importance 
of section 14 of the Criminal Law Act lies in the fact that it extended the liability bought about 
by other statutes to include the liability of corporations for crimes.1073 This is in line with 
Leigh’s observation that section 14 was “intended to have a wider effect” 1074 and that it is 
highly likely that the intention of the legislature was to put corporations in a position where 
they could be possibly held “prima facie liable for most statutory offences”.1075 This extension 
of criminal liability for statutory offences to corporations played an important role in the 
development of the concept of corporate criminal liability.  
 
 Corporations could also be held liable for non-compliance,1076 where they had breached 
statutory duties.1077 This is in spite of the fact that the contravention of regulatory statutes was 
not really regarded as true criminal offences. As stated above, a conviction for such an offence 
dates back to 1842 in R v Birmingham & Gloucester Railway Co.,1078 where “the corporation 
was indicted for disobeying an order of the Justices, confirmed at Quarter Sessions, directing 
it to remove a bridge which it had erected over a road”.1079 Although this was a simplistic form 
of holding a corporation liable1080 for its unlawful conduct, it formed an important part of the 
development of the concepts of corporate criminal liability and corporate homicide as we know 
it today.  
 
                                                          
1073 Ibid. 
1074 Ibid 16. 
1075 Ibid. 
1076 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 3.  
1077 These were known as regulatory offences and Wells points out the fact that “they were not perceived as real 
crime”. (C Wells ‘A Quiet Revolution in Corporate Liability for Crime’ (1995)  New Law Journal 1326).  
1078 R v Birmingham and Gloucester Railway Co. (note 93) 223. 
1079 Leigh (note 58) 16. 
1080 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 7. 
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Section 2(1) of the Interpretation Act was another legislative intervention that further 
influenced the development of corporate criminal liability in England. In term of section 2(1)  
“In the construction of every enactment relating to an offence punishable on indictment or on 
summary conviction, whether contained in an Act passed before or after the commencement 
of this Act, the expression ‘person’ shall, unless the contrary intention appears, include a body 
corporate”.1081 
It is submitted that the express inclusion of corporations as persons who could be held 
criminally liable for statutory offences in the 1889 Interpretation Act paved the way for the 
criminal liability for commission of common-law offences to be extended to corporations. 
 
Civil lawsuits against corporations along with the enforcement of regulatory statutes also 
played an important role in the development of corporate criminal liability. Wells points out 
the fact that corporations were considered to have legal personality did not mean that they were 
not regarded as having criminal capacity.1082 It is submitted that this is an important observation 
because such recognition of corporations as quasi-legal persons meant that corporations were 
becoming an integral part of society and it would be a matter of time before they would be fully 
recognized legal persons. The actual regulation of corporate criminal liability developed over 
a number of centuries1083 and, as will be seen below, courts played an important role in this 
regard.  
                                                          
1081 Section 2(1) of the Interpretation Act, 1889. 
1082 “…although corporations had been regarded as a kind of legal person for the purposes of property ownership 
since the seventeenth century, this did not necessarily mean that they were so regarded in other contexts, nor 
necessarily that they were thought to be capable of committing criminal offences”. (Wells (note 15) 84). 
1083 Despite the existence of corporations in the 17th century, Williston states that “the corporation was far from 
being regarded as simply an organization for the more convenient prosecution of business. It was looked on as a 
public agency, to which had been confided the due regulation of foreign trade, just as the domestic trades were 
subject to the government of the guilds”. (Williston (note 916) 110). 
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III THE MENS REA OF THE CORPORATION AND THE BASIS FOR 
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN ENGLAND 
 (a) The Basis for Liability  
Corporate criminal liability in England has become a well-regulated area of law which aims at 
ensuring that corporations do face consequences for their criminal actions. There are regulatory 
agencies which deal specifically with issues pertaining to corporations and regulatory 
offences.1084 Some of these originate from the nineteenth century.1085 The aim of the regulatory 
bodies is to ensure that the statutes they are responsible for, are enforced.1086 This they do by 
conducting investigations and enquiries. 
 
An important statute is the Health and Safety at Work Act, 19741087 which specifically states 
that “it shall be the duty on all employers to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the 
health, safety and welfare at work of all his employees”.1088 The Act further states that “it shall 
be the duty of every employer to conduct his undertaking in such a way as to ensure, so far as 
is reasonably practicable, that persons not in his employment who may be affected thereby are 
not thereby exposed to risks to their health and safety”.1089 From these two sections it is clear 
that a duty of care is placed on the employer to ensure that its employees and all other people 
are in safe conditions. Moreover, in terms of the Reporting of Diseases and Dangerous 
Occurrences Regulations 1995, regulation 3(1) companies have a duty to report all incidents of 
                                                          
1084 “They are staffed by health and safety inspectors, environmental health officers, trading standards officers, 
and many others”. (Wells (note 15) 3). 
1085 “Some have their origins in the nineteenth century but most have been established since the Second World 
War, and they are particularly a phenomenon of the 1960s onwards”. (Ibid). 
1086 Ibid 4. 
1087 Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the HSWA). 
1088 Ibid section 2(1). 
1089  Ibid section 3(1). 
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deaths occurring as a result of its work to the Health and Safety Executive.1090 A shortcoming 
of the Health and Safety Executive is, however, its failure to investigate some of the deaths that 
are reported to it.1091 
 
Even though regulatory offences were not crimes as such,1092 it is clear that they played an 
important role in the development of corporate criminal liability. The contravention of a 
regulatory provision meant that the corporation itself would be punished accordingly. Here we 
see a simple form of corporate criminal liability where the question of mens rea does not 
arise.1093 As long as it was clear that a regulatory offence had been committed, the corporation 
was held liable and there was no need to prove mens rea.  
 
Where the breach of a statutory provision resulted in the death of a person, the regulatory 
authorities had to cooperate with relevant bodies, such as the police, for a decision to be made 
as to whether a prosecution for manslaughter ought to be proceeded with.1094 
 
(i) Strict Liability  
Offences where strict liability is applicable are offences which do not require mens rea. A strict 
liability offence “is one which requires no fault for conviction: any person may be found guilty 
                                                          
1090 C Belcher ‘Corporate Killing as a Corporate Governance Issue (2002) 10 (1) Corporate Governance 47, 47. 
1091 Belcher refers to the failure to investigate at least 88% of the matters reported to the Health and Safety 
Executive and states that it is probably due to lack of resources that these investigations do not take place. (Ibid). 
1092 These were not regarded as ‘true crimes’. Wells states that “what appears to lie behind the ‘true crime / quasi 
crime distinction is an unarticulated argument that, if an activity was not traditionally a matter for the criminal 
law, then it cannot achieve the status of the true crime”. Wells (note 15) 7. 
1093 “Crimes which do not require intention, recklessness or even negligence as to one or more elements in the 
actus reus are known as offences of strict liability”.  Ormerod (note 96) 155. 
1094 MG Welham Tolley’s Corporate Killing: A Manager’s Guide to Legal Compliance (2002) 9. 
230 
 
simply through doing or failing to do a certain act”.1095 Under strict liability it is therefore not 
necessary to prove the presence of mens rea for the corporation to be held liable.1096 Regulatory 
offences were usually strict liability offences.1097 The wording of regulatory offences was such 
that corporations were held strictly liable, without the question of mens rea coming into play. 
As a result, strict liability became the first basis for corporate criminal liability in England.  
 
It must be noted though that, at this point in time, corporations were usually only held liable 
for so-called regulatory offences, which did not require mens rea as an element.1098  
 
(ii) Vicarious liability as a way of addressing the corporation’s lack of criminal intent 
Despite having strict liability as the basis for liability for regulatory offences, corporate 
criminal liability was limited when it came to the holding of corporations criminally liable for 
other offences, particularly those that had mens rea as an element. Pinto and Evans point out 
that  
“On the assumption that a corporation could neither act nor think itself, the courts were confronted 
with the problem of how, if at all, a corporation could commit a criminal offence; if it could not 
act, how could it cause a certain event forbidden by the criminal law (the actus reus), and if it could 
                                                          
1095 Ashworth (note 246) 116. 
1096 “…the corporation was liable for the conduct of its employee without proof of any criminal state of mind”. 
(Pinto & Evans (note 94) 35). 
1097 “Strict liability is a key feature of regulatory offences”. (Lacey, Wells & Meure (note 177) 239). “Many other 
offences, including most regulatory offences, do not require proof of any of these mental elements and are known 
as offences of strict liability”. (Wells (note 15) 67). 
1098 “…by 1915 corporations were held liable for nuisance, whether at common law or under statute, for failure to 
perform statutory duties, for minor offences of strict liability, and for offences to which vicarious liability was 
recognized as applying, whether or not mens rea was required for their commission. Liability did not however, 
extend to offences, regarded as truly criminal in character, of which it was said that mens rea was a necessary 
ingredient”. (Leigh (note 58) 24). 
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not think, how could it form the requisite state of mind in relation to the causing of the event 
forbidden by law (the mens rea)”?1099 
As a response to what has been raised in the above quotation, the application of the doctrine of 
vicarious liability was used by the English courts to make corporations criminally liable for 
crimes that had been committed through the employees of corporations. With regard to 
nonfeasance for public nuisance Wells notes that  
“the basis of local authority liability for nuisance was itself rooted in an analogy with the 
master / servant relationship. They were liable as ‘masters’ when their ‘servants’, the local 
officials, created a public nuisance in streets through failing to maintain them”.1100 
 
Vicarious liability was also used in the context of corporate criminal liability when it was 
decided that corporations could be held criminally liable for misfeasance in R v Great North of 
England Railway Co.1101 As observed  by Khanna1102 
“In order to hold corporations liable for misfeasance, courts imputed agent conduct to 
corporations, and such imputation would have been theoretically troublesome without the 
doctrine of respondeat superior. However the doctrine was established at common law by the 
time courts decided the first corporate misfeasance cases in the mid-1800s. The doctrine’s 
development coincided with the growth in the number and importance of corporations and 
with society’s subsequent demand for regulation of business activity”.1103 
                                                          
1099 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 17.  
1100 Wells (note 15) 88. 
1101 Wells observes that “at the same time, many of the early large corporate bodies such as the railway companies 
were set up under special charters or private Acts which imposed specific duties upon them, analogous to the 
municipal duties of local authorities. Thus, it was not a huge step to hold them liable, at first for failing in those 
duties, non-feasance and later for misfeasance”. (Wells (note 15) 88).  
1102 Khanna (note 25) 1481. 




As stated above, vicarious liability entails holding an employer liable for the wrongful actions 
of the employee which take place within the scope of the employee’s duties.1104 The employer 
as the principal would only be held liable if the actions of the employee or agent had been 
commissioned by the employer / principal.1105 It is important to note that even though the 
corporation is held vicariously liable for the wrongs of its employees, such acts “remain the 
acts of the employees”.1106 The employer / principal is therefore held vicariously liable for the 
wrongful conduct of the employee / agent.  
 
As explained in chapter one, vicarious liability is a concept that originates from tort law. The 
idea of taking this tort law concept into criminal law by holding an agent vicariously liable for 
the criminal actions of another person was a notion that was not welcomed. Wells, however, 
expresses that “the emergence of the common law principle that masters had ‘vicarious’ 
liability for their servants facilitated the development both of civil and criminal liability of 
corporations”.1107 
 
Vicarious liability was in the first instance applied in matters where there was no requirement 
of mens rea. Where a statute imposed a strict duty vicarious liability would be applicable1108 
and in such a situation the employer or the principal could not escape liability by relying on 
                                                          
1104 See full discussion of vicarious liability in Chapter One V (a) above. 
1105 “The doctrine of vicarious liability developed out of medieval concepts of the master/servant relationship. 
Originally restricted to cases where the wrong was expressly commanded by the master, by the beginning of the 
eighteenth century it was accepted by the civil courts that the master (or employer) could be held liable for acts 
done at his implied, as well as his express, command. Such implied command could be inferred from the general 
terms of the servant’s employment”. (Pinto & Evans (note 94) 18). 
1106 Ibid 39. 
1107 Wells (note 15) 88. 
1108 Pinto & Evans  (note 94) 21. 
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the defence that the acts had not been authorized.1109 It must be noted that even though vicarious 
liability is applicable to strict liability offences, it is incorrect to say that vicarious liability is 
only applicable to offences that do not require mens rea. 1110  This can be seen in the 1917 case 
of Mousell v London and North Western Railway 1111 where the court actually held a 
corporation vicariously liable for an offence requiring mens rea committed by its employee.1112 
In passing judgment Lord Atkin stated that:  
“The penalty is imposed upon the owner for the act of the servant if the servant commits the 
default provided for in the statute in the state of mind provided for by the statute. Once it is 
decided that this is one of those cases where a principal may be held liable criminally for the 
act of his servant, there is no difficulty in holding that a corporation may be the principal. No 
mens rea being necessary to make the principal liable, a corporation is in exactly the same 
position as a principal who is not a corporation”.1113  
 Leigh hails the Mousell decision as “the key to the development of corporate criminal liability” 
and “a milestone on the path to corporate criminal liability”. 1114 
 
(iii) The identification doctrine and offences requiring mens rea 
                                                          
1109 Ibid. 
1110 “The extension of vicarious liability to a corporation where the offence involved required mens rea developed 
from a line of decisions holding that a corporation could be held to be vicariously liable in respect of torts, 
committed by corporate servants, involving malice. While the battle swirled for some time, it was gradually 
established that corporations could be held liable for all torts whether or not malice was a necessary ingredient. 
Corporate liability for malicious prosecution was established in 1900, for libel in 1904 and for slander in 1911. 
Liability rested, it was said, upon the ordinary principles of the law of master and servant”. (Leigh (58) 22). 
1111 Mousell v London and North Western Railway [1917] 2 KB 836. 
1112 “The Divisional court convicted the corporation holding it to be vicariously liable for the acts of its branch 
manager, and in the course of so doing, delivered the classic judgment indicating in what circumstances a master 
would be subject to vicarious liability”. (Leigh (note 58) 29). See also Wells (note 15) 90.  
1113 Mousell v London and North Western Railway (note 1111) 846. 
1114 Leigh (note 58) 29. 
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At first corporations could not be prosecuted for offences requiring mens rea. In fact, prior to 
1944, the basis for liability in all cases of corporate criminal liability was vicarious liability.1115 
This was largely due to the fact that a corporation was regarded as being incapable of having 
mens rea.1116As time went by, in order to distinguish between vicarious and personal liability, 
the courts have made use of the identification doctrine as the basis for corporate criminal 
liability.1117 With vicarious liability the conduct of the employee that the company is held liable 
for remains the conduct of the employee, whereas with personal liability the conduct of the 
employee that the company is held liable for, is considered to be the conduct of the company 
itself.1118 The fact that the acts remain acts of the employee distinguishes vicarious liability 
from personal liability.1119 Pinto and Evans explain the differences between vicarious and 
personal liability in the following manner: 
“It is necessary to distinguish between liability for the acts of another (true vicarious liability) 
and liability for breach of a personal duty. In the latter category although the act may be 
committed by an employee, it is the employer’s own failure to prevent the harm that renders 
him liable. The person committing the act does not himself commit the offence because it can 
only be committed by the person fixed with the duty. Such duties have been described as non-
delegable, not because the person fixed with the duty must carry it out personally (impossible 
in the case of a corporation), but because the responsibility cannot be delegated”.1120 
The identification doctrine, that was made applicable to the criminal liability of corporations 
in the 1944 decisions, made it possible for corporations to be held personally liable for crimes 
committed.  
                                                          
1115 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 35. 
1116 “…since a company was a legal device without mind or soul, it could not possess the criminal intent required 
to convict a person of serious crime”.  (McGrane & Gault (note 251) 167). 
1117 Leigh (note 47)  1514. 
1118 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 35. 
1119 Ibid. 




(b) The 1944 decisions and their impact on the development of corporate criminal liability 
Prior to 1944 the identification theory was applied in holding corporations civilly liable for the 
wrongs committed by their employees. A civil lawsuit that greatly influenced the development 
of the identification doctrine, which was later to be applied to criminal cases so as to hold 
corporations personally liable for crimes is the 1915 civil case of Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd 
v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd. 1121 Lennard’s Carrying Company owned a ship which was being 
used by Asiatic Petroleum Company. It had been brought to the attention of the owner of the 
ship that it had problems and repairs had been made to the ship. The ship subsequently carried 
benzine on behalf of Asiatics Petroleum Company but due to its alleged “unseaworthiness” it 
perished during its voyage.1122 In finding against Lennard’s Carrying Company Lord Haldane 
stated that: 
“a corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own any more than it has a body of its 
own; its active and directing will must consequently be sought in the person of somebody who 
for some purposes may be called an agent, but who is really the directing mind and will of the 
corporation, the very ego and centre of the personality of the corporation. That person may be 
under the direction of the shareholders in general meeting; that person may be the board of 
directors itself, or it may be, and in some companies it is so, that that person has an authority 
co-ordinate with the board of directors given to him under the articles of association, and is 
appointed by the general meeting of the company, and can only be removed by the general 
meeting of the company… It must be upon the true construction of that section in such a case 
as the present one that the fault or privity is the fault or privity of somebody who is not merely 
a servant or agent for whom the company is liable upon the footing respondeat superior, but 
                                                          
1121 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd (note 234) 705. 
1122 Ibid 713. 
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somebody for whom the company is liable because his action is the very action of the company 
itself. It is not enough that the fault should be the fault of a servant in order to exonerate the 
owner, the fault must also be one which is not the fault of the owner, or a fault to which the 
owner is privy…”.1123 
 
Lord Haldane was pointing out that the will of a person who is regarded as the directing mind 
of the company is in fact the will of the company itself. That person is regarded as the alter 
ego of the company. This is the identification doctrine and though it started off as a principle 
that was applied to civil cases, after the 1944 cases, which are discussed below, the 
identification doctrine was made applicable to criminal prosecutions of corporations. 
 
In 1944 three important cases in which the identification theory was applied in criminal matters 
were heard viz: Director of Public Prosecutions v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd;1124 R v 
ICR Haulage Limited1125 and Moore v I Bresler Ltd.1126 All three cases dealt with holding 
corporations criminally liable for offences requiring mens rea. These cases were a 
breakthrough in the development of corporate criminal liability as the employees’ states of 
mind were imputed to the corporations.1127 As a result of these three decisions it has been said 
that 1944 is the year in which “corporate criminal liability became firmly established in English 
criminal law”.1128 
 
                                                          
1123 Ibid. 
1124 DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors [1944] KB 146, DC. 
1125 R v ICR Haulage Ltd [1944] KB 551, CCA. 
1126 Moore v I Bresler Ltd [1944] 2 All ER 515 
1127 Wells (note 15) 94 -95. 




(i) Director of Public Prosecutions v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd 
In this matter a company allegedly committed offences by completing and submitting incorrect 
details regarding the use of a company vehicle, in order to obtain petrol coupons. The 
corporation was charged with an offence regulated by Regulations 82 (1.) (c) and 82 (2.) of the 
Defence (General) Regulations, 1939. For the offence to be committed there had to be mens 
rea in the form of “intention to deceive”.1129 In the court a quo it was held that the details 
submitted were indeed incorrect, and the company was acquitted because the mens rea of the 
transport manager1130 (intention to deceive) could not be imputed to the corporation.1131  
 
The Divisional Court, however, disagreed and found that there was plenty of evidence that the 
corporation did act with the required intention to deceive.1132 In passing judgment Hallett J 
stated that a corporation ought to be liable in the same way as a natural person where it 
contravenes the statute by failing in its duty to provide correct information.1133 McNaghten J 
in his decision states that even though the corporation itself depends on natural persons for its 
knowledge and intention at times it is necessary to regard the knowledge and intention of those 
natural persons as that of the corporation.1134 Statements made by both Hallet J and McNaghten 
J amount to an application of the identification doctrine as the mens rea of the responsible 
individuals within the corporation was imputed to the corporation itself. The importance of this 
case lies in the fact that it became the first criminal matter in which the doctrine of identification 
                                                          
1129 DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors (note 1124) 146; Ormerod (note 96) 260. 
1130 “The justices dismissed the information on the ground that a body corporate could not be guilty of offences 
requiring proof of a dishonest state of mind”. (Wells (note 15) 94). 
1131 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 36. 
1132 Ibid 36 - 37. 




was applied.1135  
(ii) R v ICR Haulage Co Ltd 
In R v ICR Haulage1136 the court was faced with a decision as to whether a corporation could 
be held liable for conspiracy to defraud. Conspiracy to defraud was a common law offence 
which required proof of mens rea. The company and its managing director (together with 
others) had been charged with conspiracy to defraud and was convicted. The company appealed 
on the basis that where the offence required proof of mens rea, as a legal person, a company 
could not be indicted. The argument made on behalf of the company was not accepted.  
 
The court upheld the indictment against the corporation. Its decision was based on the fact that 
the court accepted that the acts and the mens rea of the managing director were those of the 
corporation.1137 In this particular case the decision of the court in Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd was approved. This case is important in the 
development of corporate criminal liability1138 because of the “wider liability of 
corporations”1139 that is found in this case.1140 
 
                                                          
1135 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 36. 
1136 R v ICR Haulage (note 1125) 691. 
1137 Ibid. 
1138 In passing judgement Stable J stated that “We are not deciding that in every case where an agent of a limited 
company acting in its business commits a crime the company is automatically to be held criminally responsible. 
Our decision only goes to the invalidity of the indictment on the face of it. Whether in any particular case there is 
evidence to go to a jury, that the criminal act of an agent, including his state of mind, intention, knowledge or 
belief is the act of the company, and in cases where the presiding Judge so rules, whether the jury are satisfied 
that it has been so proved, must depend on the nature of the charge, the relative position of the officer or agent 
and the other relevant facts and circumstances of the case”. (R v ICR Haulage Co Ltd (note 1125) 39 - 40). 
1139 Ormerod (note 96) 152. 
1140 “The Court of Criminal Appeal in R v ICR Haulage took the identification or alter ego theory a step further”. 





(iii) Moore v I Bresler Ltd 
This was a matter arising from the contravention of section 35(2) of the Finance (No.2) Act, 
19401141 which prohibited “the use of any document which was false in a material particular 
with intent to deceive”.1142 The facts of the case were interesting because in the process of 
committing the offence, the company itself had been deceived.1143 The company was tried 
together with the company’s secretary and its sales manager, who had secretly sold handbags, 
which the company was going to sell to the public, for their own benefit. False documents were 
then produced with the aim of covering up the fraud and as a result, the company’s tax returns 
reflected lower figures. They were convicted and the company was granted leave to appeal by 
the Recorder1144 on the basis that it had been defrauded by its employees who had acted beyond 
the scope of their employment.1145  The appeal was not successful. 
 
Viscount Caldecote took into account the fact that the employees concerned were senior 
officials within the corporation and concluded that their acts were the acts of the 
corporation.1146 Humphrey J also found that the company ought to be held liable. According to 
him the acts of the two senior officials concerned, the general manager and the sales manager 
                                                          
1141 As quoted in Pinto & Evans (note 94) 38. 
1142 Ibid. 
1143 Wells (note 15) 95. 
1144 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 38. 
1145 Ibid. 
1146 Ibid 39. 
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of that branch, bound the company.1147 It has been pointed out though, that Moore v Besler 
went “too far down the scale in identifying a controlling officer”.1148  
 
(c) The relevance of the 1944 cases towards the development of corporate criminal 
liability  
The above three cases are hailed as the first in which the doctrine of identification was applied 
to criminal cases.1149 They specifically dealt with situations where the employers of the 
corporate bodies had committed offences but these had been committed outside the scope of 
vicarious liability. In all three the corporate bodies were found to be liable on the basis that the 
employees had been acting on the authority of the corporate bodies. It is interesting, however, 
that in the three criminal cases there is no mention of the Lennards’ case.1150 This is despite the 
fact that the Lennards’ case (albeit a civil matter) had been the first case in which the doctrine 
of identification was applied. Wells observes that 
“Although this case was not specifically mentioned in the three 1944 cases from which 
modern doctrine originates, it seems clear that they were impliedly based on Haldane’s views 
that certain officers are the company and not merely agents of it”.1151 
 
Criticism has also been levelled at the 1944 cases, particularly, for their failure to clearly 
indicate when the act and mens rea or negligence of certain individuals within the corporation 
                                                          
1147 Ibid. 
1148 Ormerod (note 96) 262. 
1149 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 35. 
1150 Wells (note 15) 97. This is also observed by Pinto & Evans with regard to DPP v Kent. (Pinto & Evans (note 
94) 36). 
1151 Wells (note 15) 97. 
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will be regarded as though they are those of the corporation.1152 This failure led to what Parsons 
refers to as the courts’ “expansive approach”1153 when identifying which individuals within the 
corporation could be regarded or identified as the ‘mind’ of the corporation. Leigh notes that 
where mens rea is a requirement, a successful prosecution in England will not be easy, unless 
it is proven that a senior individual should have been aware of the fact that the 
circumstances1154 required him / her to act in terms of his duty, but did not do so.1155 
 
Another criticism concerns the fact that the three cases failed to explain the extent to which the 
identification doctrine could be applied.1156 
 
(d) Difficulties posed by the identification principle 
It is noteworthy that the existence of corporate criminal liability does not preclude the corporate 
liability of corporate officers. In addition to the corporation, corporate officers are also subject 
to punishment if wrongdoing is found on their part. Modern statutes containing regulatory 
offences clearly state that directors or officers are capable of being held liable for the offences 
committed by the corporation.1157 This includes those committed as a result of their 
negligence.1158 Here there is even a reverse onus in that the director has to prove that “he 
exercised due diligence to prevent commission of the offense”.1159  
                                                          
1152 Parsons (note 242) 70. 
1153 Ibid. 
1154 Own emphasis. 
1155 Leigh (note 47) 1518.  
1156 “What is clear is that none of these cases gave any clear idea as to how far this doctrine whereby the mens rea 
of certain company officers could be imputed to the company should extend”. (Wells (note 15) 95). 
1157 Leigh (note 47) 1524. 
1158 Leigh (note 47) 1524. 




Following the 1944 cases it became clear that the approach followed by the courts when 
determining which officers could be regarded as the mind and will of the corporation was too 
“expansive”.1160 An example highlighted by Parsons is the identification of the transport 
manager, as was done in DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors.1161 This wide approach was 
brought to an end by the 1971.  
 
(i) The restrictive approach of the identification theory 
 The 1971 decision in Tesco Supermarkets v Natrass1162 “established that the doctrine of 
identification applied, in principle, to all offences not based upon vicarious liability”.1163  The 
result is that the liability imposed on the corporation would be direct criminal liability. Lord 
Reid in Tesco Supermarkets v Natrass states that a controlling officer 
“is acting as the company and his mind which directs his acts is the mind of the company. 
There is no question of the company being vicariously liable. He is not acting as a servant, 
representative or delegate. He is the embodiment of the company or, one could say, he hears 
and speaks through the persona of the company, within his appropriate sphere, and his mind 
is the mind of the company. If it is a guilty mind then that guilt is the guilt of the company”.1164 
 
In essence the decision in Tesco Supermarkets v Natrass was that for a company to be held 
criminally liable the criminal liability of an individual or individuals who are regarded as the 
controlling mind of the company had to be identified first.1165 As Khanna observes “English 
                                                          
1160 Parsons (note 242) 70. 
1161 Ibid. 
1162 Tesco Supermarkets v Natrass (note 249). 
1163 Ibid. 
1164 Ibid 171. 
1165 Whyte (note 35) 4. 
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law, for example, only imputes an agent’s criminal intent to the corporation if the agent is the 
‘alter ego’ of the corporation, and the courts usually define ‘alter ego’ to mean an agent high 
up in the corporate hierarchy”.1166 
 
Tesco Supermarkets v Natrass accordingly “established that a corporation could be convicted 
of a non-regulatory offence requiring proof of mens rea if the natural person who had 
committed the actus reus of the offence could be identified with the corporation”.1167  
 
It is submitted that holding a corporation criminally liable for offences committed only by its 
senior officers clearly posed a threat to the development and to the success of corporate 
criminal liability, particularly corporate manslaughter or corporate homicide.1168 The essence 
of the identification theory as the basis for corporate criminal liability is that a corporation will 
be held liable only for the wrongful acts of its senior members.1169 Once pinpointed, the senior 
person must be guilty of the crime before the company can be held criminally liable for that crime.1170  
 
Clarkson, however, points out the fact that when dealing with big companies pinpointing a 
senior official who has acted with the required mens rea is virtually impossible.1171 In this 
                                                          
1166 Khanna (note 25) 1491 
1167 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 42. 
1168 “Before a company can be convicted of manslaughter proof is required that a ‘directing mind’ (that is, an 
individual at the very top of the company, who can be said to embody the company in his actions and decisions) 
is themselves guilty of manslaughter. Only then can the company be convicted…Without sufficient evidence to 
convict such an individual, the prosecution of the company must fail”.  
(Home Secretary ‘Need for Reform in the Draft for Reform Corporate Manslaughter’  
www.corporateaccountability.org/dl/manslaughter/reform/billmar2005.pdf). (accessed 20 November 2013). 
1169 “The ‘directing mind’ theory of corporate criminal responsibility imputes both the conduct and the fault of 
certain high ranking corporate officers to the corporation itself”. (Burchell (note 195) 471). 
1170 Belcher (note 1090) 47. 
1171 Clarkson (note 90) 151. 
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regard Sargason states that  
“…where the corporation is one of even moderate size, the common law encounters 
insurmountable difficulties. The senior manager will only be guilty of manslaughter and 
criminally liable for the deaths where his own gross negligence is the cause of the death(s). 
The company will only be liable if that senior manager is guilty of gross negligence 
manslaughter and was an individual identified with the company itself – part of its governing 
mind”.1172 
 
This is supported by Parsons, who also perceives the identification doctrine as a hindrance to 
successful corporate criminal liability.1173 Parsons states that “the doctrine attempts to impose 
the principles of criminal law relating to personal fault, which were developed against 
individuals, on to corporations and when it does so it assumes that only board directors make 
decisions of consequence in large corporations”.1174 It is submitted that Parsons’ perception is 
indeed correct because holding a corporation liable for acts committed only by its senior 
members does lead to some corporations escaping liability as a result of the difficulty in 
pinpointing a senior individual whose blame for the crime committed may be imputed to the 
corporation.  
 
This was in fact the case in England in R v P & O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd.1175 This was 
a criminal prosecution for the deaths of 154 passengers and 38 crew members caused when the 
ferry, the Herald of Free Enterprise, capsized a short distance from the harbour at Zeebrugge.  
                                                          
1172 A Sargason ‘Corporate Killing. The liabilities of Companies and Senior Management for Deaths on Holiday’ 
2000 International Travel Law Journal 131, 133. 
1173 Parsons (note 242) 70. 
1174 Ibid 71. 
1175 R v P & O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd. (note 248) 73 
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Upon investigation it became clear that the cause of the ‘accident’ was the fact that the ferry’s 
bow doors had not been closed.1176 The prosecution failed as there was no senior officer who 
could be pinpointed and blamed for the deaths therefore liability could not be imputed on the 
corporation.1177 Although the prosecution failed in this matter, this case is of importance to the 
development of corporate homicide. It was in this particular case that the trial judge held that 
a prosecution of a corporation for manslaughter was possible.1178 
 
Both Clarkson1179 and Parsons1180 find the identification doctrine weak in the sense that it 
attempts to give corporations attributes such as mens rea, which are confined to natural persons. 
The weakness of the doctrine is clearly expressed by Clarkson, who points out1181 that in huge 
corporations it is not easy to identify a single person who has made a specific decision.1182  
 
Another weakness of the identification doctrine has been its narrow (or restrictive) 
approach.1183 This refers to the fact that there were certain situations where the doctrine was 
not applied, for instance in certain cases where mens rea was a requirement and in strict liability 
statutory offences.1184 This is due to the fact that “these offences tend to be of a regulatory 
                                                          
1176 According to the report “the Herald capsized because she went to sea with her inner and outer bow doors 
open”. (Justice Sheen in the Department of Transport, The Sheen Report (1987) MV Herald of Free Enterprise 
Report of court no. 8074 Formal Investigation, third Impression 1988, 8). 
1177 The case and its merit will be fully discussed in this chapter at III (e) (ii) (aa) below. 
1178 McGrane & Gault (note 251) 166. 
1179 “…the law, instead of trying to look at the problem of corporate wrongdoing with fresh eyes, has tried to 
superimpose its individualistic constructs on to companies. It has reasoned that only human beings can ‘actually’ 
commit crimes and therefore it has tried to find a senior individual within the company who committed the actus 
reus and the mens rea of the crime”. (Clarkson (note 90) 150).  
1180 “…the doctrine attempts to impose the principles of criminal law relating to personal fault, which were 
developed against individuals, on to corporations and when it does so it assumes that only board directors make 
decisions of consequence in large corporations”.  (Parsons (note 242) 71). 
1181 “The doctrine ignores the reality of modern corporate decision-making which is often the product of corporate 
policies and procedures rather than individual decisions”.  (Clarkson (note 793) 561). 
1182 Ibid 563. 
1183 Ashworth (note 246) 118. 
1184 This is discussed above in Chapter Two III (a) above. 
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nature and to apply the identification doctrine where liability stops with the controlling officers, 
would defeat the purpose of the legislation”.1185 The restrictive approach meant that in many 
cases, certain corporations, especially large corporations, would escape liability because of the 
difficulty of identifying the wrongdoers as officers who are the ‘mind’ of the corporation.  
  
(ii) Overcoming the restrictive approach of the identification theory 
In developing the law of corporate criminal liability the courts have questioned the restrictive 
approach of the identification theory and in certain cases, they have decided not to rely on the 
identification theory. In practice the courts thus overcome the restrictive approach of the 
identification theory by simply imposing liability on the corporation without identifying the 
senior or controlling officers.1186 An example of a case in which this was done is Environment 
Agency v Empress Car Co. (Abertillery) Ltd.1187 This was an appeal heard by the House of 
Lords, against a conviction for a regulatory strict liability offence.  
 
Another important case in which the corporation was held liable despite the fact that the 
identification theory had not been applied is that of Tesco Ltd v Brent LBC.1188 An employee 
at Tesco had sold a video to a person below the age of eighteen, in contravention of section 11 
(1) of the Video Recordings Act 1984 and Tesco was convicted on the basis of vicarious 
liability.  Even though this was an offence requiring mens rea, the court, nevertheless convicted 
the corporation without applying the identification doctrine. 
                                                          
1185 Parsons (note 242) 71. 
1186 “In respect of statutory crimes of strict liability, a corporation is liable in the same way as a natural person”. 
(Ibid). 
1187 Environment Agency v Empress Car Co. (Abertillery) Ltd. [1998] 2 WLR 351, HC. 




As another way of overcoming the obstacles of the identification doctrine, there has also been 
a move by the courts to apply vicarious liability by holding the corporation liable even in 
circumstances where it would not have been possible to do so had the courts applied the 
identification doctrine.1189 An example is the case of National Rivers Authority v Alfred 
McAlpine Homes East1190. In this particular case the corporation had been acquitted in the court 
a quo due to the fact that it could not be found liable on the basis of the identification 
doctrine.1191 The law that had been contravened was a strict liability statutory regulation. The 
court decided to hold the corporation vicariously liable.1192 
 
Another important case in which a corporation was held criminally liable without the 
identification doctrine being applied is that of R v British Steel Plc.1193 The matter dealt with 
the contravention of two sections of the Health and Safety at Work, etc Act 1974. The 
contravened sections were s. 3 (1) which made it a duty for all employers to conduct their 
business in such a way that they ensure the safety of people, including those not employed by 
them and s. 33 which made the deaths or injuries of such persons an offence of non-compliance. 
In making a judgment the court clarified the fact that the term ‘every employer’ included 
corporations. The court also made it clear that with regard to section 3 (1) the identification 
doctrine was not applicable.1194  
                                                          
1189 Clarkson (note 793) 563.  
1190 National Rivers Authority v Alfred McAlpine Homes East [1994] CLR  760. 
1191 Clarkson (note 793) 563. 
1192 “…the Divisional Court applied the doctrine of vicarious liability. Looking at the purpose of pollution 
legislation, and bearing in mind it was dealing with a strict liability offence, it held that the only way of enforcing 
such laws, where the pollution will often be caused by persons of low positions in the corporate hierarchy, was 
by imposing vicarious liability on the company”. (Ibid 563-564). 
1193 R v British Steel Plc [1995] 1 WLR 1356, CA. 
1194 In his judgment Steyn LJ stated that “counsel for British Steel plc concedes that it is not easy to fit the idea of 




The role of the English courts in developing corporate criminal liability and paving the way for 
the concept of corporate homicide is clearly important as can be seen from the above 
discussion. Instead of allowing themselves to be restricted by the identification doctrine, the 
courts have seen it as their responsibility to ensure that corporations which have committed 
crimes are convicted. Relying on vicarious liability, the courts saw to it that the obstacles posed 
by the identification doctrine were overcome.  It is not possible, however, to rely on vicarious 
liability in each case where there is a chance that the corporation may escape liability and this 
has led to the notion that there are two forms of corporate criminal liability: one where vicarious 
liability may be used because the offence is a strict liability offence and another, where the 
direct liability is imputed on the corporation because of the requirement of mens rea.1195 In 
practice, however, this is not always the case.1196   
  
In Re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete (No.2) vicarious liability was applied despite the fact 
that mens rea was a requirement for the offence in question.1197 Moreover, in Seaboard 
Offshore Limited v Secretary of State for Transport1198 the notion that it is imperative to apply 
vicarious liability in strict liability cases was not accepted by the court.1199 Clarkson points out 
                                                          
(1). We would go further. If it be accepted that Parliament considered it necessary for the protection of public 
health and safety to impose, subject to the defence of reasonable practicability, absolute criminal liability, it would 
drive a juggernaut through the legislative scheme if corporate employers could avoid criminal liability where the 
potential harmful event is committed by someone who is not the directing mind of the company…That would 
emasculate the legislation”. (Ibid 1362-1363). 
1195 “Most people are familiar with the idea that there are two types of corporate liability for crimes. The general 
understanding is that the vicarious type applies to strict liability offences and the direct type to offences requiring 
a mental element”. (C Wells ‘Corporate Liability and Consumer Protection: Tesco v Natrass Revisited’ (1994) 
57, 5 The Modern Law Review 817, 817). 
1196 “The position is, however, not that straightforward. First the doctrine of vicarious liability has now been 
applied beyond the confines of strict liability offences to offences of negligence or hybrid offences”. (Clarkson 
(note 793) 564).  
1197 In Re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete (No.2) [1995] 1 All ER 99. 
1198 Seaboard Offshore Limited v Secretary of State for Transport [1994] 1 AC 456 (HL). 
1199 “The House of Lords…rejected the notion that vicarious liability can necessarily be imposed in strict liability 
offences”. (Clarkson (note 793) 564). 
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that “the position appears to be that whether the doctrine of vicarious liability applies or not, is 
a matter of statutory interpretation, taking into account  the language, content and policy of the 
law, and whether vicarious liability will assist enforcement”.1200 
 
The courts’ move against the restrictive approach of the identification doctrine are 
commendable, however, they still did not solve the problems caused by the existence of the 
identification doctrine. There were still many offences in which the courts had no leeway to 
overlook the identification doctrine. In practice this meant that corporations could still be able 
to escape liability where it is impossible to identify the wrongdoer as a senior controlling 
officer. This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs which necessitates further attention to the 
development of corporate criminal liability. As long as the identification doctrine continues to 
be an obstacle, it cannot be said that corporate criminal liability in English law is fully effective. 
 
(e) Corporate Manslaughter 
“More than any other aspect of corporate criminal liability, it has been the apparent inability 
of the criminal law adequately to punish those perceived as being responsible for corporate 
deaths that has sparked the most controversy”.1201 
The above quotation refers to the frustration over the failure over the years to prosecute many 
corporations who were allegedly responsible for various corporate disasters that claimed many 
lives. These corporate disasters led to deaths of not only people employed by the said 
                                                          
1200Ibid 565. 
1201 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 235. 
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corporations, but also of members of the public and the failure to prosecute the responsible 
corporations inevitably led to questioning whether the law needed to be reformed. 
 
Traditionally, manslaughter is alleged when the death of a person has occurred as a result of 
another person’s act in circumstances where the element of intent is lacking.1202 McGrane and 
Gault define manslaughter as “unlawful homicide without malice aforethought”.1203 Initially, 
there was no formal recognition of corporate manslaughter. With the development of corporate 
criminal liability as well as the increase in corporate activities which affected individuals, this 
was bound to change.  
 
As time went by, due to several incidents where a number of people lost their lives or were 
seriously injured as a result of the negligence or recklessness of employees of the corporations, 
corporations at last found themselves facing the possibility of criminal prosecutions for 
manslaughter. This would eventually lead to corporations being charged with offences such as 
manslaughter, which, at first was regarded as a crime which required mens rea.1204 This of 
course developed over a long period of time, but prior to the coming into effect of the CMCHA 
a corporation could in law be prosecuted and convicted of the common law crime of gross 
negligence manslaughter. Such prosecutions and convictions have, however, been rare,1205 
hence observations such as the one made by Whyte that “corporate crime that causes death of 
                                                          
1202 “There are two categories of manslaughter: voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. In the case of voluntary 
manslaughter the defendant has the mens rea and actus reus for murder but there were circumstances that offered 
some form of excuse for his conduct…Involuntary manslaughter is unlawful homicide, but the mens rea for 
murder is not present”. (Welham (note 1094) 17). 
1203 McGrane & Gault (note 251) 166. 
1204 Parsons (note 242) 76. 
1205 Wells has observed that “while the idea of corporate manslaughter has undoubtedly gained some purchase in 
popular vocabulary over the last fifteen years, it is still unusual for such a prosecution to be considered or pursued”. 
(Wells (note 15) 9). 
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workers and members of the public is a huge, if largely invisible, problem. Rarely are those 
serious offences treated with the force of the criminal law they deserve”.1206 
 
R v Cory Bros and Co Ltd is the first recorded matter where an attempt at holding a corporation 
liable for manslaughter was made.1207 In casu the court had to make a decision regarding the 
validity of an indictment where a company was being charged for manslaughter.1208 A person 
had fallen against an electric fence and was electrocuted. The company together with three 
engineers who had been responsible for the erection of the electric wall had been indicted on 
charges requiring mens rea.1209 Unfortunately the prosecution failed as Finlay J. felt that he 
had to abide by what had been set by precedent.1210 He relied on the premise that a company 
could neither be indicted with a felony nor with a misdemeanour under section 31 of the 
Offences against the Person Act, 1861,1211 reason being that a company cannot be said to have 
the requisite state of mind, mens rea. 
  
Counsel for the company based its argument on the fact that as a rule manslaughter is a crime 
requiring mens rea and a corporation is not capable of having mens rea.1212 The court came to 
the conclusion that in terms of section 31 of the Offences against the Person Act1213 a 
                                                          
1206 Whyte (note 35) 4, 7. 
1207 R v Cory Bros & Co Ltd (note 275). 
1208 Ibid. 
1209 The charges were manslaughter and “setting up, or causing to be set up, an engine calculated to destroy human 
life or inflict grievous bodily harm, with intent that the same or whereby the same might destroy or inflict grievous 
bodily harm upon a trespasser or other person coming in contact therewith, contrary to s. 31 of the Offences 
against the Person Act, 1861”. (Ibid 810). 
1210 Ibid 817. 
1211 Ibid 810. 
1212 Ibid 811. 
1213 Section 31 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861. 
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corporation was incapable of being charged with an offence “involving personal violence”, and 
ruled that the indictment was invalid.1214  
 
 Finlay J has, however, been severely criticized for this decision, particularly his assessment of 
the law when he made the decision.1215 According to Pinto & Evans Finlay J failed to make a 
sufficient assessment of the law and the number of cases referred to was insufficient.1216 
Moreover, most of the cases he referred to were rather old.1217 Having referred to these cases 
Finlay J acknowledges the fact that the law may need to be changed,1218 however he concludes 
that he is bound by the law as it stands.1219 It is submitted that an opportunity at contributing 
to the development of corporate manslaughter was missed by Finlay, J. As Pinto and Adams 
correctly point out, the judge limited himself tremendously when he examined the law.1220 He 
only looked at authority favouring a single view and although it was clear that the law, as it 
was, was unsatisfactory, the judge chose not to develop it. It is submitted that corporate 
criminal liability is an area which developed under common law and it was up to the courts to 
                                                          
1214 R v Cory Bros & Co Ltd (note 275) 810. 
1215 “Given the major strides taken towards corporate liability in the railway cases, the food and drug cases, and 
the potential opportunity of using Mousell Bros. as the stepping stone, it would not have been inconceivable for 
the corporate charges to be allowed”. (Wells (note 15) 92). 
1216 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 32. 
1217 “His scrutiny of the law was minimal; he referred to only four cases, the most recent of which was decided in 
1891”. (Ibid). The cases referred to by Finlay J were Reg. v. Great North of England Ry. Co (note 164); Reg. v. 
Birmingham and Gloucester Ry. Co (note 93).; Reg. v. Tyler and International Commercial Co. [1891]2 QB 588; 
and Pharmaceutical Society v. London and Provincial Supply Association (1880) 5 App.Cas.857:[1874-80] All 
ER Rep. Ext 136 
1218 “…the common law ought to keep pace with modern developments, and therefore it ought to be decided that 
these authorities are antiquated and that in 1927 they do not apply”. (R v Cory Bros & Co Ltd (note 275) 817). 
1219 He states: “It is always a tempting argument to say that the common law ought to keep pace with modern 
developments, and therefore it ought to be decided that these authorities are antiquated and that in 1927 they do 
not apply. Well, all I can say to that argument is this: it may be that the law ought to be altered; on the other hand 
it may be that these authorities ought still to govern the law, but it is enough for me to say, sitting here, that in my 
opinion I am bound by authorities, which show quite clearly that as the law stands an indictment will not lie 
against a corporation either for a felony or for a misdemeanour of the nature set out in the second count of this 
indictment”. (Ibid 817). 
1220 Pinto and Evans (note 94) 32. 
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make the necessary developments and since he clearly saw the need for reform, he should have 
used the opportunity to bring about the needed reform. 
 
In the event of a death caused by a corporation, the corporation was held responsible if it was 
found that there was negligence on the part of the senior officers of the corporation. This was 
in terms of the identification doctrine which the English law relied on. As stated above, 
according to the identification doctrine, before a corporation can be held criminally liable, the 
individual within the corporation who committed the offence, must be identifiable as the mind 
of the corporation1221 and such individual “must first be shown him or herself guilty”1222 of the 
said crime. It is thus only the acts of the top management that are taken into account.1223 In a 
large corporation, however, it is not easy to single out the senior officers as the persons who 
have committed offences1224 which corporations may be held liable for.1225 Application of the 
identification doctrine has thus made it virtually impossible to prosecute large corporations 
successfully for manslaughter.1226  In this way it hampered the development of corporate 
criminal liability.1227  
 
                                                          
1221 Leigh (note 994) 252. 
1222 Belcher (note 1090) 47. 
1223 C Wells  ‘Manslaughter and Corporate Crime’ (1989) New Law Journal  931. 
1224 It has been stated that the doctrine “prevents a large corporation from being held responsible for 
manslaughter”. (Parsons (note 242) 69). Also Clarkson (note 793) 560, 561. 
1225 As a result “the larger and more diffuse the company structure, the easier it will be for it to avoid liability”. 
(Wells (note 1223) 931). 
1226 “the identification doctrine prevents a large corporation from being held responsible for manslaughter”. 
(Parsons (note 242) 69). Clarkson states that the identification doctrine is more suitable for small enterprises where 
identifying senior people who may be responsible for a crime that has been committed is not problematic 
(Clarkson (note 793) 560). 
1227 “The identification principle was a major obstacle to securing a conviction under the common law offence of 
gross negligence manslaughter, particularly with a company of any size or with any complexity in its management 
structure…The only successful prosecutions against corporate entities for gross negligence were in relation to 
small companies, where there was more likely to be a single person directly and immediately responsible for the 
death and who was senior enough to be regarded as the ‘directing mind and will’ of the company. There were few 
successful prosecutions for gross negligence manslaughter against corporations”. (Ormerod (note 96) 563-564). 
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An example of the identification doctrine being applied successfully is the case of Kite and 
Others. 1228 Also known as the Lyme Bay Tragedy, this case has been cited as the first case 
where a corporation was successfully prosecuted for manslaughter.1229 The corporation 
concerned was a small ‘owner-managed’ corporation which had organized a canoeing 
expedition. The expedition did not go well and it resulted in the death of four students.1230 It 
transpired that the corporation had allegedly failed to maintain the required safety standards 
and the leaders of the expedition were not sufficiently trained to undertake such an expedition, 
especially in open sea.1231 The corporation was found to have been negligent. In addition to 
that its manager was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment1232 for manslaughter by gross 
negligence.1233 
 
Another case in which a small corporation was convicted for manslaughter is R v Jackson 
Transport (Ossett) Ltd.1234 Wells’ assertion that the Kite and the Jackson cases lacked the 
challenge that usually accompanies the prosecution of large corporations,1235 makes it clear 
that the identification theory inhibits the successful prosecution of large corporations.1236 This 
is evident from the unsuccessful prosecutions of several corporations where it was clear that 
they were responsible for people’s deaths, but because of the application of the identification 
doctrine, they escaped liability.1237 Public outcry over those unsuccessful prosecutions of 
                                                          
1228 R v Kite (note 999). 
1229 Clarkson (note 793) 561. 
1230 R v Kite (note 999).  
1231 R v Kite (note 999) 
1232 On appeal the manager’s sentence was reduced to two years’ imprisonment, R v Peter Bayliss Kite [1996] 2 
Cr. App. R. (S.) 295. 
1233 R v Kite (note 999) 
1234 R v Jackson Transport (note 999) 
1235 Wells (note 15)107. 
1236 “Precisely the big corporate names which people may want to blame are those which are most difficult to 
target under the identification rule”. (Ibid 115). 
1237 For instance the Zeebrugge disaster, Hatfield rail disaster and the King’s Cross fires. 
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corporations for deaths led to the enactment of the CMCHA in 2007 which allows for liability 
without reliance on the identification doctrine. 
 
This piece of legislation introduces a new offence known as corporate manslaughter.1238 The 
legislation came into being as a result of various developments, including the 1996 Law 
Commission recommendations for the reform of manslaughter1239 by introducing a new offence 
of corporate killing that was not based on the identification doctrine;1240 which subsequently 
led to the passing of the 2005 Draft Bill on Corporate Manslaughter.1241 The Bill introduced, 
inter alia, a new offence of “corporate killing”, dealing, specifically with deaths caused by the 
recklessness of corporations or by corporations’ lack of respect for human life.1242   
 
Within a relatively short period of time English law has moved from its initial reluctance to 
prosecute corporations responsible for the negligent deaths and serious injuries of people to a 
point where it has clear legislation dealing with corporations that cause the deaths of people. 
The new legislation is indeed a commendable development in English law, but it remains to be 
seen whether it provides solutions to problems created by the application of the identification 
doctrine.  
  
(i) Gross negligence manslaughter 
                                                          
1238 The Act specifically states that it is “an Act to create a new offence that in England, Wales or Northern Ireland 
is to be called corporate manslaughter, and, in Scotland, is to be called corporate homicide”. (CMCHA (note 36). 
1239 Law Commission no. 237 (note 913). 
1240 Belcher (note 1090) 47. 
1241 Draft Bill on Corporate Manslaughter, 2005. 
1242 “…manslaughter can be approached either through an unlawful act or through recklessness”. (Lacey, Wells 
& Meure (note 177) 243).   
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In English law the crime known as involuntary manslaughter may be alleged in the following 
circumstances:  
“(1) where death results from an unlawful act which any reasonable person would recognize 
as likely to expose another to the risk of injury; (2) where death is caused by a reckless act or 
omission; or (3) where death results from criminal negligence in the performance of a duty 
tending to the preservation of life imposed by law or voluntarily undertaken”.1243  
 
There are several decisions which influenced the development of the crime of manslaughter in 
England and Wales. The first case to be taken into account is a case in which an individual was 
charged with gross negligence manslaughter for the death of a patient who died whilst 
undergoing an eye operation.1244 This was the 1994 case of R v Adomako where an anaesthetist 
was charged with gross negligence manslaughter for failure to notice that a ventilator tube to a 
patient had disconnected and caused the patient’s death.1245 The disconnection was for about 
six minutes and the patient then went into cardiac arrest and died.1246 The charge against the 
anaesthetist was involuntary manslaughter. Prior to Adomako “liability for involuntary 
manslaughter was founded on the concept of recklessness”.1247 
 
In his judgment Lord Mackay cites Andrews v DPP as ‘the most authoritative statement’1248 
and goes on to state: 
                                                          
1243 McGrane & Gault (note 251) 166. 
1244 R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171, [1994] 3 All ER 79, 19 BMLR 56. 
1245 Ibid. 
1246 Ibid. 
1247 Pinto & Evans (94) 239. 
1248 R v Adomako (note 1244). 
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In my opinion the ordinary principles of the law of negligence apply to ascertain whether or not 
the defendant has been in breach of a duty of care towards the victim who has died. If such 
breach of duty is established the next question is whether that breach of duty caused the death 
of the victim. If so, the jury must consider whether that breach of duty should be characterized 
as gross negligence and therefore as a crime. This will depend on the seriousness of the breach 
of duty committed by the defendant in all the circumstances in which the defendant was placed 
when it occurred. The jury will have to consider whether the extent to which the defendant’s 
conduct departed from the proper standard of care incumbent upon him, involving as it must 
have done a risk of death to the patient, was such that it should be judged criminal.1249 
 
The importance of the Adomako case lies in the fact that it serves as authority that it was 
possible to prove involuntary manslaughter by means of proving gross negligence.1250 The 
Adomako case laid the foundation for holding corporations liable for involuntary manslaughter 
by proving gross negligence on the part of the corporation. The decision in Adomako is hailed 
as having “made clear that manslaughter is a crime of negligence”.1251 The principle laid down 
in Adomako was followed in subsequent cases where corporations were held liable for 
involuntary manslaughter.  
 
Pinto and Evans do note however that since 1992 there were only 34 prosecutions of 
corporations for gross negligence manslaughter and these resulted in only seven 
convictions.1252 They further state that for a corporation to be liable for gross negligence 
manslaughter there had to be 
                                                          
1249 Ibid.  
1250 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 239. 
1251 Parsons (note 242) 76. 
1252 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 239. 
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 “proof of gross breach of the duty of care by an individual acting as the directing mind of the 
corporation…A duty of care may arise where an officer has expressly procured or authorized 
the particular act resulting in death, but some nexus between the death and the individual 
acting as the direct or controlling mind of the corporation is necessary”. 
 
It is further noted that the identification principle when applied to larger companies is not 
effective. This is an indication that corporate criminal liability, particularly the identification 
doctrine1253 was not as effective as it could have been particularly because even where 
convictions did occur, the said corporations were tiny companies. It is clear at this point already 
that there was a need for the law to be reformed. 
 
(ii) A discussion of some of the disasters that led to the public outcry against the 
ineffectiveness of corporate criminal liability in cases involving negligent deaths at the 
hands of companies. 
(aa) R v P & O European Ferries(Dover) Ltd1254 
This landmark case with regard to the liability of corporations for manslaughter is R v P & O 
European Ferries (Dover) Ltd, 1255 and deals with a disaster which is known as the Zeebrugge 
disaster. The facts of the case, briefly, are that on 6 March 1987 a ferry, the Herald of Free 
Enterprise owned by the corporation, P & O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd had an accident 
which resulted in the loss of life of 187 people.1256 The ferry was a roll-on roll-off care ferry 
                                                          
1253 “Within an organisation there has to be an individual who had direct involvement in the failure that caused 
the death and can be identified as having had involvement. The person who is identified must be a controlling or 
directing mind within the organisation in that they are of sufficient standing to control what happens or direct an 
activity. This would normally mean a director, executive or a person of similar standing”. (Welham (note 1094) 
21). 
1254 R v P & O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd (note 248). 
1255 Ibid. 
1256 Law Commission Report 237 (note 913) para 1.15. 
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and it had just left Zeebrugge, heading to Dover.1257 There was a prosecution, however, it was 
argued that the corporation could not be held liable for manslaughter as corporate manslaughter 
was not part of English law.1258 Furthermore, it was argued, in English law manslaughter could 
only be committed by a natural person killing another natural person.1259 A corporation could 
therefore not be charged with manslaughter.  
 
It was held that the law allows the prosecution of a corporation for manslaughter. Even though 
a corporation could be held liable for manslaughter, the identification doctrine was 
applicable.1260 This meant that for the corporation to be held successfully liable for corporate 
manslaughter, a senior officer, who was liable for the manslaughter, had to be identified.1261 
According to the Law Commission “this decision highlighted the major difficulty that has to 
be overcome before a company can be successfully prosecuted, namely that the relevant acts 
have to be committed by those “identified as the embodiment of the company itself’”.1262 As 
stated above, this was a serious impediment to the prosecutions of corporations for 
manslaughter, particularly the bigger and more complex corporations. The requirement that 
there had to be the identification of a senior officer who bears the guilt for the offence has been 
described as the “controlling officer test” and in the Zeebrugge case the failure to pinpoint a 
controlling officer who is guilty of the offence inevitably meant the collapse of the case against 
the company as the company could not face manslaughter charges without a guilty controlling 
officer having been identified.1263  
                                                          
1257 Ibid. 
1258 R v P & O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd. (note 248). 
1259 Ibid. 
1260 Wells (note 15) 109.  
1261 Ibid.  
1262 Law Commission Report 237 (note 913) para 1.16. 
1263 “This has come to be known as the “controlling officer” test…Such a narrow test has had considerable 




Of relevance is that a judicial enquiry  
“severely criticized P & O European Ferries. The jury at the inquest returned verdicts of 
unlawful killing in 187 cases, and eventually in June 1989 the DPP launched prosecutions 
against the company and seven individuals. But the trial collapsed after Turner J directed the 
jury to acquit the company and five most senior individual defendants”.1264 
 
In its Report the Law commission points out that the decision made above (by Turner J) with 
regard to the Zeebrugge disaster served to highlight “the major difficulty that has to be 
overcome before a company can be successfully  prosecuted, namely that the relevant acts have 
to be committed by those ‘identified as the embodiment of the company itself’”.1265  
 
(bb) King’s Cross fires  
A fire occurred in the underground station of King’s Cross on 18 November 1987 and 31 people 
perished as a result.1266 “No one person was charged with overall responsibility”.1267 An 
investigation into the King’s Cross fires was ordered and the findings were the Department of 
Transport’s Investigation into the King’s Cross Fires by Desmond Fennel OBE QC. In the 
                                                          
of manslaughter, the Crown had to prove that one of its directors was guilty of manslaughter. So it was that when 
the prosecution against the five senior employees collapsed, so the case against the company went too. The fact 
that Stanley and Sabel may have had a case to answer did not affect the position of P & O because, as assistant 
boatswain and chief officer respectively, they were not nearly senior enough to have acted as the company”. (D 
Burles ‘The Criminal Liability of Corporations’ (1991) New Law Journal 609, 610). 
1264 Law Commission Report 237 (note 913) para 1.15. 
1265 Ibid para 1.16. 
1266 Ibid para 1.12. 
1267 Ibid para 1.12. 
261 
 
report it was shown that due to people continuing to smoke in the railway area, particularly on 
the escalators, despite a ban that was in existence.1268 In the report it was stated that  
“Beneath each side of the treads lay the running tracks of the escalator. Those running tracks 
should have been cleaned and lubricated properly. They were not. There was an accumulation 
of grease and detritus (dust, fibre and debris) on the tracks which constituted a seed bed for a 
fire and it was into that bed that the match fell”.1269 It was found that the throwing of a lighted 
cigarette down the escalator led to the ignition of the fire and that the debris, dust and fibre 
that it fell onto was conducive to a fire. The investigation also showed that there were previous 
fires that had been ignited, but these had fortunately not led to any disaster.1270    
 
The investigation showed that even though the alarm was raised the casualties happened 
because the staff member who became aware of the fire failed to inform the station manager 
and/or the line controller.1271 Upon investigation Fennel was of the following view regarding 
the operating staff of the London Underground: “(i) they had not been adequately trained; (ii) 
there was no plan for evacuation of the station; (iii) communications equipment was poor or 
not used; and (iv) there was no supervision”.1272 It was also found that from the time the fire 
started at 19h30 to 19h45 “not one single drop of water had been applied to the fire which 
erupted into the tube lines ticket hall causing horrendous injuries and killing 31 people”.1273 In 
examining the ethos of the London’s Underground’s organization and management, Fennel 
found them to be “fundamentally in error in their approach”.1274 In concluding the report Fennel 
                                                          
1268 This was a ban that was effective from February 1985 after a fire that had occurred at the Oxford Circus 
Station. (D Fennel Department of Transport’s Investigation into the King’s Cross Fires 15 by Desmond Fennel 
OBE QC, 15 http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/documents/DoT_KX1987.pdf (accessed 10 March 2014)). 
1269 Ibid. 
1270 “When the skirting board of the escalator was examined it was clear from the burn marks that fires had started 
on many previous occasions. Happily they had gone out”. (Ibid). 
1271 Ibid 16. 
1272 Ibid 61. 




states that “London Underground and its holding company London Regional Transport, had a 
blind spot – a belief that fires were inevitable coupled with a belief that any fire on a wooden 
escalator, and there had been many, would never develop in a way which would endanger 
passengers. In my view that approach was seriously flawed for it failed to recognize the 
unpredictability of fire, that most unpredictable of all hazards”.1275 Based on the conclusion of 
the investigation, it is clear that blame was attributed to the corporation. Compensation orders 
were made, however, the corporation was not prosecuted based on the findings. 
 
(cc)The Piper Alpha oil rig disaster  
This disaster unfolded in the North Sea.1276 As a result of several explosions and fires that 
rocked the Piper Alpha rig platform on 6 July 1988 a public enquiry / inquest was held and the 
liability for the deaths of the victims was placed on the platform operator.1277 Investigating this 
disaster was rather a challenge though as the physical evidence had been destroyed by the fires 
and as a result it was mainly accounts of witnesses that made the investigation possible.1278 
 
                                                          
1275 Ibid 183. 
1276 “As shifts changed and the night crew aboard Piper Alpha assumed duties for the evening one of the platform’s 
two condensate pumps failed. The crew worked to resolve the issue before platform production was affected. But 
unknown to the night shift, the failure occurred only hours after a critical pressure safety valve had just been 
removed from the other condensate pump system and was temporarily replaced with a hand-tightened blind flange. 
As the night crew turned on the alternate condensate pump system, the blind flange failed under the high pressure, 
resulting in a chain reaction of explosions and failures across the Piper Alpha that killed 167 workers in the world’s 
deadlieast offshore oil industry disaster”. (NASA ‘The case for safety – The North Sea Piper Alpha Disaster’ 
http://nsc.nasa.gov/SFCS/SystemFailureCaseStudy/Details/112. (accessed 25 November  2013)). 
1277 Law Commission Report 237 (note 913) at para 1.13. 
1278 “Subsequent investigation was hindered by a lack of physical evidence; however based on eyewitness 
accounts it was concluded that, most likely, a release of light hydrocarbon (condensate; ie propane butane and 
pentane) when a pump was restarted after maintenance”. (Building Process safety culture: tools to enhance 
process safety performance” Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical 
Engineers https://www.aiche.org/sites/default/files/docs/embedded-pdf/Piper_Alpha-case-history.pdf 
(accessed 25 November 2013). 
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From the inquiry it became clear that management had been aware of the fact that “the 
structural integrity could be lost with 10 – 15 minutes if a fire was fed from a large pressurized 
hydrocarbon inventory”.1279 Moreover at least a year prior to the disaster “company 
management had been cautioned in an engineering report that a large fire from escaping gas 
could pose serious concerns with respect to the safe evacuation of the platform”.1280 As with 
the other disasters that have been discussed above it was clear from the investigation that 
corporation was responsible for the disaster as a result of management’s failure to take heed of 
the warnings given to them. It has been stated that “the report provided critical commentary on 
what was judged as inadequate management and follow-up”.1281 
 
(dd) The Clapham rail disaster 
This disaster occurred on 12 December 1988. Due to ‘a signal breakdown’ there was a collision 
involving three trains during rush-hour. This resulted in 35 deaths and almost 500 injuries.1282 
The disaster was investigated for the Department of Transport by Anthony Hidden QC in a 
report entitled “Investigation into the Clapham Junction Railway Accident”.1283  The 
investigation found that “lax maintenance” led to the disaster.1284 According to the report the 
disaster was directly caused by faulty wiring1285 and that a Mr Hemmingway who had been 
responsible for the wiring was highly regarded by his colleagues, while in actual fact his work 




1282 Welham (note 1094) 39. 
1283 Department of Transport Report November 1989 Investigation into the Clapham Junction Railway Accident 
147. 
1284 Welham (note 1094) 39. 
1285 “The direct cause of the Clapham Junction accident was undoubtedly the wiring errors which were made by 
Mr Hemmingway…”. (Department of Transport Report November 1989 (note 1283) 147). 
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was full of “errors of practice”.1286 The report highlighted British Rail’s negligence in not 
monitoring how the work was being carried out. It is stated that: 
“That he could have continued year after to follow these practices, without discovery, without 
correction and without training, illustrates a deplorable level of monitoring and supervision 
within BR which amounted to a total lack of such vital management actions. Further that 
deplorable monitoring and supervision did not confine itself to Mr Hemmingway’s immediate 
superiors”.1287 
 
This was clearly criticism aimed at British Rail and the manner in which the monitoring and 
supervision of its workers was done. The blame for the disaster was stated as the faulty wiring 
and that was attributed to Mr Hemmingway and British Rail. It was stated that “For Mr 
Hemmingway’s characteristic errors, since they were so and were his normal working practice, 
the blame must clearly be a shared one…It is a collective liability that lies on British Rail”.1288 
In the same report British Rail was criticized by Mr Anthony Hidden QC who stated that 
“concern for safety was permitted to co-exist with working practices which…were positively 
dangerous…the evidence showed the reality of failure to carry that concern through into 
action”.1289  
 
                                                          
1286 Ibid 65. 
1287 Ibid 65. 
1288 Ibid 148. 
1289 Law Commission Report 237 (note 913) at para 1.14. “Had the quality initiative been in place…the major 
weaknesses which allowed circumstances to combine in such a way as to cause the Clapham Junction Accident 
might well have been eradicated. Instructions should have been more clearly drafted. Staff should have been better 
aware of their own responsibilities and those of others, staff should have been trained to work to laid down 
standards, fully and at all times and the quality of the installation work and the testing process should have been 
regularly reviewed”. (Department of Transport Report November 1989 (note 1283) 125). 
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As with the King Cross disaster it is common cause that it is the corporation that was to blame 
for the disaster. However, as this was an inquiry and not a criminal trial, the corporation was 
not held criminally liable for the deaths. 
 
(f) The significance of the failure of prosecutions for the 1987 and 1988 disasters 
These disasters occurred within a short period of time and the total number of lives lost exceeds 
400. Combined with the fact that all those disasters resulted in failed prosecutions, it is not 
surprising that a feeling of loss of confidence in the law dealing with manslaughter caused by 
corporations developed. The fact that it was not possible to punish the responsible corporations 
for the deaths of so many led to a public outcry. This took place via the media and also through 
academic articles by commentators who criticized the system and called for the reform of that 
particular area of the law. 
 
Although it is commendable that there were investigations made into the cause of the disasters, 
it is submitted that this was not enough. These investigations do not amount to prosecutions1290 
although, they made it possible for the public to be aware of the cause of the disasters. In that 
way future disasters of the same nature could be averted, however, the responsible parties 
remained unpunished, hence the public outcry. Wells points out that these investigations were 
not supposed to determine criminal or civil liability.1291 
                                                          
1290 In the Clapham Report it is specifically stated that “An inquiry under the Regulation of Railways Act 1871 is 
not a trial: it is not a test of legal liability whether civil or criminal. Its procedures are not accusatorial: no one is 
put in the dock or made the object of a civil suit for damages. Its procedures are instead inquisitorial, it is an 
investigation with the object of discovering the truth”. (Department of Transport Report November 1989 (note 
1283) 147). 
1291 “Emphasis in the coroners’ directions that the purposes of the inquests was not to determine civil or criminal 
liability was ignored”. (Wells C, Inquests, inquiries and indictments: the official reception of death by disaster 
(1991) Vol 11, Issue Legal Studies 76,76).  
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(g) Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission1292 
This case dealt with a statutory regulatory offence where the court had to determine whether 
the actions of the company’s chief investment officer (Norman Koo Hai) and its senior 
portfolio manager (Norman Ng Wo Sui), who had purposely concealed their unlawful 
actions from the company, could be regarded as the actions of the company. In determining 
whether the company or the individuals concerned should be held criminally liable Lord 
Hoffman referred to the rules of attribution.1293 He went on to explain how the company 
becomes liable for acts 1294 and in holding that these could be regarded as the actions of the 
company Lord Hoffman stated that 
“By applying the usual canons of interpretation, taking into account the language of the 
statutory provision, its content and policy, it is possible for the court to ascertain whose act 
(or knowledge or state of mind) was for this purpose intended to count as the act etc. of the 
company”.1295 
                                                          
1292 Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1995] 2 A.C. 500; [1995] 3 W.L.R. 
413; [1995] 3 All E.R. 918. 
1293 The company's primary rules of attribution together with the general principles of agency, vicarious liability 
and so forth are usually sufficient to enable one to determine its rights and obligations. In exceptional cases, 
however, they will not provide an answer. This will be the case when a rule of law, either expressly or by 
implication, excludes attribution on the basis of the general principles of agency or vicarious liability. (Ibid para 
506 C) 
1294 For example, a rule may be stated in language primarily applicable to a natural person and require some act 
or state of mind on the part of that person "himself", as opposed to his servants or agents. This is generally true of 
rules of the criminal law, which ordinarily impose liability only for the actus reus and mens rea of the defendant 
himself. How is such a rule to be applied to a company?  
One possibility is that the court may come to the conclusion that the rule was not intended to apply to companies 
at all; for example, a law which created an offence for which the only penalty was community service. Another 
possibility is that the court might interpret the law as meaning that it could apply to a company only on the basis 
of its primary rules of attribution, i.e. if the act giving rise to liability was specifically authorised by a resolution 
of the board or a unanimous agreement of the shareholders. But there will be many cases in which neither of these 
solutions is satisfactory; in which the court considers that the law was intended to apply to companies and that, 
although it excludes ordinary vicarious liability, insistence on the primary rules of attribution would in practice 
defeat that intention. In such a case, the court must fashion a special rule of attribution for the particular substantive 
rule. This is always a matter of interpretation: given that it was intended to apply to a company, how was it 
intended to apply? Whose act (or knowledge, or state of mind) was for this purpose intended to count as the act 
etc. of the company? One finds the answer to this question by applying the usual canons of interpretation, taking 
into account the language of the rule (if it is a statute) and its content and policy”. Ibid para 506C. 
1295 Ibid para 507E-F. 
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Accordingly in this case it was made clear that determining whether the actions of a person 
within the corporation should be attributed to the corporation or not is a matter of 
interpretation of the statutory provision in question.1296 This involves interpreting the 
content, policy as well as the purpose of the statutory provision. This clearly is a rejection of 
vicarious liability and a broadening of the identification doctrine and this approach by the 
Privy Council has been hailed as “a more modern, organisational concept of liability”1297 
and as “an innovative, flexible approach”.1298 It has been stated that it is an approach that 
could possibly lead to the number of prosecutions and convictions of companies being 
increased,1299 however, it does have its shortcomings.1300 
 
(h) Attorney General's Reference (No 2 of 1999)1301 
 
This was a referral by the Attorney General to the Court of Appeal to get clarity after the failure 
of a prosecution of a corporation for a rail disaster1302 that had resulted in the loss of seven 
lives. There were two questions that the Attorney General sought clarity on under the Criminal 
Justice Act.1303 One of them was whether a defendant who is not a natural person could be 
                                                          
1296 “Whether the act of a particular individual, even a junior employee, is to be attributed to a corporation is a 
matter of interpretation or construction of the language, content, policy and purpose of the statute under which 
proceedings are brought”. (Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (note 82) 687). 
1297 Wells (note 15) 103. See further discussion of this approach in this chapter at V(c) below. 
1298 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 57.  
1299 (Borg-Jorgensen & van der Linde (note 82) 687). 
1300 “including the difficulty in designating an individual with whom the corporation may be identified for the 
purpose of a particular offence. It has also been argued that it might to some degree have collapsed the distinction 
between the doctrine of identification and vicarious liability, contributing to further uncertainty.  Moreover, this 
approach did not resolve the problems related to the lack of the principle of aggregation as: “one individual has 
to be the company for the relevant purpose since two or more individuals cannot jointly constitute it”. (Borg-
Jorgensen & van der Linde (note 82) 687). 
1301 Attorney General's Reference (No 2 of 1999) Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Lexis UK CD M364, [2000] 
2 Cr App Rep 207; Also reported as  [2000] 3 All ER 182, CA. 
1302 Also known as the Great Western Trains disaster. 
1303 The Criminal Justice Act 1972, section 36. The section is entitled: Reference to Court of Appeal of point of 
law following acquittal on indictment. In terms of sub-section (1)Where a person tried on indictment has been 
acquitted (whether in respect of the whole or part of the indictment) the Attorney General may, if he desires the 
opinion of the Court of Appeal on a point of law which has arisen in the case, refer that point to the court, and the 
court shall, in accordance with this section, consider the point and give their opinion on it. 
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convicted of manslaughter by gross negligence without the guilt of an identified natural person, 
for that crime, being established.1304  
 
The Court of Appeal responded by stating that a corporation could only be held liable for 
manslaughter if there is gross criminal negligence on the part of an identified individual which 
the corporation can be blamed for.1305 The Court of Appeal further pointed out that “at present, 
the identification principle remained the only basis in common law for corporate liability for 
gross negligence manslaughter”.1306 By so doing, the Court of Appeal brought clarity regarding 
the approach to follow when a corporation is to be held criminally liable for the acts of its 
employees, agents etc.: 
“A company’s conviction can only be established on the back of an individual director’s guilt 
(though at least in theory not necessarily a conviction); where a corporation is prosecuted there 
must be evidence proving a director’s guilt”.1307 
It is submitted that it is lamentable that this decision effectively put to a halt the approach of 
Lord Hoffman in the Meridian case and reverted to the strict application of the identification 
doctrine. 
 
(i) The way forward 
According to the then Home Secretary, the Rt Hon Charles Clarke MP corporate criminal 
liability as it existed at the time, particularly with regard to corporate manslaughter was failing 
                                                          
1304 Attorney General's Reference (note 1301). 
1305 Ibid. 
1306 Ibid. 
1307 Wells (note 15) 162. 
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“to reflect the reality of modern corporate life, operates too restrictively and fails to deliver an 
effective sanction”.1308 These sentiments were brought by the fact that the main impediment to 
corporate manslaughter was that before a corporation could be convicted, it was mandatory to 
identify a senior person guilty of gross negligence manslaughter.1309 Something needed to be 
done to ensure that corporations do not continue to escape liability even in instances where it 
is clear that had it not been for negligence on the corporation’s part, deaths would not have 
occurred. 
 
After a long process, the CMCHA came into being in 2007.1310 In the following paragraphs the 
process will be duly outlined and discussed. The process is relevant to this discussion as it 
shows how the idea which eventually led to the introduction of the crime of corporate 
manslaughter evolved and how all stakeholders were granted an opportunity to have a say in 
what would eventually become the Act. It will be seen that through discussions, criticisms and 
recommendations, parliament was able to make changes to the law by introducing the crime of 
corporate manslaughter. 
  
(j) Earlier Recommendations made towards reform 
The first recommendations for the reform of the English law on corporate homicide were made 
by the Law Commission in Working paper 44 of 1972.1311 In 1989 the Draft Criminal Code 
included recommendations on reforming corporate homicide.1312 It was, however, not until 
                                                          
1308 Home Secretary “Foreword  to the Draft for Reform - Corporate Manslaughter”        
www.corporateaccountability.org/dl/manslaughter/reform/billmar2005.pdf   (accessed  25 November 2013). 
1309 Ibid.  
1310 It became operational in April 2008. 
1311 Law Commission Working Paper 44 (note 913). 
1312 Law Commission A Criminal Code for England and Wales, Report No 177, London 1989, Draft Criminal 
Code, clauses 29, 30. 
270 
 
1996 that the Law Commission gave closer attention to the reform of the law on corporate 
homicide. Following the failure of the prosecution for the Zeebrugge disaster the Law 
Commission made recommendations for the extension of the crime of manslaughter.1313  
Clarkson  avers that 
“pressure for reform was reinforced by an increased awareness of the number of people killed 
or injured every year in the workplace where again, in many cases, blame could be laid at the 
door of the company involved. As a result of mounting concern and criticism from academics, 
pressure groups, trade unions and politicians, 34 prosecutions for corporate manslaughter 
have now been brought – but there have only been 7 convictions”.1314 
 
(aa) Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter, 
Report No. 237, London 1996 
Although the Law Commission deals with involuntary manslaughter the focus in this report is 
corporate manslaughter. Reasons advanced for this are (a) the failure of the prosecutions of 
companies for disasters negligently caused by them. Apart from the Zeebrugge disaster, there 
were other disasters1315 that had taken place and none of them had resulted in successful 
prosecutions for manslaughter. Difficulties in prosecuting corporations for manslaughter led to 
general dissatisfaction and public outcry for amendments to be made to the law on corporate 
manslaughter.1316 (b) the high number workplace related deaths, which the Law commission 
                                                          
1313 Law Commission no. 237 (note 913) 
1314 CMV Clarkson ‘Corporate Manslaughter: Yet More Government proposals’ 2005 Criminal Law Review 677, 
677.  
1315 “The Piper Alpha oil rig explosion, the Clapham rail disaster, the King’s Cross fire, the sinking of the 
Marchioness” ( Ashworth  (note 246) 117). In the Law Commission’s Report specific reference is made to the 
King’s cross fire which claimed 31 lives, the Piper Alpha explosion which claimed 167 lives, the Clapham rail 
disaster which claimed 35 deaths and the Zeebrugge disaster which claimed 187 lives, Law Commission Report 
no. 237 (note 913) at para 1.12 – 1.15. 
1316 C. Wells “A New Offence of Corporate Killing - the English Law Commission's Proposals” (1999) Criminal 
Responsibility of Legal and Collective Entities., Freiburg i. B.: Max-Planck-Institut für Ausländisches und 
Internationaler Strafrecht 119. 
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was of the view that they were preventable. (c) the very low level of prosecutions of 
corporations for manslaughter and the even lower level of successful prosecution.1317 
 
In the part of the report entitled “the scope and structure of this report” it is specifically stated 
that the report relates to the criminal liability where deaths or serious injuries have been caused 
without intention.1318 The report further clarifies the type of manslaughter that is dealt with. 
This is involuntary manslaughter, which is described in the report as the type of manslaughter 
that includes “cases where there was no intention to kill or cause serious injury, but where the 
law considers that the person who caused death was blameworthy in some other way”.1319 The 
Law Commission then differentiates between the two types of involuntary manslaughter, 
namely, “unlawful act manslaughter”1320 and gross negligence manslaughter”.1321 After 
discussing the two types of involuntary manslaughter the Law Commission examines their 
respective problems. In the latter part of the report the Law Commission makes a 
recommendation for the reform of the law on involuntary manslaughter. With regard to 
corporations the recommended reform is through the creation of a new offence of corporate 
killing by gross carelessness.1322 
                                                          
1317 Clarkson states that “the reason for this paucity of prosecutions and convictions has been well documented: 
under the identification doctrine it is necessary to find an individual in the company who committed the crime and 
who is senior enough to be regarded as part of the “directing mind” of the company; his/her actions can then be 
attributed to the company. In large modern companies with complex organisational structures, decision-making 
is usually buried at various levels making it almost impossible to pinpoint any one individual of sufficient seniority 
for the company to be identified with his/her actions. As a result, when a prosecution is brought it tends not to be 
corporate manslaughter but rather for an offence under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 where a 
company can be convicted on the basis of vicarious liability without resort to the identification doctrine”. 
(Clarkson (note 1314) 678). 
1318 Law Commission Report no. 237 (note 913) para 1.1. 
1319 Ibid para 1.3. 
1320 The Law Commission describes “unlawful act manslaughter as the one which “arises where the person who 
causes death was engaged in a criminal act which carried with it a risk of causing some, perhaps alight , injury to 
another person”. (Ibid para 1.4). 
1321 The Law Commission explains that defining this type of manslaughter is not an easy task, however “the 
offence is committed by those who cause death through extreme carelessness”. (Ibid.) 




This offence would be applicable where the conduct of the corporation in causing the death of 
a person “falls far below what could reasonably be expected”.1323 Corporate killing would be a 
crime that a company could be found guilty of without reliance on the identification 
doctrine.1324 Corporate killing would rather be based on “management failure”.1325 That means 
that  
“For the purposes of the corporate offence, a death should be regarded as having been caused 
by the conduct of a corporation if it is caused by a failure, in the way in which the corporation’s 
activities are managed or organized, to ensure the health and safety of persons employed in 
or affected by those activities”.1326 
 
Pinto and Evans explain that “the concept of ‘management failure’ would obviate the need to 
prove the requisite fault of an individual identified as the directing mind of the company”.1327 
The Law Commission further makes a recommendation that when it comes to the corporate 
offence, “it should be possible for a management failure on the part of a corporation to be a 
cause of a person’s death even if the immediate cause is the act or omission of an 
individual”.1328 
                                                          
1323 Ibid. 
1324 Belcher (note 1090) 47. 
1325 Ibid. In the report the Law Commission explains that its “proposed concept of “management failure” is an 
attempt to define what, for the purposes of a corporate counterpart to the individual offence of killing by gross 
carelessness, can fairly be regarded as unacceptably dangerous conduct by a corporation. But it must of course be 
proved, as in the individual offence, that the defendant’s conduct (which, in the present context, means the 
management failure) caused the death”. (Law Commission Report no. 237 (note 913) para 8.36). 
1326 Ibid para 8.35. 
1327 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 241. They further state that “management failure which was a cause of death, would 
be sufficient for corporate liability to be established even if the immediate cause was the act or omission of an 
individual”. (Ibid). 




The Law Commission specifies that all corporations, regardless of how they are incorporated 
should fall under the ambit of the proposed new offence of corporate killing. This would widen 
the scope to include all sorts of entities, with the exception of a corporation sole.1329 A 
corporation sole refers to a single person who is given certain rights to act in a special legal 
capacity, for instance archbishops.1330 The Law Commission further describes the corporation 
sole as “a legal device for differentiating between an office-holder’s personal capacity and her 
capacity qua holder of that office for the time being”.1331 
 
According to Wells the Law Commission’s recommendation was the first time that the Law 
Commission showed some kind of commitment to holding corporations criminally liable for 
the crimes they commit.1332  
 
The two main obstacles in holding a corporation liable for manslaughter were identified as the 
identification doctrine’s requirement that a senior individual who had acted with gross 
negligence had to be pinpointed and the fact that there was no clarity regarding causation. 1333  
In its report the Commission made an attempt at providing ways to address these obstacles.1334  
                                                          
1329 Ibid para 8.53. 
1330 Ibid. 
1331 Ibid. 
1332 Wells (note 1316) 119. 
1333 Parsons (note 242) 78-79. 
1334 “The Report sought to overcome the problem of the identification principle by introducing a tailor-made test 
of corporate liability based on management failure”. (Wells (note 1316) 123. In the report the Law commission 
states that they “have decided to devote special attention to corporate liability for manslaughter, for three reasons. 
First… a number of recent cases have evoked demands for the use of the law of manslaughter following public 
disasters, and there appears to be a widespread feeling among the public that in such cases it would be wrong if 
the criminal law placed all the blame on junior employees who may be held individually responsible, and did not 
also fix responsibility in appropriate cases on their employers, who are operating and profiting from, the service 
they provide to the public, and may be at least as culpable. Second, we are conscious of the large number of people 
who die in factory and building site accidents and disasters each year: many of those deaths could and should have 
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The Commission’s recommendation of a new offence of “corporate killing” was a response the 
public’s general dissatisfaction1335 with the way previous disasters had been handled.1336 
 
In terms of the Law Commission’s recommendation the common-law crime of manslaughter 
was to be replaced by 3 offences: 
- reckless killing 
- killing by gross carelessness 
- corporate killing 
The first two crimes could be committed by individuals, however corporations could also be 
held liable for them, based on the identification doctrine. With regard to the latter offence of 
corporate killing, corporations were the only persons who would be able to commit such an 
offence. 
 
The commission’s aim was to overcome the identification doctrine,1337 which, as already stated, 
was hampering the development of corporate criminal liability by making it extremely difficult 
to prosecute corporations (especially the large corporate entities) for crimes. 
 
                                                          
been prevented. Third, there appear to have been only four prosecutions of a corporation for manslaughter in the 
history of English law, and only the last of these cases resulted in a conviction; significantly, this was a “one man 
company””. (Law Commission Report no. 237 (note 913)).   
1335 “This is a reflection of changing attitudes to safety and risk, and to differing perceptions of transport and other 
disasters, which have led to the now familiar history of calls for corporations to be prosecuted for manslaughter. 
The present proposals testify to the contemporary social and symbolic importance of corporate accountability…”. 
(Wells (note 1316) 119). 
1336 Ibid 122. 
1337 “the Report sought to overcome the problems of the identification principle by introducing a tailor-made test 
of corporate liability based on ‘management failure’”.  (Wells (note 1316) 123). 
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 In terms of Clause 4 of the Draft Involuntary Homicide Bill: 
“(l) A corporation would be guilty of corporate killing if  
(a) management failure by the corporation is the cause or one of the causes of a person's death; 
and 
(b) that failure constitutes conduct falling far below what can reasonably be expected of the 
corporation in the circumstances. 
 
(2) (a) There is a management failure by the company if the way in which its activities are 
managed or organised fails to ensure the health and safety of persons employed in or affected 
by those activities. 
(b) Such failure may be regarded as a cause of a person's death notwithstanding that the 
immediate cause is the act or omission of an individual”.1338 
 
Wells make four important criticisms of the Law Commission’s Report. The first is with regard 
to the definition of management failure, which is not clarified in the report. She further reckons 
that the creation of a separate offence specifically for corporations may result in even more 
marginalisation of corporate killing rather than less.1339 She then urges that more attention be 
given to the issue of the ‘individual liability of directors and senior managers’.1340 Finally, she 
points out the Commission’s failure to deal with cases where the wrongful acts of corporations 
do not result in death but rather in serious injury.1341 The Law Commission’s recommendations 
                                                          
1338 Ibid 123. 
1339 Ibid. 
1340 Ibid. Mainly due to the fact that “the Law commission proposed that the offence would be capable of 
commission by any corporation…but it should not be capable of commission by an individual, even as a secondary 
party”. (Pinto & Evans (note 94) 242). 
1341 Wells (note 1316) 123. 
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were, however, not followed up1342 and it was only in 2000 that the government made moves 
towards the implementation of the recommendations.1343 
 
(bb) Reforming the law on involuntary manslaughter: the Government’s Proposals, 2000. 
Between the 1996 recommendation by the Law Commission of an offence of corporate killing 
and 2000, there was no movement by the government towards the implementation of the 
recommendation. It has in fact been stated that the recommendations were shelved and it was 
only in 2000 that government removed them from the shelf.1344 In Attorney General’s reference 
the Court of Appeal made it clear that with regard to common law offences, the applicable law 
is still the identification doctrine.1345 These offences include manslaughter.1346 
 
During that same year, yet another disaster caused by corporate behavior befell the country. 
This was the Hatfield Railway disaster, which, once more drew the public’s attention to the 
criminal liability of corporations for negligent deaths of people. The public outcry that followed 
the Hatfield crash led to the government’s taking up of the Law Commission’s 
recommendations.  
 
The Home Office published a consultation paper entitled Reforming the law on Involuntary 
Manslaughter: the Government’s Proposals, 2000. In the consultation paper the government 
                                                          
1342 “The Government’s response to the Law Commission’s Report No. 237 was generally positive, but hardly 
prompt”. (Pinto & Evans (94) 242). 
1343 Belcher (note 1090) 47. 
1344 Ibid. 
1345 Attorney General’s Reference (note 1301). 
1346 Parsons (note 242) 69. 
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proposed reform to the law of manslaughter as it applied to individuals and to corporations. A 
proposal was made for the introduction of a new offence of corporate killing.1347 Corporate 
killing would be committed where the death of a person was caused by “management failure” 
in a company or by the corporation’s conduct having fallen “far below what could reasonably 
be expected”. The proposal defined management failure as “failure in the way in which an 
organization managed or organized its activities to ensure the health and safety of employees 
or those affected by its activities”.1348  
 
Comments on the proposals were requested from the public. Generally the response to the 
proposals was positive and there was a general consensus that reform in this area of the law 
was necessary.1349 102 responses were received and the majority were in favour of reform.1350 
Twenty of the respondents totally rejected the proposal as they felt that the Health and Safety 
regulations were sufficient.1351 In addition to that the responses showed that the public required 
some of the wording used in the proposal to be clearly defined.1352 These include phrases such 
as “falling far below” and “management failure”.1353 
 
(ii) The draft Corporate Manslaughter bill1354 
                                                          
1347 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 242. 
1348 Reforming the Law on Involuntary Manslaughter: the Government’s Proposals, 2000. 
1349 Corporate Manslaughter: A Summary of Responses to the Home Office’s Consultation in 2000 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons-2005-corporate-manslaughter/2000-cons-summary-





1354 Home office, Corporate Manslaughter: The Government’s Draft Bill for Reform Cm6497 
www.corporateaccountability.org/dl/manslaughter/reform/billmar2005.pdf  (accessed 11 March 2014). 
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As a direct result of the Law Commission’s recommendations the Draft Bill on Corporate 
Manslaughter was passed. The Draft Bill which introduced, inter alia, a new offence referred 
to as “corporate manslaughter” was passed on 23 March 2005.1355 The aim of the Draft Bill 
was not only to introduce a new offence which would be more effective, but also to introduce 
a law that would not burden business.1356 This would be achieved by the fact that the new 
offence, instead of imposing a senior official’s guilt on the corporation, would make 
corporations responsible for the manner in which they are run.1357 The Draft bill was a 
“substantial revision” of the proposals made by the law commission in Report 237 and a 
noteworthy point is that it discarded the notion of “management failure”.1358  
 
The corporate manslaughter provision in the Draft Bill does not only refer to corporations, but 
also includes other collective units, hence the term organization is used. The provision 
envisages a situation where it is determined that the death of a person was caused by the gross 
breach of the organization’s duty of care, such organization would be convicted of the new 
offence.1359 The organization owes a duty of care where it is an employer, a supplier of goods 
or services or where it occupies a building. The extent of the breach of the health and safety 
regulation concerned would be measured in accordance with ‘statutory criteria’ and the 
knowledge of the senior individuals. All corporations, including government departments 
would be capable of committing the new offence.1360 The punishment would be an unlimited 
                                                          
1355 Ibid. 
1356 Foreword  to the Draft for Reform (note 1308). 
1357 Corporate Manslaughter Draft Bill, Explanatory Notes no. 6. 
www.corporateaccountability.org/dl/manslaughter/reform/billmar2005.pdf  (accessed 11 March 2014. 
1358 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 242. 




fine, although the court will be able to grant remedial orders as well and the court having 
jurisdiction over such offences would be the Crown Court.  
 
An interesting observation is that the offence is specifically directed at organizations and not 
at individuals within the organizations. Moreover, it was envisaged that if the Bill is passed as 
legislation, corporations would no longer be charged with the common law offence of 
manslaughter.1361  
 
(aa) The Government’s Reply to the first joint report on the draft Corporate 
Manslaughter bill from the Home Affairs and Work and Pensions committees1362  
In this section some of the concerns that were raised and how they were addressed will be 
briefly discussed.  This discussion puts the provisions of the Act into perspective, as we gather 
insight as to the rationale behind some of the words and phrases used in the Act.  A concern 
had been raised regarding the government’s slow response to calls for reform in corporate 
criminal liability.1363 The government was then urged to attend to the introduction of the Bill 
as a matter of urgency. The government gave assurance of its commitment to reforming the 
law timeously.1364 
 
                                                          
1361 In terms of clause 13 of the Draft Bill “The common law offence of manslaughter by gross negligence is 
abolished in its application to corporations”. (Ibid clause 13). 
1362 The Government’s Reply to the first joint report on the Draft Corporate Manslaughter Bill from the Home 
Affairs and Work and Pensions Committees Session 2005-06 HC 540 (2006) 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons-2005-corporate-manslaughter/government-
response.pdf?view=binary (accessed 11 March 2014). 




 Reference to the new offence as ‘corporate manslaughter’ as opposed to ‘corporate killing’ 
was welcomed. A point of concern was, however, raised that the government had not taken 
into consideration large corporations that are unincorporated, such as partnerships and huge 
law firms.1365 In terms of the Draft Bill corporations would be prosecuted for corporate 
manslaughter, while natural persons and unincorporated entities would be prosecuted for 
common-law manslaughter. As part of the response, statistics regarding the prosecution of 
large unincorporated corporations were requested.1366 The government responded by providing 
the statistics and by stating that such prosecutions do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Health 
and Safety Executives, but rather, under local authorities.1367 Government further stated that it 
would look into how to deal with this to ensure that there is no gap.1368 The government also 
mentioned the fact that it would consider “extending the application of the offence to some 
types of unincorporated body”.1369 The comprehensive list of organizations that would fall 
under the ambit of the Act was welcomed and a suggestion to extend the list further, as this 
would result in certainty, was made.1370 It was also suggested that police forces should be 
included.1371 
 
The fact that the government did not want the offence to be limited to the deaths of workers 
was welcomed.1372 It was recommended that even where serious injury is caused, organizations 
should be held liable in a similar manner, however, to avoid losing focus of the Manslaughter 
                                                          





1370 Ibid 5. 
1371 Ibid. 
1372 Ibid 7. 
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Act, the government should consider introducing a new offence of ‘corporate grievous bodily 
harm’.1373 
 
A recommendation that the government remove the term ‘duty of care’ and revert to the 
original proposal of the Law commission that as long as there was a management failure on the 
part of an organization which results in the death of an employee or any other person the 
organization should be held liable, was made.1374 Moreover, it was recommended that in 
assessing gross management failure an important factor to be considered should be whether the 
organization has failed to comply with the provisions of ‘any relevant health and safety 
legislation’.1375 
 
The proposal that where gross management failure of a subsidiary company causes death, the 
parent company should also be prosecuted was welcomed. A concern was raised that under the 
then existing law it was not possible to prosecute parent companies due to the lack of a ruling 
that such companies have a duty of care as far as the activities of their subsidiary companies 
are concerned.1376 
 
A recommendation that the government ensures that the bill includes that in the event where 
the gross management failure of an employment agency or main contractor is responsible for 
                                                          
1373 Ibid. 
1374 Ibid 9. 
1375 Ibid. 
1376 Ibid 11. 
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the death of an agency worker or a person in a subcontracting company, such employment 
agency or main contractor should be held liable jointly or individually.1377 
 
Criticism had been leveled at the senior management test.1378 It was stated that it may lead 
organizations to lessening their attention to health and safety.1379 Fear that a can of worms 
might be opened on the issue of who is to be regarded as senior manager or not, was also 
expressed.1380 The term senior manager was criticized in that it may lead to the unwillingness 
of unpaid volunteers to act in such positions.1381 A recommendation was made for government 
to reconsider the senior management test.1382 It was further recommended that the test ought to 
be based on management failure rather than on individual culpability at a particular level of the 
organization.1383 
 
In response the government reiterated the fact that focus is not only on senior people in the 
organization, but that it is mainly on failures in the manner in which the activities of the 
organization are managed or organized.1384 The government further explains that nevertheless 
there is still a need to include the senior manager test as it would not be proper to hold a 
corporation liable where culpability lay at a ‘relatively junior level’.1385 Moreover, the 
                                                          
1377 Ibid 12. 










government states that ‘senior management test’ has been widely misconstrued.1386 The 
government did, however, accept the recommendations of the Committee.1387  
 
It was further stated that the offence fails to address problems that have been experienced in 
the past as a result of the identification doctrine. In fact, the offence was seen by the Committee 
as a broadening of the identification doctrine. This was regarded as a major weakness of the 
Draft Bill. The government was urged to find an offence that would be suitable for all sizes of 
organizations. 
 
(bb) Shortcomings of the Draft Bill  
Criticisms levelled against the Draft Bill include the fact that it fails to provide a solution to 
problems that are found in cases where a corporation is prosecuted for manslaughter.1388 
Another criticism is the fact that the new offence deals only with corporate homicide and does 
not address the other aspects of corporate criminal liability.1389  
 
One of the Draft’s Bill’s main shortcomings is that it refers to senior management, which means 
that where the responsibility lies on a low level employee, the corporation may escape 
liability.1390 Whyte argues that it is “inappropriate to impute liability to the corporation in a 
way that does not recognize clearly that corporate offences are often committed by those further 
                                                          
1386 Ibid. 
1387 Ibid 15. 
1388 “However, the belief that the new test would entirely solve the problems inherent in corporate manslaughter 
cases is misplaced”. (Wells (note 1316) 126). 
1389 Ibid 128. 
1390 Whyte (note 35) 4. 
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down the hierarchy”.1391 It is submitted that this is a valid argument, as some of the prosecutions 
in the past failed directly as a result of the identification doctrine’s failure to take into account 
fault on the part of lower level employees, for liability to be imputed to the corporation. This 
shortcoming has been identified as a possible “unnecessary restriction upon prosecution”.1392 
 
Moreover, it is not clear who the Draft Bill is referring to by the term ‘senior management’. 
Although it is likely that the term refers to directors, the Draft Bill is criticized for not providing 
clarity in this regard.1393 
 
Another shortcoming is the fact that before a corporation can be held liable, there must be some 
form of organizational failure. This requirement has been criticized in that it creates “a route 
to establishing liability that is more restrictive than in any of the previous proposals floated by 
the Home Office”.1394 
 
The Draft Bill requires a “gross breach” before liability can be imputed to the corporation. The 
problem with this requirement is that the requirements for a gross breach are such that they 
may provide impediments to the successful prosecution of corporations:1395 “In order to 
determine whether or not the conduct in question is gross, a jury is required to consider the 
                                                          
1391 Ibid 5. 
1392 Ibid 4.  
1393 Ibid 5. 
1394 Ibid 4. 
1395 Ibid 5. 
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seriousness of the failure to comply with relevant legislation and to consider what the senior 
manager knew about or ought to have known about the failure to comply”.1396 
 The jury is also required to establish whether senior managers “sought to cause the 
organization to profit from that failure”.1397 This requirement has been identified as a possible 
bar to the prosecution of corporations as it “introduce(s) a requirement that may be very 
difficult to demonstrate”.1398 
 
Another criticism against the Draft Bill is its reference to the duty of care. As this is a civil law 
duty of care, the Draft Bill is criticized in that it fails to take into account the statutory duties 
that are found in regulatory statutes such as the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act.1399 
 
IV THE CURRENT REGULATION OF CORPORATE HOMICIDE IN ENGLAND 
(a) The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 
On 26 July 2007 the CMCHA was passed, bringing into being a new offence of corporate 
manslaughter.1400 The Act became operational on 6 April 2008.1401 In terms of the Act the 
common law offence of manslaughter by gross negligence, with regard to corporations and 
other entities that are subject to the Act, is abolished.1402 The wording of the Act makes it clear 
that the common law offence of manslaughter by gross negligence is abolished where death 
                                                          
1396 Ibid 5. 
1397 Ibid. 
1398 Ibid. 
1399 Ibid 6. 
1400 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 242. 
1401 Ibid. 
1402 The CMCHA (note 36) section 20 states : “The common law offence of manslaughter by gross negligence is 




has been caused by an organization, including a corporation. However, where it is a natural 
person who has caused the death of another, the common law offence of manslaughter by gross 
negligence continues to be applicable.1403 This means that with regard to natural persons, the 
common law offence of manslaughter by gross negligence is not affected by the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act. 1404 
 
(i) The offence of corporate manslaughter / corporate homicide 
As stated above, the Act abolishes the common law offence of manslaughter by gross 
negligence1405 in relation to corporations and introduces a new statutory offence of corporate 
manslaughter. In terms of the new statutory offence, a corporation is presumed guilty of 
corporate manslaughter if (a) “it owes a duty to take reasonable care for a person’s safety”1406 
and  (b) its activities are managed or organized ‘by its senior management” in such a manner 
that it amounts “to a gross breach of a relevant duty owed by the organization to the 
deceased”1407 and (c) causes the death of a deceased. 
 
Elements that would need to be proven are that (a) the manner in which the activities are 
managed or organized (b) caused death and (c) amount to a gross breach of a relevant duty 
owed to the deceased by the organization.1408 It is thus important to establish how activities are 
                                                          
1403 R Matthews Blackstone’s Guide to the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (2008) 1. 
1404 See section 20. “Individuals will continue to be subject to the common law offence of gross negligence 
manslaughter”. (Ibid). 
1405 The CMCHA (note 36) section 20). 
1406 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 225. 
1407 Section 1. “The test for liability in the Act is focused on the way that an organization’s activities were managed 
or organized, which must be the cause of a person’s death and found the ‘gross’ breach of a relevant duty of care 
owed in negligence”. Matthews  (note 1403) 1. 
1408 “In summary, the offence is committed where an organisation owes a duty to take reasonable care for a 
person’s safety and the way in which activities of the organisation have been managed or organised amounts to a 
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managed or organized by its senior management and since the act also refers to a relevant duty, 
it must be established that the corporation owed a duty to the deceased.1409  
In essence, instead of a corporation being held liable due to the fact that a senior individual 
within the corporation is guilty of the offence causing the death, the corporation itself will be 
guilty if its activities are managed in a grossly negligent manner.1410 Gobert points out that the 
effect of this is an implicit recognition of aggregated fault, in spite of the courts’ rejection of 
the principle of aggregation.1411 It is submitted that Gobert’s observation is correct as the 
wording of the CMCHA does indeed allow for the aggregation of the fault of several 
individuals. 
 
(ii) The relevant duty of care 
The Act further explains the meaning of “relevant duty of care”.1412 With regard to incorporated 
and unincorporated entities, the Act specifies the meaning of ‘relevant duty of care’. It states 
that it refers to circumstances where in terms of the law of negligence, the organisation 
concerned would owe a duty.1413 This includes situations where the organization as an 
                                                          
gross breach of that duty and causes the person’s death. How the activities were managed or organised by senior 
management must be a substantial element of the gross breach”. (Pinto & Evans (note 94) 243). 
1409 “The offence can only be committed if the organisation owed the deceased a relevant duty of care”. (Ibid 245). 
1410 “Rather than being contingent on the guilt of one or more individuals-, liability for the new offence depends 
on a finding of gross negligence in the way in which the activities of the organisation are run”.   (Ibid 242 -243). 
1411  J Gobert “Country Report: UK” in J Gobert and A Pascal (eds) European Developments in Corporate 
Criminal Liability (2011) 315, 318-319. 
1412 The relevant duty of care is referred to in section 2(1) which states that:  
“A relevant duty of care in relation to an organization means any of the following duties owed by it under the law 
of negligence –  
(a) a duty owed to its employees or to other persons working for the organization or performing services for it; 
(b) a duty owed as occupier of premises; 
(c) a duty owed in connection with – 
(i)  the supply by the organization of goods or services (whether for consideration or not), 
(ii)  the carrying on by the organization of any construction or maintenance operations, 
(iii)  the carrying on by the organization of any other activity on a commercial basis, or 
(iv)  the use or keeping by the organization of any plant, vehicle or other thing; 
(d) A duty owed to a person who, by reason of being a person within subsection (2) is someone whose safety the 
organization is responsible”. 
1413 The CMCHA (note 36) section 2 (1). 
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employer owes a duty to its employees as well as to others who work in the organization or 
perform services for the organization;1414 where the organization is an occupier of premises1415 
and where the organization supplies goods or services,1416 or performs any construction or 
maintenance operations,1417 or carries on any other commercial activity,1418 or where the 
organization uses or keeps any plant, vehicle or other thing.1419 Based on section 2(1) it is clear 
that the legislature tried by all means to include all people who could possibly be harmed by 
corporate activities. It is explained that  
“a duty of care exists for example in respect of the systems of work and equipment 
used by employees, the conditions of worksites and other premises occupied by an 
organisation and in relation to products or services supplied to customers”.1420 
 
In section 2(4) it is made clear that the duty referred to is a duty under the law of negligence1421  
and that the question as to whether one is owed the relevant duty by the organization or not, is 
to be decided by the judge. This means that the CMCHA is not bringing about new duties as 
the offence is based on duties already existing under the law of negligence. 1422 Moreover, as 
will be seen below, the CMCHA is worded in such a way that a corporation or organization 
may owe several duties with regard to a single operation:1423 “So where a company is engaged 
                                                          
1414 The CMCHA (note 36) section 2 (1) (a). 
1415 Ibid section 2 (1) (b). 
1416 Ibid section 2 (1) (c) (i). 
1417 Ibid section 2 (1) (c) (ii). 
1418 Ibid section 2 (i) (c) (iii). 
1419 Ibid section 2 (1) (c) (iv). 
1420 Ministry of Justice ‘Understanding the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007’ 2. 
1421 “A reference in subsection 1 to a duty owed under the law of negligence includes s reference to a duty that 
would be owed under the law of negligence but for any statutory provision under which liability is imposed in 
place of liability under that law”. (CMCHA (note 36) section 2(4)). 
1422 Ministry of Justice (note 1420) 2. 
1423 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 248. 
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in construction or repair it will owe a duty under that head as well as under the supply of a 
service head and because it is operating commercially”1424. 
 
From the discussion of the duty of care, that follows, it is submitted that defining the duty of 
care in such a way that it encompasses all who may possibly be harmed by activities of 
corporations, is a good thing. By not confining the duty to cover only employees and those who 
are paying for services from these companies, the wording of the Act puts an obligation on 
corporations generally to ensure that all who may possibly be harmed by corporations are 
included. In other words, the legislature acknowledges the fact that corporate harm usually 
goes beyond affecting the corporation’s employees or people who are being rendered services 
by the corporation.  
 
(aa) Duty owed to employees 
The section refers firstly to employees in formal employment by the corporation and the 
relevant duty of care with regard to such employees would entail the duty to ensure that the 
employees work in safe conditions.1425  As with all the other duties in the Act, the duty of care 
owed to employees is not a new duty of care, it is simply referring to the duty of care that 
existed prior to the coming into being of the Act. 1426  
 
                                                          
1424 Ibid. 




In addition to employees, the wording of this subsection widens the net to include people who 
are not in the organization’s formal employment “but whose work it is able to control or direct, 
contractors for example”.1427 The Act provides the definition of employer as follows: 
“an individual who works under a contract of employment or apprenticeship (whether express 
or implied and, if express, whether oral or in writing), and related expressions are to be 
construed accordingly”.1428 
 
By including those who are not employees in the strict sense of the word, the Act makes it 
difficult for an organization to escape liability on the basis that it had no duty towards the 
deceased person. This should be of assistance to the families of the deceased as Pinto and Evans 
point out that it is not an easy task to show whether a contract of employment exists or not.1429 
 
(bb) Duty owed as occupiers of premises 
Section 2(1)(b) refers to the duty owed by the corporations as occupiers of premises. Section 
25 states that the term ‘premises’ includes “land, buildings and movable structures”.  The duty 
of care with regard to premises refers to the “organisation’s responsibilities to ensure, for 
example, that buildings it occupies are kept in a safe condition”.1430  
 
                                                          
1427 Ibid. 
1428 The CMCHA (note 36) section 25. 
1429 “Whether there is a contract of employment is a mixed question of fact and law. The issue is not always an 
easy one to resolve, indeed it has proved ‘elusive’. Under the Act, it is a question of law to be decided by the 




 The duty of ensuring that premises are safe is inclusion of movable structures in the definition 
of premises means that people who are being rendered services by corporations, such as boat 
rides and all other individuals who may find themselves being exposed to harm, as a result of 
activities of corporations are owed a duty of care by the corporation. 
 
(cc) A duty owed in connection with the supply by the organization of goods or services 
(whether for consideration or not) 
This is the duty that organizations which supply goods or services owe to their clients. An 
example is the duty owed to passengers by companies that provide transport.1431 By specifically 
including organisations that supply goods or services, the legislature has made sure that all 
organizations, especially corporations that provide good and services fall under the ambit of 
the Act. In this way, when deaths occur negligently it would be possible to hold organizations 
such as retailers and transport companies criminally liable for those deaths.  
 
(dd) A duty owed in connection with the carrying on by the organization of any 
construction or maintenance operations 
In terms of section 2(7) construction or maintenance operations refers to 
 
(a)  Construction, installation, alteration, extension, improvement, repair, maintenance, decoration, 
cleaning, demolition or dismatling of – 
(i)  any building or structure, 
                                                          
1431 Ibid 230. 
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(ii)  anything else that forms, or is to form, part of the land, or  
(iii)  any plant, vehicle or other thing 
(b)  operations that form an integral part of, or are preparatory to, or are for rendering complete, 
any operation within paragraph (a). 
 
It is submitted that section 2(7) covers a very wide area of corporate activity. This is 
commendable as it is envisaged that organizations will find it difficult to escape liability by 
relying on the absence of a duty of care when it finds itself being accused of the offence of 
corporate manslaughter. 
  
(ee) A duty owed in connection with the carrying on by the organization of any other 
activity on a commercial basis 
This refers to commercial activities other than the ones specifically mentioned in the other 
subsections. It has been stated that this was made part of the section as a way of making sure 
“that activities that are not the supply of goods and services but which are still performed by 
companies and others commercially, such as farming or mining are covered by the offence”.1432 
In this regard Pinto & Evans correctly state that “it is hard to envisage any corporation not 
caught by this provision”.1433 
 
(ff) A duty owed in connection with the use or keeping by the organization of any plant, 
vehicle or other thing 
                                                          
1432 Matthews (note 1403) 62. 
1433 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 248. 
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This refers to a duty that arises as a result of the organization using or keeping anything.1434 It 
is noted that “this extremely wide category is apparently there to sweep up a relevant activity 
undertaken by a public body that falls through the net of supplying goods or services or of any 
duty arising in respect of a commercial activity”.1435 It is clear that the legislature went to 
extreme measures to ensure that all activities of corporations and organisations would be 
covered, so as to ensure that all corporations and organisations are held criminally liable for 
negligent deaths caused as a result of the organisation’s activities. 
 
(gg) A duty owed to a person who, by reason of being a person within subsection (2) is 
someone for whose safety the organization is responsible1436 
The act further refers to a duty which arises as a result of the fact that the organization is 
responsible for that person’s safety. The list in subsection 2 includes, inter alia, detainees in 
courts or police stations, people being transported or held for purposes of prison or immigration 
arrangements as well as detained patients. The duty of care therefore “extends to that owed to 
all persons subject to compulsory detention that is, custody, remand, detention pursuant to 
immigration controls, secure accommodation, being transported under the Mental Health Act 
1983”. 1437 
 
(iii) Determining the existence of the duty of care 
                                                          
1434 Matthews (note 1403) 63. 
1435 Ibid. 
1436 The CMCHA (note 36) section 2(1). 
1437 Matthews (note 1403) 65. 
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In terms of the Act, the question whether there was, indeed, a duty of care or not is a matter 
that must be determined by the judge. Section 2(5) specifically states that  
“For the purposes of this Act, whether a particular organization owes a duty of care to a particular 
individual is a question of law. The judge must make any findings of fact necessary to decide that 
question”.1438 
Section 2(5) simply states that the question whether a duty of care is owed by the organization 
to a particular individual is a question of law, to be determined by a judge. The section, 
however, does not provide further guidance as to how the judge must / should go about doing 
this. This is also noted by Matthews who states that “the corporate offence under the act is 
unique in including an element of the offence to be determined by a judge who will then direct 
the jury of its existence as a matter of law”.1439 
 
It is submitted that making the determination of whether a duty existed or not a question for 
the judge is a good thing as it prevents a situation where the families of victims have to show 
that their loved ones were owed a duty by the corporation. Pinto and Evans point out that the 
burden of proving that an organization owed a duty of care to the deceased is borne by the 
prosecution.1440 This is supported by Matthews, who states that “in the face of the Act’s silence, 
it must be that the prosecution bear the burden of proving the existence of a duty of care, and 
that, in making its findings of fact, the judge will have to be satisfied to the criminal standard, 
so that he is sure”.1441  
 
                                                          
1438 The CMCHA (note 36) section 2(5). 
1439 Matthews (note 1403) 34. 
1440 “It is for the prosecution to prove that the particular organisation owed a duty of care to the deceased”. 
(Pinto & Evans (note 94) 245). 
1441 Matthews (note 1403) 34. 
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This may be difficult to prove, particularly in circumstances where the deceased was neither 
an employee of the corporation nor someone who was being rendered a service by a 
corporation, and for that reason it is a good thing that the family of the victim does not bear the 
burden of proving that he was owed a duty. Matthews observes that the intention is for the 
offence “to apply only in circumstances where an organization owed a duty of care to a 
deceased victim under the law of negligence at common law”.1442  
 
(iv) Gross breach 
This clause does not differ much from the proposal in the Draft Bill. The Act explains what is 
meant by a gross breach. The issue of gross breach only becomes applicable once it has been 
proven by the prosecution that that organization did owe a relevant duty of care to the deceased 
and that the death was caused by the manner in which the organisation’s activities were 
managed or organized.1443 The jury must then decide if there was a gross breach of that duty.1444 
 
A breach is regarded as a gross breach of duty if it “falls far below what can reasonably be 
expected of the organization in the circumstances”.1445 It is submitted that this is a difficult 
yardstick as what one may regard as being “far below” may not be the same as what another 
sees as conduct “far below what can be reasonably expected”. The courts will have to look 
carefully at the circumstances of each particular case and decide whether a gross breach has 
occurred or not. The Act does provide guidance in that in section 8(2) it states that Gobert’s 
submission that instead of asking “what can be reasonably be expected of a company in the 
                                                          
1442 Ibid 31. 
1443 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 232. 
1444 The CMCHA (note 36) section 8(1)(b). 
1445 Ibid section 1(4)(b).  
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circumstances, courts should …be asking what the public has a right to reasonably expect of a 
company in the circumstances”1446 should be taken into consideration. 
 
The legislation provides factors which the jury must take into account when deciding whether 
a gross breach has occurred or not.1447 It states that once it is clear that a relevant duty of care 
was owed to a person by the organization, the jury must make a decision as to whether the duty 
was grossly breached.1448 Factors to be considered by the jury include the question whether 
there was a failure by the organization to comply with any health and safety legislation 
concerning the alleged breach.1449 If there was such failure, the jury must take into account the 
seriousness of that failure1450 as well as the extent of the risk of death that the failure posed.1451 
Additional factors that a jury may consider include attitudes and policies within the 
organization which may have possibly encouraged or led to the tolerance of such failure,1452 as 
well as any health and safety guidance relating to the alleged breach.1453 The Act does not limit 
the factors that the jury may consider. In fact it gives the jury the freedom to take into account 
any other factors which, in its opinion, is relevant.1454 The reference to health and safety 
guidance in section 8 is defined as referring to “any code, guidance, manual or similar 
publication that is concerned with health and safety matters and is made or issued (under a 
statutory provision or otherwise) by an authority responsible for the enforcement of any health 
and safety legislation”.1455 The Act has taken into account the fact that a defendant’s conduct 
                                                          
1446 J Gobert ‘Corporate Killing at Home and Abroad – Reflections on the Government’s Proposal’ (2002) Law 
Quarterly Review 72, 83. 
1447 The CMCHA (note 36) section 8. 
1448 Ibid section 8 (1). 
1449 Ibid section 8 (2).  
1450 Ibid section 8 (2) (a).  
1451 Ibid section 8 (2) (b). 
1452 Ibid section 8 (3) (a). 
1453 Ibid section 8 (3) (b). 
1454 Ibid section 8 (4).  
1455 Ibid section 8 (5). 
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may lead to the defendant being charged with the offence of corporate manslaughter as well as 
the failure to observe some or other health and safety regulation. In such circumstances the Act 
gives the jury the discretion “if the interests of justice so require” to make a ruling on each 
charge.1456  
 
Moreover, where there is a conviction of corporate manslaughter or corporate homicide, the 
convicted organization may also be charged with a health and safety offence based on the same 
circumstances, if it is in the interests of justice to charge such an organization with that 
offence.1457 The Act further explains that in section 19 reference to a health and safety offence 
refers to a statutory offence under any health and safety legislation.1458 
 
(v) Entities that fall within the ambit of the Act 
In English law entities without legal personality1459 were not capable of incurring criminal 
liability.1460 Instead of the entity being held criminally liable, the individual members bore 
personal liability for criminal offences “to which they are parties”.1461 It is submitted that the 
fact that the individual members were held liable only for offences which they actually took 
part in is commendable. This is due to the fact that members of unincorporated bodies need not 
fear facing personal liability for the offences committed by the other members without their 
knowledge. 
                                                          
1456 Ibid section 19 (1). 
1457 Ibid section 19 (2). 
1458 Ibid section 19 (3). 
1459 “A group of people – for example, a club, association, or partnership – does not generally have a legal existence 
separate from it individual members”. (Wells (note 15) 81). 





It is noted that an entity which did not have legal personality could, in the event of a 
prosecution, be treated as if it had legal personality.1462 This is done via legislation which does 
impose criminal liability on unincorporated entities.1463 An example provided by Smith and 
Hogan is that of trade unions and employers’ organizations being guilty of the contravention 
of section 12 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act1464  where they fail to perform 
specific duties imposed by the Act.1465 The Corporate Manslaughter Act addresses this 
shortcoming by specifically including unincorporated entities in Schedule 1 and subjecting 
them to the application of the Act. 
 
Although the legislation is named the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, it 
is not confined only to deaths caused by corporations.1466 It also deals with deaths of persons 
that have been caused by various organizations, including certain government departments,1467 
the police force,1468 partnerships, trade unions and employer’s associations who are also 
employers.1469 Some of the organizations that are included in this legislation could not be 
prosecuted under the common law crime of manslaughter.1470 The wide ambit of the Act is to 
                                                          
1462 An entity “not endowed with corporate status may be treated as legal persons for the purpose of prosecution”. 
(Leigh (note 47) 1511). 
1463 Leigh explains that “in some systems the problem has been resolved by legislation that specifies which 
unincorporated bodies may be so treated”. (Ibid 1511). 
1464 Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974. 
1465 Ormerod (note 96) 154. Leigh also refers to “some offenses involving trade unions”. (Leigh (note 47) 1511). 
1466 The CMCHA (note 36) section 1 (2) (a). 
1467 Ibid Section 1 (2) (b). These are listed in Schedule 1 and include, inter alia, the Crown Prosecution Service, 
Department of Transport; Department of Health; Foreign and Commonwealth Office; Ministry of Defence; 
Northern Ireland Court Services, Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland; Scottish Executives; Serious 
Fraud Office; UK Trade and Investment and the Welsh Assembly Government. 
1468 The CMCHA (note 36) section 1 (2) (c). 
1469 Ibid section 1 (2) (d). 
1470 For instance “government departments and crown bodies , from whom Crown immunity in this respect is 
removed, and partnerships”. (Matthews (note 1403) 1). 
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be commended as it serves as evidence that the question of bearing responsibility for the deaths 
of persons is seen in serious light, regardless who the perpetrator may be.  
 
Section 1(2) makes it clear that the Act is not only concerned with deaths that have been caused 
by corporations. The legislature has made it possible for just about any entity to be held 
criminally liable for deaths it causes. Apart from the corporation, section 1(2) refers to “a 
department or other body listed in schedule 1”; a police force; a partnership, or a trade union 
or employers’ association , that is an employer”. Moreover, in terms of section 21 it is possible 




In terms of section 25 of the Act a corporation sole is excluded from the application of this 
Act.1471 The term corporation refers to “any body corporate wherever incorporated”.1472 
Matthews explains that this would include a situation where a corporation incorporated in a 
foreign country is responsible for corporate activities that have caused death in the United 
Kingdom.1473  
  
(bb) a department or other body listed in schedule 1 
                                                          
1471 This “being a vehicle used to create an office that is held successively by different individuals. Many such 
offices are religious but a number of such corporation sole have been recently created by statute in respect of the 
office of chief constable of various police forces and the commissioner of various public bodies”. (Matthews (note 
1405) 23). 




Schedule 1 provides a list of forty eight government departments and other bodies including: 
Attorney General’s Office; Crown Prosecution Service; Department for Culture, Media and 
Sports; Department for International Development; Department for Transport; Department of 
Health; Forestry Commission; Home Office; Ministry of Defence; National Archives; National 
School of Government; Office for National Statistics; Revenue and Customs Prosecution 
Services. 
 
In terms of section 11 the government departments and bodies as listed in Schedule 1 and 
organizations that are servants or agents of the Crown are not immune to prosecution and will 
be regarded as owing a duty of care in the same way as a corporation that is not an agent or 
servant of the Crown.1474 Whatever is done by the department, even though in law it is regarded 
as being done by the Crown or by the holder of that office, for purposes of section 2 to 7 of the 
Act it shall be regarded as having been done by the department or other body itself.1475 In this 
way where senior management failure amounts to a gross breach of the relevant duty of care 
and has resulted in death that department or body will be prosecuted for corporate 
manslaughter. 
 
(cc) a police force 
This is defined in section 13 of the Act1476 which further allows for the police force “to be 
treated as owing whatever duties of care it would owe if it were a body corporate. Section 13 
                                                          
1474 The CMCHA (note 36) section 11(1) and (2). 
1475 Ibid Section 11(4). 
1476 According to the CMCHA ‘police force’ means: 
(a) A police force within the meaning of – 
(i) The Police Act 1996 (c.16) or 
(ii) The Police (Scotland) Act 1967 (c. 77); 
(b) The Police Service of Northern Ireland; 
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goes further to explain which people should be regarded as employees of the police force. It is 
important to provide clear guidelines in this regard, as the police force will be held liable if it 
is shown that the death was caused by its employee’s gross breach of the duty of care. Attention 
is drawn to the provision of section 13(7), which states that “where, by virtue of section 13 (3), 
a person is treated by the Act as employed by a police force, and by virtue of any other statutory 
provision he is, or is treated as, employed by another organization, then ‘the person is to be 
treated for those purposes as employed by both the force and the other organization”.1477 This 
may sound absurd, as the same person is regarded as being simultaneously employed by the 
police force and by the organization, however, for purposes of possible liability for corporate 
manslaughter it is important for the legislature to spell out this dual employment. 
 
(dd) a partnership or trade union or employers’ association that is an employer 
A partnership is defined in section 25 of the Act and it refers to partnerships within the scope 
of the Partnership Act 1890 as well as limited partnerships registered in terms of the limited 
Partnerships act 1907.1478 The definition further accommodates similar or equivalent entities 
established in jurisdictions other than the United Kingdom.1479  
 
(vi) Senior management  
                                                          
(c) The police Service of Northern Ireland Reserve 
(d) The British Transport Police force 
(e) The Civil Nuclear Constabulary; 
(f) The Ministry of Defence Police (The CMCHA (note 36) section 13(1)). 
1477 Matthews  (note 1403) 27.  
1478 The CMCHA (note 36) section 25. 
1479 Ibid section 25. 
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In terms of section 1(3) of the Act a corporation will be found guilty of the offence of corporate 
manslaughter only if the manner in which the activities of the corporation are managed or 
organized by its senior management is a substantial element in the breach.1480 That means that 
the substantial failure must have been at senior level1481 and senior level refers to “the people 
who make significant decisions about the organization or substantial parts of it. This includes 
both centralized headquarters functions as well as those in operational management roles”.1482  
 
The concept of senior management failure was first seen in the Draft Bill 2005.1483 It has been 
stated that the offence of corporate manslaughter allows for “the aggregation of the actions and 
culpability of several individuals”.1484 Ormerod and Taylor point out that “of course no 
identifiable single individual needs to be proved to have been responsible for the management 
failure and the senior managers’ contribution need be only a substantial element in the breach 
of duty leading to death”.1485 Aggregation is an alternative doctrine that may be relied on as a 
basis of liability. Instead of relying on the guilt of a senior officer for the corporation to be held 
liable, as it is done under the identification doctrine, aggregation as a basis for liability refers 
to “the cumulative effect of a number of different negligent acts by different persons, so as to 
amount, in total, to gross negligence”.1486  Criticism leveled against the concept of senior 
management failure will be discussed below. 
 
                                                          
1480 Ibid section 1(3). 
1481 Ministry of Justice (note 1420) 1. 
1482 Ibid. 
1483 See discussion in this chapter at IIII (h) (iii) on the Draft Bill above. 
1484 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 251. See also Gobert (note 1411) 318 – 319. 
1485 D Ormerod and R Taylor “The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007” (2008) 8 The 
Criminal Law Review 589, 591 – 592. 





(vii) Territorial application 
This is dealt with in section 28 of the Act. The territorial application of the Act is limited to 
England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.1487 Section 28 further makes it clear that 
the legislation is concerned with deaths caused by organizations within the United Kingdom. 
It does not concern itself with issues such as where the organization was incorporated  etc. As 
Matthews puts it “neither the location or place of incorporation of the organization nor the 
place where any management failure or breach of a relevant duty occurs affects jurisdiction 
concerning an alleged offence”.1488 
 
(viii) Prescribed punishment 
In terms of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act the punishment that may 
be meted out to a corporation that has been convicted of corporate manslaughter are the fine, a 
remedial order as well as a publicity order. Section 1(6) states that “an organization that is 
guilty of corporate manslaughter or corporate homicide is liable on conviction on indictment 
                                                          
1487  The CMCHA (note 36) Section  28. “Jurisdiction in respect of an offence of corporate manslaughter arises 
solely through and in relation to harm resulting in death that occurs within the territory of the United Kingdom. 
Proceedings for an offence of corporate manslaughter may not be instituted in England and Wales without the 
consent of the Director of Public prosecutions”.  (Matthews (note 1403) 14). 
1488 Ibid. “Section 1 will therefore still apply if the harm resulting in death is sustained as a result of an incident 
involving a British vessel, but the victim is not physical on board when he suffers that harm. It seems it will not 
apply where, for example, a British vessel in international waters ploughs down a small non-British yacht killing 
the passengers”. (Ormerod & Taylor (note 1485) 610). 
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to a fine”.1489 Fines “may be measured in millions of pounds”.1490 This is a reflection of how 
serious corporate manslaughter is perceived to be.1491  
 
The Sentencing Guidelines Council requested the Sentencing Advisory Panel to furnish advice 
with regard to the sentencing of the offence and in November 2007 a consultation paper was 
produced by the Sentencing Advisory Panel.1492 Matthews states that “the paper suggests that 
the primary factor in assessing the seriousness of an offence of corporate manslaughter or of a 
health and Safety at Work Act offence that has resulted in death is the extent to which the 
conduct of the offender fell below the appropriate standard of care”.1493 The aggravating and 
mitigating factors that are found in the consultation paper are as follows: 
 
        Aggravating factors having to do with the level of harm: 
 If the offence has resulted in the death of more than one person.1494 
 Serious injury to one or more person(s), in addition to the deaths.1495 
      Aggravating factors affecting the degree of culpability: 
 Failure to act upon advice, cautions or warning from regulatory authorities1496 
 Failure to heed relevant warnings regarding the safety of employees1497 
 Carrying out operations without an appropriate licence 
                                                          
1489 The CMCHA (note 36) section 1(6). 
1490 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 260.  
1491 “The offence of corporate manslaughter requires gross breach at a senior level”. (Ibid). 
1492 Matthews (note 1403) 119 – 120. 
1493 Ibid 120 
1494 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 258; Matthews (note 1403) 120. 
1495 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 258; Matthews (note 1403) 120. 
1496 Matthews (note 1403) 120 
1497 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 258. 
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 Financial or other inappropriate motive 
 Corporate culture encouraging or producing tolerance of breach of duty 
       Mitigating factor 
 Employee acting outside authority or failing in duties 
        Offender mitigation 
 Ready co-operation with authorities 
 Good safety record1498 
    
In the consultation paper the Panel makes a suggestion that a fine should be imposed so as to: 
  
 To reflect the serious concern at the loss of life 
 To ensure future compliance with safety standards 
 To eliminate financial benefit1499 
 
The consultation paper was succeeded by combined sentencing guidelines for corporate 
manslaughter and health and safety offences causing death.1500 These were published in 2010 
and they provide guidance as to the approach to be taken by courts when sentencing convicted 
corporations.1501  
                                                          
1498 Matthews (note 1403) 120. 
1499 Ibid 121. 
1500 Wells (note 92) 105. 
1501 According to paragraph 37 of the sentencing guidelines  
“The normal approach to sentence should therefore be (in outline): 
(1) consider the questions at paragraph 6; 
(2) identify any particular aggravating or mitigating circumstances (paragraphs 7–11); 
(3) consider the nature, financial organisation and resources of the defendant (paragraphs 12–18); 




The sentencing guidelines provide courts with guidance regarding the approach to be taken 
when sentencing a corporation that has been convicted under the CHCMA. They are meant for 
the offence of corporate manslaughter as well as offences that infringe sections 2 and 3 of the 
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSWA) which are capable of being committed by 
individuals as well the organisation.1502 In the guidelines it is mentioned that there may be 
overlaps and the differences between the two offences are highlighted: It is firstly stated that  
“because corporate manslaughter involves both a gross breach of duty of care and senior 
management failings as a substantial element in that breach, those cases will generally involve 
systemic failures; by contrast health and safety offences are committed whenever the 
defendant cannot show that it was not reasonably practicable to avoid a risk of injury or lack 
of safety; that may mean that the failing is at an operational rather than systemic level and can 
mean in some cases that there has been only a very limited falling below the standard of 
reasonable practicability”.1503 
 
The second difference between the two is that when it comes to corporate manslaughter the 
onus of proof is borne solely by the prosecution. This is in contrast to a health and safety 
prosecution where the prosecutor only bears the onus of proving that “there has been a failure 
to ensure safety or absence of risk”.1504 It is stated that this may simply be done through 
                                                          
(5) consider compensation (but see paragraphs 27–28); 
(6) assess the fine in the light of the foregoing and all the circumstances of the case; 
(7) reduce as appropriate for any plea of guilty; 
(8) consider costs; 
(9) consider publicity order; 
(10) consider remedial order. 
 The effect on the employment of the innocent 
 The effect upon the provision of service to the public”.  (Sentencing Guidelines (note 26) para 37). 
1502 Sentencing guidelines (note 26) para 2 (a). 
1503 Ibid para 4(a). 
1504 Ibid para 4(b). 
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“pointing to the injury”.1505 When the prosecution has done so, the onus then shifts from the 
prosecution to the defendant. Although the prosecution is neither compelled to establish the 
precautions that it alleges the defendant should have taken nor to prove the manner in which 
the accident occurred, this is normally done by the prosecution.1506 The final difference is that 
for the corporate manslaughter cases the prosecution has to prove that “the breach was a 
significant (but not necessarily the only) cause of death”.1507 On the contrary it is possible to 
prove that there was a health and safety offence “without demonstrating that any injury was 
caused by the failure to ensure safety”.1508 
 
The sentencing guidelines further provide step-by-step guidance on how the court should 
approach sentencing.1509 The court is advised to begin by considering the questions at 
paragraph 6 namely: (a) “How foreseeable was serious injury”?1510  In this regard if the serious 
injury was more foreseeable the offence should be considered to be more serious.1511 (b) “How 
far short of the applicable standard did the defendant fall”?1512 In this regard, the court is 
advised to take into account the degree by which the conduct fell short of the applicable 
standard.1513 (c) “How common is this kind of breach in this organisation”?1514 Here the court 
is advised to take into account the ‘frequency’ of non-compliance by that particular 
organisation in order to establish whether the offence was a sporadic event or if it had become 
the norm.1515 If the offence had become the norm this would be point to a “systematic departure 
                                                          
1505 Ibid. 
1506 Ibid. 
1507 Ibid para 4(d) 
1508 It is further stated that “this guideline is for cases where it is proved that the offence was a significant cause 
of death, not simply that death occurred”. (Ibid). 
1509 Ibid para 37. 
1510 Ibid para 6(a). 
1511 Ibid. 
1512 Ibid para 6(b). 
1513 Ibid. 




from good practice across the defendant’s operations”.1516 The other issue that the court is 
advised to take into consideration is (d) “how far up the organisation does the breach go”?1517 
It is stated that the further up in the organisation the breach is, the more serious the offence 
is.1518 
 
It is submitted that taking the above four questions into consideration and obtaining answers 
which are a true reflection of the corporation’s position in each individual case, prior to 
deciding what the sentence should be, will go a long way in enabling the court to make an 
informed decision. This will in turn result in a sentence that is appropriate for that particular 
corporation. 
 
The second step that the court is advised to follow is to establish which factors are aggravating 
and which ones are mitigating. In this regard the court is referred to paragraph 7 to 11 of the 
sentencing guidelines. Paragraph 7 provides a list of factors that will aggravate the offence if 
they are found to exist. It is specified that the list does not include all aggravating factors that 
may be in existence. These factors are as follows: (a) “more than one death, or very grave 
personal injury in addition to death”.1519 This means that serious injury and or death will serve 
to aggravating the offence. At this point it must be pointed out that the serious injury refers to 
the Health and Safety offence, as the CMCHA is only concerned with deaths. The second 
aggravating factor is (b) failure to heed warnings or advice, whether from officials such as the 
Inspectorate, or by employees (especially health and safety representatives) or other persons, 
                                                          
1516 Ibid. 
1517 Ibid para 6(d). 
1518 Ibid. 
1519 Ibid para 7(a). 
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or to respond appropriately to ‘near misses’ arising in similar circumstances.1520 Where 
warnings have been given and these were not taken into account to avert possible deaths, when 
deaths have occurred flowing from the same conditions that the organisation was previously 
warned about, this will serve as an aggravating factor. It is commendable that this is clearly 
stated and it is in a document that all organisations have access to. Prior to the coming into 
being of the CMCHA during investigations that took place, subsequent to some disasters that 
had claimed lives, it transpired that those disasters could have been prevented from happening, 
had previous warnings about dangers that persisted, been taken seriously and given the 
necessary attention.1521 In other cases the corporation was found to have had a close call, but 
instead of using that as a learning curve and ensuring that such conditions are avoided at all 
costs, those near disasters were simply ignored.1522 Evidence that there was failure to heed 
warnings and to take action when there have been near disasters will aggravate the offence. It 
is submitted that this is an important improvement on the previous position as corporations are 
warned in advance, through having access to the sentencing guidelines, to ensure that they heed 
all warnings of imminent danger and take seriously events that point towards potential disaster 
that may lead to loss of life should similar events occur again, (perhaps at a larger scale, 
depending on the circumstance). Averting potential loss of life if there is the opportunity to do 
so is important and failure to do so aggravates the offence. The next aggravating factor is (c) 
“cost-cutting at the expense of safety”.1523 It is submitted that this particular aggravating factor 
is prompted by the fact that since corporations are usually concerned about making and 
retaining finances, there may be a temptation to cut down expenses that need to be incurred to 
ensure safety, thus compromising the safety of people. If it is clear that the defendant 
                                                          
1520 Ibid para 7(b). 
1521 P & O; Piper Alpha etc. 
1522 For instance in the case where there were underground fire on previous occasions, Fennel (note 1270) para 
18. 
1523 Sentencing Guidelines (note 26) para 7(c). 
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deliberately failed to obtain relevant licences or to comply with them this will also be an 
aggravating factor.1524  Where it is “vulnerable persons” who were injured, this would also be 
an aggravating factor.1525 It is explained that “in this context, vulnerable persons would include 
those whose personal circumstances make them susceptible to exploitation”.1526 
 
It is submitted that providing guidance to courts by means of the sentencing guidelines so that 
they approach the sentencing of convicted corporations in a particular manner makes the 
CMCHA more effective. This is due to the fact that courts follow a uniform approach, which 
will lead to more or less similar outcomes in cases having similar facts. In addition to that, the 
organizations have access to factors that will be considered, even before they commit crimes. 
It is yet to be seen whether being privy to what is at stake will not deter corporations from for 
instance cutting costs meant for safety measures as they would be aware of the fact that that 
would be regarded as an aggravating factor.  
 
The CMCHA specifically gives the court that has convicted the corporation the power to make 
remedial orders. This is not a novel idea as this sanction is a possible sanction under the 
HSWA.1527 It must be noted that a remedial order may be made only on application by the 
prosecution specifying the terms of the proposed order.1528 In terms of section 9(5) failure by 
an organization to comply with a remedial order will lead to the organization being guilty of 
an indictable offence. The punishment for that offence is in the form of a fine.  
                                                          
1524 Sentencing Guidelines (note 26) para 7(d) which goes on to state that this will be the case “where the process 
of licensing involves some degree of control, assessment or observation by independent authorities with a health 
and safety responsibility”. 
1525 Paragraph 7(e).  
1526 Ibid. 
1527 HSWA (note 1087) section 42. 




Pinto and Evans commend the sanction in the form of a remedial order in that  
“firstly, it enables sentencing to be a constructive measure aimed at improving the working 
systems of a defendant who has committed a crime; secondly, it allows the court to oversee 
the progress made in compliance with the remedial order, and to enforce it with the sanction 
that non-compliance will lead to the commission of a separate criminal offence with robust 
sentencing powers”.1529 
 
Under the HSWA remedial orders are not often used due to the fact that when sentencing takes 
place, usually efforts to remedy whatever caused the breach are made by then.1530 It has been 
suggested that the same will happen with remedial orders for corporate manslaughter.1531 
The Act also allows the convicting court to make a publicity order.1532 This is an order to make 
public, in a specified manner, the details of the conviction of the organization. An organization 
which has been ordered to make a publicity order is obliged to divulge publicly the following: 
a) The fact that it has been convicted of the offence 
b)  Specified particulars of the offence 
c)  The amount of any fine imposed 
d)  The terms of any remedial order made1533 
 
                                                          
1529 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 262. 
1530 Ibid. 
1531 Ibid. 
1532 The CMCHA (note 36) section 10. 
1533 Ibid section 10(1) (a) – (d). 
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As with the remedial order, if a convicted corporation fails to comply with a publicity order it 
will be found guilty of an indictable offence which can only be punished by means of a fine.1534 
A publicity order is regarded as a deterrent, due to the stigma attached to having a conviction 
becoming public knowledge.1535 Matthews observes that since there is no manner that is 
specified for publicizing the details of the conviction “the section appears to give a sentencing 
judge a very wide power to compel the organization to publicize its conviction in any way”.1536 
 
With regard to the punishment of partnerships, the Act envisages a situation where a 
partnership1537 is regarded in the same way as a corporate body1538 regardless of the fact that it 
lacks legal personality. In accordance with the Act, proceedings ought to be brought in the 
name of the partnership, as opposed to any of the members.1539 Where, upon conviction, a fine 
is imposed on a partnership, the Act states that such fine ought to be paid directly from the 
partnership’s funds / coffers.1540 The Act further makes it clear that in section 14 it is 
specifically referring to those partnerships which are not recognized as having legal personality 
under the laws governing them.1541  The legislator is to be commended for ensuring that entities 
lacking legal personality do not escape liability where a person’s death is caused by the gross 
breach of a relevant duty of care. By insisting on the fine being paid from the funds of the 
partnership, the legislator has also ensured that the partnership itself would feel the punishment 
imposed on it. 
                                                          
1534 Ibid section 10(2). 
1535 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 261. 
1536 Matthews (note 1403) 130. 
1537 The Act defines a partnership as  a partnership within the Partnership Act 1890 (c.39), or (b) a limited 
partnership registered under the Limited Partnerships Act (c.24), or a firm or entity of a similar character formed 
under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, the CMCHA (note 36) section 14 (1). 
1538 “For the purpose of this Act a partnership is to be treated as owing whatever duties of care it would owe if it 
were a body corporate”. (The CMCHA (note 36) section 14 (1)). 
1539 Ibid section 14 (2). 
1540 Ibid section 14 (3).  





The Act includes several exemptions which are specifically aimed at public authorities. In 
terms of section 3(1) “any duty of care owed by a public authority in respect of a decision as 
to matters of public policy (including in particular the allocation of public resources or the 
weighing of competing public interests) is not a ‘relevant duty of care’”.1542 It is explained that 
“the offence does not apply to certain public and government functions whose management 
involve wider questions of public policy and are already subject to other forms of 
accountability”.1543 Examples of functions that are exempt are child protection and the response 
of emergency services.1544 
 
V  CRITICISMS / SHORTFALLS OF THE CORPORATE MANSLAUGHTER AND 
CORPORATE HOMICIDE ACT  
 
The CMCHA is clearly aimed at overcoming the obstacles caused by the identification doctrine 
and it does overcome some of the obstacles caused by the identification doctrine. It has been 
stated that the CMCHA “certainly represents an improvement on the common law position in 
which manslaughter was unlikely to be proved where a death arose from sloppy safety 
procedures and policies in a blameworthy organisation”.1545  Moreover, in terms of the 
CMCHA, the degree of fault that is required in order to hold a corporation liable, is higher than 
what is required for a breach of a health and safety offence and it has been suggested that “the 
                                                          
1542 Ibid section 3(1). 
1543 Ministry of Justice (note 1420) 2. 
1544 Ibid. 
1545 Ormerod & Taylor (note 1485) 611. 
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higher degree of fault required will ensure that the new offence will be targeted at only the 
most serious management failings”.1546  
 
The Act does however, have shortcomings.  It was hoped that the CMCHA would be an 
improvement on the identification doctrine and that the task of identifying an individual whose 
guilt would be regarded as the guilt of the corporation was going to be eliminated.1547  Since 
the offence will occur only if “the way senior management have managed or organized 
activities has played a role in the gross breach”,1548 there is a need to determine who senior 
management is1549 and what senior management failure is. Gobert refers to this as “lingering 
echoes of the ‘identification doctrine’ in that the gross negligence causing the death needs to 
be traceable back to the company’s senior management”.1550 
In terms of section 1(4)(c) of the act the term senior management is defined as  
“the persons who play significant roles in – 
(i)  the making of decisions about how the whole or a substantial part of its activities are 
to be managed or organized or 
(ii)  the actual managing or organizing of the whole or a substantial part of those 
activities”.1551 
 
This is problematic in that it does not solve the major problem of the common law manslaughter 
offence’s requirement to identify a senior individual guilty of the offence and may even result 
                                                          
1546 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 233. 
1547 “The main weakness of the common law offence was the need to prove that an individual ‘directing mind’ of 
the corporation was himself guilty of the offence”. (Ibid). 
1548 Wells (note 15) 104. 
1549 Ibid. 
1550 Gobert (note 1411) 318. 
1551 The CMCHA (note 36) section 1(4) (c). 
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in delays of the prosecution while it is being established who these individuals are within that 
corporation and to what extent their involvement was.1552 As Ormerod and Taylor observe 
“This extends beyond the narrow category of senior individuals being the “directing mind and 
will” who would be caught at common law by the identification doctrine. It is a further 
limiting factor to the offence and one which brings with it the potential for time consuming 
technical arguments on employment law, potentially distracting and delaying the criminal 
trial. The question may be further complicated where the organisation is not incorporated or 
managed in England”.1553 
 
The inclusion of the term senior management raises the question whether this does not 
“reproduce the same old problems by focusing on individuals at particular level as opposed to 
systemic fault”?1554 Pinto and Evans state that by including the issue of ‘senior management’ 
“it can be argued…that the new offence entails little more than a broadening out of the 
identification doctrine to permit aggregation of the conduct of several senior managers”.1555 
Moreover the fact that the involvement of senior managers only needs to be a substantial 
element in the breach of duty that results in the death Ormerod and Taylor point out that the 
“involvement and conduct” of employees who are not in senior managerial positions but still 
play a role in “the management and organization of activities” is also important.1556 They 
further point out that for the offence the “substantial” contribution may be more than one, as in 
                                                          
1552 Ormerod & Taylor (note 1485) 591 – 592. 
1553 Ibid 604. Ormerod and Taylor make further observations regarding the inclusion of ‘senior management’ in 
the Act: “Arguably the test is too restrictive in forcing the inquiry back onto the issue of identifiable individuals 
and the part they play in the organisation as the identification doctrine had done”. (Ibid). 
1554 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 251. 
1555 Ibid 252. “The mechanism by which this new liability is achieved is through the abandonment of the 
identification doctrine as a method of attribution of responsibility to companies and organisations. This is replaced 
with what might be described as a qualified aggregation principle which primarily bases responsibility on the 
activity of the company as an aggregate or composite entity rather than on the separate activities of the senior 
individuals who can be artificially identified with it”. (Ormerod & Taylor (note 1485) 591 – 592. 
1556 Ormerod & Taylor (note 1485) 604. 
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some cases the contribution of the employees who are not in senior managerial positions may 
be substantial. This means that “in other words there can be more than one “substantial” 
contribution to the breach on the basis that substantial does not mean predominant”.1557 This 
raises problems with the  term substantial which will require the courts to provide its 
meaning.1558                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Pinto and Evans as well as Wells raise valid concerns in their criticisms of the issue of ‘senior 
management’ and raise the possibility that the statutory offence may be easier to prove against 
small corporations and more difficult to prove against large corporations, as was the case with 
the common law gross negligence manslaughter.1559 
 
Wells correctly points out that the Act does not solve the difficulties that were inherent under 
the common law system of the identification doctrine. She states that  
“Far from addressing the difficulties in capturing organizational fault, the CMCH Act slips 
between two grammatical uses of the word ‘management’. The term ‘management’ can mean 
either ‘the action or manner of managing’ or ‘the power of managing’, or it could function as 
a collective noun for ‘a governing body’. By requiring the substantial involvement of ‘senior 
management’ and then defining this body as ‘those persons who play significant roles’, the 
act gives the lie to the government’s claimed commitment to an organizational version of fault 
that is not derivative on the actions of specified individuals”.1560 
                                                          
1557 Ibid. 
1558 “No doubt the courts will say that a “substantial” involvement is something that the jury can evaluate as an 
ordinary English word meaning more than trivial. All of this is further complicated by the fact that the senior 
managers, as individuals, must be those who play a ‘significant’ role in decisions about, or management of, the 
“whole or substantial part” of the activities of the organisation, thus bringing in the word “substantial” for as 
second and different purpose”. Ibid 604.                                                                      
1559 “Worryingly, this ingredient will inevitably favour large corporations with highly devolved day-to-day 
operations; proving that the way in which its activities were managed or organised by its senior management was 
a substantial element in the breach may be impossible”. (Pinto & Evans (note 94) 252). 




The move towards a new model of corporate criminal liability which is based on the fault of 
the organization itself, as opposed to the identification of the conduct of specific individuals 
has been made and this has been supported by the government. It is therefore unsatisfactory to 
find that the government’s opportunity to come up with that new model, has not been used. 
Instead semantics have been used in such a way that they may create confusion. 
 
Section 18 of the Act does not allow for individual liability. It states that an individual cannot 
be guilty of aiding, abetting, counseling or procuring the commission of an offence of corporate 
manslaughter and of corporate homicide.1561 This omission to punish directors as well as senior 
managers is a serious shortfall1562 and has, understandably, attracted criticism.1563 Although it 
may be argued that such individuals could still be liable under health and safety regulations,1564 
Clarkson points out that “there is a real danger that even fewer prosecutions would be brought 
against individuals as prosecutors could view companies as easier targets”.1565 
 
Another shortcoming of the Act is that it only deals with situations where death has actually 
occurred. It does not deal with situations where there is a serious injury. As Clarkson states, “it 
is regrettable that a separate new offence covering the causing of serious injury has not been 
                                                          
1561 The CMCHA (note 36) section 18 . 
1562 Gobert criticizes the fact that more emphasis is placed on the corporation than on individual liability. He states 
that “directors who bear responsibility for the strategic decisions within a company may as a result see themselves 
free to choose profits over safety without fear of personal criminal liability”. (Gobert (note 1446) 81). 
1563 Gobert argues that “If deterrence of corporate wrongdoing is the goal, it may be more likely to be achieved 
by holding individual directors personally responsible for the company’s crimes, a sort of reverse application of 
the identification doctrine”. (Ibid 80).  
1564 “If an HSWA offence is committed with the consent, connivance or neglect of an officer of the company, he, 
as well as the company, can be prosecuted”. (Pinto & Evans (note 94) 256). 
1565 Clarkson  (note 1314) 687. 
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introduced”.1566 Ormerod and Taylor also refer to the fact that, unlike the proposal of the Law 
Commission the CMCHA “does not make explicit that the organisation’s liability will not be 
avoided simply because the most immediate cause of death is the act or omission of an 
individual”.1567 They make the observation that failure to include that in the Act will lead to 
arguments during prosecution that causation was broken by the “employee’s free deliberate 
informed act”.1568  It is submitted that this is a loophole in Act and it is indeed likely that 
corporations will try to escape liability by putting the blame on the deceased where death was 
caused by the deceased’s own act or omission.  
 
As far as the penalty for the offence of corporate manslaughter is concerned, there has not been 
much change in the law. The convicted corporation or organization is punishable by means of 
a fine imposed on it.1569 In addition to that the convicting court is allowed to make remedial 
orders as well as publicity orders. Wells states that ‘the purpose of the remedial order under 
which an organization may be ordered to take steps to remedy the breach is unclear”.1570 Wells 
further states that: 
“This is another example of confusing the underlying aims of an offense of corporate 
manslaughter. Rather than minimizing the risk directly, which is the main function of health 
and safety regulation, the aim of this offense is to punish in a retributive sense. It may 
secondarily act as a general deterrent or encouragement to take safety compliance more 
seriously but the time lag between the event and the trial renders the idea of relevant remedial 
action impractical. A manslaughter trial would not in any case, be the most effective forum in 
which to decide on appropriate remedial action. The penalty for failing to comply with any 
                                                          
1566  Ibid 689. 
1567 Ormerod & Taylor (note 1485) 605. 
1568 Ibid. 
1569 The CMCHA (note 36) section 1 (6). 
1570 Wells (note 92) 105. 
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remedial order, a fine, would again only be enforceable against the organization itself. The 
government has rejected the suggestion that company directors should be liable for taking 
specified steps”.1571 
 
It is unfortunate that the legislator did not make improvements in this regard as there are other 
ways of punishing a corporation or organization other than imposing a fine. It is important for 
English law to recognize the fact that the fine is not the only possible sanction.1572  There are 
ways of punishing corporations other than directly through its finances. Wells refers to 
sanctions ranging from “incapacitation in the form of corporate dissolution, corporate 
‘imprisonment’, through to probation, adverse publicity, community service, direct 
compensation orders, and punitive injunctions”.1573  These need to be seriously considered.        
 
(a) Decisions under the CMCHA 
(i) R v Cotswold Geotechnical (Holdings) Ltd1574 
 
This is the first manslaughter case that has gone to trial since the inception of the 
CMCHA.1575 A company was convicted of corporate manslaughter following the death of 
one of its employees. The employee’s work entailed entering into trial pits in order to 
investigate soil conditions. There had been times when employees entered pits as deep as 1.2 
metres, which were not supported, but there was usually another colleague close by, who was 
                                                          
1571 Ibid 105 – 106. 
1572 Wells mentions Canada's probation orders, the U.S.'s corporate imprisonment etc., Wells (note 15) 37. 
1573 Ibid. 
1574 R v Cotswold Geotechnical Holdings Ltd [2011] All ER (D) 100 (May). 
1575 K Napley & J Grimes ‘First corporate manslaughter trial under the new act gets underway: R-V- Cotswold 
Geotechnical (Holdings) Limited Lexology’ http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=764a95c2-e9a4-
408a-93dd-a6e7f2c42766 (accessed 13 March 2014). 
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not in the pit. On the day of the deceased’s death, he entered a pit that was 3.5 metres deep 
with no colleague nearby. The pit collapsed on him causing his death. The company was 
found to have breached its duty as it was “plainly foreseeable that the way the company 
conducted operations could cause serious injury or death”.1576 The fine imposed on the 
company was £385,000 which was payable over a ten year period.1577 An appeal was made 
against the excessive amount of the fine. It was contended that the fine was far beyond the 
means of the company and would in fact result in the liquidation of the company. The appeal 
was dismissed and the company was severely punished for having caused “death as a result 
of a gross breach of duty following a system of work that was unsafe with the potential for 
causing death”.1578 
 
Unfortunately, the corporation that was responsible for the deceased’s death is a small 
corporation, similar to those ones that were successfully prosecuted under the application of 
the identification doctrine. It, therefore, has not given the court much to do in terms of 
application and interpretation of the CMCHA. As Napley puts it, it does “not really test the 
ability of CMCHA to identify corporate responsibility for manslaughter even where a 
corresponding human defendant (“the controlling mind”) cannot be identified”.1579 
 
In this case the identification of a senior individual who was responsible for the death was 
not a relevant factor to be considered before the corporation could be held liable. The issue 
was whether the corporation had breached its duty and when it was found to have breached 
                                                          
1576 R v Cotswold Geotechnical (Holdings) Ltd (note 1574) 100.  
1577 Ibid. 
1578 Ibid. 
1579 Napley and Grimes (note 1575).  
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its duty, the punishment imposed was severe. This is indeed a positive step towards ensuring 
that corporations are effectively held liable for deaths caused by their negligence. The 
harshness of the sanction imposed shows that the English courts take seriously the negligent 
causing of loss of life by corporations. Although the sanction is a fine, it is so high that it is 
equivalent to a death penalty for that particular corporation. The court’s attitude towards 
corporations that negligently cause loss of life is commendable and it is hoped that a message 
will be sent1580 to all corporations that they must exercise their duty of care towards people 
dealing with them.  
 
(ii) R v JMW Farms1581 
This was a 2012 North Ireland case in which a pig farm, JMW Farms was convicted under 
the CMCHA.1582 It was fined 187,500 pounds. The prosecution was for the death of its 
employee, Robert Wilson, who had been hit by a metal bin that had fallen off a forklift truck 
while it was reversing. At the time the deceased had been working on the farm at a meal 
fixing plant. Upon investigation it became clear that the metal bin that had fallen on the 
deceased had not been secured on to the forklift, which was in temporary use at that time as 
the truck that was normally used was undergoing service.1583 The Belfast Telegraph recorded 
                                                          
1580 “The effect of the new act and the decision in Cotswold Geotechnical (Holdings) Ltd means that companies 
will now need to be more realistic and transparent in their assessment procedures and more rigid with the 
implementation of their health and safety policies. The new Act is likely to have a significant impact on 
organisations where jobs are carried out that bear considerable risk. Whilst the Act does not create new duties, 
with the offences continuing to be based on the civil law of negligence, it now enables the Courts to collectively 
look at the actions of senior management as a whole rather than just focusing on the actions of one individual in 
particular. Arguably, this new offence now makes it easier to sanction those who have failed their employees”. 
(K Jones ‘Corporate Manslaughter – R v Cotswold Geotechnical (Holdings) Ltd’ (2011)September 14 PR FIRE 
http://www.prfire.co.uk/solicitors/corporate-manslaughter-r-v-cotswold-geotechnical-holdings-ltd-2001-all-er-d-
100-may-75863.html (accessed 13 November 2013)). 
1581 R v JMW Farms [2012] NICC 17. 
1582 L McKeown  “Huge Fine for First Northern Ireland Company guilty in Corporate Manslaughter Case” Belfast 
Telegraph 15 February 2013 www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/northern-ireland/huge-fine-for-





Judge Tom Burgess as having stated that “yet again the court is faced with an incident where 
common sense would have shown that a simple, reasonable and effective solution would 
have been available to prevent this tragedy”.1584 He was further recorded as having stated 
that he hoped that the imposing such a huge fine would “send a message” to other 
companies.1585  
 
(iii) R v Lion Steel Equipment Limited1586 
The Manchester Crown Court convicted Lion Steel Limited under the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 following the death of Steven Berry who 
sustained fatal injuries after falling “through a fragile roof panel”,1587 while investigating a 
leak on the roof of the factory.1588 The corporation was charged along with its three directors 
but the directors were charged for breach of the HSWA, as it is not possible to hold directors 
liable for corporate manslaughter under the CMCHA.1589 The company pleaded guilty and 
the fine imposed is 480 000 pounds.1590 This is the highest amount that has been imposed on 
a corporation convicted of corporate manslaughter.1591 In passing the sentences the judge 
stated that “the fine had been reduced by 20% in recognition of factors such as the company’s 
guilty plea to corporate manslaughter and its financial position”.1592 The British Safety 
                                                          
1584 Ibid. 
1585 Ibid. 
1586 R v Lion Steel Equipment Ltd (2012) Unreported, Manchester Crown Court, 20 July 2012. 
1587 S Piddington “Third company convicted of corporate manslaughter. Could you be next?” 
http://www.sarahpiddington.com/third-company-convicted-corporate-manslaughter/ accessed 15 February 2014. 
1588 British safety Council “Lion Steel fined 480 000 pounds in third corporate manslaughter case” 
https://www.britsafe.org/news/lion-steel-fined-%C2%A3480000-third-corporate-manslaughter-case (accessed 
15 February 2014). 
1589 “The case is particularly notorious for the fact that not only was the company charged with corporate 
manslaughter but all three of its executive directors found themselves in the dock facing charges of gross 
negligence manslaughter and breach of s. 37 HSWA 1974”. (S Antrobus ‘The Criminal Liability of Directors for 






Council further mentions that “companies convicted of corporate manslaughter are liable to 
unlimited fines, and the Sentencing Guidelines Council has stated a fine should ‘seldom be 
less than 500,000 pounds and may be measured in millions”.1593 
 
(b) Observations from convictions  
One of the main complaints against corporate criminal liability prior to the coming into being 
of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act was the collapse of 
prosecutions, mainly due to the failure to pinpoint senior individuals who were blameworthy. 
Within a few years there are already three successful prosecutions. It may be said that the 
Act has brought an improvement in the way killings caused by corporations are dealt with.  
 
It is noteworthy that in each of the three cases even though the CMCHA provides the courts 
with other forms of punishment, the courts persist on making use of the fine as punishment 
for guilty corporations.1594 Moreover, the amount of the fine imposed is quite high in spite 
of the fact that it is only one person’s life that is involved.  
 
Another, rather surprising, observation is that contrary to the fear and expectation that under 
the CMCHA prosecutors would focus on organisations to the exclusion of directors, it has 
been observed that “the current  trend suggests otherwise as the numbers of prosecutions of 
directors appears to be increasing”.1595 Although it is not possible to prosecute directors for 
corporate manslaughter this has not been problematic as there are other avenues that can be 
                                                          
1593 Ibid. 
1594 This issue will be discussed further in this chapter at VI above. 
1595 Antrobus (note 1589) 309.  
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used for purposes of holding directors liable.1596 Antrobus makes an observation that “the 
inability to charge individuals with liability as secondary parties to corporate killing under 
the CMCHA 2007 may have provoked a more aggressive approach amongst the police and 
CPS”.1597 In practice the corporation is charged for corporate manslaughter alongside the 
directors who face common law gross negligences manslaughter. In this way, the directors 
still face prosecution. It is submitted that it is good that prosecutions against directors 
continue to take place in spite of the Act not allowing prosecutions of directors for corporate 
manslaughter.1598 With regard to organizational fault Antrobus  notes that “the Act’s reliance 
upon such fault being substantially attributable to “senior management” means there will 
always be anxiety on the part of those prosecuting that they need to join one or more of those 
senior managers to the indictment”.1599 This was in fact the case in Lion Steel, discussed 
above.1600 
 
(c) Moving towards another basis of liability  
According to Clarkson “the central debate still rages on: should companies be held criminally 
responsible and, if so, how”?1601 As stated at the beginning of this chapter in England the 
contentious issue is no longer whether corporate criminal liability should exist, so the first 
part of Clarkson’s question is answered in the affirmative. The second part of the question 
reflects what the contentious issue is, and that is what form corporate criminal liability should 
                                                          
1596 “The Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008 sought to address the former concern by providing the courts 
with the ability to impose custodial sentences of up to two years’ imprisonment for employees and directors who 
are convicted of safety offences under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSWA 1974) and its subordinate 
legislation. This expression of Parliamentary intent has been combined with a far greater emphasis upon individual 
accountability in terms of corporate harm, both from the HSE, CPS and industry itself”. (Ibid 309 – 310). 
1597 Ibid 311. 
1598 “Logically the concept of organisational fault in the CMCHA 2007 avoids the need to search for a directing 
mind to put in the dock alongside the corporate entity”. (Ibid). 
1599 Ibid. 
1600 See discussion in this chapter at V (a) (iii) above. 
1601 Clarkson (note 793) 562. 
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take. Having examined vicarious liability, the identification doctrine as well as the form of 
liability brought about by the new crime of corporate manslaughter, the focus is now on 
whether the time has not come for a better approach to criminal liability to be considered, 
particularly when it comes to the negligent deaths of people. These questions were already 
raised prior to the coming into being of the CMCHA and from case law it can be seen that 
the courts did not rigidly adhere to the strict identification doctrine. As Clarkson observes, 
“an alternative device courts have recently started employing to circumvent the rigours of 
the identification doctrine has been that of vicarious liability”.1602 
 
Vicarious liability and the theory of identification reflect two different approaches to corporate 
criminal liability. As stated above, when it comes to holding a corporation vicariously liable, 
the liability is of the corporation is vicarious. This means that the guilt of the officer of the 
corporation remains the guilt of the corporation. The corporation is merely held liable as a 
result of its relationship with the responsible officer. Wells refers to the criticisms levelled 
against vicarious liability. 
 
This approach differs from the identification doctrine, which results in the personal liability of 
the corporation. The guilt of the senior officer of the corporation is imputed to the corporation 
so that the corporation is also personally guilty of the crime. 
 
With regard to vicarious liability Clarkson refers to the two opposing situations where the 
doctrine was allowed to apply to strict liability offences and even beyond and to the second 
                                                          
1602 Ibid 563. 
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situation where the doctrine of vicarious liability was rejected by the House of Lords when it 
came to strict liability.1603  He then concludes that “the position appears to be that whether the 
doctrine of vicarious liability applies or not is a matter of statutory interpretation, taking into 
account the language, content and policy of the law, and whether vicarious liability will assist 
enforcement”.1604 It does appear as though the vicarious liability approach on the rise. 
 
Parsons draws attention to the fact that “the legal barrier to corporate criminal liability resulting 
from the operation of the identification doctrine has led to the courts questioning whether the 
doctrine is the most suitable route to corporate liability in respect of statutory offences of strict 
liability and of mens rea”.1605 As seen from the discussion above, the courts have been making 
use of both the identification doctrine to impute guilt on the corporation, as well as vicarious 
liability to hold corporations vicariously liable for the guilt of its officers.1606 The vicarious 
liability for statutory crimes of mens rea is by means of what is referred to as the principle of 
delegation.1607 Parsons indicates that  
“courts have been concerned with the legal barrier to criminal liability resulting from the 
operation of the identification doctrine and have moved away from it in respect of crimes of 
strict liability and of mens rea by imposing either a direct liability not limited by the fiction 
of identification or vicarious liability”.1608  
                                                          
1603 “first, the doctrine of vicarious liability has now been applied beyond confines of strict liability offences to 
offences of negligence or hybrid offences (ie prima facie strict liability offences which provide due diligence or 
reasonable knowledge defences such as are common in consumer protection legislation…secondly, the House of 
Lords has recently rejected the notion that vicarious liability can necessarily be imposed in strict liability 
offences”. (Ibid 564). 
1604 Ibid 565. 
1605 Parsons (note 242) 71.  
1606 “The flaws in the identification doctrine have already been exposed. An alternative device courts have recently 
started employing to circumvent the rigours of the identification doctrine has been that of vicarious liability”. 
(Clarkson (note 793) 563). 
1607 Parsons (note 242) 72. 




Parsons further observes that the statutory offences of mens rea and of strict liability are usually 
regulatory and he argues that applying the identification doctrine to such cases “where liability 
stops with the controlling officers, would defeat the purpose of the legislation”.1609 This then 
begs the question why the identification approach has persisted. It is submitted that the answer 
is to be found in Ashworth’s observation that, despite its weaknesses / limitations, the 
identification doctrine is responsible for the successful prosecution of certain small 
corporations.1610 In that sense the identification doctrine still plays a valuable role, however, as 
there are still challenges when it comes to the prosecution of larger and more sophisticated 
corporations,1611 it is submitted that there is a need for reform. 
 
Parsons refers to the possibility of “the retention of the identification doctrine but with gross 
negligence being found by means of aggregating the fault of more than one controlling 
officer”.1612 Parsons is not in favour aggregation and further observes that 
“the difficulty is that even if the faults of various controlling officers are added together the 
aggregation may not amount to gross negligence in a large corporation because the 
organizational reality is that none of the controlling officers has responsibility for human 
safety as that responsibility has been delegated to others within the corporation”.1613 
 
                                                          
1609 Ibid 71. 
1610 Ashworth (note 246) 118. 
1611 “However, there are major problems with this identification doctrine and over the past decade there has been 
a growing realisation that it simply does not reflect modern corporate practice, particularly in larger companies. 
The doctrine ignores the reality of modern corporate decision-making which is often the product of corporate 
policies and procedures rather than individual decisions”. (Clarkson (note 793) 561). 




Clarkson also advocates the rejection of aggregation states that it does not reflect “corporate 
decision making and reality”.1614 He goes on to criticize aggregation in that “instead of trying 
to find one person with whom the company can be identified, one simply finds several such 
persons”.1615 It must be noted though that despite the rejection of the principle of aggregation 
As stated above, Gobert points out that the wording of the CMCHA is such that it gives 
recognition to the possibility of aggregation.1616 
 
With the courts having attempted to find a way to avoid strictness of the identification theory 
by making use of vicarious liability,1617 the question that arises as to whether the answer lies in 
applying both approaches, even though they each reflect two different approaches to corporate 
criminal liability. It is submitted that Wells’ assertion that “on their own, neither of these 
models is a solution”, is correct.1618 She goes on to state that “they are better conceived as part 
of a broader organizational model that is responsive to different forms of criminal offenses”.1619  
 
Clarkson suggests an approach in which the rules of attribution are done away with and 
corporations are held directly liable for their crimes.1620 In the 1995 Meridian Global Funds 
case1621 Lord Hoffman brings forth a compromise approach which would have the effect of 
                                                          
1614 Clarkson (note 793) 561. 
1615 Ibid 562. 
1616 See discussion in this chapter at III (a) (i) above. “Nonetheless, one can discern a gloss on the identification 
doctrine in the reference to senior management defined in terms of persons (note the plural) who play significant 
roles in either making decisions about how the whole or a substantial part of the company’s activities are to be 
managed, or the actual managing of the whole or a substantial part of those activities. This formulation 
implicitly recognises the possibility of ‘aggregated’ fault as a basis of corporate liability, a position previously 
rejected by the courts”. (Gobert (note 1411) 318). 
1617 Ibid 563. 
1618 Wells (note 92) 110. 
1619 Ibid. 
1620 “a better approach would be to effect a complete break from all attribution rules, and hold companies as such, 
directly criminally liable”. (Clarkson (note 793) 566). 
1621 Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission (note 1292). See discussion of this 
case in this chapter at III (g) above. 
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broadening the identification doctrine. Parsons points out that Lord Hoffman “was not 
imposing vicarious liability but rather was stretching the identification doctrine to include 
wider personnel that controlling officers”.1622 This is echoed by Wells who states that “there 
was likely to be a broadening of identification liability itself… A decision of the Privy Council, 
Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission appeared to herald a 
more modern, organizational, concept of liability”.1623 Clarkson hails the Meridian Global 
Funds decision as “a more promising approach” and states that in “rejecting the doctrine of 
vicarious liability, the Privy Council held that a person had to be found within the company 
whose acts and knowledge could be attributed to the company. Significantly, however, Lord 
Hoffman was not prepared to limit the attribution of knowledge on the basis of the test of 
‘directing mind and will’”.1624 
 
Wells states that “dissatisfaction with both the vicarious and identification routes has led to an 
emerging principle based on company culture that exploits instead the dissimilarities between 
individual human beings and group entities”.1625 
 
VI THE PUNISHMENT OF CORPORATIONS  
One of the main obstacles to the development of corporate criminal liability was the fact that 
corporations could only be held liable for offences which were punishable via a fine.1626 It has 
been accepted that there are certain punishments which cannot be imposed on a corporation as 
                                                          
1622 Parsons (note 242) 76. 
1623 Wells (note 15) 103. 
1624 Clarkson (note 793) 565. 
1625 Wells (note 92) 109.  
1626 “…most felonies attracted punishments such as imprisonment or death that could have no application to an 
inert body”. (Wells (note 15) 90). 
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it lacks a physical existence. The fine has therefore, been regarded as the most suitable penalty 
for a corporation. In English law the fine has mainly been the sanction imposed on convicted 
corporations.1627 It is submitted, however, that imposing a fine as a penalty following a 
corporation’s conviction for negligent deaths of people trivializes the crime committed and 
even if the fine is of a substantial amount or an unlimited amount, it is not necessarily the 
corporation that suffers as a result of the fine. If the corporation does not suffer it will neither 
be deterred nor rehabilitated.  
 
The fine has been a point of criticism for several reasons. It has been pointed out that fining a 
corporation amounts to punishing innocent shareholders,1628 who in turn suffer as a result of 
the corporation’s conviction. This is referred to as ‘overspill’ which means that “it is not the 
company which pays the fine but shareholders (whose dividends may be reduced), employers 
(whose wages or jobs may be affected) and consumers (prices for whom may be 
increased)”.1629 
 
Another criticism leveled at the fine is that the company may not be affected by the fine at 
all1630 as “a fine on the corporation alone can be absorbed merely as a cost of doing 
business”.1631  
 
                                                          
1627 Ormerod (note 96) 152. 
1628 “The fine imposed is ultimately borne by the shareholders, who, in most cases, are not responsible, in any 
sense, for the offence”. (Ibid 153). 
1629 Jefferson (note 897) 238 – 239. 
1630 Ibid 241. 
1631 Ibid 241 – 242. 
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Ashworth wonders if there is “much point in punishing corporations? A company can hardly 
be imprisoned, moderate fines can be swallowed up as business overheads, and swingeing fines 
might have such drastic side-effects on the employment and livelihoods of innocent employees 
as to render them inappropriate”.1632  
 
On the contrary, in view of the fact that imprisonment is impossible, the fine appears to be a 
penalty that courts prefer to make use of. One of the criticisms against the fine is that it may 
result in “overkill”, that is, that the fine may be so high that it would have the effect of putting 
the convicted corporation out of business.1633 This would result in, inter alia, the dismissals 
and unemployment of those who were employed by the companies as well as the loss of future 
dividends for shareholders.1634 Also of importance is the fact that “heavy fines which led to the 
enforced liquidation of the company would also not deal with the facts which led to the 
crime”.1635 
 
The other criticism against fines is that instead of serving as punishment fines can serve as 
“licences to kill”. Many corporations have more than sufficient funds and with the knowledge 
that punishment is in the form of a fine they may set aside part of the budget for paying off 
fines. This would in turn allow them to disregard their duty of care with the knowledge that in 
the case of casualties there is money set aside for the fine. As Jefferson observes “there still 
                                                          
1632 Ashworth (note 246) 121 - 122. 





remains the perception that fines are not seen as punishment but as ‘buying’ the ‘right’ for 
example to kill. Paying the fine buys the right to kill”. 1636 
 
In spite of the above criticisms against the fine, the fine appears to be a form of punishment 
that is working well in jurisdictions such as England. It is submitted that in addition to the fine 
the courts should also make use of the other available forms of punishment. 
Prior to the coming into being of the CMCHA there were suggestions made regarding possible 
alternative ways of punishing corporations that cause death. The inclusion of remedial orders 
and publicity orders is an improvement on the common law crime of gross negligence 
manslaughter, however, this is far from adequate. These orders are not compulsory and may be 
made at the discretion of the sentencing judge. Compulsory publicity orders in addition to the 
fine may have the desired effect of deterring the corporation. There is in fact an argument that  
“enforced poor publicity is the sanction which will do most to deter corporate wrongdoing. It 
may have more of a deterrent effect than a fine because of the stigma associated with it. It 
may also draw the attention of the regulatory bodies down on the company and it may lead to 
that holy grail of increased compliance with regulatory regimes”.1637 
It is submitted that Gobert’s suggestion that “the way forward may lie in introducing more 
creative sanctions”1638 is indeed the way forward. There are a number of suggested sanctions 
that may be used in addition to or as alternatives to the fine. These are discussed in more detail 
in chapter 6 below. 
 
                                                          
1636 Ibid 243. 
1637 Ibid 258. 




Corporate criminal liability is a concept that was faced with challenges when it was first 
introduced to English Law. Although a corporation had legal personality, it took time before it 
was accepted that a corporation could commit crime and could face prosecution.  The concept 
of corporate criminal liability has gradually evolved through the ages and in England there is 
now a statutory system whereby corporations are held directly liable for the deaths of people 
to whom they owe a duty of care. The CMCHA has introduced an offence called corporate 
manslaughter, which ensures that there are uniform rules dealing with deaths caused by both 
corporations as well as unincorporated entities.  
 
Public outcry and the written works of academics such as Celia Wells and CMV Clarkson 
played an important role in ensuring the development of the concept of corporate criminal 
liability and specifically corporate manslaughter, in England. Moreover, before passing the 
Act, the government saw to it that all stakeholders had an opportunity to comment on the 
recommendation and the Bills. Government did take many of the recommendations into 
account and clearly made an attempt at addressing concerns raised. 
 
 The CMCHA does have its shortcoming, as discussed above, however, it marks an 
improvement to the way English law dealt with deaths caused by corporations. With regard to 
applicable sanctions, even though the fine as imposed in R v Cotswold1639 is high, it is hoped 
that the courts will make use of the alternative sanctions which may be more effective in 
deterring corporations, especially where a loss of lives has occurred as a result of corporations’ 
                                                          
1639 R v Cotswold (note 1574). 
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CHAPTER 5 – CANADIAN LAW AND CORPORATE HOMICIDE  




As many have noted, corporate actors who cause injury and death rarely receive sanctions 
equivalent to those meted out to traditional criminals. Workplace injury and deaths, 
environmental crimes and corporate fraud are rarely sanctioned or shamed. And when they 
are, punishments are much lighter than those received by the street offender who commits 
comparable acts of theft, fraud, assault and murder.1640 
 
This statement shows that Canada, like many other countries, has also, over the years, been 
facing challenges when it comes to corporate criminal liability and particularly corporate 
homicide. From the quotation it is clear that Canada has experienced the differential treatment, 
by the criminal justice system, between natural persons and juristic persons who have caused 
deaths negligently. Corporate criminal liability, as a way of dealing with corporations that 
cause harm to society, including those that cause negligent deaths “is an established doctrine 
in Canada”1641 and it has been recognized by Canadian law for many years.1642  
 
Apart from the fact that criminal liability in Canada for all entities, including corporations, is 
now codified in the Criminal Code,1643 case law has played a very significant role in the 
development of both corporate criminal liability and corporate homicide in Canada.1644 
Although allowing the law to be developed by judges has been criticized,1645 Ferguson points 
                                                          
1640 S Bittle & L Snider ‘From Manslaughter to Preventable Accident: Shaping Corporate Criminal Liability’ 
(2006) 28 (4) Law and Policy 470, 481. 
1641 Ferguson (note 165) 155. 
1642 R v Stephens (1866) L.R. 1 Q.B. 702; R v Holbrook (1878) 578 4, Q.B.D. 42. Moreover, as early as 1909 the 
legislature included a provision in the Criminal Code “that when a corporation was found guilty, a fine could be 
substituted for a sentence of imprisonment”. (Stessens (note 52) 498). 
1643  The Criminal Code is a national statute that regulates / codifies criminal law. In addition to common law 
rules, it is the primary source of criminal law in Canada. 
1644 For instance “the basis for imposing criminal liability – originally arose and is still dependent today on 
common law principles developed by judges on a case by case basis”. (Ferguson (note 165) 156). Examples of 
cases that have played important roles in developing corporate criminal liability are Union Colliery Co. v The 
Queen (1900), 31 S.C.R. 81; R. v Great West Laundry Co. (1900), 3 C.C.C. 514 (Man.Q.B.); R v Fane Robinson 
Ltd [1941] 3 D.L.R. 409 (D.A.C.S.Alta); Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v R, (note 160) 251; The Rhone v The 
Peter A.B. Widener [1993] 1 S.C.R. 497. 
1645 Ferguson refers to Jeremy Bentham’s “scathing criticism…that uncodified criminal law is undemocratic since 
it is created and altered by unelected and unrepresentative judges; it is unfair because judges thereby engage in ex 
post facto or retrospective law making; it is also unfair and undemocratic because common law rules which are 
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out that an important advantage of the common law is that it “permits, with relative ease and 
flexibility, the creation of new and adjusted principles of law to meet changing social 
conditions”.1646 
 
 In addition to that, Canada has recently adopted amendments to its Criminal Code which have 
resulted in significant improvements to corporate criminal liability and corporate homicide. 
Bill C-451647 which brought about these improvements has been hailed as constituting “a 
fundamental change, if not a revolution, in corporate criminal liability”.1648 It has extended 
corporate criminal liability in such a way that certain entities that were originally excluded 
from liability, due to lack of incorporation, are now regarded as organizations and for that 
reason they are also subject to corporate criminal liability if they commit crimes. 1649 The 
extension of criminal liability in such a way that it provides a wider scope of application1650 is 
a positive development as it makes it difficult for individuals who have committed crime under 
the auspices of an unincorporated entity to hide behind the lack of incorporation in order to 
escape liability.  
 
 Another significant change made by the recent amendments is the move away from complete 
reliance on the identification doctrine as a way of establishing corporate fault. There are new 
rules that have been formulated for attributing criminal liability to organizations, which apply, 
                                                          
buried in cases are not accessible, intelligible or easily ascertainable to ordinary citizens, and finally it is 
unsystematic in the sense that it is an unruly sea of single decisions rather than an organized, rational and 
comprehensive body of law built up from first principles”. (Ferguson (note 165) 156 – 157). 
1646 Ibid 157. 
1647 Bill C-45, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (criminal liability of organizations) 2d Sess., 37th Parl., 2003 
(Royal Assent, 7 November 2003), S.C. 2003, c.21 [Bill C-45]. 
1648 T Archibald, K Jull and K Roach ‘The Changed Face of Corporate Criminal Liability’ 48 Criminal Law 
Quarterly (2003 – 2004) 367, 368. 
1649 These amendments came into being as a result of Bill C-45 (Bill C-45 (note 1647) which will be fully discussed 
in this chapter at III below. 
1650 DL MacPherson ‘Extending Corporate Criminal Liability?: Some thoughts on Bill C-45’ (2004) 30 Manitoba 
Law Journal 253, 253. 
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in addition to the identification doctrine. It is submitted that the move away from strictly 
applying the identification doctrine only is a positive development as the identification 
doctrine, on its own, played a big role in hampering the prosecution of corporations, 
particularly the large corporations and in circumstances where there were fatalities caused by 
corporate activities.  
 
In this chapter the recognition and development of the concept of corporate criminal liability 
and corporate homicide in Canada will be discussed. The discussion will include the basis for 
liability, the shortfalls of the identification doctrine, the calls for reform, the reform that 
subsequently followed in the form of amendments to the Criminal Code as a result of Bill C-
45, an assessment of some of the case law subsequent to the reform, and the effectiveness of 
corporate homicide in Canada. In assessing the effectiveness of corporate homicide in Canada, 
the question whether the penalties that may be imposed on the corporations are adequate and 
effective will form part of the discussion. 
 
II THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
IN CANADA 
 
(a) The recognition of corporations as legal persons in Canada 
Prior to the formal discovery of Canada in 1534, there were already fishing and fur-trading 
expeditions in the area, dating as far back as 15061651 and these took the form of 
“unincorporated associations of merchants formed to raise a common fund to finance each 
expedition and they divided their profits at the end of each voyage in the ration of their 
                                                          
1651 “It is known that European fishing and fur-trading ventures extended to the land and waters of Newfoundland 
as early as forty years before Cartier’s formal discovery of Canada in 1534”. (FE Labrie & E Palmer ‘The Pre-
Confederation History of Corporations in Canada’ in JS Ziegel Studies in Canadian Company Law 1967, 33).  
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contributions”.1652 During this period the French operated under the French legal system while 
the Britons operated under the British legal system.1653 Corporate activity during the period 
before the mid-eighteenth century had little, if any impact on the development of corporate 
law.1654  
 
After the discovery of Canada, laws regulating corporations in Canada were influenced by the 
French and English legal systems as well as developments in the United States.1655 Prior to the 
nineteenth century Canadian law made provision for two forms of incorporation,1656 namely, 
by means of exercising royal prerogative1657 and by means of legislation.1658 Corporations 
created by means of royal prerogative were a far cry from the modern corporations as, for 
instance, in spite of incorporation the obligations of the corporation were borne by the 
shareholders.1659 Incorporation by means of legislation rarely occurred.1660 
 
Until the late nineteenth century, fur trade1661 was the dominating economic activity.1662 Fur 
was mainly traded by companies that were originated in Paris and London.1663 The Compagnie 
de la Nouvelle France1664 and the Hudson’s Bay Company were two of those companies and 
                                                          
1652 Ibid. 
1653 Hadden et al. (note 941) 18. 
1654 Labrie & Palmer (note 1651) 36. 
1655 Hadden et al. (note 941) 18. 
1656 JA Van Duzer The Law of Partnerships and Corporations (2009) 90. 
1657 “This was done by the Crown issuing letters patent sometimes referred to as a “Royal Charter”. Only a small 
number of royal charters were granted”. (Ibid 91). 
1658 Ibid 90 – 91. 
1659 Ibid 91. 
1660 Ibid. 
1661 “Following Cartier’s discoveries of Canada, there arose a commercial interest in carrying on a fur trade and a 
desire by the Kings of France to establish colonies in order to reinforce French claims to the territory”. (Labrie & 
Palmer (note 1651) 33). 
1662 Hadden et al. (note 941) 18. 
1663 Ibid 19. 
1664 Also known as the Compagnie des Cent Associes “it was formed in 1628 and given the exclusive right to 
trade, colonize, govern and promote religious teaching in all of New France, from Florida northwards, the King 
reserving only the allegiance of residents in the territory and the right to select the judicial officers from among 
the company’s nominees. The company was incorporated by letters patent and given the privilege of limited 
liability by express stipulation in its articles. The head office of the company was in Paris, from where it was 
governed, and in form, it was similar to existing European corporations”. (Labrie & Palmer (note 1651) 36. 
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they “were modeled on well-established European precedents for foreign trading 
companies”.1665 These companies featured greatly in the economic activities of Canada in its 
early days, however, they did not have a great impact on future forms of corporations.1666  
 
Prior to the mid eighteenth century “little corporate activity occurred in Canada”.1667 The 
coming into being of the Joint Stock Companies Act in England in 1844 brought with it a new 
method of incorporation, which simply allowed for incorporation once specified documents 
were registered.1668 This approach of incorporation by means of registration was followed by 
Canada and as early as 1849 Upper and Lower Canada passed statutes that allowed for the 
incorporation1669 of certain companies.1670 These companies are still not comparable to modern 
companies as “they were organizations set up for a limited purpose, and did not provide 
shareholders with limited liability”.1671 
 
1850 is hailed as the year in which the “first truly private commercial companies in Canada”1672 
came into being. This was as a result of the promulgation of the first Canadian Companies Act: 
An Act to Provide for the Formation of Incorporated Joint Stock Companies, for 
                                                          
1665 Ibid. 
1666 “Though the fur trade and the companies which ran it played a dominant role in the early history of Canada, 
their operations were based on seventeenth and eighteenth century conceptions of business organization and 
cannot be said to have had much lasting impact on subsequent forms of corporate organization”. (Hadden et al. 
(note 941) 19).  
1667 Labrie & Palmer (note 1651) 36. Three reasons have been advanced for this state of affairs: “first in Great 
Britain the Bubble act was passed in 1720 which discouraged the creation of new companies; second, France 
wanted to use New France merely as a supplier of furs and a market for manufactured goods; and, third, in both 
British and French jurisdictions the companies then in existence had monopoly rights with regard to the fur trade 
and hence actively opposed the creation of any new companies”. (Labrie & Palmer (note 1651) 36 – 37). 
1668 Van Duzer (note 1656) 91. 
1669 “Incorporation did not require the exercise of the royal prerogative but was obtained by the registration of 
prescribed documents in the country in which the work was to be done”. Ibid. 
1670 These included: “An Act to Authorize the Formation of Joint Stock Companies for the Construction of Roads 
and Other Works in Upper Canada, S.C. 1849, c.84; An Act to Authorize the Formation of Joint Stock Companies 
in Lower Canada for the Construction of Macadamized Roads, and of Bridges and Other Works of Like Nature, 
S.C. 1849, c 56”. (Ibid).  
1671 Ibid. 
1672 Hadden et al.  (note 941) 21. 
340 
 
Manufacturing, Mining, Mechanical or Chemical Purposes.1673 The Act was promulgated in 
1850 and it was a “more generally applicable statute for incorporation”.1674 Incorporation under 
this Act was similar to the 1849 approach in that the mere registration of certain documents led 
to incorporation.1675 The 1850 Act provided for a simple process of incorporation that would 
bring into being a corporation with its own rights and responsibilities, having the capacity to 
sue and to be sued in its own name; to enter into contracts of sale and to have succession.1676 
Incorporation under the 1850 Act, therefore “had two of the defining characteristics we 
associate with the modern corporation: separate legal personality and limited liability”.1677 
However, unlike modern companies, companies incorporated under the 1850 Act had a lifespan 
of only fifty years.1678 
 
With regard to the Canadian Companies Act 1850, it has been stated that  
 
the basic features of modern Canadian company law are to be found here readily available 
incorporation, central management which was to be accountable electorally to shareholders, 
shareholders with a ‘limited commitment’ and a measure of protection of the capital of the 
corporate vehicle, which had no parallel in general partnership law.1679  
 
The fur trade was replaced as the most dominant trade during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century.1680 Timber was one of the trades that replaced fur and the timber trade in Ontario and 
                                                          
1673 An Act to provide for the formation of Joint Stock Companies for Manufacturing, Mining, Mechanical or 
Chemical Purposes 13 & 14 Vict., c 28 (Can 1850). (Labrie & Palmer (note 1651) 56). See also Van Duzer (note 
1656) 91 and Hadden et al. (note 941) 25. 
1674 Van Duzer (note 1656) 91. 
1675 Ibid 92. 
1676 The Act made it clear that ‘the result of the process of incorporation was ‘a body politic and corporate’ which 
should ‘have succession’, and be capable of suing being sued and buying and selling real or personal property for 
the purposes of its operations…’. (Hadden et al. (note 941) 26). 
1677 Van Duzer (note 1656) 92. 
1678 Ibid. 
1679 Hadden et al. (note 941) 27. 
1680 Ibid 19. 
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Quebec had a greater impact on the future of corporations as it was more sophisticated and was 
under state control.1681 Capital for felling trees and transporting them was generally “provided 
by British timber traders who established branches or factors in Canada”.1682 In 1853 there was 
provision made for companies to be incorporated “for the improvement of river transportation 
facilities”.1683 It is not clear how many took advantage of this opportunity, as the “larger timber 
houses…appear to have operated as unincorporated partnerships, at least until late in the 
nineteenth century”.1684  
 
Welling observes that “corporate development during the first half of the nineteenth century 
shows that, while a separate corporate legal personality had not yet fully evolved, statutory 
rules were leading in that direction”.1685 This can be seen in that the Acts that provided for the 
incorporation of the Joint Stock Companies for Manufacturing Mining, Mechanical or 
Chemical Purposes and of the banking industry were the first Acts1686  to enshrine limited 
liability for companies.1687 This has led to the observation that the development of banking 
appear to have paved the way to the development of “the first truly private commercial 
companies in Canada”.1688 
 
The 1850 Act was followed by the Joint Stock Companies Judicial Incorporation Act of 
18601689 and the 1864 Act to authorize the granting of charters on Incorporation to 
                                                          
1681 “All uncultivated land was in the hands of the Crown, and licences to fell timber were sold in individual lots 
by the state authorities. The authorities were also directly involved in the construction and operation of timber 
slides on the larger rivers, from which a substantial toll revenue was collected”. (Ibid 19 – 20). 
1682 Ibid 20. 
1683 This was specifically “for the improvement of river transportation”. (Ibid). 
1684 Ibid. 
1685 Welling et al. (note 971) 92 – 93. 
1686 An Act to establish freedom of banking in this Province and for other purposes relative to Banks and Banking 
13 & 14 Vict., c 21 (Can 1850) and An Act to provide for the formation of Joint Stock Companies for 
Manufacturing, Mining, Mechanical or Chemical Purposes 13 & 14 Vict., c 28 (Can 1850). (Ibid 91). 
1687 Ibid 85.  
1688 Hadden et al. (note 941) 21. 
1689 Joint Stock Companies Judicial Incorporation Act, 23 Vict., c. 31 (Can). 
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Manufacturing, Mining and other Companies.1690 These were both passed by the United 
Province and focused mainly on tightening the procedure of incorporation.1691 In the 1864 Act 
the United Province made use of the approach based on royal prerogative whereby letters patent 
had to be issued by the governor in Council for the corporation to be incorporated.1692 
 
The confederation of Canada in 1867 brought with it significant developments in company law 
which resulted in the possibility of incorporation via federal authority and via the provincial 
legislature.1693 The 1869 the Canadian Joint Stock Companies Letters Patent, a “federal 
incorporation statute” followed the letters patent approach.1694 The same approach was 
followed in the provinces of Manitoba, New Bruswick, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Quebec 
and Ontario.1695 It has been stated that “throughout most of the twentieth century, Canadian 
registration and letters patent statutes changed very little”.1696 On the other hand Alberta, 
British Columbia, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan followed the English 
approach of registration after filing a memorandum of association and articles of 
association.1697 The vital difference between these two approaches is that “a letters patent 
corporation is deemed to have the rights and powers of a natural person, whereas a corporation 
under the English registration system…has only the powers provided for expressly or by 
implication in its articles”.1698 The Ontario legislature deserted the letters patent system in 1967 
in the new Ontario Act, which allowed for incorporation simply upon the registration of the 
                                                          
1690 Act to authorize the granting of Charters on Incorporation to Manufacturing, Mining and other Companies. 
1691 Hadden et al. (note 941) 28. 
1692 “For some reason the United Province of Canada reverted to a model based on the exercise of royal 
prerogative… While permitting incorporation for any commercial purpose, under this Act, incorporation occurred 
only upon the issue of letters patent by the Governor in Council. Issuing letters patent was a discretionary act of 
an official of the state”. (Van Duzer (note 1656) 92). 
1693 “Federal competence lay in the residual power to pass laws ‘for the Peace, Order and Good Government of 
Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects”. (Hadden et al. (note 941) 29). 
1694 Van Duzer (note 1656) 92. 
1695 Ibid. 
1696 Ibid 94. 




“articles of association”. This was influenced by developments in the United States of 
America.1699 In 1975 the Canada Business Corporations Act, a federal corporate law statute 
came into being, which followed the same approach of registering the articles of association 
for incorporation. 1700 
 
Although there have been further developments in Canadian law, what remains vital is that as 
with both England and South Africa, Canada also relies on the principle of legal personality as 
stated in Salomon v Salomon.1701 A Canadian textbook cited this case as “having laid down the 
cornerstone of modern corporate law”.1702 The current position is that Canadian law recognizes 
corporations as full1703 legal persons with rights and responsibilities and whose existence is 
separate from their shareholders.1704  
  
(b) The history of corporate criminal liability in Canada 
“Corporations make decisions, hold property, and complete legal transactions. So do 
individuals. Some physical acts and transactional details that we think we see performed by 
individuals can be legally attributed to a corporation”.1705 
 
                                                          
1699 “Incorporation was effected by filing only a very simple document called “articles of incorporation”. This 
approach followed the Model Business corporations Act drafted by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the 
American Bar Association”. (Ibid 94). 
1700 Ibid. 
1701 Salomon v Salomon (note 960).  
1702 Welling et al. (note 971) 126. 
1703 Own emphasis. 
1704 “A corporation’s legal identity is separate from that of its shareholders, directors and officers. A corporation 
can hold property, enter contracts and can sue and be sued. Owners and shareholders enjoy the benefit of limited 
liability; they are not personally liable for the debts or obligations of the corporation. And a corporation is 
perpetual in the sense that its existence is not altered by the addition of new members or the retirement or death 
of existing members”. (G Ferguson ‘Corruption and Corporate Criminal Liability’ Paper presented  at seminar on 
New Global and Canadian Standards on Corruption and bribery 
http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/FergusonG.PDF Also: International Centre for Criminal Law 
Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, http://www. icclr. law. ubc. ca/Site% 20Map/Publications% 
20Page/Gerry_Ferguson. htm (1998) 1,2. (accessed 4 October 2013)).  
1705 Welling et al. (note 971) 132. 
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As corporations in Canada became legal entities with rights and responsibilities, they were also 
bound to have an impact on peoples’ lives. It was therefore inevitable for the concept of 
corporate criminal liability to develop and to be recognized by Canadian law. The development 
of Canadian criminal law is therefore important. 
 
The occupation of Canada took place in various stages1706 and each territory, including 
Newfoundland,1707 “possessed a criminal law – that is, the criminal law (both common law and 
applicable statute law) of England as of the date of their settlement. Each would, however, also 
have some form of legislature with power, to some degree, to change that law”.1708 A process 
of consolidating the criminal law of the various territories into a single uniform system took 
place gradually and in 1892 the first Criminal Code of Canada came into being.1709 Canadian 
criminal law has since been mainly1710 regulated by the Federal government1711 by means of 
the Criminal Code.1712  
 
At first it was thought that a corporation could not be subject to prosecution as it did not have 
a physical body.1713 This was subsequently overcome and Canadian law has accepted that 
                                                          
1706 “The dates are fixed at September 17, 1792 for Ontario, October 1763 for Quebec, November 19, 1858 for 
British Columbia, July 15, 1870 for Manitoba, July 15, 1870 for Alberta, Saskatchewan, Northwest Territories 
and the Yukon, and 1758 for Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island”. (AW Mewett and M 
Manning Mewett and Manning on Criminal Law 3rd ed (1994) 4). 
1707 The criminal law of Newfoundland was declared to be the criminal law of England to a limited extent. (Ibid). 
1708 Ibid 3-4. 
1709 Ibid 4. 
1710“The position after 1892 was therefore that the criminal law consisted primarily of the Criminal Code of 
Canada, together with all those pieces of prior federal legislation preserved in the Schedule, plus as much of the 
common law preserved in each province as of the relevant date but excluding imperial criminal statutes, save 
where it had been altered or removed by federal legislation. While prosecutions for common law offences were 
not common, they did exist and there are several instances of successful prosecutions for offences that did not 
appear in any statute”. (Ibid). 
1711 DL MacPherson ‘Reforming the doctrine of attribution: a Canadian solution to British concerns’ in S Tully 
Research Handbook of Legal Responsibility (2005) 194, 200. 
1712 The Criminal Code (note 1643) section 2. 
1713 “At one time, because of the ‘intangible’ nature of the corporate person, it was felt that corporations were not 
amenable to all types of criminal proceedings”. (DH Bonham and DA Soberman “The Nature of Corporate 
Personality” (1967) in JS Ziegel Studies in Canadian Company Law 3, 29). 
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corporations are capable of committing crimes and they may be prosecuted.1714 The Criminal 
Code has been instrumental in making it possible to prosecute corporations1715 and it has been 
credited with having ‘swept away’ “all difficulties as to procedure and punishment of 
corporations”.1716 Criminal liability has been extended to corporations by section 2 of the 
Criminal Code which, until recently, defined the terms ‘every one’ and ‘person’ in such a way 
that they encompass “public bodies, corporate bodies, societies and municipalities in relation 
to the acts and things that they are capable of doing”.1717 Although it is mainly corporations 
that have been prosecuted for crimes they have committed,1718 the law allows for the 
prosecution of corporations,1719 municipalities, societies, trade unions, incorporated 
associations and non-profit corporations such as religious corporations.1720 An example of the 
recognition of corporate criminal liability with regard to entities that are not strictly speaking 
corporations can be seen in Cory J’s statement in United Nurses of Alberta v Alberta,1721 where 
in answering the question whether unions can be subject to criminal contempt he reasons that 
“There can be no doubt that unions have the legal status to sue and be sued in civil matters. 
They can and do present and defend cases before the courts. They make full use of the courts 
and the remedies they provide. If unions avail themselves of court facilities, they must be 
subject to the court’s rules and restraints placed on the conduct of all litigants. It follows that 
they are subject to prosecution for the common law offence of criminal contempt. There can 
                                                          
1714 Ibid. 
1715 “Now the difficulties of summoning a corporation before the court and of prosecuting it have been eliminated 
by the Criminal Code. Also, the code contains provision for imposing fines as punishment on corporations in lieu 
of imprisonment. As a result, from a procedural point of view, there is no reason why a corporation should not be 
prosecuted criminally”. (Ibid). 
1716 R v Fane Robinson (note 1644). 
1717 Ferguson (note 165) 153. 
1718 Ferguson (note 1704) 2. 
1719 “Although legal writers differ as to why it may be desirable to hold corporations criminally responsible at all, 
it seems clear that Canadian law contemplates that corporations will be subject to the criminal law. Indeed it has 
been said that corporations and natural persons really ‘stand on an equal footing at the bar of criminal justice’”. 
(Bonham & Soberman (note 1713) 29). 
1720 Ferguson (note 165) 154. Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v R (note 216) – corporation; R v Sault Ste. Marie 
(City) (1978), 40 C.C.C. (2d) 353 - municipality; United Nurses of Alberta v Alberta (Attorney General) [1992] 1 
S.C.R. 901; [1992 S.C.J. No. 37. – societies and trade unions; R v Church of Scientology (1997), 33 O.R. (3d) 65  
(Ont. C.A.) – religious corporation. 
1721 United Nurses of Alberta v Alberta (Attorney General) (note 1720) 
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be no question that unions fall within the scope of the term ‘societies’ in the Criminal Code’s 
definition of person and they must be equally liable for prosecution for a common law 
crime”.1722 
Furthermore, in 1909 the Criminal Code was amended in such a way that it “introduced notions 
of corporate criminal liability” by providing for the substitution of a fine for a sentence of 
imprisonment, when a corporation was found to be guilty of a crime.1723 In the 1941 case of R 
v Fane Robinson the idea that a corporation is capable of committing a crime was totally 
accepted.1724 
In R v Fane Robinson an appeal was heard against the dismissal of charges against a corporation 
for conspiracy to defraud and for obtaining money through false pretences.1725 Both charges 
required mens rea to be proven. The court a quo had dismissed the charges on the ground that 
it was not possible for a corporation to be guilty of mens rea.1726 With reference to the two 
directors that had committed the offences Ford JA stated that  
“In my opinion George Robinson and Emile Fielhaber were the acting and directing will of 
Fane Robinson Ltd. Generally and in particular in respect of the subject-matter of the offences 
with which it is charged, that their culpable intention (mens rea) and their illegal act (actus 
reus) were the intention and the act of the company and that conspiracy to defraud and 
obtaining money by false pretences are offences which a corporation is capable of 
committing”.1727 
                                                          
1722 Ibid par 3. 
1723 Stessens (note 52)  498. 
1724 R v Fane Robinson (note 1644). See also Stessens (note 52) 498. 
1725 R v Fane Robinson (note 1644) 410. 
1726 Ibid 409. 
1727 Ibid 410. 
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R v Fane Robinson is regarded as the leading Canadian case for having set the precedent for 
finding corporations guilty of crimes having mens rea as an essential element.1728 
(c) The development of corporate criminal liability in Canada 
Corporations have mainly been held criminally liable for regulatory offences1729 as Canadian 
law has, in the past, dealt with corporate criminal liability and corporate homicide mainly by 
means of enacting regulatory offences.1730 These are offences that are found in statutory 
regulations. They emanate from the federal government as well as provincial and municipal 
governments.1731 With regard to employees, traditionally there was protection for employees 
in the form of factory inspectors and in the event of injuries and deaths at work, employers 
were held responsible and provision was made for employees to receive compensation for 
injuries sustained by them.1732 
 
 It must be noted that regulatory offences in Canada have not been regarded as ‘true’ crimes.1733 
The main reason is that mens rea is not a requirement for liability for such offences. There is 
absolute liability, as long as the prohibited act has occurred.1734 The prosecution is not required 
to prove fault on the part of the corporation, as long as it is clear that there has been a 
contravention. Holding corporations liable for the contravention of statutory regulations has 
therefore been normal practice. The kind of liability that corporations are subject to when it 
                                                          
1728 P. Dusome “Criminal Liability under Bill C-45: Paradigms, Prosecutors, Predicaments” (2007 - 2008) 53 
Criminal Law Quarterly 98, 142. 
1729 Ferguson (note 165)159. “Many regulatory offences deal with various forms of pollution and violations of 
health and safety standards in the work place and in the production and sale of goods and services. Penalties 
normally involve fines and the possibility (but infrequent use) of imprisonment, which might range from a few 
days up to two years”. (Ibid 159 – 160). 
1730 “Regulatory or public welfare offences emphasize the protection of the public from the risk of harm and the 
regulatory interests of the modern state, as opposed to the punishment of inherently wrongful and harmful 
conduct”. (Roach (note 310) 164. 
1731 Ibid 164. 
1732 Bittle & Snider (note 1640) 472. 
1733 Macpherson (note 1711) 198; Ferguson (note 165) 159. 
1734 Macpherson (note 1711) 198. 
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comes to regulatory offences is vicarious criminal liability.1735 Vicarious liability or respondent 
superior1736 made it possible for a corporation to be held liable for offences committed by its 
employee.1737 The corporation as employer could be held liable simply because of its 
relationship with the employee responsible for committing the crime.1738  
 
Under the common law corporations could therefore be held criminally liable for crimes 
committed under their auspices provided that these were regulatory offences, as, Canadian 
courts were, at first, reluctant to hold corporations criminally liable for ‘true crimes’.1739 The 
common law was opposed to the application of vicarious liability to criminal law due to the 
fact that mens rea / fault is an element of a crime1740 and a corporation was regarded as being 
incapable of having mens rea as the corporation is an incorporeal being without a brain. This 
reasoning had the effect that courts were reluctant to hold corporations criminally liable for 
mens rea offences.1741  
 
There were, however, exceptional instances where common law allowed for corporations to be 
held liable for ‘true crimes’ and the basis for liability in such cases was vicarious liability.1742 
                                                          
1735 D Goetz BillC-45 An Act to amend the criminal code (criminal liability of organizations) 2003 Law and 
Government Division http://www.parl.gc.ca/About?Parliament?legislativeSummaries?bills_Is.asp?Is=c457P  
1 (Accessed 18 November 2013). 
1736 Ferguson (note 1704) 4. 
1737 Ferguson (note 165) 161. 
1738 “This doctrine was created in the law of tort in the seventeenth century in order to provide compensation to 
third parties who were injured by a master’s servant while the servant was carrying out the master’s business. This 
doctrine was justified on the ground that since the master acquired the benefits of the servant’s work, he should 
also carry the burdens. And as a practical matter, servants were impecunious and therefore if compensation was 
to be forthcoming it would have to be obtained from the master”. (Ferguson (note 1704) 4). 
1739 Ferguson (note 165) 161. “If an offence is considered a ‘true crime’, courts will presume Parliament intended 
the offence to require subjective mens rea (i.e. intent, knowledge, recklessness or willful blindness measured 
subjectively, but not negligence) unless the words of the statute suggest otherwise”. (Ibid 159). 
1740 Ibid 162. 
1741 Ferguson (note 1704) 4. 
1742 Ferguson (note 165) 161. 
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These were public nuisance,1743 contempt of court1744 as well as criminal libel,1745  all of which, 
despite being regarded as true crimes, did not have mens rea as an element.1746 These three 
categories of crimes together with regulatory offences, for which corporations were being held 
vicariously liable, were the only instances in which corporations were being held criminally 
liable for crimes.1747 
 
In addition to the courts’ reluctance to hold corporations liable for true crimes, there was also 
the argument that when a crime has been committed, the corporation has acted ultra vires 
because the employee has acted beyond the scope of his or her employment, for that reason the 
corporation ought not be held criminally liable.1748 The courts refused to accept this line of 
reasoning,1749 but continued with the reluctance to hold corporations liable for crimes requiring 
mens rea. 
 
The courts’ reluctance begins to disappear during the early days of the 20th century. In Union 
Colliery Co. v The Queen1750 the Supreme Court of Canada, faced with the question whether it 
is possible to indict a corporation for a crime, confirmed that in terms of sec. 213 of the 
Criminal Code it is possible for a corporation to be ‘indicted for omitting, without lawful 
excuse, to perform the duty of avoiding danger to human life from anything in its charge or 
under its control’.1751 The Supreme Court of British Columbia had convicted a corporation 
                                                          
1743 Ferguson (note 1704) 4. See also R v Stephens (note 1642). 
1744 Ferguson (note 1704) 4. See also R v Evening Standard Co Ltd [1954] 1 Q.B. 578. 
1745 Ferguson (note 1704) 4. See also R v Holbrook (note 1642). 
1746 Ferguson (note 165) 162. 
1747 Ferguson (note 1704) 4. 
1748 “corporate criminal immunity stemmed from the abhorrence of the common law for vicarious liability in 
criminal law, and from the doctrine of ultra vires, which regarded criminal activities by corporate agents as beyond 
their authority and beyond corporate capacity”. (Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v R (note 216) 674 - 675). 
1749 Ferguson (note 165) 162. 




following an indictment for the unlawful killing of people1752 caused by the corporation’s 
failure to properly maintain a bridge used by certain trains.1753 A train which had gone through 
this poorly maintained bridge had an accident while doing so, in which several lives were 
lost.1754 The question “whether or not the indictment would lie against a corporation”1755 was 
reserved for the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme 
Court of Canada held that in terms of the Criminal Code1756 it was possible to indict a 
corporation for failure1757 to perform the duty of avoiding danger to human life from anything 
under the control of the corporation. Furthermore, in deciding whether an indictment lies 
against a corporation, the Supreme Court confirmed that the term ‘everyone’ as found in the 
Criminal Code refers to all persons, including corporations.1758 Sedgewick J stated that: 
“‘Everyone’ is an expression of the same kind as ‘person’, and therefore includes bodies 
corporate unless the context requires otherwise”.1759 
 
It is interesting to note that the indictment in the Supreme Court of British Columbia was not 
specifically for manslaughter, but rather for the negligence of the corporation in the discharge 
of its duty. This is noted by the Court of Appeals and it is stated that 
 
It is possible that the facts alleged in the indictment would be sufficient to sustain an 
indictment for manslaughter against an individual, but the offence alleged in the indictment 
here is not the manslaughter; it is criminal negligence in the discharge of duty. The killing is 
                                                          
1752 Ibid. 
1753 Union Colliery had been convicted for failure to exercise its duty to maintain a particular bridge. Due to its 
failure to do so there were fatalities. Union Colliery was alleged to have “unlawfully neglected, without lawful 
excuse, to take reasonable precautions and to use reasonable care in maintaining” the bridge. (Ibid 83). 
1754 Ibid 81. 
1755 Ibid. 
1756 The Criminal Code (note 1643) section 213. 
1757 Without lawful cause. 




not alleged as the offence, but merely the consequence of the offence. In an indictment for 
manslaughter it is at least necessary to charge manslaughter as the crime—to allege that the 
defendants "unlawfully did kill and slay, &c." or "did commit manslaughter," allegations 
wholly absent in the present case. It is not, therefore, necessary here to express any opinion 
as to whether or not under the present state of the law and its constantly broadening and 
widening jurisprudence on the subject of the civil and criminal liability of bodies corporate, 
they are capable of committing the offence.1760 
This observation by Sedgewick J is important. Although the notion of charging the corporation 
with the consequences of its action, rather than the actual killing of the deceased, appears to be 
strange and somewhat absurd, it must be understood that at that particular time it was not 
possible to hold a corporation liable for manslaughter. The main hindrance to such a charge is 
the fact that manslaughter requires mens rea, and at that time a corporation was regarded as an 
entity that could not possibly possess mens rea.  
The Canadian legal system is, however, to be commended for taking seriously the 
consequences of the actions of corporations and for ensuring that the corporation are held 
criminally liable where they have discharged their duties in a negligent manner. 
The indictment in this particular case was worded in such a way that the Court of Appeals 
found it unnecessary for it to comment on the fact that a corporation was regarded as an entity 
that could not possibly commit manslaughter. It is submitted that this could have been an 
opportunity to develop the concept of corporate homicide and, had that opportunity been used, 
the concept of corporate homicide would have likely developed during the early days of the 
recognition of corporate criminal liability. 
                                                          
1760 Ibid 90.  
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It must be noted that in spite of the provisions in the Criminal Code, the Canadian courts’ full 
acknowledgement of corporate criminal liability only occurred in 1941 in R v Fane 
Robinson1761 in which Ford JA stated that 
 
After reading and considering, with many others, the cases cited on the argument I have, not 
without considerable hesitation, formed the opinion that the gradual process of placing those 
artificial entities known as corporations in the same position as a natural person as regards 
amenability to the criminal law has, by reason of the provisions of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 
1927, ch. 36, reached that stage where it can be said that, if the act complained of can be 
treated as that of the company, the corporation is criminally responsible for all such acts as it 
is capable of committing and for which the prescribed punishment is one which it can be made 
to endure.1762 
The current Criminal Code includes corporations under the term organization. The definition 
of organisation is rather wide as it refers to entities that have legal personality as well as those 
that do not have legal personality. The specific mention of the different entities is commendable 
as it provides certainty regarding which entities fall under the ambit of the Criminal Code. In 
addition to the specific mentioning of partnerships, societies and trade unions, the Legislature 
has gone a step further, by adding the phrase ‘an association of persons’. By adding such a 
phrase, the Legislature has ensured that in the event of doubt regarding whether a particular 
entity is included or excluded in the Criminal Code, such entity will be regarded as an 
association of persons. 
Developments to the Criminal Code have reached a point where the criminal code has a section 
dedicated solely to the criminal liability of organisations. This will be fully discussed below.  
                                                          
1761 R v Fane Robinson Ltd (note 1644). 




III MENS REA AND THE BASIS FOR LIABILITY  
The Criminal Code does not provide the basis for the criminal liability of corporations. As a 
result it has been left to the common law and courts to develop the basis for liability.1763 Canada 
has been holding corporations criminally liable on the following bases: vicarious liability and 
primary liability.1764 Primary liability is in the form of absolute liability;1765 strict liability and 
“real” criminal liability for mens rea offences.1766 With regard to primary liability, it is 
important to note that the basis for liability is closely linked with the type of offence that the 
corporation has committed.1767 The categories of offences that a corporation may be held liable 
for were made clear in R v City of Sault Ste. Marie1768 where the court provided absolute 
liability offences, strict liability offences and offences requiring mens rea as the three classes 
of offences that a corporation could be held liable for.1769 
 
A corporation will face absolute liability where an absolute liability offence has been 
committed. This occurs where a statute clearly states that proof of the commission of the 
prohibited act will result in guilt.1770 In this case the accused is held criminally liable without 
mens rea being proven and there is no possibility for the accused to “exculpate himself by 
showing that he was free of fault”.1771 Where a strict liability offence has been committed, the 
basis for liability will be strict liability. Public welfare offences fall under this category.1772 
                                                          
1763 Ferguson (note 165) 156. 
1764 Hanna (note 201) 453. 
1765 “…‘absolute liability’ entails conviction on proof merely that the defendant committed the prohibited act 
constituting the actus reus of the offence. There is no relevant mental element”. (per Dickson J in R v Sault ste. 
Marie (note 1720) 362. 
1766 Hanna (note 201) 453. 
1767 Ferguson (note 165) 157. 
1768 R v Sault Ste Marie (note 1720) 373 – 374. 
1769 Ibid. 
1770 Ibid 374. 
1771 Ibid 374. See also Stessens (note 52) 497. 
1772 R v Sault Ste Marie (note 1720) 374. 
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Here the accused is also held criminally liable without mens rea being proven, however, the 
accused has the opportunity to vindicate himself / herself by proving due diligence.1773 Where 
offences requiring mens rea have been committed ‘real’1774 criminal liability for mens rea 
offences will take place. 
 
(a) Vicarious liability 
Vicarious liability entails holding a person criminally liable for the unlawful actions and fault 
of another person.1775 This is a tort law doctrine and in Canada holding a person vicariously 
liable for crime is a notion that was not well received.1776 The courts’ argument against this has 
been that “criminal law regards a person as responsible for his own crimes only”.1777 In essence 
vicarious liability was regarded as not being suitable for crimes as one of the elements for a 
crime is that there must be mens rea or personal fault on the part of the accused.1778 The fact 
that there is an employer – employee relationship does not justify the attribution of blame to 
the employer for crimes committed by the employee.1779 In fact the conviction of one person 
for the crime that has been committed by another without taking into consideration the fault of 
the person being accused, has been referred to as being unjust.1780  
 
In the English case of R v Huggins1781 a prison warden and his servant were indicted for the 
murder of a prisoner who had been killed by the servant. The prisoner had been put by the 
                                                          
1773 Stessens (note 52) 497. 
1774 Own emphasis. 
1775 “Vicarious liability occurs when the acts and fault of another person are attributed to the accused for the 
purpose of determining liability”. (Roach (note 310) 176). 
1776 “This doctrine was created in the law of tort in the 17th century in order to provide compensation to third 
parties who were injured by a master’s servant while the servant was carrying out the master’s business”. 
(Ferguson (note 165) 162). 
1777 R. v. Stevanovich (1983), 7 C.C.C. (3d) 307 (Ont. C.A.), 311; Roach (note 310) 176. 
1778 Ferguson (note 165) 162. 
1779 Ibid. 
1780 Colvin (note 60) 6. 
1781 R v Huggins (1730), 92 E.R. 518. 
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servant in a room 1782 which was not suitable for human habitation for a period of six weeks.1783 
The court had to decide whether the prison warder could be found guilty of the same offence, 
murder, as his servant.1784 The court found that the prison warden could not be held liable for 
murder, as  
‘He only is criminally punishable, who immediately does the act, or permits it to be done…So 
that if an act be done by an under-officer, unless it is done by the command or direction, or 
with the consent of the principal, the principal is not criminally punishable for it’.1785  
 
The decision in R v Huggins was thus based on the lack of fault on the part of the prison warden 
for a crime that required fault on the part of the accused. R v Huggins is an English case, and 
since Canadian law was greatly influenced by English law, this decision was later followed in 
Canada.1786 In spite of the fact that R v Huggins dealt with the possibility of an individual being 
vicariously liable for the crime of another, it is relevant to corporate criminal liability and 
corporate homicide as it laid the foundation for the courts’ refusal to accept the principle of 
vicarious liability where crimes are concerned. This principle is followed in  Canadian Dredge 
and Dock Co v The Queen1787 where Estey J makes it clear that vicarious liability has no place 
in criminal law with regard to natural persons.  
 
                                                          
1782 “the walls of the aforesaid room made of bricks and mortar at the aforesaid time of imprisonment…in the 
same being very moist), and the room aforesaid being situated over the common sewer of the said prison… the 
room aforesaid was very unwholesome and greatly dangerous to the life of any person detained in the same”. (Ibid 
519). 
1783 “Barnes assaulted, and carried by force the said Arne into the room, and kept him there against his consent”. 
(Ibid). 
1784 Ibid 521. 
1785 Ibid 522 -523. 
1786 “The British became the dominant force in Canada, so it is as much historical accident as intellectual 
narrowness that led us to develop our legal institutions, corporate and otherwise, around English models” 
(Welling (note 971) 85. 
1787 Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v. The Queen  (note 216) 662. 
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In R v Burt1788 the Saskatchewan Court of Appeals was faced with the question whether the 
owner of a motor vehicle could be held vicariously liable for offences committed by the driver 
of the vehicle. In question was section 253 of the Vehicle Act for the Province of Saskatchewan 
which states 
 
The owner of a motor vehicle, tractor or trailer, other than a public service vehicle, is liable 
for violation of any provision of this Act in connection with the operation of the motor vehicle, 
tractor or trailer, unless he proves to the satisfaction of the provincial magistrate or justice of 
the peace trying the case that at the time of the offence the vehicle, tractor or trailer was not 
being operated by him, nor by any other person with his consent, express or implied.1789 
 
In giving judgment Bayda J identifies the doctrine in section 253 as vicarious liability.1790 
Bayda J goes on to trace the origin of the doctrine and explains that it is a law of tort doctrine 
which “virtually does not exist outside that sphere”.1791 He further points out that the 
distinguishing factor of vicarious liability is that a person is held vicariously liable without any 
investigation being made regarding that person’s fault in the matter.1792 Bayda J comes to the 
conclusion that vicarious liability is justifiable in tort law situations as it is compensatory in 
nature and is directed at the person who stands to benefit economically as a result of that 
person’s relationship with the wrongdoer.1793 He then states that vicarious liability as imposed 
by section 253 is not justifiable as it is not compensatory in nature, but rather ‘regulatory and 
punitive’.1794 Bayda J concludes that section 253 offends the principles of fundamental 
                                                          
1788 R v Burt (1987), 38 C.C.C. (3d) 299 Sask. C.A. 
1789 Ibid 301. 
1790 “Section 253 makes the owner of the automobile automatically (with one exception) responsible for the 
wrongdoing of the driver solely on the basis of the owner-driver relationship. It is a case of pure vicarious 
liability’”. (Ibid 305). 
1791 Ibid. 
1792 Ibid 306. 
1793 Ibid 309. 
1794  Ibid 309. 
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justice1795 and is in contravention of section 7 of the Charter,1796 however, he emphasizes the 
fact that his conclusion is only with regard to natural persons, thus leaving the question whether 
the same applies to corporations unanswered.  
Bayda J points out that 
 
In a Charter context, this statement of the law means that in the case of offences requiring 
mens rea the doctrine of vicarious liability has no place whatever amongst the principles of 
fundamental justice. That is so regardless of the penalty which a conviction for the offence 
may attract. The principles of fundamental justice simply do not recognize the ascribing to 
one person of another's state of mind. Accordingly, where a statute purports to make one 
person vicariously liable for another's mens rea offence the statute may be said to offend, ipso 
facto, the principles of fundamental justice.1797 
 
Bayda J provides a thorough discussion of vicarious liability which is clear and convincing and 
in his judgment he looks at works of Prof Atiyah as well as case law which dealt with vicarious 
liability previously.1798 Roach criticizes vicarious liability by pointing out that ‘an offence that 
bases the accused’s liability on the acts and faults of another may be found to be an absolute 
liability offence that punishes the accused without fault’.1799 He goes further to state that the 
person being held vicariously liable for the offence should not be sentenced to 
imprisonment.1800 
                                                          
1795  Ibid 311. 
1796 Ibid 313. This refers to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 1 of the Charter sates that “The 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”. Section 7 
of the Charter states that “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice”. (Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms). 
1797 R v Burt (note 1788) 310 – 311. 
1798 Ibid 308 - 311. 





Another criticism against vicarious liability is that where a crime has been committed, but fault 
is not attributed to a particular individual within the corporation, the corporation may end up 
not being held liable at all, despite the existence of corporate fault.1801 
 
In spite of all the criticism leveled against the application of vicarious liability to criminal acts, 
vicarious liability is part of the history of corporate criminal liability and it has played an 
important role in the recognition and development of corporate criminal liability. 
 
In applying vicarious liability to hold corporations liable for crimes committed by their 
employees it is important to ensure that the individual concerned must have acted within his or 
her scope of employment.1802 Acting within the scope of employment does not, however, mean 
that there must be instructions or even authorization to commit a particular act.1803 Colvin states 
that “it is sufficient if the conduct falls within the area of operations that has been assigned and 
also perhaps has or is intended to have some benefit for the corporation”.1804 In fact a 
corporation may still be held vicariously liable even in circumstances where it is clear that the 
employee in committing the offence had acted against clear instructions from the 
corporation.1805 It must be noted though that “because vicarious liability does not require proof 
of personal fault on the part of the part of the master, it is only used in exceptional 
circumstances in Canadian penal law”.1806 
 
                                                          
1801 Vicarious liability “is underinclusive because it is activated only through the criminal liability of some 
individual. Where offences require some form of fault, that fault must be present at the individual level. If it is not 
present at this level, there is no corporate liability regardless of the measure of corporate fault”. (Colvin (note 60) 
8). 
1802 Ibid 7. 
1803 Ibid. 
1804 Ibid. 
1805 Ibid 7 - 8. 
1806 Ferguson (note 165) 164. 
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(b) Primary Liability 
As stated above, primary liability is in the form of absolute liability, strict liability and liability 
for mens rea offences.  
 
(aa) Absolute Liability 
Absolute liability occurs when a corporation is held liable for an offence simply due to the fact 
that the prohibited act has occurred.1807 Absolute liability offences are also known as ‘no fault 
offences’.1808 Absolute liability is found in regulatory offences.1809 Absolute liability has been 
classified in Canadian Dredge as primary liability, where Estey J explains it in the following 
manner:  
 
Where the legislature by the clearest intendment establishes an offence where liability arises 
instantly upon the breach of the statutory prohibition, no particular state of mind is a 
prerequisite to guilt. Corporations and individual persons stand on the same footing in the face 
of such a statutory offence. It is a case of automatic primary responsibility. Accordingly, there 
is no need to establish a rule for corporate liability nor a rationale therefor. The corporation 
is treated as a natural person.1810 
 
A statute will simply state that the commission of a particular act consists in the commission 
of an act. Once that act is committed, the corporation will be held liable, without it being given 
the opportunity to defend itself by stating that the individual who committed the offence had 
no intention to do so, or by providing evidence that the corporation had taken reasonable steps 
                                                          
1807 “As there is no defence of due diligence nor a requirement of mens rea, liability merely follows from the 
commission of the actus reus of the offence such that a corporation is liable for the acts of any employee who is 
acting on the corporation’s behalf”. (Hanna (note 201) 460). 
1808 Ibid. 
1809 “Regulatory offences frequently apply to corporations that have engaged in harmful conduct such as pollution, 
misleading advertising, or violations of health, safety or licensing requirements”. (Roach (note 310) 165). 
1810 Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v R., (note 216) 251. 
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to avoid the commission of the offence.1811 In R v Sault Ste. Dickson J makes it clear that with 
absolute liability offences it is not possible for the accused to escape liability by providing 
evidence that he or she was not at fault.1812 Clearly the question of mens rea does not feature 
at all when it comes to absolute liability.1813  
 
Since a corporation is guilty once it has been proven that there was an actus reus, the question 
arises as to how the actus reus of a corporation is established. Where an employee or an agent 
of the corporation has committed the actus reus, the corporation becomes liable. It is submitted 
that this creates a blur between vicarious liability and absolute liability, as the corporation is 
held liable without any fault on its part because a prohibited act has been committed by its 
employee or agent. This concern is echoed by Ferguson’s conclusion that “notwithstanding the 
Supreme Court’s claim that the corporation’s liability is primary, it seems in fact to be more 
like vicarious liability”.1814 
 
Roach’s criticism of absolute liability offences includes the fact that such offences are open to 
attack for being in contravention with section 7 of the Charter,1815 particularly where the 
penalty is imprisonment. Furthermore one of the criticisms against absolute liability that was 
referred to in Sault Ste. Marie is that absolute liability  
                                                          
1811 “Absolute liability offences are sometimes referred to as ‘no fault’ offences. Once the Crown proves the actus 
reus, the accused will be found guilty even if the accused shows that he or she is free of any fault. The fact that 
the accused did not intend the harm and took all reasonable steps to avoid the harm is no defence”. (Ferguson 
(note 165) 158). 
1812 R v Sault Ste. Marie (City) (note 1720) 374. 
1813 “Under an appropriate statute (assuming it passes constitutional muster) one can be vicariously liable for the 
acts and the state of mind of another, whereas absolute liability excludes, by definition, state of mind as a 
consideration”. (Hanna (note 201) 460). 
1814 Ferguson (note 165) 165. 
1815 Roach (note 310) 170. 
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“violates fundamental principles of penal liability. It also rests upon assumptions which have 
not been and cannot be, empirically established. There is no evidence that a higher standard 
of care results from absolute liability”. 1816 
 
Ferguson points out that in practice, absolute liability offences are “few in number; they are 
only appropriate where the penalty is relatively trivial, where there is no real stigma attached 
to a conviction, and where requiring proof of fault would seriously impair enforcement 
procedures”.1817 
 
(bb) Strict Liability 
In R v Sault Ste. Marie (City)1818 strict liability offences are defined as 
“Offences in which there is no necessity for the prosecution to prove the existence of mens 
rea; the doing of the prohibited act prima facie imports the offence, leaving it open  to the 
accused to avoid liability by proving that he took all reasonable care. This involves 
consideration of what a reasonable man would have done in the circumstances. The defence 
will be available if the accused believed in the mistaken set of facts which, if true, would 
render the act or omission innocent, or if he took all reasonable steps to avoid the particular 
event. These offences may properly be called offences of strict liability”.1819 
 
For a strict liability offence the prosecution will therefore succeed as long as it is able to prove 
the actus reus beyond reasonable doubt.1820 The accused will, however, escape liability if 
he/she is able to prove due diligence or absence of negligence on a balance of probabilities.1821 
Dickson J in R v Sault Ste. Marie (City) explains that the due diligence that is referred to when 
                                                          
1816 R v Sault Ste. Marie (City) (note 1720) 363. 
1817 Ferguson (note 165) 165. 
1818 R v Sault Ste. Marie (City) (note 1720). 
1819 Ibid 374. 
1820 Roach (note 310) 172. 
1821 Ferguson (note 165) 166. 
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discussing strict liability offences is the due diligence of the corporation itself,1822 ie that of the 
persons regarded as the directing mind of the corporation. He states that  
‘the availability of the defence to a corporation will depend on whether such due diligence 
was taken by those who are the directing mind and will of the corporation, whose acts are 
therefore in law the acts of the corporation itself’.1823  
 
In this way, the court also makes it clear that the corporation will be regarded as being at fault, 
not as a result of the application of vicarious liability, but rather based on the identification 
doctrine.1824  
 
It must be noted that the majority of statutory regulations are strict liability offences.1825 Strict 
liability offences have played a role in the development of corporate criminal liability as they 
are concerned with both individual activities as well as business activities.1826 
 
In Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v R it was made clear that one is found guilty of a strict 
liability offence once it is established that there was an actus reus and a defence of due 
diligence is not raised.1827 
                                                          
1822 “Since the issue is whether the defendant is guilty of an offence, the doctrine of respondeat superior has no 
application. The due diligence which must be established is that of the accused alone. Where an employer is 
charged in respect of an act committed by an employee acting in the course of employment, the question will be 
whether the act took place without the accused’s direction or approval , thus negating wilful involvement of the 
accused, and whether the accused exercised all reasonable care by establishing a proper system to prevent the 
commission of the offence and by taking reasonable steps to ensure the effective operation of the system”. (R v 
Sault Ste. Marie (City) (note 1720) 377. 
1823 Ibid 377 – 378.  
1824 Ibid. In this regard Ferguson states that “the inquiry into whether the directing minds of the corporation have 
exercised due diligence is focused on whether the corporation ‘has established a proper system to prevent 
commission of the offence’ and has taken ‘reasonable steps to ensure the effective operation of the system’. This 
emphasis on systems and procedures is consistent with the idea that corporate fault can be found in a corporation’s 
organizational structure, culture and ethos”. (Ferguson (note 165) 168). 
1825 Ferguson (note 165) 166. “In 1978 the Supreme Court indicated that all regulatory offences would be 
presumed to be strict liability offences, unless there was a clear indication from the legislature that either absolute 
liability or subjective mens rea was intended”. (Roach (note 310) 172). 
1826 Ferguson (note 165) 166. 
1827 “Where the terminology employed by the legislature is such as to reveal an intent that guilt shall not be 




(cc) ‘Real’ criminal liability for mens rea offences 
Usually offences of mens rea are those that have “intention, knowledge or wilful recklessness” 
as an essential element.1828 As mentioned above, Canadian courts at first rejected the idea of 
holding corporations vicariously liable for mens rea offences.1829 A gradual acceptance of the 
fact that corporations are capable of being criminally liable for mens rea offences is seen in 
cases such as R v Simington1830 and R v Solloway.1831 In both cases the judges assumed that 
corporations could be convicted for conspiracy to defraud, a crime having mens rea as an 
element.  
R v Fane Robinson Ltd1832 was, however, the case that made a pronouncement that a 
corporation is capable of committing mens rea offences.1833 The doctrine applied in R v 
Fane Robinson is a doctrine which identifies individuals holding senior positions in the 
corporation and regards their acts and faults as the acts and faults of the company.1834 This 
doctrine is known as the identification doctrine or the alter ego doctrine. With regard to 
mens rea offences, ie where the element of fault has to be proven, the identification doctrine 
is the basis for liability.1835  
 
                                                          
the defence of due diligence, an offence of strict liability arises”. (Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v R. (note 216) 
674). 
1828 Ferguson (note 165) 168. 
1829 “At common law a corporate entity could not generally be convicted of a criminal offence”. (Canadian Dredge 
& Dock Co. v R., (note 216) 674). 
1830 R v Simington (1926) 45 C.C.C. 249. 
1831 R v Solloway [1930] 2 W.W.R. 516, 54 C.C.C. 129. 
1832 R v Fane Robinson Ltd (note 1644). 
1833 Ford JA states that “I find it difficult to see why a corporation which can enter into binding agreements with 
individuals and other corporations cannot be said to entertain mens rea when it enters into an agreement which is 
the gist of conspiracy, and if by its corporate act it can make a false pretence involving it in liability to pay damages 
for deceit why it cannot be said to have the capacity to make a representation involving criminal responsibility”. 
(Ibid para 20). 
1834 Roach (note 310) 178. 
1835 Macpherson  (note 1650) 254. 
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The identification doctrine basically refers to the holding of a corporation criminally liable if, 
the person responsible for the criminal conduct is one who is regarded as the directing mind of 
the corporation.1836 To be regarded as a directing mind of a corporation, one had to be a senior 
employee thereof.1837 The identification doctrine is a doctrine derived from English law, which, 
as mentioned above, has greatly influenced Canadian law.1838   
 
In English law the common law application of the identification doctrine emanated from the 
English case of Lennard's Carrying Co., Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co., Ltd.1839 Later on, the 
identification doctrine was explained by Lord Reid in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Natrass,1840 
and it basically states that a corporation ought to be held criminally liable for acts that were 
committed by the directing mind of the company. Lord Reid described the directing mind as 
follows: 
“Normally the board of directors, the managing director and perhaps other superior officers 
of a company carry out the functions of management and speak and act as the company. Their 
subordinates do not. They carry out orders from above and it can make no difference that they 
are given some measure of discretion. But the board of directors may delegate some part of 
their function of management giving to their delegate full discretion to act independently of 
instructions from them”.1841 
 
The essence of the identification doctrine is that a corporation will be held criminally liable 
only if the crime has been committed by senior personnel, who are regarded as people who 
                                                          
1836 Bittle and Snider (note 1640) 475. 
1837 Ibid. 
1838 This can be seen in the constant citation of English cases by Canadian judges. For instance in Union Colliery 
Co. v The Queen (note 1644) 84 the judge not only cites, but bases his decision on Lord Denman C.J’s 
pronounciations in  the 1846 English case of Regina v. The Great North of England Railway Co. (note 164). 
1839 Lennard's Carrying Co., Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co., Ltd., (note 234).  
1840 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Natrass (note 249). 
1841 Ibid 171. 
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represent the will of the corporation.1842 The identification doctrine entails identifying such 
directing minds and in cases where they could not be identified, corporations could escape 
liability.  The identification doctrine came into being as a result of the fact that there was a need 
for corporations to be held liable for mens rea offences.1843 Roach makes it clear that when 
basing liability on the identification doctrine ‘the wrongful action of the directing mind is 
attributed to the corporation so that the corporation has primary, not vicarious liability for the 
acts and mind of an official who is the directing mind of the corporation’.1844 
 
The application of the identification doctrine in Canadian corporate criminal liability was, at 
first similar to that of the English law.1845 In R v St. Lawrence Corp Ltd1846 the identification 
doctrine was applied successfully and an agent who played such an important role in the 
corporation and whose portfolio put him in a position where he was literally the directing mind 
of the corporation, the conduct and intent of such a person are indeed the conduct and intent of 
the corporation itself.1847 This is the case if such a person’s conduct falls within the scope of 
his / her express or implied authority.1848 
 
                                                          
1842 Ramraj points out that the “corporation cannot act but through natural persons; it is their desires, intentions 
and purpose that are deemed to be those of the corporation”. (V Ramraj ‘Disentangling Corporate Criminal 
Liability and Individual Rights’ (2001 - 2002) 45 Criminal Law Quarterly 29, 47). 
1843 “There is said to be on this theory no responsibility through vicarious liability or any other form of agency, 
but rather a liability arising in criminal law by reason of the single identity wherein is combined the legal entity 
and the natural person; in short, a primary liability. This rule stands in the middle of the range or spectrum. It is 
but a legal fiction invented for pragmatic reasons”. (Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v R. (note 216) 675). See also 
Ferguson (note 165) 168. 
1844 Roach (note 310) 178. 
1845 Some examples of application of identification doctrine in Canada are R v Fane Robinson (note 1644) R v St. 
Lawrence Corp Ltd [1969] 3 C.C.C. 263, 281, 7 C.R.N.S. 265, 272 – 273; R v Waterloo Mercury Sales Ltd (1974), 
18 C.C.C. (2d) 248, 27 C.R.N.S. 55, [1974] 4 W.W.R. 516 (Alta. Dist. Ct.); R v Syncrude Canada Ltd [1984] 1 
W.W.R. 355, 48 A.R. 368, 28 Alta.L.R. [2d] 233[Q.B.]. 
1846 R v St. Lawrence Corp Ltd (note 1845). 




In the case of R v Waterloo Mercury Sales Ltd1849 a corporation was faced with fraud charges 
arising from the fact that its car sales manager who had odometers tampered with on used cars 
before selling them.1850 The court had to answer the question whether the corporation could be 
held criminally responsible for crimes committed by its used car sales manager, provided that 
he was acting within the scope of his employment.1851 The court in finding the corporation 
liable for the crimes committed by the corporation’s used car salesman stated that  
‘…it was the policy of the accused corporation to delegate to him ‘the sole active and directing 
will’ of the corporation in all matters relating to the used car operation of the company, and as 
such he was the its directing mind and will. His actions and intent were those of the accused 
itself and his conduct renders the company criminally liable.1852 
 
The Ontario Supreme Court in R v Amway Corp was faced with the prosecution of two related 
corporate defendants, whose chairman of Board of Directors and President, held the same 
positions in both corporations.1853 The corporations were found guilty of having defrauded the 
Canadian government by means of false presentations and submissions of false invoices and 
price lists to the Department of National Revenue.1854 Evans C.J.O.  referred to the two 
individuals  in the following manner ‘They were either directly or indirectly one might call 
joint owners of the two corporations and they were certainly the directing mind and policy-
makers and exercised control over these companies’.1855  
 
                                                          
1849 R v Waterloo Mercury Sales Ltd (note 1845) 248.  
1850 Ibid. 
1851 Ibid 250. 
1852 Ibid 254. 
1853 R v Amway Corp [1982] O.J. No. 3129, par 3. 
1854 Ibid Par 4. 
1855 Ibid Par 3. 
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In R v  Syncrude1856 a corporation was charged with criminal negligence causing death. This 
was as a result of the deaths of two workers employed by an independent contractor who had 
been killed by nitrogen gas when they entered a reactor vessel at the corporation’s plant where 
they were carrying out repairs. The identification doctrine was applied, but not successfully as 
the court acquitted the corporation. In casu the people responsible for issuing safe working 
permits were alleged to be the directing mind and will of the corporation. Agrios J questioned 
whether the  those individuals played such an important role in the corporation that they could 
be considered as its directing mind and will, in such a way that their conduct and intentions 
ought to be regarded as the conduct and intentions of the corporation.1857 He then came to the 
conclusion that he could not  “find that in a company  with 4000 employees, permit issuers, albeit 
they have the authority to implement safety procedures, can be considered the directing mind 
and will of the corporation, the alter ego of the corporation”.1858 
 
(c) Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v R 
In the leading case on the identification doctrine in Canada Estey in Canadian Dredge & Dock 
Co. v R refers to the identification doctrine as a  
 
median rule whereby the criminal conduct, including the state of mind, of employees and 
agents of the corporation is attributed to the corporation so as to render the corporation 
criminally liable so long as the employee or agent in question is of such a position in the 
organization and activity of the corporation that he or she represents its de facto directing 
mind, will, centre, brain area or ego so that the corporation is identified with the act of that 
individual.1859  
                                                          
1856 R v Syncrude Canada Ltd. (note 1845). 
1857 Ibid 250. 
1858 Ibid. 




In this case, Estey J provided an explanation of the identification doctrine. This explanation 
extended the notion of the directing mind beyond the board of company directors. In Canadian 
Dredge & Dock Co. v R Estey J’s interpretation of the identification doctrine is not the same 
as that found in English law. Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v R is a case that brought changes 
to the identification doctrine as the basis of liability for corporate criminal liability in 
Canada.1860 Basically Estey J endorsed the idea of a directing mind, as expressed in Tesco 
Supermarket, however he disagreed with idea of having a single directing mind.1861 Instead of 
the single directing mind Estey developed the identification doctrine so that it allows for 
“multiple  directing minds”.1862  
 
In Canada the application of the identification doctrine entails the holding of a corporation 
‘liable only for the acts and omissions of such persons who by reason of their relevant position 
or authority in the corporation may be said to constitute a ‘directing mind’ of the corporation, 
including all those to whom ‘governing executive authority’ has been delegated’.1863  
 
Below is a discussion of some of the significant points raised by the Supreme Court in this 
leading case on the identification doctrine in Canadian law:  
 
The case dealt with an appeal by four appellants,1864 all of whom were companies that had been 
convicted in terms of sections 338(1) and 423(1)(d) of the Criminal Code. The identification 
doctrine was a central issue in this case, particularly the question whether a corporation could 
                                                          
1860 Ibid. 
1861 Colvin (note 60) 10. 
1862 Archibald et al. (note 1648) 371. 
1863 Goetz (note 1737) 2. 
1864 The appellants were Canadian Dredge & Dock Company; Marine Industries Limited; the J.P. Porter Company 
Limited and the Richelieu Dredging Corporation Inc. 
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face criminal liability for a mens rea offence on the basis of the identification theory.1865 The 
appellants claimed that the corporations could not be held liable as the people whose action the 
corporations were held liable for ‘(1) were acting in fraud of the appellant-employers, (2) were 
acting throughout for their own benefit, or (3) were acting contrary to instructions and hence 
outside of the scope of their employment with the appellants’.1866  
 
Estey J refers to several English law cases in which the identification doctrine was applied or 
endorsed. He states that ‘the identification theory was inspired in the common law in order to 
find some pragmatic, acceptable middle ground which would see a corporation under the 
umbrella of the criminal law of the community but which would not saddle the corporation 
with the criminal wrongs of all its employees and agents’1867 
 
In dismissing the appeals, Estey J made observations and remarks that changed the face of 
corporate criminal liability in Canadian law. Apart from providing a classification of the 
offences as recognized by Canadian law (absolute liability offences, offences of strict liability 
and offences requiring mens rea) the court accepted the identification doctrine as 
 
…a court-adopted principle put in place for the purpose of including the corporation in the 
pattern of criminal law in a rational relationship to that of the natural person. The identity 
doctrine merges the board of directors, the managing director, the superintendent, the manager 
or anyone else delegated the governing executive authority of the corporation, and the conduct 
of any of the merged entities is thereby attributed to the corporation.1868 
 
                                                          
1865 Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v R. (note 216) 670. 
1866 Ibid 662. 
1867 Ibid 701. 
1868 Ibid 693. 
370 
 
In Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v R.,1869 the Supreme Court therefore embraced the 
identification doctrine. The identification doctrine as adopted in Canada basically meant that a 
person’s guilt would be imputed to the corporation only if that person is the directing mind of 
the corporation.1870 One was regarded as a directing mind only if a specific department or unit 
was the responsibility of that particular person and if the corporation benefitted from the 
crime.1871 
 
 The court, however, did not interpret the identification doctrine in the same way as the English 
Court in Tesco Supermarkets.1872 Estey provided an interpretation of the identification doctrine 
that was peculiar to Canada1873 - an interpretation that did not accept the idea that ‘a corporation 
necessarily has a single directing mind, wielding centralized authority’.1874  According to 
Justice Estey 
“A corporation may… have more than one directing mind. This must be particularly so in a 
country such as Canada where corporate operations are frequently geographically widespread. 
The transportation companies, for example, must of necessity operate by the delegation and 
sub-delegation of authority from the corporate centre; by the division and subdivision of the 
corporate brain; and by decentralizing by delegation the guiding forces in the corporate 
undertaking. The application of the identification rule in Tesco… may not accord with the 
realities of life in our country, however appropriate we may find to be the enunciation of the 
abstract principles of law there made”.1875 
 
                                                          
1869 Ibid 
1870 Ramraj (note 1842) 47, who further states that “the corporation cannot act but through natural persons; it is 
their desires, intentions and purposes that are deemed to be those of the corporation”.  
1871 Bittle & Snider (note 1642) 475. 
1872 Tesco Supermarkets, Ltd v Natrass (note 249). 
1873 Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. (note 216). 
1874 Colvin (note 60) 10. 
1875 Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v R (note 216) 693; Colvin (note 60) 11; 
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In contrast with the English identification doctrine, the interpretation of the doctrine in 
Canadian Dredge takes away the obstacle of identifying a particular individual as the directing 
mind of the corporation. It allows more than one person to be regarded as the directing mind 
of the corporation. The broader interpretation of the identification doctrine also meant that in 
Canada even though the directing mind still has to be a senior person, the directing mind did 
not necessarily have to be in top management.1876 Even the actions or omissions of people in 
lower management positions could be regarded as acts or omissions of the corporation.1877 This 
is a marked difference from the identification theory in English law, which requires that the 
directing mind be located at the senior management level.1878 
 
Another major difference between the application of the identification doctrine in English law 
and in Canadian law is the fact that under Canadian law where the ‘directing mind’ of the 
corporation acted with the aim of defrauding the corporation, the corporation escaped liability. 
“Where the directing mind conceives and designs a plan and then executes it whereby the 
corporation is intentionally defrauded, and when this is the substantial part of the regular 
activities of the directing mind in his office, then it is unrealistic in the extreme to consider 
that the manager is the directing mind of the corporation. His entire energies are, in such a 
case, directed to the destruction of the undertaking of the corporation. When he crosses that 
line he ceases to be the directing mind and the doctrine of identification ceases to operate”.1879 
 
                                                          
1876 “The identity doctrine merges the board of directors, the managing director, the superintendent, the manager 
or anyone else delegated by the board of directors to whom is delegated the governing executive authority of the 
corporation, and the conduct of any of the merged entities is thereby attributed to the corporation”. (Canadian 
Dredge & Dock Co. v R., (note 216) 693). 
1877 “The directing mind does not have to be the corporate president, but it does have to be a manager with 
responsibility for the corporate activities that result in the crime”. Roach (note 310) 15. 
1878 “The difference between the Canadian and English identification theory is that Canadian courts are apparently 
prepared to locate the directing mind at a lower level in the corporation than are the English courts”. (Ferguson 
(note 165) 164). 
1879 Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v R. (note 216) 713. 
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It is submitted that the reasoning of the judge is correct as it would be unjust to hold the 
corporation liable in a situation where it has been defrauded. In line with Roach’s view, in such 
a case the corporation itself “would be the victim of the crime”1880 indeed. 
 
The court also stated that the corporation will only be held liable for the actions or omissions 
of a person regarded as the ‘directing mind’, if such action / omission occurred with the 
intention to benefit the corporation.1881 It is also commendable to provide clarity regarding this, 
as it would not be in line with the concept of corporate criminal liability to hold a corporation 
criminally liable when it was clearly not the intended beneficiary of the crime. Where the 
actions of the directing mind are for his own exclusive benefit, the identification doctrine is not 
applicable.1882 As Colvin states “the Supreme Court of Canada took the view that the 
identification doctrine made no sense without some link either by design or by result with a 
benefit for the corporation”.1883  
 
In conclusion Estey J stated that in his opinion 
‘the identification doctrine only operates where the crown demonstrates that the action taken 
by the directing mind (a) was within the field of operation assigned to him; (b) was not totally 
in fraud of the corporation; and (c) was by design or result partly for the benefit of the 
company”.1884  
 
                                                          
1880 Roach (note 310) 178. 
1881 “Where the criminal act is … intended to and does result in benefit exclusively to the employee-manager, the 
employee directing mind, from the outset of the design and execution of the criminal plan, ceases to be a directing 
mind of the corporation and consequently his acts could not be attributed to the corporation under the identification 
doctrine”. (Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v R. (note 216) 713). 
1882 Stessens (note 52) 515 
1883 Colvin (note 60) 27 - 28;  
1884 Canadian Dredge & Dock v R., (note 216) 713 - 714.  
373 
 
Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v R played an important role in the development of corporate 
criminal liability in Canada. Apart from providing clarity regarding primary and vicarious 
liability, it provides a wider interpretation of the identification doctrine. In this interpretation 
we see the net of individuals who are regarded as directing minds being cast further than it had 
been previously. It is made clear that a corporation does not necessarily have only one directing 
mind, there may be more. In this regard, it has been stated that ‘Estey J contemplated the 
Canadian reality that a company might have multiple directing minds’.1885 This extension 
provided the possibility of making it easier to prosecute and convict large corporations whose 
structures are more complicated or sophisticated. Clarity regarding situations where the 
corporation is defrauded by its directing mind and where the benefit of the crime is derived 
solely by that individual, is also a welcomed development, as it would eliminate the absurdity 
of having corporations who are victims of crimes being held liable for those particular crimes. 
 
(d) Difficulties posed by the identification principle and the road towards reform 
As a result of the decision in Canadian Dredge and Dock the identification doctrine in Canada 
was made broader1886 in that it allowed for more than one individual to be regarded as the 
directing mind of the corporation. Moreover, the directing mind of the corporation did not 
necessarily have to belong to top management in the corporation. In cases that followed 
Canadian Dredge and Dock, however, this broad interpretation was not always applied. Instead 
the broader interpretation that came from Canadian Dredge and Dock was limited by the 
courts. For instance in The Rhone v The Peter A.B. Widener,1887 a case dealing with the collision 
                                                          
1885 Archibald et al. (note 1648) 371 who further state that “the modern and frequently multinational corporation 
has indeed evolved beyond geographic multiple minds to add a series of decision making layers”.  
1886 “Canadian courts have tended to define the directing mind of the corporation more broadly than English courts, 
in part because of the decentralized nature of much corporate activity in Canada”. (Roach (note 310) 179). 
1887 The Rhone v The Peter A.B. Widener (note 1644) 497. 
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of a tug boat and a ship, Iacobucci J refers to what Estey said in Canadian Dredge and Dock1888 
with regard to the fact that in applying the identification doctrine it must be determined whether 
the person being regarded as the directing mind of the corporation has, through the scope and 
authority of his/her work been given ‘governing executive authority’ of the corporation and 
provides an explanation of the term ‘governing executive authority’ by stating: 
“That one must determine whether the discretion conferred on an employee amounts to an 
express or implied delegation of executive authority to design and supervise the 
implementation of corporate policy rather than simply to carry out such policy. In other words, 
the courts must consider who has been left with the decision-making power in a relevant 
sphere of corporate activity”.1889 
 
Accordingly, a person who plays an active role in formulating company policies has 
“governing executive authority” and is regarded as the mind and will of the corporation.1890 
This is in contrast to a person who, after policies have been made, is in charge of the 
implementation thereof.1891 Such a person does not have “governing executive authority” and 
can therefore not be regarded as the directing mind / will of the corporation.1892   
 
Another important aspect of Iacobucci J’s explanation of “governing executive authority” is 
the fact that he does not refer to the general exercising of such authority. He speaks of the 
“decision-making power in a relevant sphere of corporate activity”.1893 A person may 
                                                          
1888 “As Estey J.’s reasons demonstrate, the focus of inquiry must be whether the impugned individual has been 
delegated the ‘governing executive authority’ of the company within the scope of his or her authority”. (Ibid 520 
– 521). 
1889 Ibid 521. 
1890 As Iacobucci puts it 
“The key factor which distinguishes directing minds from normal employees is the capacity to exercise decision-
making authority on matters of corporate policy, rather than merely to give effect to such policy on an operational 
basis”.  Ibid 526. 
1891 Ibid. 
1892 MacPherson (note 1650) 255. 
1893 The Rhone v The Peter A.B. Widener (note 1644) 521. 
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therefore have such authority when it comes to certain activities and not have it when it comes 
to others.1894 Where the person had governing executive authority, the corporation will be held 
liable. Where the person did not have ‘governing executive authority’ the company would not 
be held liable, however, such individual would face prosecution.1895 MacPherson provides an 
interesting example in which he explains this.1896 
 
In R v Safety-Kleen Canada Inc1897 the Ontario Court of Appeal applied The Rhone, however, 
in R v Church of Scientology1898 the decision in The Rhone was not applied by another panel 
of the Ontario Court of Appeal. In R v Safety-Kleen Canada Inc an appeal was heard against a 
conviction of a corporation on two counts: non-compliance with regulations and the 
falsification of documents and the latter was a mens rea offence. Both the corporation had been 
charged together with the employee who had committed the offence, Paul Howard.1899 The 
corporation operated waste oil collection trucks as well as transfer stations. The charges 
emanated from an event where Mr Howard transferred waste from a broken-down truck owned 
by a third party to the corporation’s truck.1900 Regulations in this industry must be strictly 
adhered to and both Mr Howard and the driver of the other truck had full knowledge of that, 
                                                          
1894 MacPherson (note 1652) 255. 
1895 Ibid. 
1896 Macpherson states 
“For example, assume that a fraud is perpetrated against a third party by the vice-president of marketing, using 
the corporation’s advertising department to line both the company coffers and his own pockets. The corporation 
will be liable, provided the vice-president for marketing sets policies for the advertising department (which he / 
she presumably would). The company would be criminally liable in addition to the human perpetrators of the 
fraud. If, however, the vice-president of research and development perpetrated the same fraud using the 
advertising department, it is unlikely that the corporation would be liable. The vice-president of research and 
development generally does not set corporate policy with respect to advertising. Since the vice-president of 
research and development is only a directing mind for the areas where he or she has the discretion to set policy, 
and the fraud related to the advertising department, the corporation would not be liable for the actions of the vice-
president research and development. However this does not prevent the individuals responsible for carrying out 
the fraud from potentially being convicted”. (MacPherson (note 1650) 255). 
1897 R v Safety-Kleen Canada Inc (1997), 114 C.C.C. (3d) 214 (Ont.C.A.). 
1898 R v Church of Scientology (note 1720). 




however they chose not to.1901 Apart from not complying with the regulations, Mr Howard 
falsified information on the official document concerning the transfer.1902 In applying the 
decision in The Rhone, Doherty JA stated that: 
 
“I find no evidence, however, that he had authority to devise or develop corporate policy or 
make corporate decisions which went beyond those arising out of the transfer and 
transportation of waste. In my opinion, Mr. Howard's position is much like that of the tugboat 
captain in The Rhône, supra. Both had extensive responsibilities and discretion, but neither 
had the power to design and supervise the implementation of corporate policy. The majority 
of the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the captain was not a directing mind of his 
corporate employer. I reach the same conclusion with respect to Mr. Howard”.1903 
 
 
In R v Church of Scientology the Guardian’s Office of the church had planted some of the 
members of the church as employees in government agencies that had been identified by the 
church as “enemies of the church”, so that they could steal documents, thus breaching “their 
oath of office”.1904 The church was prosecuted and convicted in the court a quo. The appeal 
was dismissed in the appeal court, which applied the identification doctrine. On appeal it was 
argued that the applicable law was the one stated in The Rhone.1905 The court did not accept 
                                                          
1901 “Both men knew that they needed verbal authorization from the Ministry of the Environment to do so. They 
also knew that the transfer required a new manifest complete with a new generator number. After one attempt to 
contact the Ministry proved unsuccessful, Mr Corcoran and Mr Howard went ahead without authorization and 
transferred the waste water into Mr Howard's truck”. (Ibid para 6). 
1902 “Mr Howard immediately completed Part C of the original manifest showing that the waste water had been 
received at the appellant's transfer site in Trenton at 2:30 p.m. This was patently false. In fact the waste water was 
transferred at Mr Corcoran's garage at about 9:30 a.m.”. (Ibid par 6). 
1903 Ibid par 14. 
1904 R v Church of Scientology (note 1720). 
1905 The Rhone v The Peter A.B. Widener (note 1644). “The corporate appellant argues that even if the 
identification doctrine applies to it, the trial judge failed to direct the jury properly on the doctrine as it is now 
understood in light of the Supreme Court's decision, after the trial in this case, in "Rhone" (The) v. "Peter A.B. 
Widener" (The). In fact, the appellant submits that based on the law as enunciated by Iacobucci J. in "Rhone" 
(The), there was no evidence upon which the appellant could be convicted”. (R v Church of Scientology (note 
1720) par 225). 
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this argument and decided that the decision in The Rhone was not applicable in casu, mainly 
because the structure of the church differs from that which was referred to in The Rhone, where 
there is a board of directors which holds the “ultimate executive authority”.1906 
 
Despite the changes brought about by Canadian Dredge to the identification principle in 
Canada, it became increasingly clear that the identification doctrine was not the most ideal 
basis of liability, due to its failure to “reflect the reality of the internal dynamics of corporations, 
particularly in the case of larger corporations”.1907 Moreover the identification doctrine as a 
basis for liability proved to be dissatisfactory in that 
“It is only the misconduct of those who are relatively high up in the corporate structure that 
can cause the corporation to be criminally liable, because generally only executives have the 
discretion to set corporate policy. Middle managers do not usually set policy; rather, they are 
the instrument to implement the policy set by others. This means that at common law the 
corporation is generally immune from criminal sanction for the actions of mid- to low-level 
managers and other employees”.1908 
 
In this regard, Bittle and Snider point out that the identification doctrine is specifically aimed 
at people in senior positions in the corporations.1909 This posed a challenge when it came to 
prosecutions as even though the senior people make policy decisions in doing so they may 
                                                          
1906 “In my view, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in "Rhone" (The) did not apply to this case, and 
the trial judge properly directed the jury with respect to corporate criminal liability. The discussions by Iacobucci 
J. in "Rhone" (The) and Estey J. in R. are premised on a corporate structure in which ultimate executive authority 
lies with the board of directors. The identification doctrine renders the corporation liable as a result of the acts, in 
addition to those of the board of directors, of those persons to whom the board has expressly or impliedly delegated 
executive authority. That, however, was not this case. The Church operated in the context of a rigid command 
structure in which the board of directors was irrelevant. The board of directors did not appoint, much less delegate 
to, the senior officials of the Church. In fact, the members of the board were themselves required to sign undated 
letters of resignation. The evidence is clear that the appellant's board of directors had no executive authority. Thus, 
it is beside the point to attempt to apply principles relating to the degree of delegation of that authority”. (Ibid par 
227). 
1907 Goetz (note 1735) 2. 
1908 Macpherson (note 1650) 255. 
1909 Bittle & Snider (note 1640) 475. 
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“create or contribute to a corporate environment where subordinate managers, supervisors and 
employees feel encouraged or even compelled to cut corners on health and safety matters, even 
in the face of legal prohibitions or official corporate policy”.1910 After all, it is normally 
corporate officers in lower management levels who are faced with the actual task of 
“interpreting company policies”.1911 Roach warns that following the interpretation that only 
actions of senior persons will lead to the criminal liability of a company, may result in it being 
virtually impossible to hold corporations responsible for crimes committed by them.1912 In 
practice, these senior people are usually far removed from actual day to day operations of the 
company and play no role in the actual implementation or failure to implement company policy 
and in making decisions that may result in death or injury or other violations of occupational 
health and safety rules.1913  
 
Bittle & Snider further state that at times it was extremely difficult to identify the senior 
employees responsible for crimes committed.1914 Moreover, Colvin points out further criticism 
of the doctrine of identification by stating that ‘it distorts the allocation of liability as between 
large and small corporations’ in that there are many decisions that are made at levels other than 
the high level of management and applying the identification doctrine restrictively results in 
corporations escaping liability.1915 The identification doctrine thus found itself being criticized 
                                                          
1910 Goetz (note 1735) 2. 
1911 Bittle & Snider (note 1640) 475. 
1912 “This trend may make it difficult to hold corporations criminally accountable for crimes committed in Canada. 
The designers and even the supervisors of corporate policies in a large and economically dependent country such 
as Canada may often be so far away from the criminal acts that take place under the corporate aegis that they may 
not have the mens rea required for the particular crime. Those closer to the ground who would have the required 
fault, may not be classified as directing minds because they do not design or supervise the implementation of 
corporate policy”. Roach (note 310) 170. 
1913 Goetz (note 1735) 2. 
1914 Bittle & Snider (note 1640) 475. 




for hampering prosecutions against large corporations1916 and as a result of this and the other 
criticisms mentioned above, calls were made for the identification doctrine to be replaced by a 
more flexible approach.1917  
 
In view of the criticism against the strict application of the identification doctrine as well as the 
failure of prosecutions against some of the corporations that had committed crimes, it became 
clear that change was inevitable. The Law Commission made proposals in 1987 for an 
identification doctrine that would be of broader application.  
 
(e) The 1987 proposals / recommendations of the Law Reform Commission of Canada 
In 1987 the Law Reform Commission made recommendations for broadening the application 
of the identification doctrine. These recommendations are contained in the Law Reform 
Commission of Canada, Recodifying Criminal law, Report No. 31.1918 The Commission made 
two recommendations for the improvement of corporate criminal liability in Canada. The first 
recommendation entailed continuing with the application of the identification doctrine, but 
making it broader. This recommendation, if effected, would result in the broadening of 
corporate criminal liability in such a way that the liability of the corporation could be triggered 
by ‘directors, officers or employees acting within the scope of their authority and identifiable 
as persons with authority over the formulation or implementation of corporate policy’.1919 This 
would expand the group of people whose unlawful acts could lead to the corporation being held 
criminally liable.  
                                                          
1916 “Increasingly vocal critics argued that this legislation obviously failed to ‘reflect the reality or complexity of 
corporate decision-making in large, modern companies”. (Bittle & Snider (note 1640) 475. Ferguson states that 
“the organizational and command structure and complexity of corporations is so varied between small 
corporations and multinational corporations that a certain degree of flexibility is essential in both the wording and 
the application of the identification theory”. (Ferguson (note 165) 177). 
1917 Roach (note 300) 180. “Given the internal behavioural dynamics of corporations, it is argued that the criminal 
law must look beyond the discrete, wrongful conduct of individuals”. (Goetz (note 1735) 2). 
1918 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Recodifying Criminal law, Report No. 31, (rev. & enl. Ed 1987. 




The second recommendation was an alternative approach to corporate criminal liability. Where 
the offence was one of negligence, it was proposed that even where the individual who acted 
negligently is not held liable, the corporation should still be held liable for that negligent act of 
that individual.1920 It was a proposal to move ‘away from the identification doctrine toward a 
finding of corporate fault in its own right’.1921  The Commission was in fact proposing the 
application of the doctrine of aggregation when it comes to the attribution of corporate criminal 
liability, and this was intended for all crimes.1922 
 
The Law Reform Commission of Canada also made a recommendation that corporate criminal 
liability in Canada should be made a strict liability offence.1923 These recommendations were 
not, however, carried forth as “political will was lacking”.1924 
 
(f) 1993 Government White Paper by the Minister of Justice 
The 1993 Government White Paper by the Minister of Justice1925 was a federal government 
proposal for recodifying criminal law.1926 It included a proposal “to codify a definition of 
corporate criminal liability”.1927 This proposal is in section 22 of the White Paper which states: 
 A corporation commits a mens rea offence if 
(a) One or more of its representatives, acting under its express, implied or apparent 
authority, do or make, individually or collectively, the act or omission specified in the 
                                                          
1920 Colvin (note 60) 13; Where negligence is an element of the crime, “the relevant actions and states of mind of 
all such employees with the requisite authority could be aggregated for the purposes of fixing liability on the 
corporation. In other words, it would not be necessary for any individual to have committed the offence for the 
corporation to be guilty”. (Goetz (note 1735) 2 – 3). 
1921 Colvin (note 60) 13. 
1922 Goetz (note 1735) 3. 
1923 Bittle & Snider (note 1640) 475. 
1924 Ibid. 
1925 1993 Government White Paper by the Minister of Justice. 




description of the offence, and 
(b) One or more of its representatives 
(i) knows that the occurrence described in paragraph (a) is taking place, has taken 
place, might take place or will take place; 
(ii) has its express or implied authority to direct, manage or control its activities in 
the area concerned; and  
(iii) has, while executing that authority, the state of mind required for the 
commission of the offence, 
Whether or not the representatives referred to in paragraph (a) and those referred to in 
paragraph (b) are the same person or persons, whether or not any of them is identified, and 
whether or not any of them has been prosecuted for or convicted of that offence.1928  
 
In essence in the White Paper the Minister of Justice made a recommendation to Parliament 
that criminal liability should be attributed to corporations for ‘the acts and omissions of any of 
its ‘representatives’ while acting under the corporation’s express, implied or apparent 
authority’.1929 The term ‘representative’ is defined as "including a director, officer, employee, 
member or agent”.1930 The term ‘corporation’ is defined as including “a public body, body 
corporate, society, company, partnership and trade union”.1931  
 
Proposals contained in the White Paper advance a basis for liability which is broader than 
vicarious liability and which is also not limited in its application, as the identification doctrine 
is.1932 The proposal provides for the liability of the corporation even in situations where 
traditionally, the corporation would not be held liable. There is a recognition that the 
                                                          
1928 Government White Paper (note 1925) section 22 of the White Paper; Ferguson (note 165) 179. 
1929 Goetz (note 1735) 3. 





corporation should be held criminally liable even where the crime committed has been 
committed by individuals other than those high up in the corporation.1933 From the proposal, it 
is clear that there is a recognition that “the directing mind who has the mens rea for an offence 
does not have to be the person who physically committed the offence”.1934  
 
Similar to the 1987 Law Commission Recommendation, the White Paper contained proposals 
for the further development of corporate criminal liability in a way that would make it possible 
to cast the net wider as restrictions imposed by vicarious liability and by the identification 
doctrine would be reduced or removed. In both cases there was a move away from the ‘directing 
mind’ of the corporation. Moreover, like the 1987 Law Commission Recommendation, the 
White Paper made a clear distinction between crimes of negligence and those of intent / 
recklessness. For negligence they both suggested the aggregation theory. With regard to crimes 
of intent or recklessness the proposal in the White Paper was ‘the aggregation of 
representatives’ conduct only with respect to the attribution of the actus reus, or the guilty 
physical act or omission forming the basis of the offence. The requisite intent would actually 
have to be formed by one or more corporate representatives acting within their area of corporate 
authority’.1935 
 
In addition to that, it was proposed that corporate criminal liability be broadened in such a way 
that it includes entities, other than corporations, e.g. partnerships, limited partnerships and trade 
unions.1936 
 
                                                          
1933 “Corporate criminal liability can be imposed provided the actus reus and mens rea are proven, even if the 
Crown cannot establish which specific employees or agents in the corporation committed the actus reus and 
mens rea”. (Ibid). 
1934 Ibid. 




Proposals in the White Paper drew criticism from the corporate sector, particularly for 
“allowing corporate criminal liability without actual corporate knowledge and through the 
artificial aggregation of the acts and knowledge of various individuals”.1937 Unfortunately, 
similar to the 1987 Law Commission Recommendation the proposals contained in the White 
Paper did not result in any action on the part of the government.1938 The proposals in the White 
Paper came ten years before the amendment of the Criminal Code and even though they were 
ignored, they paved the way for reform. 
  
(g) The Westray Disaster and the Parliamentary Sub-committee of the Standing 
Committee on Justice and Human Rights, 1994 
Unfortunately, as was the case in England, it took a disaster for the Canadian government to 
realize that there was a need for the reform of corporate criminal liability in Canada.1939 This 
disaster was the 9 May 1992 deaths of 26 miners in Westray. The mine, which belonged to a 
mining company called Curragh Resources, had been opened eight months prior to the disaster, 
and at the time of its official opening it had been seen as a ray of hope in terms of addressing 
the high levels of unemployment that were being experienced at the time in that area.1940 
 
The disaster occurred when an explosion during the early hours of the morning claimed the 
lives of 26 miners who had been on night duty.1941 Although at first it was not clear what had 
                                                          
1937 Ibid. 
1938 “The White Paper proposals have to date been ignored by Parliament”. (Ferguson (note 165) 179). 
1939 Bittle and Snider (note 1642) 474 where it is noted that “as is often the case, the latest government initiative 
to get tough on corporate crime followed a much-publicized disaster”. 
1940 “Traditionally, unemployment in the area was high (over 25 percent), and many of the younger people had to 
leave to other parts of Canada to find employment. Westray promised to turn things around in a significant way: 
fifteen to twenty years of employment at good wages were guaranteed for 200 local residents and, of course, 
spinoff benefits for the local economy”. (C Goff ‘The Westray Mine Disaster: Media Coverage of a Corporate 
Crime in Canada’ in HN Pontell and D Shichor Contemporary Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice – Essays in 




caused the explosion,1942 it later transpired that there was an underground methane gas 
explosion.1943 The strength of the explosion was such that “the blast, apparently caused when 
sparks from a mining machine ignited methane gas, was so intense that ‘it blew the top off the 
mine entrance, more than a mile above the blast centre’”.1944 It is therefore not surprising that 
it was not possible to recover all the victims’ bodies.1945 
 
After the disaster, the question of safety standards at Westray was raised. Apparently, the area 
where the mine was located was known for having high levels of methane gas, which prior to 
the Westray disaster, had claimed 290 miners’ lives over a period of time.1946  
 
It has been stated that the Westray disaster “might have been prevented by corporate 
compliance with health and safety”.1947 The subsequent prosecution of the company and its 
three directors failed mainly due to the fact that “it was deemed too difficult to determine legal 
responsibility”1948 and this was subsequently followed by a public inquiry which subsequently 
led to the law to being reformed.1949  
 
In 1994 recommendations based on the 1987 Law Reform Commission Proposals were made 
by a Parliamentary Sub-committee of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights. 
                                                          
1942 Ibid. 
1943 Bittle & Snider (note 1640) 474. 
1944 Ibid. 
1945 “Fifteen of the victim’s bodies were recovered; rescuers were unable to reach the remaining eleven victims, 
whose bodies remain trapped in the mine to this day”. (Ibid). 
1946 Goff (note 1940) 197. 
1947 Archibald et al. (note 1648) 367. 
1948 Bittle & Snider (note 1640) 474. 
1949 “In 1997, the Nova Scotia public inquiry into the Westray Mine disaster recommended that the federal 
government study the issue of the accountability of corporate executives and directors for corporate wrongdoing, 
particularly in relation to workplace safety, and introduce any necessary legislation”. (Goetz (note 1735) 3). 
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It was recommended that “corporations be made liable for any ‘collective failure’ to exercise 
reasonable care by any or all corporate ‘representatives’”.1950 
 
(h) The Recommendations made in the Report of the Westray Inquiry, 1997 
Following the failure of the prosecution for the Westray Disaster, the Royal Commission of 
Inquiry was established with a view to investigating the Westray disaster. The Royal 
Commission’s findings were reported in The Westray Story: a Predictable Path to Disaster 
(Report of the Westray Inquiry 1997).1951 Among the recommendations made by the Royal 
Commission of Inquiry, was a call for a change in the Criminal Code of Canada in such a way 
that corporate officials would be held ‘properly accountable for workplace safety’.1952 
 
As part of responding to the recommendations made in  the Report of the Westray Inquiry there 
was an introduction in the House of Commons of private members’ bills ‘providing for 
enhanced criminal accountability of corporations and senior corporate officials for corporate 
wrongdoing’.1953 Although these Bills contained important proposals,1954 none of them reached 
a point where they were adopted as law. 
 
(i) Bill C-468, 1999  
                                                          
1950 Bittle & Snider  (note 1640) 476. 
1951 Ibid 474. 
1952 Ibid. 
1953 Goetz (note 1735) 3. 
1954 “These bills would have extended the basis of attributing criminal liability to corporations by: 1) expanding 
the  category of individuals whose acts or omissions could supply the physical element of an offence (the actus 
reus); and 2) permitting the mental element of the offence (mens rea) to be attributed to the corporation through 
various scenarios of management participation or collective management negligence. The bills also would have 
shifted the onus to the corporation to disprove the various scenarios for attributing fault to the corporation once 
the physical element of the offence had been established. The bills also sought to facilitate the personal criminal 
liability of corporate directors and officers in respect of crimes attributable to the corporation either where these 
officials were aware of such wrongdoing, or where it was deemed that they should have been aware of it. Finally, 
the bills proposed the creation of a new Criminal Code offence of failing to provide a safe working place, aimed 
at corporations and their directors and officers”. (Ibid 3).  
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Bill C-468 – ‘An act to amend the Criminal Code to make corporations and directors of 
corporations liable when they knowingly permit unsafe working conditions’, was introduced 
by New Democratic Party leader Ms Alexa McDonough at the 36th Parliament in 1999.1955 
According to McDonough Bill C-468 would give MPs “the chance to stand up to those who 
wilfully risk the safety of their employees”.1956 Bill C-468 did not proceed any further, after 
the 1st session of the 36th Parliament ended.1957 
 
(j) Bill C-259, 1999 
Bill C- 259 An Act to amend the Criminal Code (criminal liability of corporations, directors 
and officers) was introduced by Ms Desjarlais in the House of Commons, also in the 36th 
Parliament in 1999.1958 The Bill proposed the amendment of the Criminal Code by adding 
section 467.3; 467.4; 467.5; and 467.6 to the Criminal Code which would deal with offences 
by corporations, directors and officers.1959 The phrase ‘management of a corporation’ is 
explained in wide terms and includes directors, officers and even individuals to whom day to 
day duties have been delegated,1960 and it included situations where there was failure to prevent 
the crime.1961 
 
The proposal made in Bill C- 259 would widen the scope of corporate criminal liability as ‘a 
corporation to be guilty of an offence under subsection (2), it is not necessary to show that the 
person who committed or ordered the act or omission was or was a part of the management of 
                                                          
1955 Bill C-468 (Historical) An Act to ament the Criminal Code (criminal liability of directors and officers) 
http://openparliament.ca/bills/36-1/ C-648 (25 November 2013). 
1956 Ibid. 
1957 Bittle & Snider (note 1640) 476; Goetz (note 1735) 3. 
1958 Goetz (note 1735) 3. 
1959 Bill C-259 An Act to amend the Criminal Code (criminal liability of corporations, directors and officers) 
R.S., c. C-46. 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=2330610&Language=E&Mode=1&File=16 
(25 November 2013). 
1960 Proposed section 467.3. 
1961 Proposed section 467.3. 
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the corporation’.1962 The proposal also included the possibility of the personal criminal liability 
of directors or officers of a convicted corporation, even in the event where the director or officer 
did not know that the said crime was being committed but should have known that a crime was 
being committed or was likely to be committed.1963 
 
It was further proposed that corporations that fail to take reasonable measures to ensure safe 
working conditions be convicted and fined.1964 Where such convictions take place, the directors 
and officers, who ought to have known that the working conditions are not safe would also face 
personal criminal liability.1965 Bill C-259 also did not make headway as it ceased when the 36th 
Parliament was dissolved.1966  
 
(k) Bill C-284, 2001 
Out of frustration from the Liberal government’s failure to reform the laws regulating corporate 
criminal liability, Bill C-284 was tabled by the New Democratic Party.1967 Bill C-284 was 
characterised by its emphasis on “corporate culture”.1968 Bittle and Snider explain that 
corporate culture is a concept that was developed by the Australian government in 1995.1969 
They go on to define corporate culture as meaning that “senior management could be held 
criminally liable if a corporate culture – defined as an ‘attitude, policy, rule course of conduct 
or practice existing within the corporate body generally or in the part of the body corporate in 
which the relevant activities take place’ – allowed or encouraged violation or facilitated law 
avoidance”.1970 It is further stated that corporate culture ‘signifies official recognition that in 
                                                          
1962 Proposed section 467.4.  
1963 Proposed section 467.4. 
1964 Proposed section 467.5. 
1965 Proposed section 467.5. 
1966 Goetz (note 1737) 3. 
1967 Bitlle & Snider (note 1640) 476. 





any profit-making business there is always ample motivation to justify or ignore unsafe 
working conditions’.1971 Bill C-284 was ‘withdrawn at second reading stage’.1972 It was then 
passed on to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights for 
study.1973  
 
This was followed by hearings, during which more than 30 witnesses provided evidence to the 
Justice Committee. The Committee then issued a recommendation in 2002 that “the 
Government table in the House legislation to deal with the criminal liability of corporations, 
directors and officers”.1974  
 
IV THE CURRENT REGULATION OF CORPORATE HOMICIDE IN CANADA 
(a) Bill C-45  
Bill C-45, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (criminal liability of organizations) was given 
Royal Assent on 7 November 20031975 and became law on March 31 2004.1976 The legislation, 
also known as the Westray Bill,1977 was a direct response to the Justice Committee’s 
recommendation1978 and its aim was to remove the obstacles to prosecuting larger 
corporations.1979 Through the Bill, the Canadian government has, for the first time, made 
statutory provisions that deal specifically with the criminal liability of corporations.1980 The 
                                                          
1971 Ibid. 
1972 Ibid. 
1973 Goetz (note 1735) 3. 
1974 Ibid. 
1975 Macpherson (note 1650) 253. 
1976 “The Criminal Code was amended effective 31 March 2004 to alter the rules used to determine when a 
corporation is criminally responsible, expanding significantly the categories of persons whose actions can trigger 
corporate criminal liability. These changes have been described as a ‘revolution’ in the criminal liability of 
corporations”. (Van Duzer (note 1656) 200). 
1977 The Westray disaster led to public outcries that the corporation and its directors should not escape criminal 
liability, which led to Bill C-45. (Dusome (1728) 121). 
1978 Goetz (note 1735) 3. 
1979 Welling et al. (note 971) 236. 
1980 Bittle & Snider (note 1640) 471. 
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Bill has codified corporate criminal liability and it has also brought about significant changes 
to corporate criminal liability in Canada.1981 The main features of the Bill are extension of 
criminal liability to entities other than corporations; the expansion of the basis for corporate 
criminal liability; effecting changes to rules of attribution for fault-based crimes; effecting 
changes to potential defences; increasing fines and including sentencing guidelines. 
 
(i) Extension of criminal liability to entities other than corporations 
Whereas under the common law corporate criminal liability was directed at business 
corporations, Bill C-45 moves from the common law corporate criminal liability, to the 
criminal liability of organizations.1982 In terms of the amendments brought into being by Bill 
C-45 the net of corporate criminal liability is now cast so widely that those entities that were 
previously not held criminally liable are now subject to corporate criminal liability.  
 
Prior to the amendment the meaning in section 2 of the Criminal Code of ‘everyone’, ‘person’ 
and ‘owner’ included ‘various public bodies and private entities with the legal capacity to 
engage in the relevant conduct’.1983  Bill C-45 changes the definition that appears in section 2 
of the Criminal Code of the terms ‘everyone’, ‘person’ and ‘owner’ as well as similar 
expressions. These terms now include Her Majesty and also an organization.1984 The word 
“organizations” is now used and it is defined as a  
 “public body, body corporate, society, company, firm, partnership, trade union or 
municipality or an association of persons that 
                                                          
1981 “Recent amendments to the Criminal Code have redefined the circumstances in which corporations may be 
held criminally responsible by creating a more robust and specific set of rules that expand the scope for corporate 
criminal liability substantially”. (Welling et al. (note 971) 203). 
1982 “It creates a new regime of criminal liability that applies not only to corporations, but unions, municipalities, 
partnerships and other associations of persons”. (Archibald et al. (note 1648) 368). 
1983 Goetz (note 1735) 3. 
1984 Bill C-45 (note 1647) clause 1(1). 
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(i) is created for a common purpose, 
(ii) has an operational structure, and 
(iii) holds itself out to the public as an association of persons”.1985 
 
The changed definition makes it possible to hold entities such as trade unions and associations 
lacking legal personality criminally responsible for the crimes committed in the interest of the 
entity. Macpherson observes that by extending liability to organisations “the government has 
decided that, regardless of the form chosen to undertake illegal activity…prosecution of the 
organization should be allowed”.1986 The new definition is a firm acknowledgement and 
acceptance that criminal activities may be performed by the different types of entities that exist, 
regardless of whether they have legal capacity or not and holding organizations criminally 
liable is commendable. Goetz states that it ‘expands the reach of criminal liability to a wide 
range of entities that structure and embody the collective activities and interests of associated 
individuals’.1987 It is submitted that the following observation by Archibald, Julls and Roach 
clearly sums up the effect of the new definition. 
“While previously it may have been possible under the common law to charge such 
organizations, the explicit reference to them in this legislation sends a green light to policing 
bodies and private complainants that they now become potential targets”.1988 
 
It has been observed that the new definition will have a greater impact on those entities which 
did not fall under the ambit of corporate criminal liability, prior to its codification.1989 This is 
                                                          
1985 Ibid clause 2. 
1986 Macpherson (note 1650) 256. 
1987 Goetz (note 1735) 4. 
1988 Archibald et al.  (note 1648) 375. 
1989 “The real effect of these changes, if implemented, will be felt in circles outside of the corporation (which was 
already subject to criminal law of Canadian Dredge)”. (Ibid 375 - 376). 
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likely due to the fact that the corporation is already familiar with the fact that it will be subject 
to corporate criminal liability if it commits a crime.  
 
The question that arises is on what grounds should organizations be put on the same footing as 
corporations. One of the main reasons for holding corporations criminally liable is the 
corporation’s separate existence and the acceptance that the ‘separate entity’ is capable of 
committing crimes.1990 Macpherson questions that Bill C-45 “offers no insight into why the 
other ‘organizations’ should be treated similarly to corporations”.1991  
 
 (ii) The expansion of the basis for corporate criminal liability 
One of the main changes brought about by the Bill is the move from the identification doctrine 
as the basis of liability to a form of corporate criminal liability that is not limited by relying on 
the existence of the culpability of someone in a senior position who is regarded as the directing 
mind / will of the corporation to establish corporate fault.1992 The identification doctrine that 
had been developed1993 and even been modified1994 by courts is a rule of attribution which had 
become problematic as it was making it possible for corporations to escape liability. There 
were two main grievances that stemmed from the application of the doctrine of identification. 
Firstly, as establishing corporate fault was not possible without the identification of a 
blameworthy senior official, when such identification was not possible that would mean the 
corporation escaped liability. Secondly, the application of the identification doctrine proved to 
be problematic as it had the effect of making it easier to prosecute small corporations while, on 
                                                          
1990 “In other words the corporation is a reality that permeates modern commerce and modern life in general. 
Therefore, the courts have been unwilling to place corporations outside the reach of criminal law. This is a 
pragmatic rationale for corporate criminal liability. So much occurs in the corporate form that society cannot allow 
this activity (some of it criminal) to remain untouchable by the criminal law”. (Macpherson (note 1650) 257. 
1991 Ibid 258. 
1992 “It is no longer necessary for the criminal act to be committed by a person who is a directing mind of the 
corporation”. (Van Duzer (note 1656) 203). 
1993 Lennards Carrying (note 234). 
1994 Canadian Dredge (note 216). 
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the converse, it was making it virtually impossible to prosecute large corporations. It has been 
said that the changes made by Bill C-45 “altered the treatment of the criminal mind”.1995  
 
Under Bill C-45 there is more than one manner in which organisations are held criminally 
liable.1996  
“For offences based on negligence, an organization can be found guilty if the Crown can prove 
that ‘employees of the organization committed the act and that a senior officer should have 
taken reasonable steps to prevent them from doing so’1997….For subjective intent offences – 
offence requiring intent, knowledge, or proof of fault – there must be evidence that harmful 
actions of senior officers somehow benefitted the organization”.1998 
 
It puts blameworthiness for corporate crime on the ‘representatives’ of organizations or on the 
‘senior officers’ of organizations.1999 An organization is now regarded as a party to the offence 
where one of its senior officers, with the intention of benefitting the organization takes part in 
the offence in the scope of duty; or where the senior officer directs the work of other 
representatives within the organization in such a way that they commit the offence; or where 
the senior officer whilst being aware of the fact that a crime is or is about to be committed, by 
one of the organisation’s representatives, fails to take reasonable steps to prevent that 
representative from taking part in the offence.2000  
 
                                                          
1995 Welling et al. (note 971) 236. 
1996 Bittle & Snider (note 1640) 477. 
1997 Ibid. See section 22.1. 
1998 Bittle & Snider (note 1640) 477. These will be dealt with in the discussion that follows at (iii) below. 
1999 Ibid. 
2000 See section 22.1. 
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With regard to the latter, Goetz points out that it deviates from the previous position in that 
criminal liability may be borne by the corporation or organization even where there is no senior 
person involved in the commission of the offence.2001  
 
In essence, what this means is that when determining the offence it is the conduct of 
representatives of companies that is taken into account,2002 alternatively, that of senior 
officers.2003 For an organization to be prosecuted successfully the Crown must have provided 
proof that representatives of the corporation / organization “committed the act and that a senior 
officer should have taken reasonable steps to prevent them from doing so”.2004 The term 
representative refers to people within the organization, including employees, agents and even 
contractors.2005  
 
Senior officers are defined as those members of the organization who have a vital role when it 
comes to establishing the policies of the organization or managing an important aspect of the 
activities of the organization.2006 Macpherson sees this part of the definition of ‘senior officer’ 
simply as the codification of the common law.2007 The Bill further specifies that where the 
organization is a body corporate, the term senior officers encompasses its director, chief 
executive officer and chief financial officer,2008 which means that “anyone who ‘is responsible 
for managing an important aspect of the organisations’ activities’ can render the corporation 
                                                          
2001 Goetz (note 1735) 4. “It is no longer necessary for the criminal act to be committed by a person who is a 
directing mind of the corporation”. (Van Duzer (note 1656) 203. 
2002 Whyte (note 35) 5. 
2003 “Under the new rules of organisational liability…liability for a crime will be attributed to an organisation, 
either on the basis that one or more ‘senior officers’ actually participated in the offence, or on the basis of a 
combination of the actions of one or more ‘representatives’ and the intent or negligence of one or more ‘senior 
officers”. (Goetz (note 1735) 4). 
2004 Bittle & Snider (note 1640) 477. 
2005 Whyte (note 35) 5. 
2006 Bill C-45 (note 1647) clause 2. 
2007 MacPherson (note 1650) 259. 
2008 Bill C-45 (note 1647) clause 2. 
394 
 
liable”.2009 MacPherson is of the view that this is an extension of the attribution of corporate 
criminal liability to include even the conduct of individuals who are at the lower echelons of 
the corporate ladder i.e. ‘mid-level managers’.2010 He argues that ‘‘senior officers’ would 
include those managers who implement and operationalize corporate policies set by executives 
and/or directors and points out that “this is a much lower standard than under the common 
law”.2011 Bittle and Snider also note this extension of the attribution of corporate criminal 
liability to persons who need not be the directing mind/will of the corporation.2012 Bittle and 
Snider agree with Archibald, Jull and Roach’s observation that “while this is not pure vicarious 
liability (as it only applies to senior officers) it borders on that principle”.2013 It has been stated 
that the term ‘senior officer’ represents a classic Canadian compromise – broader than the 
‘directing mind’ but narrower than vicarious liability.2014 Where senior officers have not acted 
with due diligence, the corporation may be held liable for the crime committed.  
 
The effect of this is that, the Criminal Code makes it clear that even where the offence in 
question has been committed by an employee at a low level of the corporate ladder, the 
organization may still face corporate criminal liability.2015 It is pointed out though that “for all 
crimes, whether they require negligence or intention, the actus reus element can be satisfied by 
any individual involved in the corporation committing the act. However, the mens rea element 
must be satisfied by a senior officer”. In essence in terms of Bill C-45 ‘the criminal liability of 
corporations and other organisations will no longer depend on a senior member of the 
organization with policy-making authority [i.e. a directing mind’ of the organization] having 
                                                          
2009 MacPherson (note 1650) 259. 
2010 Ibid. 
2011 Ibid. 
2012 Bittle & Snider (note 1640) 477. 
2013 Archibald et al. (note 1648) 381. Also quoted in Bittle & Snider (note 1640) 477. 
2014 Bittle & Snider (note 1640) 478. 
2015 “Canadian law therefore makes it more explicit that corporate liability can be triggered by the conduct of 
relatively junior employees”. (Whyte (note 35) 5). 
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committed the offence’.2016 In this regard Macpherson avers that corporate criminal liability is 
extended by Bill C-45 in that “it essentially eradicates the distinction between those who create 
or set corporate policy and those charged with managing its implementation”.2017 
 
(iii) Effecting changes to rules of attribution for fault-based crimes 
Section 22.2 deals with corporate criminal liability for crimes that require fault in a form other 
than negligence. These are regarded as subjective intent offences and such offences require 
“intent, knowledge or proof of fault”.2018 Where subjective intent offences have been 
committed, it is required that evidence / proof be provided, showing that the organization did, 
indeed, benefit from the criminal act.2019  
 
Paragraph 22.2 states that 
22.2 In respect of an offence that requires the prosecution to prove fault - other than 
negligence - an organization is a party to the offence if, with the intent at least in part to 
benefit the organization, one of its senior officers  
(a) acting within the scope of their authority, is a party to the offence; 
(b) having the mental state required to be a party to the offence and acting within the scope 
of their authority, directs the work of other representatives of the organization so that they 
do the act or make the omission specified in the offence; or 
(c) knowing that a representative of the organization is or is about to be a party to the offence, 
does not take all reasonable measures to stop them from being a party to the offence. 
 
                                                          
2016 Goetz (note 1735) 3. 
2017 MacPherson (note 1650) 259. 




Section 22.2 (a) refers to the traditional position2020 of having corporate criminal liability for 
mens rea offences arising if the crime in question was committed “by a person who has the 
requisite guilty mind”.2021 Although it differs from the traditional position in that that person 
need not be a person who is senior to the extent that he has an influence on corporate policy, 
Macpherson points out that “this paragraph does not expand corporate criminal liability”.2022 
 
According to this subsection 22.2(b) “corporate liability can now arise where the actions 
constituting the crime were innocently committed by employees or other lower level 
representatives of the corporation, so long as a senior officer had the required guilty mind”.2023 
In other words, under Canadian law “a corporate executive or board member can also be liable 
under the Criminal Code for aiding or abetting an offence, for counseling a person to be a party 
to an offence or being an accessory after the fact to an offence”.2024 The Criminal Code in 
section 21.1 explains who parties to an offence are. It states as follows 
 21. (1)  Every one is a party to an offence who 
 (a)  actually commits it 
 (b)  does or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding any person to commit it ; or 
 (c)  abets any person in committing it. 
 
Macpherson avers that “the statute unites the actus reus (of the other representative) with the 
fault element (of the senior officer) to hold the corporation liable”.2025 He then points out that 
                                                          
2020 It has been observed that this paragraph “seems to replicate the common law, in that if a person in a position 
of authority is a party to the offence, and is acting within the scope of his or her authority, the corporation may be 
held liable”. (MacPherson (note 1650) 259 – 260). 
2021 Van Duzer (note 1656) 204. 
2022 MacPherson (note 1650) 260. 
2023 Van Duzer (note 1656) 204. “If a senior officer directed employees to deal in stolen goods, for example, the 
corporation would be liable, even though the employees had no knowledge that the goods were stolen”. (Van 
Duzer (note 1656) 204). 
2024 Whyte (note 35) 5. 
2025 MacPherson (note 1650) 261. 
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Paragraph 22.2(b) is a not new form of attributing liability as it already exists under the 
common law.2026 Macpherson finds paragraph 22.2(b) to be “redundant”2027 and states that “it 
does not expand the conditions for corporate criminal liability”,2028 in that 
[i]f the senior officer directs another representative to commit the actus reus, and the other 
representative does so with the requisite fault element, then the other representative commits 
the offence and the senior officer abets the other representative. Both are parties to the offence 
and are thus liable. As long as the senior officer acts within the scope of his or her authority, 
paragraph 22.2(a) is satisfied and there is no need to resort to paragraph 22.2(b).2029 
 
Paragraph 22.2(c) makes it possible for a corporation to be prosecuted where a senior officer, 
who is aware of the fact that an offence is about to be committed by representatives of the 
organization does nothing to prevent them from taking part in that. It has been observed that 
paragraph 22.2(c) changes the law substantially2030 as it provides that “if any senior officer 
becomes aware that any representative is or is about to be a party to an offence, then the 
corporation would be criminally liable, subject to a due diligence defence”.2031  
 
With regard to corporate criminal liability for crimes requiring mens rea / negligence as an 
element, the organization is held liable if its representative, within the scope of his or her duties 
takes part in the offence or where it is more than one representative, the conduct must be such, 
that if it had only been one representative responsible, such representative would have been 
party to the offence. Secondly, where a senior officer or senior officers responsible for the 
                                                          
2026 “At first blush, this might appear to be a change; however, the common law has already covered this. It has 
established that if one person (the senior officer) gets a second person (the other representative) to commit the 
actus reus of an offence without the knowledge of that other person, that other person is known as ‘the innocent 
agent’ of the person with the guilty mind. The person with the guilty mind is then considered to be the person who 
‘commits the offence’”. (Ibid 261). 
2027 Ibid. 
2028 Ibid 262. 
2029 Ibid 261 – 262. 




‘aspect of the organisation’s activities that is relevant to the offence’ deviate from the 
reasonably expected standard of care that could have prevented the representative from taking 
part in the crime, the organization will be regarded as a party to the offence. It must noted here 
that “what is key is that the senior officer must have ‘departed markedly’ from standards that 
could be reasonably expected to be followed to prevent the employee from committing the 
offence”.2032  
 
The basis for liability is that the criminal conduct must be attributable to the organisation’s 
representative or senior officer. In fact, as Goetz points out, this section makes it possible for a 
corporation / organization to be held criminally liable even when no specific individual within 
the corporation / organization, has committed the crime.2033 It allows ‘the aggregation of the 
acts and omissions and the state of mind of the organization’s representatives and senior 
officers in fixing organizational liability’.2034 This overcomes the difficulty posed by the 
identification principle of identifying senior employees who had ‘governing executive 
authority’, which in many cases led to the failure of the prosecution of some companies for 
crimes committed. It is submitted that this indeed is a positive development, which is likely to 
go a long way in ensuring that corporations are held criminally liable for their crimes. 
 
In all three circumstances the corporation will only be held liable if the offence was committed 
with the aim of benefitting the corporation.2035 
 
                                                          
2032 Bittle & Snider (note 1640) 477. 
2033 Goetz (note 1735) 4. 
2034 Ibid. 
2035 Bill C-45 (note 1647) section 22.2. 
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The traditional demarcation between true crimes and regulatory offences fades away and we 
see the corporation’s liability for both, being primarily based on the fault of the individuals 
within the corporation. This is also noted by Archibald, Jull and Roach who state that 
“The new law blurs the traditional and important distinction between regulatory and criminal 
liability. A corporation can now be found guilty of a subjective intent offence because its 
senior officers (including some managers) knew that a representative of a corporation was or 
was about to become a party to the offence, but did not take all reasonable measures to stop 
that representative – an employee agent or contractor – from being a party to the offence”.2036 
 
 (iv) Safety in the workplace 
Another important aspect of Bill C-45 is that it specifically places a legal duty on people whose 
responsibility is to direct the work of others, to see to it that such people are conducting their 
work under safe working conditions. The Bill adds section 217 to the Criminal Code, which 
states that: 
“Every one who undertakes, or has the authority to direct how another person does work or 
performs a task is under a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent bodily harm to that 
person, or any other person, arising from that work or task”.2037 
 
Goetz points out that section 217 does not create a new concept in Canadian law, ‘however, by 
clarifying the existence of such a legal duty, the provision facilitates the application of the 
offence of criminal negligence, which is predicated, in part, on the existence of a legal duty.2038  
 
In addition to section 217, section 219 of the Criminal Code is also important when it comes 
to the criminal liability of corporations / organizations. In terms of section 219 
                                                          
2036 Archibald et al. (note 1648)  368-369. 
2037 The Criminal Code (note 1643) section 217. 
2038 Goetz (note 1735) 4. 
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“Every one is criminally negligent who: 
a. In doing anything; or 
b. In omitting to do anything that is his duty to do, 
shows wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons”. 
 
This provision will be discussed in more detail below, under the discussion of the future of corporate 
homicide. 
 
(v) Sentencing of organizations that have been convicted  
Bill C-45 increases the amount of the fine that may be imposed on a corporation / 
organization2039 and in addition to that the 2004 federal budget plan effected further changes 
by disallowing the deduction of fines and other legally imposed penalties.2040 This move is 
commended by MacPherson.2041 The new section 718.21 of the Criminal Code as inserted by 
Bill C-45 introduces a new way of sentencing organizations. It lists factors which the 
sentencing court must take into consideration when it comes to sentencing a convicted 
organisation. These include whether the organization benefitted from the offence; the extent of 
planning the offence and how complex the offence is; if the organization tried to hide its assets 
with a view to avoid paying a fine or restitution; previous convictions of the prosecution. 
   
                                                          
2039 In this regard Bill C-45 makes changes to section 735(1) of the Criminal Code. 
2040 Budget Plan, Annex 9 “Fines and Penalties” [Budget Plan] (Budget 2004) 
(http://www.fin.gc.ca/budget04/bp/bpa9ae.htm  (accessed 20 November 2013). 
. 
2041 “Previously, under the common law, fines were deductible unless they were either specifically disallowed by 
legislation or so egrerious that their deductibility would offend public policy. The federal government provides 
reasons based in tax law and policy for this change. In my views, there is another reason why the deductibility of 
criminal fines is problematic. This argument is based, not in tax law and policy, but rather in the criminal law. 
The Code clearly sets out the purposes of sentencing: a sentence is meant, among other things, “to denounce 
unlawful conduct”, “to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences”, “to provide reparations 
from harm to victims or to the community” and “to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and 
acknowledgement of harm done to victims and to the community”. Since these are some of the purposes of 
sentencing, the deductibility of fines (the predominant way that we punish corporate criminal wrongdoers) does 
not further any of these avowed statutory ends”. (MacPherson (note 1650) 275). 
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Furthermore, it introduces hefty fines for summary offences.2042 The Criminal Code is further 
amended by Bill C-45 so that it adds optional probation conditions for organisations.2043 These 
include making restitution, “establishing policies standards and procedures to reduce the 
likelihood of subsequent offences,”2044 seeing to it that those policies, standards and procedures 
are communicated to its representative; reporting on the implementation of those policies, 
standards and procedures to the court; making public, in accordance with the specifications 
made by the court, the offence that the organization was convicted of, the sentence that the 
court imposed and measures that the organization has put in place to avoid that happening 
again.2045  
 
Goetz points out that these probation conditions are made available for courts to impose them, 
in addition to the fine. He further explains that though the Criminal Code already contains 
probation orders the reason these ones should be added is that the existing ones were such that 
they were more geared towards natural persons and not suitable for corporations.2046 
 
 
V  CRITICISMS / SHORTFALLS OF THE AMENDMENTS BROUGHT ABOUT BY 
BILL C-45 
The Westray disaster and the failure to convict the corporation for that disaster made it clear 
that the identification doctrine was not working as a basis for liability and that there was a need 
for improvement in the field of corporate criminal liability in such a way that when it is clear 
that the activities of the corporation were the cause of deaths the likelihood of prosecution and 
                                                          
2042 Bittle & Snider (note 1640) 478. 
2043 The Criminal Code (note 1643) section 732(1).  
2044 Ibid section 732(1)(b). 
2045 Ibid section 732(1 (c), (d) and (f). 
2046 Goetz (note 1735) 5. 
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conviction should really be there. Bill C-45 came into being with the aim of improving the 
situation and its main aim was to ensure that corporate criminals were prosecuted and 
convicted. Although Bill C-45 has been hailed as constituting “a fundamental change, if not a 
revolution in corporate criminal liability”2047 it has also been subjected to criticism.  
 
The changes brought about by Bill C-45 have been blamed for blurring “the traditional and 
important distinction between regulatory and criminal liability” 2048 in that it is now possible to 
hold a corporation criminally liable for an offence that requires subjective intent.2049 
 
One of the changes brought   about by Bill C-45 is the move from holding only individuals and 
corporations criminally liable to including “every one”. The term “every one” makes it possible 
for organisations to be held criminally liable. These include partnerships, municipalities, trade 
unions, as well as “other associations of persons”.2050 It is commendable that liability has been 
expanded in such a way that individuals will not be able to hide behind the veil of an 
organisation in order to escape criminal liability. What is of concern is that the list of people 
or groups that may be regarded as “every one” has not been made to be exhaustive2051 and as a 
result just about any association of persons may find itself being subject to criminal liability. 
Dusome observes that this means that 
“any group that organizes a public meeting, with tasks assigned to members of the group, 
could be an ‘association of persons’ and be subject to possible prosecution. Even the nuclear 
family could conceivably be an association of persons under the definition in the Code”.2052                                                                      
                                                          
2047 Archibald et al. (note 1648) 368. 
2048 Ibid. 
2049 Ibid. 
2050 Ibid 368. 
2051 Dusome (1728) 120. 
2052 Ibid 121. 
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It is submitted that not making the list exhaustive results in corporate criminal liability being 
expanded in such a way that it could have a far-reaching effect. In addition to that, Dusome 
raises the important question of “how the act and mental state of such a group are to be 
established”. Dusome concludes that in this regard the change made is to broaden the scope of 
groups that may be held criminally liable, however the application of the identification doctrine 
remains unchanged: 
“we remain firmly in the identification theory, in which the act and mental state of individual 
human beings are attributed to the group for the purpose of establishing criminal liability. 
Rather than change the paradigm of the individual's act and mental state being the basis of 
criminal liability, we have just extended the basis for corporate criminal liability to the other 
groups that can now be held criminally responsible”. 
 
It is submitted that this is a point of concern and a legitimate criticism of the changes brought 
about by Bill C-45 as the idea was to overcome the weaknesses of the identification 
doctrine.2053 
 
A further shortcoming of the changes brought about by Bill C-45 is that the requirement that 
the offence in question should have been to the benefit of the corporation is no longer there. 
As Dusome points out under the current position “the test of intent to benefit, or resulting 
benefit to, the corporation is absent”.2054 
 
                                                          
2053 Dusome does, however also note the improvements brought about by the Bill C-45 changes:  
“Bill C-45 does represent an improvement in theory over the pre-existing situation in two respects. 
First, in expanding the test for liability beyond the directing minds of the common law, the bill partially 
addresses the inadequacies of the identification theory, so that fewer large groups will escape liability. 
Secondly, there is now a continuum of liability, from individuals to large organizations, so that fewer 
groups escape potential liability. If the group is unorganized, it will be small, and the individuals can 
be charged. If a criminal group does not hold itself out to the public as an association of persons, its 
members may be caught by the criminal organization provisions and the members charged”. (Dusome 




Since aggregation is included in the basis for liability, where there is more than one single 
individual who is responsible for the cause of death the prosecution’s task of proving the 
elements becomes more arduous than it was prior to the changes.2055 It is hoped that this will 
not impede prosecutions as it has been observed that 
“the number of elements to be proven, in comparison to prosecution of an individual, is 
significantly increased, requiring increased resources to pursue, increased risk of failure of 
the case, all of which can provide an incentive to seek a less costly route”.2056 
 
 Moreover, the changes brought about by Bill C-45 have been criticised for putting the blame 
for corporate crime on employees instead of taking into account the fact that decisions 
regarding safety in the workplace are usually taken at a higher level.2057 Bittle and Snider state 
that 
“All of these changes imply that corporate crime is a result of defective low-level employees – 
not of bad corporate management, malign corporate culture, or profit-maximising strategies. 
They ignore the broader context within which decisions about workplace safety are made”.2058 
 
 
(a) A discussion of some of the decisions made after the amendments brought about by 
Bill C-45 
 
                                                          
2055 “But now the prosecution also has to prove the existence of elements 7 and 9 to 14 inclusive, in order to obtain 
a conviction of the corporation. The prosecution has to prove two mens reae: the wanton or reckless disregard of 
criminal negligence on the part of the representative, and the marked departure on the part of the senior officer(s)”. 
(Ibid 133). 
2056 Ibid 137. 




“Unfortunately, since 2004, Bill C-45 charges have been laid in only six cases – we need to 
“work closely with local law enforcement to ensure they are aware of the law so that 
employers can be criminally charged after serious workplace accidents”.2059 
This is according to the Canadian Labour Congress in February 2013, almost a decade after 
Bill C-45 effected changes to the law on corporate criminal liability in the Criminal Code. This 
is in spite of the fact that the amendments brought about by Bill C-45 are progressive and 
should result in organisations being more cautious about avoiding deaths of people. It is 
unfortunate that it has been further observed by the Canadian Labour Congress that “police are 
often not enforcing the corporate criminal negligence laws introduced into the Criminal Code 
in 2004 through Bill C-45”.2060 
 
Two post 2004 decisions in which the court was faced with the prosecution of organisations 
that were allegedly responsible for the deaths of others will be discussed below. These are R v 
Ontarion Power Generation2061 and R v Metron Construction Corporation.2062 
 
(i) R v Ontarion Power Generation 
In R v Ontarion Power Generation a corporation, a generating station, was being held liable 
for having allowed a huge amount of water to be released in an area which the public made use 
of for recreation purposes and this led to two lives being lost. The case was heard in the latter 
part of 2006 and it was noted that the changes brought about by Bill C-45 were not yet effective 
when the offence occurred2063 and it could not have been the legislature’s intention that they 
                                                          
2059 Canadian labour congress ‘Death and injury at Work, Prosecutions’ 21 February 2013 
http://www.canadianlabour.ca/news-room/publications/death-and-injury-work-prosecutions (accessed 20 March 
2014). 
2060 Ibid. 
2061 R v Ontarion Power Generation [2006] O.J. No. 4659. 
2062 R v Metron Construction Corporation [2013] O.J. No. 3909. 
2063 R v Ontarion Power Generation (note 2061) para 3. 
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apply retrospectively.2064 The court was therefore bound to “apply the law as it existed on June 
23 2002”.2065  
 
The issue of the directing mind was therefore examined in accordance with relevant case law 
and the judge specifically referred to Canadian Dredge,2066 The Rhone2067 and R v Safety 
Kleen.2068 It was found that the corporation could not be held liable as the individual concerned 
was not found to be a directing mind of the corporation.2069 
 
Although the case was not decided based on the changes brought about by Bill C-45 the 
relevance of this case lies in the fact that with regard to the changes brought about by Bill C-
45 through section 22.1 read together with section 2 of the Criminal Code it was stated that 
“the combined effect of these changes is that the corporation is now linked to the aggregated 
results of the actions of its key officials and their delegates”.2070 It is submitted that the changes 
brought about by Bill C-45 are significant and commendable and had this unfortunate event 
occurred after those changes had become operational the outcome of the case would have been 
different. 
 
(ii)  R v Metron Construction Corporation 
In R v Metron Construction Corporation, the company was held liable for criminal negligence 
causing the deaths of three employees and a supervisor as a result of the collapse of a swing 
stage as it was descending from the fourteenth floor.2071 The swing stage, which is supposed to 
                                                          
2064 Ibid para 7. 
2065 Ibid para 36. 
2066 Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v R (note 216). 
2067 The Rhone v The Peter A.B. Widener (note 1644). 
2068 R v Safety-Kleen Canada Inc (note 1897). 
2069R v Ontarion Power Generation (note 2061) para 20.  
2070 Ibid para 6. 
2071 R v Metron Construction Corporation (note 2062) para 1. 
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be boarded by two people had six people on board and only two lifelines available. The swing 
stage was not able to withstand the combined weight of the six men as well as their equipment 
and it collapsed.2072 The four people without the lifelines perished. The company pleaded guilty 
as a result of the deceased supervisor’s negligence in that he allowed six people to work on the 
swing stage which was only meant for two people; and had allowed them to board the swing 
stage while being aware of the fact that it only two lifelines and also that he allowed individuals 
who were under the infuence of drugs to take part in the work that was being done.2073 The 
supervisor was regarded as a ‘senior officer’, hence the decision by the company to plead 
guilty. At issue were the aggravating and mitigating factors  
 
(iii) R v Scrocca2074 
In this case an employer in Quebec, Pasquale Scrocca, who was a landscape contractor, was 
found guilty by the court of criminal negligence causing death as a result of the death of an 
employee, Mr Aniello Boccanfuso. According to the facts of the case Boccanfuso had been 
driving a vehicle, a backhoe, which had “major mechanical defects”. While operating the 
vehicle, Boccanfuso was fatally injured as its brakes failed and the front left side of the 
backhoe’s shovel hit him. The employer was then charged with criminal negligence causing 
death and was subsequently convicted. It was established that the backhoe had been purchased 
in 1976 and  
“The uncontradicted facts establish serious and major mechanical defects including brake 
system and, after all, a vehicle whose major components are in a poor condition”.2075 
                                                          
2072 Ibid para 11. 
2073 Ibid para 15. 




The court analysed article 219 of the Criminal Code and came to the conclusion that “the 
mechanical defects result from a failure to provide proper maintenance”.2076 For that resason 
section 219(1)(b) was found to be applicable and the employer was convicted.  
Laverne CJG stated that 
“It is not conceivable that a prudent person uses a heavy vehicle for many years without at least 
annually to monitor the status of its capital for its proper functioning components. There in the 
defendant's conduct a blatant lack of care equivalent to a marked and important given his use 
of the backhoe as well as the associated risks, among others, a defective braking system”.2077 
The court further considered section 217 of the Criminal Code and clarified the point that  
“Section 217.1 does not create offense, but confirms the obligation imposed on anyone who is 
responsible for any work to take measures necessary to ensure the safety of others. It facilitates 
the proof of the offenses of criminal negligence brought against corporations or organizations 
that the meaning of "person" extends the scope of the provision to any person”.2078 
 
(b) Observations from convictions  
The Metron case serves as an indication that the mere fact that one is a senior officer makes it 
possible for that person to bind the organisation through his or her actions or lack thereof. 
Furthermore the Metron case makes it clear that Canadian law has been brought to a point 
where “it is no longer necessary for prosecutors to prove fault in the boardrooms or at the 
highest levels of corporation: the fault of even middle managers may suffice”.2079 Corporations 
and other organizations need to be aware of the fact that actions of middle managers will also 
lead to the corporation or organisation being held criminally liable. Archibald, Jull and Roach 
regard  
                                                          
2076 Ibid para 81. 
2077 Ibid para 99. 
2078 Ibid para 107. 
2079 T Archibald, K Jull and K Roach “Critical Developments in Corporate Criminal Liability: Senior 
Officers,Wilful Blindness, and Agents in Foreign Jurisdictions” 2013 (60) Criminal Law Quarterly 92, 92. 
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“the Canadian model is one that ought to be studied by other jurisdictions as an efficient model 
that avoids the difficulty of proving fault at the level of the board of directors or directing mind 
but also is a fair model that avoids holding the corporation vicariously responsible for the 
wrongs of every employee or contractor”.2080 
They further commend the judge in the Metron case for having recognised that the fault of the 
senior manager should not be separated from the fault of the corporation or organisation.2081 
 
The Scrocca case has been hailed as being “noteworthy since it is the first trial decision under 
Bill C-45 and serves to remind employers, supervisors, officers and directors that the OHS 
criminal negligence provisions carry a real risk of accountability”.2082 
From the cases discussed above it is clear that the holding of corporations and organisations 
for criminal negligence causing death that has been brought about by Bill C-45 is a crime that 
is taken seriously by the courts and corporations, organizations and employer may find it 
difficult to avoid convictions.  It is therefore crucial for all corporations, organisations and 
employers to be fully aware of the changes brought about by Bill C-45 especially since the 
sentences that may be imposed may possibly cripple them. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                         
                                                          
2080 T Archibald, K Jull and K Roach “Corporate Criminal Liability: Myriad complexity in the scope of senior 
officer” 2013 50(3) Criminal Law Quarterly http://ssrn.com/abstract=2354562 1, 2 (accessed 20 March 2014). 
2081 “A corporation should not be permitted to distance itself from culpability due to the corporate individual's 
rank on the corporate ladder or level of management responsibility: this reflects the fact that senior officers at both 
policy and operational levels are merged. It would be inconsistent if a corporation were to be held liable for the 
actions of a middle level manager and then be excused on sentencing because the manager was lower on the 
corporate ladder than senior policy makers. Such a result would be contrary to the intention of Bill C-45. By 
rejecting the American concept of vicarious liability, Bill C-45 makes it possible to identify all senior officers 
with the corporation. It does not require sentencing judges to mitigate an overbroad liability rule (ie vicarious 
liability) at sentencing. We applaud Justice Pepall's judgment which closes off this potential loophole on 
sentencing and recognizes that the fault of all senior officers should be identified with that of the corporation”. 
(Ibid 14). 
2082 N Keith “Bill C-45 sees second conviction in Canada” 26 May 2011 Canadian Occupational Safety 




(c) The future of corporate homicide in Canada 
Corporate homicide in Canada is a clear and well-established phenomenon. Even prior to the 
full codification of corporate criminal liability in the form of Bill C-45, there are several court 
cases in which corporations were charged with offences relating to causing people’s deaths. 
Even though prosecutions did not necessarily result in convictions, it is nevertheless important 
that there is an acceptance of the notion of prosecuting a corporate entity for deaths caused by 
its negligence.  
 
In R v Syncrude Canada Ltd2083 a corporation was charged with ‘criminal negligence causing 
death, following the asphyxiation of two of its employees by nitrogen gas. The deceased were 
two employees of Western Stress Relieving Servicing Inc, an independent contractor, hired to 
do repairs at a plant belonging to Syncrude Canada Ltd. At the time of their deaths they had 
been doing repairs at the Syncrude Canada Ltd plant. The first deceased had dropped a tool in 
a reactor and upon entering the reactor with the aim of retrieving it he was asphyxiated by 
nitrogen fumes. His colleague also entered the reactor with the aim of assisting the deceased, 
and was similarly asphyxiated. According to medical evidence the nitrogen gas had led to the 
two employees falling unconscious and they both died a few moments thereafter.2084 
 
Evidence presented by Syncrude Canada Ltd showed that safety measures were in place, even 
though there was room for improvement. Among its safety measures was a well-known inhouse 
rule that vessels were not to be entered into without proper authorisation.2085 This was 
supplemented by requirements that  
 A safe entry tag needs to be on a vessel prior to the vessel being entered into and such tag needs 
                                                          
2083 R v Syncrude (note 1845) 233. 
2084 Ibid 236. 
2085 Ibid 242. 
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to be read and understood. 
 A safe work permit which had to have a specific vessel entry endorsed on it was a requirement. 
 There had to be a stand-by person outside the vessel, who had to be ready to render assistance 
to the person inside the vessel. The stand-by person was required to remain there until the other 
person is out of the vessel. He was further required to have a Scott Air Pac with him.2086 
 
The prosecution’s argument was that Syncrude negligently caused the deceased’s deaths by 
letting them work in an unsafe working area where there was a reactor filled with nitrogen. The 
deceased had no oxygen masks and there was no signage warning them that there was a lack 
of oxygen inside the reactor and this gave the deceased a ‘sense of false security’.2087 
 
In making a finding, the court relied on R v Int. Paper Co. of Can.2088 in which a corporation 
was acquitted on a charge of criminal negligence. The court in R v Syncrude stated that ‘For 
there to be criminal negligence, there must be added to civil negligence the factor of 
criminality. The act or omission for which the accused is blamed must indicate a reckless 
carelessness with respect to the safety of others’.2089 It was also stated that the deceased had 
not been required to enter the vessel and they were so experienced that they should have known 
that the vessel should not have been entered into.2090 The accused corporation was acquitted of 
criminal negligence. 
 
There are other instances where Canadian corporations have caused human rights abuses 
outside Canada and this has been taken very seriously in Canada. Barrick Gold, which is a 
Canadian mining company was dealing with the deaths of several people who had been shot 
                                                          
2086 Ibid 243. 
2087 Ibid 251. 
2088 R v Int. Paper Co. of Can., [1979] C.A. 411, 50 C.C.C. (2d) 231. 
2089 R v Syncrude (note 1845) 256. 
2090 Ibid 257. 
412 
 
by police at one of its mines on May 16 2011,2091 when it was exposed for sexual attacks of 
fourteen women in Mara, Tanzania.2092 This was followed by intensive investigations which 
led to a decision that African Barrick Gold, a subsidiary of the Barrick Gold should award 
compensation to the victims of the sexual attacks.2093 There is still uncertainty regarding 
whether criminal charges will be laid though.2094 
 
Another company, HudBay Minerals Inc which is based in Toronto, along with two of its 
subsidiaries faces criminal charges for human rights abuses including the violent death of a 
community leader in Guatemala (Choc action).2095 An order was sought for a motion to strike 
the actions against the three companies (Hudbay, HMI and CGN, which was the only one not 
connected to Canada).2096 In the event of that being successful, CGN sought the permanent stay 
of the Choc action based on the fact that the Canadian court has no jurisdiction over CGN.2097  
Brown J in the Superior Court of Ontario dismissed the motion to strike the three actions as 
well as CGN”s jurisdiction motion and ruled that HudBay Minerals Inc could be held 
criminally liable in Canada for those crimes.2098 It has been stated that  
                                                          
2091 G York “In an African mine the lust for gold sparks a deadly clash” 7 June 2011 The Globe and Mail 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/in-an-african-mine-the-lust-for-gold-sparks-a-deadly-
clash/article598554/  (accessed 20 May 2014). 
2092 G York “Claims of sexual abuses in Tanzania blow to Barrick Gold” 30 May 2011 The Globe and Mail 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/claims-of-sexual-abuses-in-tanzania-blow-to-barrick-
gold/article598557/ (accessed 20 May 2014). 
2093 G York “African Barrick to compensate assault victims” 19 December 2013 The Globe and Mail 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/african-barrick-to-
compensate-assault-victims/article16063262/ (accessed 20 May 2014). 
2094 “The company said it found the complaints “credible” and “highly disturbing.” It launched its own 
investigation by a team of experienced experts, and it turned over its findings to the Tanzanian police, although 
on Thursday it was unable to say whether the police will lay criminal charges against the perpetrators”. Ibid.  
2095 R Hart (contact person) “Award winning mining company being sued for violent death of community leader: 
Industry out of step with Canadian values and expectations” 2 December 2010 Mining Watch Canada 
http://www.miningwatch.ca/news/award-winning-mining-company-being-sued-violent-death-community-
leader-industry-out-step-canadi  accessed 22 May 2014. 
2096 Choc v Hudbay Minerals Inc., 2013 ONSC 1414 para 1. 
2097 Ibid. 
2098 Ibid para 87.  
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“as a result of this ruling, Canadian mining corporations can no longer hide behind their legal 
corporate structure to abdicate responsibility for human rights abuses that take place at foreign 
mines under their control at various locations throughout the world”.2099 
 
It is submitted that the ruling is commendable and is in line with Bill C-45 in that it makes it 
possible for corporations to be held criminally accountable for crimes they have committed, 
regardless where in the world the crimes have been committed. It is likely that Hudbay and 
other companies who commit atrocities abroad will be prosecuted in accordance with the 
changes brought about by Bill C-45. 
 
The changes effected by Bill C-45 to the concept of corporate criminal liability in Canada have 
a direct effect on the concept of corporate homicide. The legislature has defined and extended 
the concept of corporate criminal liability to such an extent that corporate homicide is fully 
accommodated. Where a corporation / organization has negligently caused the death of a 
person, such corporation / organization will be prosecuted. The Canadian law is to be 
commended in that in its regulation of corporate criminal liability it specifically includes the 
issues of failure to provide safe working conditions. Moreover in terms of the Criminal Code, 
section 219, every one who endangers the lives of others by showing disregard for the lives 
and safety of others is criminally negligent and may be prosecuted for criminal negligence. As 
stated above, every one includes organizations, which in turn includes corporations. 
 
The current Canadian model has been hailed as being “a fair model that avoids holding the 
corporation vicariously responsible for the wrongs of every employee or contractor”.2100 
                                                          
2099 Choc v. HudBay Minerals Inc. & Caal v. HudBay Minerals Inc. Lawsuits against Canadian company HudBay 
Minerals Inc. over human rights abuse in Guatemala http://www.chocversushudbay.com/ (accessed 20 May 2014). 
2100 Archibald et al. (note 2080) 2. 
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Archibald, Jull and Roach look at the definition of senior officers and point out the advantages 
of having moved from the strict identification doctrine to a position where it is easier to convict 
corporations. They state that the definition of ‘senior officer’ makes it easier because, whereas 
in the past one had to look for a senior individual, currently this term includes even “a director, 
its chief executive officer and its chief financial officer”.2101 In this way the limitation as to 
which parties’ actions may lead to the corporation being held liable is broadened, and in this 
way, the chances of a corporation being found liable are higher.2102 
 
 
VI THE PUNISHMENT OF CORPORATIONS 
As with South Africa and England, Canada also makes use of the fine as the main way in which 
it punishes corporations that have been convicted for having caused death by negligence. 
Again, as in England, there are alternative sanctions that are made available to the courts, 
however, the dominant form of punishment for corporations that have caused deaths still 
remains the fine. It appears that the fine in both Canada and in England, works well and is an 
effective form of punishment for corporations that have caused death. In both jurisdictions the 
reform to the law of corporate criminal liability also brought with it additional ways in which 
corporations may be sentenced. 
 
An innovation to corporate criminal liability in Canada that was brought about by Bill C-45 is 
the possibility of sentencing a corporation by means of probation. In this way the court is able 
to compel the corporation “to take steps to repair harms that it has caused and to prevent similar 
harms in the future”.2103 It is submitted that the manner in which corporations together with 
                                                          
2101 Ibid 3. 
2102 “The scope of what constitutes a “senior officer” has been significantly broadened. The potential criminal 
liability of corporations has been dramatically increased”. (Ibid 1). 
2103 Archibald et al. (note 1648) 368. 
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other organisations are punished may make them avoid being found guilty of causing death 
through criminal negligence. 
 
(a) Sentencing Guidelines 
Since 31 March 2004 the Criminal Code requires a court which is sentencing an organization, 
including corporations, to take certain aggravating and mitigating factors into account. These 
are found in section 718. 21 of the Criminal Code. The wording of the section is mandatory2104 
therefore the sentencing courts are obliged to take the listed factors into account. 
 
(i) Any advantage realized by the organization as a result of the offence;2105 
The court has to take into account whatever benefits the organisation or corporation has derived 
from the offence. It is submitted that this is an important factor to consider when deciding on 
the sentence to impose. The more the corporation or organisation has benefitted the harsher the 
punishment should be. This would serve as an aggravating factor, whereas if the corporation 




(ii) The degree of planning involved in carrying out the offence and the duration and 
complexity of the offence;2106 
The court is further obliged to take into account the amount of planning that was involved as 
well as the period of time over which the offence took place and how complex the offence 
was.  
                                                          
2104 According to the Criminal code “A court that imposes a sentence on an organization shall also take into 
consideration the following factors…” (own emphasis). The Criminal Code (note 1643) section 718.21. 
2105 Ibid section 718.21(a). 




(iii) Whether the organization has attempted to conceal its assets, or convert them, in 
order to show that it is not able to pay a fine or make restitution;2107 
When faced with a prosecution, some organisations may be tempted to create the impression 
that they are not in a position to pay the fine or to make restitution due to financial restraints. 
If an organisation falsely creates such an impression by concealing or converting its assets, the 
court will take this into account when deciding on the sentence to impose on the organisation. 
This will serve as an aggravating factor. 
 
(iv) The impact that the sentence would have on the economic viability of the 
organization and the continued employment of its employees;2108 
In deciding which sentence to impose the court has to look at the position of the corporation or 
organisation and how it will be affected by the sentence. This makes it possible to impose a 
sentence that is suitable for the particular corporation or organisation that is being sentenced. 
It is commendable that each time the court sentences a convicted organisation or corporation it 
must look at its particular circumstances. 
  
 
(v) The cost to public authorities of the investigation and prosecution of the offence;2109 
The court is also required to take into account the amount spent on investigating and 
prosecuting the corporation for the offence which the corporation has been convicted of. It is 
submitted that taking such into account for purposes of aggravating the sentence is 
                                                          
2107 Ibid section 718.21(c). 
2108 Ibid section 718.21(d). 
2109 Ibid section 718.21(e). 
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commendable as it may have a deterrent effect. In future that same corporation or 
organisation may plead guilty and save costs when it has acted unlawfully. 
 
(vi) Any regulatory penalty imposed on the organization or one of its representatives in 
respect of the conduct that formed the basis of the offence;2110 
If in addition to being convicted, the corporation or organisation also has a penalty imposed 
on it stemming from a regulatory authority, the sentencing court must take that into account. 
It is submitted that this is a good practice as additional punishment for the same offence is 
considered when deciding on the sentence to be imposed. 
 
(vii) Whether the organization was — or any of its representatives who were involved in 
the commission of the offence were — convicted of a similar offence or sanctioned by a 
regulatory body for similar conduct;2111 
When sentencing the organisation, an enquiry as to whether the organisation or its 
representatives have on a previous occasion been convicted of the same or similar offence is 
taken into account. This is an important factor, as it serves as an indication as to whether the 
organisation or its representatives are repeat offenders. If they have   previously been convicted 
of the same offence this would serve as an aggravating factor, whereas, if the organisation and 
its representatives are first time offenders that may be used as a mitigating factor. 
 
(viii) Any penalty imposed by the organization on a representative for their role in the 
commission of the offence;2112 
                                                          
2110 Ibid section 718.21(f). 
2111 Ibid section 718.21(g). 
2112 Ibid section 718.21(h). 
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The court takes other penalties that have been imposed on the corporation or on its 
representative for the offence. 
 
(ix) Any restitution that the organization is ordered to make or any amount that the 
organization has paid to a victim of the offence;2113 
In the event that the organisation has been ordered to make any restitution or to make any 
payment to the victim for that offence, the court takes that into account when sentencing the 
organisation for the same offence that gave rise to the restitution or payment. 
 
(x) Any measures that the organization has taken to reduce the likelihood of it 
committing a subsequent offence.2114 
If it is clear that the organization has taken measures to try to ensure that the organization does 
not subsequently commit an offence this will be viewed favourably.  
 
VII CONCLUSION 
Canadian law has gradually evolved from not accepting that a corporation could be held 
criminally liable for mens rea offences, to a point where it provides a wide scope for holding 
corporations and other organisations criminally liable for their crimes. The concept of corporate 
criminal liability for mens rea offences evolved from the narrow application of the 
identification to the wider application brought into being by Estey J in Canadian Dredge to a 
point where the identification no longer features in corporate criminal liability. Corporate 
liability is therefore no longer dependent on the fault of an individual who is regarded as 
directing mind of the corporation as the aggregation of the acts of more than one individual 
                                                          
2113 Ibid section 718.21(i). 
2114 Ibid section 718.21(j). 
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may be sufficient to bring about the liability of a corporation for an offence. Moreover, 
partnerships and other organizations may now be held criminally liable in the same way as 
corporations. 
 
These recent changes to the Criminal Code that have been brought into being via Bill C-45 
have resulted in a system that facilitates the holding of corporations that injure and kill, 
criminally liable.  
From the above discussion it is also clear that sentencing an organization or a corporation is 
not an exercise that is taken lightly. It involves investigations and the attaining of accurate 
information from the corporation or organization. For the court to be furnished with correct 
information, apart from information received from investigators, corporations and 
organizations that have been convicted have to be co-operative and supply the required 
information. It is submitted that having clear instructions to follow when deciding on the 
sentence to impose is a helpful tool that has the effect of enabling appropriate sentences to be 
imposed on corporate criminals. It is further submitted that since the guidelines enable the 
sentencing courts to take into account uniform factors in making a decision, this makes the 
sentencing process to be fair and similar.  
 
Although the Canadian system also provides for fines, there are also alternative sentences may 
also be meted out to corporate criminals. The Canadian system seems to be effective, as may 
be seen from recent cases and it is submitted that South Africa ought to draw from it. It is 
unfortunate that, as in England, it was only after there was public outcry that reform was made 













PART THREE – CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER SIX – A NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CORPORATE HOMICIDE 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
I INTRODUCTION 
In part one of this thesis, corporate criminal liability was introduced as a relevant concept in 
today’s society, which is characterised by many corporate activities.2115 It was pointed out that 
corporations and corporate activities have become part of life and corporations have made it 
possible for society to advance.2116 It was further pointed out that unfortunately, such 
advancement has come at a high price,2117 i.e. the negative impact on society in the form of 
                                                          
2115 See discussion in Chapter Two III above. 
2116 See discussion in Chapter Two III (a) above. 
2117 “In recent decades, these costs, in the form of deleterious effects on the public health, safety, and welfare, 
have become increasingly apparent”. (WA Spurgeon & TP Fagan ‘Criminal Liability for Life-endangering 
Corporate Conduct’ (1981) 72 (2) The Journal of Criminal Law 400, 401 – 402). 
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corporate criminality.2118 This negative impact on society necessitates invoking criminal law, 
hence the prosecution of corporations for corporate crimes. 
 
Furthermore, as a way of showing that corporate criminality is a universal problem and that the 
consequences of corporate activities can sometimes be extremely severe, the Bhopal disaster 
was discussed in part one.2119 The Bhopal disaster does not only show that corporate activities 
can sometimes impact very negatively on society by causing illnesses, disabilities, serious 
injuries and deaths. It also shows that despite imposing civil liability on corporations and 
individual criminal liability on the directors thereof, for justice to prevail it is imperative for 
the actual corporations that are involved in corporate criminality to be held criminally 
accountable for their unlawful actions or omissions.  
 
South Africa’s section 332 of the CPA has made it possible to hold corporations criminally 
accountable for corporate crimes, as illustrated by cases discussed in part two, chapter three 
above. The mere existence of section 332 of the CPA serves as an indication that South Africa 
takes corporate crime seriously and endeavours to ensure that corporations that are involved in 
corporate criminality are subjected to criminal law.  It is submitted that corporate criminal 
liability is indeed a crucial concept in this day and age in which some corporate activities result 
in harm to members of society.2120 The reason is that corporate criminal liability not only makes 
it possible to ensure that there is justice for the victims or for the families of victims of corporate 
crimes, but through corporate criminal liability it is also ensured that offending corporations 
                                                          
2118 From the case law that was discussed in each of the jurisdictions in part two of the thesis, the corporations’ 
negative impact on society was illustrated.  
2119 See the discussion in Chapter One I above. 
2120 Spurgeon & Fagan (note 2117) 401. Bucy (note 105) 1437. 
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are subjected to prosecution and to punishment, in the same way as all other offenders. It is 
further submitted that corporate criminal liability is the most appropriate way to deal with 
corporations that commit crimes, as opposed to individual criminal liability2121 or to subjecting 
corporations to civil liability2122 only. However, for corporate criminal liability to be effective, 
adequate and just corporations need to be punished in such a way that the purposes and theories 
of punishment as outlined in part one, chapter two2123 are fulfilled. 
 
It has been shown that section 332 of the CPA is a provision that contains flaws that render it 
ineffective, inadequate and unjust.2124 The provision has been criticised for its many 
weaknesses which, among others, impede the prosecution of corporate criminals.2125 
Nevertheless, corporate criminal liability, as discussed above, is an essential part of South-
African law.2126 It is submitted that it ought to be retained, however, it is essential to embark 
on a process of reforming this area of the law as it has been indicated that it is in desperate need 
of reform.2127 
 
In this final part of this thesis although the focus will be on corporate homicide, the chapter 
will begin by mapping a way forward with regard to the manner in which reform to corporate 
criminal liability and corporate homicide should take place. A new framework of corporate 
criminal liability in South Africa will then be recommended. This will be followed by a 
discussion of the key areas of concern with regard to corporate homicide that arise from the 
                                                          
2121 (Isaacs (note 120) 252). Also see Chapter Two III (c) above. 
2122 See Chapter Two III (b) above and the suggestion that corporations should be exposed to both criminal 
liability and civil liability. 
2123 See Chapter Two VI above. 
2124 See Chapter Three V above. 
2125 See Chapter Three V above. 
2126 Snyman (note 22) 253.   
2127 See Chapter Three V and VI above. 
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comparative study as well as justification for a separate legal framework for corporate 
homicide. The thesis will then conclude with the proposed legal framework for corporate 
homicide for South Africa and an explanation thereof. 
 
II MAPPING A WAY FORWARD FOR REFORM OF BOTH CORPORATE 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND CORPORATE HOMICIDE 
The reform of corporate criminal liability may take place in several ways. One of the ways is 
by means of remedying section 332 of the CPA through the making of amendments where 
necessary. As it has already been shown that section 332 has many weaknesses,2128 making use 
of this method may mean overhauling the entire provision through amendments. It is submitted 
that an overhaul of an entire provision by making use of amendments is not an ideal solution.  
 
Another way in which reform may occur is through making use of a proposal that was made in 
S v Coetzee of remedying a provision by means of severance2129 of the parts of the provision 
that render it ineffective, inadequate and unjust. Making use of this particular method may 
resolve the problematic parts of section 332 of the CPA, however, should this method be 
followed it is imperative to ensure that after severance “what remains gives effect to the 
purpose of the legislative scheme”.2130  This may be an arduous task and for the reform 
undertaken to succeed it is doubtful that the simple severance of undesirable parts of section 
332 of the CPA will remedy the provision. Another possibility is to reform corporate criminal 
                                                          
2128 See Chapter Three V above. 
2129 Kentridge J and O’Regan J in S v Coetzee (note 56) para 108 and para 202 respectively. 
2130 S v Coetzee (note 56) para 205.     
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liability by formulating a new legal framework for corporate criminal liability that will be free 
of the weaknesses that characterise section 332 of the CPA.  
 
It is submitted that corporate criminal liability in South Africa is so defective, inadequate and 
so unjust that neither amendments to section 332 of the CPA nor severance of parts of the 
provision will lead to corporations being held criminally liable in an effective, adequate and 
just manner. Amendment or severance will not cater for all the aspects that need to be addressed 
in the process of reform. It is submitted that the problems raised by section 332 of the CPA 
may be resolved through the formulation of a new legal framework for corporate criminal 
liability in South Africa.  
 
It should, however, be noted that although formulating a new legal framework for corporate 
criminal liability will lead to reform, such reform may not adequately address the crisis of the 
unlawful causing of deaths by corporations. It is submitted that reform is also urgently needed 
urgently in this area of South African law.2131 As discussed above, many deaths have been 
caused through corporate activities, however, the prosecution of corporations for deaths is 
generally not satisfactory in South Africa2132 and this gives the incorrect impression that deaths 
caused by corporations are acceptable.2133 This perception is reinforced by the manner in which 
                                                          
2131 Rycroft states that “a more vigorous intervention by criminal law agencies is needed to bring about corporate 
resolve to avoid workplace deaths”. (Rycroft (note 365) 157). See also Burchell (note 49) 565. 
2132 There is a lack of available statistics, however, during the period between June 2012 and June 2014 there are 
no prosecutions for deaths allegedly caused by corporations or corporate activities that were reported in the South 
African Criminal Law Reports. It must be noted though that these are reports of the High Courts, the Constitutional 
Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal. They do not include decisions made by the Magistrates courts. 
2133 “The acceptance of workplace deaths tends to confirm that contrary to what many would claim, society does 
not value human life above all: it is willing to accept a degree of hazard as the price of pursuing other goods. And 
yet it has been observed that the treatment of corporate killing by the legal system is particularly problematic in 
that there is a general recognition that the law fails to satisfy public opinion when it seeks to deal with death which 
is brought about by gross negligence in the exercise of a lawful pursuit such as commerce and industry”. (Rycroft 
(note 365) 142).  
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deaths caused by corporations are treated differently2134 from deaths caused by individuals, to 
such an extent that it has been averred that “South African law treats corporate homicide in a 
different manner to other forms of culpable homicide”.2135  
 
Despite the lack of available statistics on the prosecution of corporations for deaths in South 
Africa, it is clear that there is a serious problem when it comes to prosecutions as media reports 
and civil claims for compensation continue to provide evidence that such deaths take place 
regularly. On the other hand, England has, after the coming into being of the CMCHA, 
experienced a 40% increase in the number of corporate manslaughter prosecutions.2136 The 
English law statistics show that since the changes were made to its laws there has been an 
increase in the number of corporations that are prosecuted. This is an indication that the new 
law is making a difference, albeit slowly, as the number of successful prosecutions is still very 
low. It must be noted, however, that these are simply prosecutions, not convictions. In Canada 
the number of prosecutions since the inception of Bill C-45 has not really increased and it has 
been averred that the problem is that the new law is not being properly enforced2137 
                                                          
2134 “Enforcement processes are influenced and partly determined by stereotypes of crime and criminals; 
corporations are not stereotypical deviant offenders. Whichever comes first, the chicken or the egg, is not a 
question which we are likely to be able to answer, but the deployment of words such as ‘accident’ rather than 
‘violence’ to describe the outcome of corporate risk-taking will undoubtedly influence the construction which is 
placed upon it. For these reasons, it is proposed to use the term ‘violence’ as one way of describing negligently 
caused corporate deaths and physical injuries”. Wells (note 15) 12. “The very use of the word ‘accident’ in the 
context of workplace and transport deaths, itself functions as a block to the perception of these deaths as criminally 
caused”. (A McColgan “The Law Commission Consultation Document on Involuntary Manslaughter – Heralding 
Corporate Liability” (1994) Criminal Law Review 547). 
2135 Rycroft (note 365) 157. 
2136 “Despite only three convictions since 2008 there has been a large rise in the number of corporate manslaughter 
cases opening”. ‘Corporate Manslaughter Cases Up By 40% In A Year’ Sky News 22 July 2014 
http://news.sky.com/story/1042970/corporate-manslaughter-cases-up-by-40-percent-in-a-year (accessed 22 May 
2014). “The number of corporate manslaughter cases opened by the Crown Prosecution Service jumped by 40pc 
last year as prosecutors stepped up their use of recent legislation that has produced just three convictions to date”. 
E Gosden “Corporate Manslaughter Cases Rise” The Telegraph 28 Jan 2013 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financial-crime/9830480/Corporate-manslaughter-cases-rise.html. (accessed 
22 May 2014). 
2137 “in the 10 years since Bill C-45 passed into law, there have only been 10 prosecutions. This is particularly 
concerning because the number of fatalities has not changed over that decade — the average number of fatalities 
has remained constant at about 990 every year for the last 10 years, according to the Association of Workers’ 




It is submitted that reform of corporate criminal liability which includes a specific focus on 
deaths caused by corporations in South Africa, is likely to bring about an increase in the number 
of prosecutions, as has been the case with England. There must, however, be the political will 
to ensure that the new law is enforced. Failure to do that will result in the number of 
prosecutions not increasing, while the number of deaths caused by corporations and through 
corporate activities continue to occur, as is the case in Canada.  
 
Moreover, for South Africa to be able to effectively protect the right to life in the context of 
corporate criminal liability it is proposed that reform with regard to deaths caused by 
corporations or through corporate activities should be made in such a way that there is a specific 
offence of corporate homicide that is regulated by means of a separate legal framework. This 
submission is based on the premise that death is the most serious harm against a person2138 and 
it should be given special attention through being treated separately.  
 
It is envisaged that having a separate legal framework dedicated solely to unlawful deaths 
caused by corporations2139 will lead to corporate criminal liability becoming more effective, 
more adequate and just, particularly with regard to ensuring that corporations face criminal 
prosecutions for causing loss of life. Moreover, the existence of such a separate legal 
framework may serve as a deterrent, thus increasing chances of combatting deaths caused by 
corporations or through corporate activities. 
                                                          
mag.com/legal/legal-columns/3900-after-10-years-bill-c-45-yields-few-
prosecutions.html?print=1&tmpl=component (accessed 22 May 2014). 
2138 See discussion in Chapter One III above. 
2139 “It is because safety should be rated highly in assessing the seriousness of crimes, that an appropriate system 
of criminal justice should be devised which reflects its importance both symbolically and instrumentally”. (Wells 
(note 15) 17). Also see discussion in Chapter One III which shows that when it comes to the protection of life 




With both England and Canada having recently reformed their laws in a manner “aimed at 
making it easier to prosecute corporations for homicide and for workplace injuries”2140 South 
Africa should, in forming a separate legal framework for corporate homicide, draw from 
lessons learnt through the comparative study from the reform in both countries.  
 
III RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A FUTURE SOUTH AFRICAN CORPORATE 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY FRAMEWORK 
The comparative study that has been made above clearly shows that South Africa is lagging far 
behind Canada and England when it comes to development in the area of corporate criminal 
liability.2141 As stated above, Burchell is of the view that there is a dire need for reform of 
corporate criminal liability in South Africa.2142 The view that there is a need for reform has 
also been expressed by various commentators on corporate criminal liability in South Africa, 
including Rycroft, Jordaan, Van der Linde and Borg-Jorgensen. Based on what these 
commentators have said, together with the criticisms made against section 332 of the CPA 
above2143  it is submitted that the time has indeed come for South Africa to see to it that reform 
in this area of the law takes place.  
 
Recommendations for a future corporate criminal liability framework for South Africa are 
made below. In the process of making the recommendations suggestions will be made that will 
result in some parts of section 332 that are not problematic being retained, however, for the 
                                                          
2140 Beale (note 113) 1482. 
2141 This is seen from case law in England and Canada as well as England’s CMCHA and Canada’s Bill C-45 
which have resulted in drastic changes in corporate criminal liability in both jurisdictions.  
2142 See discussion in Chapter Three III (a) (ii) above. See also Burchell (note 195) 60. 
2143 See discussion above in Chapter Three V above. 
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most part the future legal framework of corporate criminal liability for South Africa will, as 
suggested above, be drawn from lessons learnt from both the Canadian and the English 
corporate criminal liability models.  
 
(a) Entities that should be subjected to corporate criminal liability 
Currently corporate criminal liability in South Africa applies to corporations. Section 332(1) 
specifically refers to the imposition of criminal liability “upon a corporate body”.2144 The 
phrase “corporate body” limits application to commercial entities that have legal personality. 
The meaning is, however, broad enough to include local governing bodies, universities and 
other specially constituted corporations.2145 In addition to that section 332(7) makes it possible 
for corporate criminal liability to apply where an entity lacks legal personality, but in this case 
it is the members of that association of persons who face personal criminal liability.2146 The 
partnership itself is excluded from criminal liability.  
 
Apart from excluding partnerships, the current South African law on corporate criminal 
liability does not specifically apply to other associations of persons such as clubs, trade unions, 
employers’ organisations, societies, a trust created by notarial deed2147 etc. It is also mainly 
directed towards entities that are involved in commercial activities. There is, however, no 
reason why other entities are excluded from corporate criminal liability. Pieth and Ivory show 
that there are many other entities that play a role in today’s economy and that they are just as 
                                                          
2144 See discussion in Chapter Three IV (a) (i) above. 
2145 Delport et al. (note 87) Appx 7. 
2146 See discussion in Chapter Three IV (a) (vii) above. 
2147 S v Peer (note 883). 
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capable of causing harm to members of society as corporations.2148 For that reason they ought 
to also be the object of corporate criminal liability.  
 
It is therefore submitted that corporate criminal liability should not be restricted to corporate 
bodies. It ought to be extended in such a way that it also applies to entities that are not corporate 
bodies. The main consideration should be the fact that all these entities interact with society 
and, in the same way as corporate bodies, they are capable of causing harm to those with whom 
they interact.  
 
Extending corporate criminal liability in such a way that it includes entities other than corporate 
bodies will be a development that is in line with developments in the compared jurisdictions. 
In English law the CMCHA has expanded corporate homicide to include all sorts of entities. It 
is therefore possible for inter alia, partnerships, the police force, government departments, 
trade unions and employers’ associations that are employers to be held criminally liable for 
corporate homicide.2149 The CMCHA further extends liability to include entities that are listed 
in schedule 1.2150 Corporate homicide is therefore not only limited to corporations. Canada has 
similarly expanded corporate criminal liability in such a way that it is now possible for 
organisations, other than corporations to be held criminally liable for corporate crimes.2151  It 
                                                          
2148 “In industrialised economies, companies are only one vehicle for investment. National private laws recognize 
other structure (trusts, partnerships, Anstalten, Einzelunternehmer, etc.) some of which have legal personality 
under national law and others which are legally identified with their owners. Further, individuals and groups of 
citizens are not the only participants in the economy: many government and government agencies are also engaged 
in commercial activities, including in industries or sectors with higher levels of “compliance risk”. Finally, neither 
companies nor governments are the only large, complex institutions whose stakeholders have the opportunity to 
harm others through their collective operations. Non-government, non-profit entities operating in the “public” 
sector may provide important social services and otherwise exercise considerable influence over human health 
and well-being”. (Pieth & Ivory (note 24) 5). 
2149 Matthew (note 1403) 14. 
2150 See discussion in Chapter Four IV (a) (v) above. 
2151 See Chapter Five III (a) (i) above. 
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is submitted that moving away from strictly holding only corporations criminally liable to 
holding other entities criminally liable eliminates the possibility of entities escaping 
prosecution due to the fact that they are not entities that are legally recognised as corporate 
bodies. 
 
In Canada, through Bill C-45 the Criminal Code has also extended corporate criminal liability 
to those entities that are not corporate bodies.2152 As with the Canadian approach the extension 
of liability in South Africa to other entities should be “to widen criminal liability beyond formal 
corporations to include various types of collective organizations”.2153 The inclusion of entities 
other than corporate bodies to the application of corporate criminal liability will also be of 
value as “the stigma and sanctions of the criminal law promise greater deterrence from 
corporate misconduct and more opportunities for asset recovery, compensation and mandatory 
corporate reform”.2154   
 
In the CMCHA these entities or organisations have been listed.2155 In contrast with the 
CMCHA, the Canadian model does not provide a list of those entities. It merely expands the 
definition of “association of persons” to include organisations. The term organisation is 
therefore wide enough to include “organised criminal gangs”.2156  
 
                                                          
2152 See discussion in Chapter Five IV( a) (i) above. 
2153 Archibald et al.  (note 1648) 374. 
2154 Pieth and Ivory (note 24) 5. 
2155 Apart from the list in Schedule 1 in terms of section 1(2) “a department or other body listed in schedule 1”; a 
police force; a partnership, or a trade union or employers’ association , that is an employer” is also subjected to 
the Act. See discussion in Chapter Four IV (a) (v) above. 
2156 Archibald et al.  (note 1648) 374. 
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Not providing a list has been criticised for expanding criminal liability too wide to such an 
extent that  
“any group that organises a public meeting with tasks assigned to members of the group, could 
be an ‘association of persons’ and be subject to prosecution. Even the nuclear family could 
conceivably be an association of persons under the definition of the Code”.2157 
As a way of ensuring that the term organisation in the legal framework for corporate criminal 
liability in South Africa is not too wide, it is recommended that South Africa should follow the 
English law model by providing a list of entities that may be subjected to corporate criminal 
liability, and this list should include “organised criminal gangs”. The legal framework must be 
in such a way that it makes provision for the future expansion of that list. With regard to the 
CMCHA “the list of organisations to which the offence applies can be further extended by 
secondary legislation, for example to further the types of unincorporated association, subject 
to the affirmative resolution procedure (s.21)”.2158 Provisions similar to section 21 and section 
22 of the CMCHA may be therefore be included in the new legal framework for corporate 
criminal liability in South Africa so as to ensure that the list does not remain static. 
 
(b) The basis for liability 
As explained in chapter three, South Africa relies on the derivative approach as a basis for the 
liability of corporations.2159 Burchell refers to this as an “antiquated” approach.2160 This 
approach, as discussed in chapter three above2161 entails reliance on the identification of or the 
pointing out of an individual within the corporation with guilt, so that that guilt can be imputed 
                                                          
2157 Dusome (note 1728) 121. 
2158 Ormerod and Taylor (note 1485) 597. See also section 22 of the CMCHA. 
2159 See Chapter Three III (b) (ii) above. 
2160 Burchell (note 195) 472 
2161 Chapter Three III (b) (ii) above. 
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to the corporation. It is submitted that this hinders the effectiveness of corporate criminal 
liability, as the failure to identify such an individual leads directly to the inability to 
prosecute.2162 It is recommended that another basis for liability which will be more effective 
should replace the derivative approach.  
 
The identification doctrine2163 could be an option, however, it does not differ from the 
derivative approach as it also relies on the identification of a particular individual, albeit a 
senior one, within the company who is guilty of the offence. Gobert states that 
“In effect, the identification test imposes derivative liability on the company; the company’s 
liability derives from that of a person who is identified with the company and who commits a 
criminal offence”.2164 
From Gobert’s statement it is clear that the similarities between the current South African 
position and the identification doctrine are such that they are likely to present with the same 
challenges. As seen from discussions above in both England and Canada the identification 
doctrine was problematic2165 and as a way of overcoming its problems changes were made in 
both jurisdictions. It is submitted that for South Africa the solution should be found in making 
a move towards  
                                                          
2162 See discussion in Chapter III (b) above. 
2163 See discussion in Chapter Four III (a) (iii) above. 
2164 Gobert (note 1411) 316. Moreover, “With regard to the identification model, it is important to note that it 
encourages senior management or the board of directors to delegate the management of criminogenic activities to 
middle or junior level managers in order to escape liability”. (Nana (note 488) 100). 
2165 “It has been widely recognised that groups can divide responsibility within the organization so that no one 
individual is responsible for an action, or no individuals can be identified as having been responsible, thus 
shielding individuals from liability, so that without group liability independent of individuals, no one is 
responsible or punished. Such diffusion presents a serious problem for any model that requires the identification 




“a more realistic concept of corporate liability and a more sophisticated acknowledgement that 
corporations can be criminally responsible, whether collectively or individually, not just 
through the conduct of their ‘controlling minds’, but through their management, other 
personnel, and even their policies. The corporation as such can be at fault”.2166 
 
The English CMCHA imposes a duty on the corporation and then holds the corporation liable 
directly or personally for breach of that duty if senior management failure has played a 
substantial role in the breach of that duty.2167 The ‘senior management failure approach’ has 
been dubbed the “most controversial provision in the Act”2168 and the issue of requiring proof 
of failure by senior management has drawn criticism.2169 Pinto and Evans pose the following 
question 
“Does the need to prove that “senior management failure” was a “substantial element in the 
breach” reproduce the same old problems by focusing on individuals at particular levels as 
opposed to systemic fault?” 2170 
 
On the other hand, with regard to Canada changes brought about by Bill C-45 to the Canadian 
Criminal Code,2171 require that where the prosecution has to prove negligence the senior 
                                                          
2166 Burchell (note 195) 471 – 472. 
2167 Section 1(3) of the CMCHA states that “an organisation is guilty of an offence under this section only if the 
way in which its activities are managed or organised by its senior management is a substantial element in the 
breach referred to in subsection (1)”. 
2168 Matthews (note 1403) 110. It has also been criticised for among others the fact that “it would introduce 
additional legal argument about who is and who is not a ‘senior manager” and “that by aiming at senior 
management to catch larger organizations, it actually focuses on smaller organisations”. (Matthews (note 1403) 
111). 
2169 Matthews points out the concerns raised by the Joint Committees regarding the ‘senior management 
requirement’ including that 
  “- it would introduce additional legal argument about who is and who is not a ‘senior’ manager’ 
  - that by aiming at senior management to catch larger organizations, it actually focuses on smaller 
organizations”. (Ibid) 
2170 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 251. 
2171 See section 22.1(b) of the Canadian Criminal Code. 
434 
 
officers’ marked departure  from the standard of care collectively leads to the corporation or 
organization being held criminally liable.2172 
 
It is submitted that questions raised about and criticisms made against the senior management 
failure approach and against the issue of “senior officers”2173 are valid as they seem to retain 
the weakness of the identification doctrine that both England and Canada intended to move 
away from. These two approaches, are however, as seen from the discussions above an 
improvement in that they do make a move away from the strict nominalist approach.2174  
The South African system may still benefit from making use of either of these two approaches. 
It is submitted that for corporate criminal liability the senior management failure approach 
would eliminate some of the problems posed by the derivative approach. The shortfalls of this 
approach may be remedied by following the suggestion made by Nana that this approach may 
be followed with improvements being made to it.2175  Nana suggests “clearly stipulating which 
officers and employees qualify as the senior management of the company for purposes of a 
particular offence and when their acts would be attributed to the company”.2176 
The legal framework of corporate criminal liability would therefore  
 Impose a duty of care on corporations and other organisations. Although this will be a 
duty based on the common law duty of care, it is important for the duty of care to be 
clearly defined and explained in such a way that the corporations / organisations are 
                                                          
2172 See discussion on the Canadian approach in Chapter Five IV (a) above. 
2173 See criticisms of the Canadian approach in Chapter Five IV (a) above. 
2174 “The old limitations of the identification doctrine are gone and this aspect of the definition is linked to a 
particular level of management but considers how an activity was managed within the organisation as a whole. It 
will now be possible to examine the shortcomings of a wide variety of individuals within the organisation to prove 
a failure of management by the organisation…” (Ormerod & Taylor (note 1485) 602). 




fully aware of the duty imposed on them. As with the CMCHA the question whether 
the duty existed should be a question of law that is determined by the criminal court.2177 
 Where the duty has been breached, before the corporation or organization is held 
criminally liable, it must be shown that the breach was as a result of senior management 
failure. The onus will be on the prosecution to prove this. 
 
(c) The citation in summons  
Section 332 does not allow for the corporate body to be summonsed in its own name.2178 There 
is no reason that has been provided for disallowing the summonsing of the corporate body in 
its own name. The representative of the corporation who will plead on behalf of the corporation 
and who will be tried in the place of the corporation is the one whose name is cited in the 
summons. The unfortunate result of using the name of the representative is that the case ends 
up appearing as though it is a prosecution against that natural person who is tried in his 
representative capacity on behalf of the corporation and not a prosecution against a corporation. 
 
As observed above, this has the untenable result of concealing the fact that a particular company 
is being or has been prosecuted. If the case is not publicised those who deal with the corporation 
are effectively deprived of information regarding the alleged crimes committed by that 
corporation. The stigma, which serves to make corporate criminal liability more effective is 
therefore not present. The corporation continues with business as usual and unless those who 
deal with the corporations may not be aware of the allegations against that corporation unless, 
                                                          
2177 “Given the potential breadth of the categories of duty and examination of the common law necessary to 
determine whether a duty does exist, it is reassuring to see that the question whether a duty of care is owed is a 
question of law. It is for the trial judge to decide: s.2(5). Moreover, ‘the judge must make any findings of fact 
necessary to decide that question’”. (Ormerod &Taylor (note 1485) 599 – 600). 
2178 R v Hammersma  and Another (note 602) 39. See discussion in Chapter Three IV (a) (ii) above. 
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perhaps with the help of the media the prosecution is made public. Members of society who 
deal with corporations and other organisations should not have to rely on the media or chance 
to made aware of criminal court proceedings against the corporations or organisations they deal 
with. 
 
It is submitted that the new legal framework for corporate criminal liability must ensure that 
unlike the current provision the corporate body or the organisation is cited in its own name in 
the summons.  In this way it becomes clear that it is the corporate body or the organisation that 
is being subjected to prosecution. As with corporate criminal liability in England when 
proceedings are against a corporate defendant, the corporate defendant must be cited in the 
summons. Pinto and Evans point out that  
“…summonsing the wrong defendant may be fatal to the proceedings. This is particularly so if 
the defendant is a corporation, since amending the summons to change the name may be a 
substitution of the accused, not just an insignificant or merely technical modification”.2179 
 
It is submitted that making changes to the issuing of summons in such a way that the 
corporation is cited as a defendant will also put South Africa in line with other jurisdictions. 
 
(d) The inclusion of a defence 
One of the Constitutional weaknesses of section 332 of the CPA, which also makes it to be 
unjust, is that corporations do not have a defence against corporate criminal liability. Borg-
                                                          
2179 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 105. 
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Jorgensen and van der Linde observe that as a result of not having a defence the current 
provision “as it stands might not be susceptible to justification in terms of the limitation clause 
and might therefore be inconsistent with the constitution”.2180 It is proposed that for corporate 
criminal liability to be just and to be in line with the Constitution it should be possible for the 
corporation to have a defence. The framework for the future corporate criminality ought to 
include possible defences for a corporation against corporate criminal liability.  
 
It is submitted that due diligence should be a defence. If it can be shown that the corporation 
took steps to prevent the crime from taking place the corporation should be able to escape 
liability on the basis of due diligence. The new legal framework for corporate criminal liability 
in South Africa should, however, be worded in such a way that the duty of care that is imposed 
on the corporation or organisation is not undermined by the defence. Where it can be shown 
that the corporation has a valid defence, the individual within the corporation who actually 
committed the crime should be held criminally liable.  
 
(e) A legal framework that results in corporate criminal liability that is free of provisions 
that infringe upon the presumption of innocence 
In Chapter three it has been shown that the criminal courts and the Constitutional Court are 
loathe to accept provisions that undermine the Constitution by infringing upon the presumption 
of innocence. Various court cases have been discussed that show that such provisions cannot 
pass the constitutional test,2181 including S v Coetzee2182 which dealt directly with the 
                                                          
2180 Borg-Jorgensen  & Van der Linde (note 53) 459. 
2181 See discussion in Chapter Three IV (a) (v) (bb) above. 
2182 S v Coetzee (note 56). 
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infringement of the presumption of innocence in section 332 of the CPA.2183 Moreover in the 
discussion of criticisms or shortfalls of section 332 of the CPA the fact that section 332(1), 
332(4) and 332(7) of the CPA contain infringements of the presumption of innocence have 
been raised.  
 
It is submitted that the wording of the new legal framework for corporate criminal liability 
should be in such a way that there is absolutely no part of the provision that will infringe upon 
the presumption of innocence, as such infringement results in the provision being unjust.  
 
 (f) Punishment and sentencing 
As already noted one of the challenges posed by section 332 of the CPA is that it allows for 
the fine as the only form of punishment that may be imposed on a corporation. This makes 
corporate criminal liability ineffective in certain cases, especially where a minimal fine is 
imposed on a corporate criminal whose net worth exceeds that of an average corporation. That 
corporation is therefore not punished by the sentence and there is a possibility that since it faced 
no consequences, the corporation may repeat the offence at a later stage. It is recommended 
that the fine be retained but when deciding on the amount of the fine, the court must take into 
consideration factors such as how serious the offence committed is and what the corporation’s 
financial status is. In this way the fine that is imposed may lead to corporate criminal liability 
being effective. This is an important aspect that is drawn from English law.2184 Moreover, the 
court should be able to impose any amount that it deems fit for the offence committed and the 
                                                          
2183 The case dealt with section 332(5) of the CPA and found that its infringement of the presumption of 
innocence was not justifiable. See discussion in Chapter Three IV (a) (v) (aa) above 
2184 “See discussion in Chapter Four VI above. 
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offender concerned. In England in terms of the CMCHA there is no limit as to the amount that 
may be imposed as a fine. 
 
It is recommended that whilst retaining the fine, there should be other forms of punishment that 
may be imposed on a corporation.2185 It is submitted that having other forms of punishment in 
addition to or as alternatives to the fine plays a role in making corporate criminal liability or 
corporate homicide more effective. Although both England and Canada both rely heavily on 
the fine, they have both developed to a point where there are additional sentences that may be 
imposed on a corporation. South Africa should, in addition to the fine, impose sentences such 
as remedial orders, publicity orders, as well as court orders that restrict the operation of the 
corporation. It is submitted that since these additional sentences have the direct effect of 
tarnishing the image of the corporation this effectively punishes the corporation. It is submitted 
that having the additional sanctions at the court’s disposal will lead to a situation where  
“even the individualistic, rehabilitative aim of punishment could be seen as providing an 
incentive to the organisation to change its behaviour or policies, rather than just imposing a 
retributive penalty on a corporation for committing a wrong”.2186 
In this way the theories of punishment as discussed in part one of the thesis will be put into 
effective application in the new corporate criminal liability provision for South Africa.  
The theories of punishment as discussed in Chapter Two VI above are all important. It is 
submitted that the importance of the theories of punishment should be reflected in the 
sentencing regime of corporate criminal liability. Currently the fine may fulfil the retributive, 
deterrent and preventive theories, however the courts’ lack of forms of punishment at their 
                                                          
2185 See Rycroft (note 365). 
2186 Burchell (note 195) 472. 
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disposal that will ensure that theories such as restorative justice are also fulfilled means that 
the other theories of punishment are completely left out when it comes to the punishment of 
corporations. Where the nature of the corporation makes it impossible for that theory to be 
fulfilled this is not a problem, however, where it is possible for the theory to be fulfilled it is 
submitted that this it is not satisfactory to continue not to have forms of punishment that may 
be relevant. 
 
We have moved from the time when punishment was intended for the natural person who has 
been convicted of an offence, to a time when it is possible to convict corporations for offences. 
Where it is possible to fulfil the other theories of punishment through other forms of 
punishment, this should be the case. Corporations play an important role in society and like 
other offenders it should be possible to punish them in such a way that it is possible for instance, 
for restorative justice to take place through the punishment that is imposed on the corporation.  
 
It is submitted that making use of the above suggestions when formulating a new corporate 
criminal liability regime for South Africa will lead to corporate criminal liability being 
effective, adequate and just. 
 
 




It is submitted that the reform of corporate criminal liability in South Africa should include a 
specific focus on the loss of life caused by corporations and corporate activities. As indicated 
in part one of this thesis, the South African Constitution respects human life2187 and provides 
protection thereof in the form of the right to life.2188 The right of life is in turn regarded as the 
most fundamental human right2189 as well as the basis for all other rights.2190 For that reason 
apart from the general reform of corporate criminal liability in South Africa, corporate 
homicide is a concept that needs to be formally established and formally recognised in South 
African law as a specific and separate offence that entities such as corporations as well as 
individuals may be prosecuted for. In this part of this thesis key areas of concern regarding 
corporate homicide that arise from the comparative study will be pointed out, with a view to 
making proposing a legal framework for a separate offence of corporate homicide in South 
Africa. 
 
(a) Acceptance of the concept of corporate homicide 
In South African law corporate homicide is not a specific crime that is recognised on its own, 
having its own peculiar elements that need to be proven for liability to arise. Corporate 
homicide is regulated by section 332 of the CPA in the same way as other corporate crimes. 
Consequently corporations that cause deaths are held criminally liable in the same manner as 
those corporations which have allegedly committed any other form of crime. On the contrary, 
English law makes provision for a specific and separate crime of corporate manslaughter.2191 
This is done through the CMCHA which puts mechanisms in place to deal specifically with 
                                                          
2187 See Chapter one III above. 
2188 Section 11 of the Constitution.  
2189 S v Makwanyane (note 29) para 217. 
2190 Chapter One III above. 
2191 CMCHA (note 36). 
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corporations that cause deaths. The CMCHA makes the circumstances that may lead to 
criminal liability clear. Similarly, Canadian law through its amended Criminal Code2192 also 
makes specific provision for the criminal liability of corporations that cause deaths, however 
these are not contained in separate legislation dealing specifically with corporations that cause 
deaths.  
 
It is submitted that both the English and the Canadian systems provide more effective systems 
which make it more possible and conducive for corporations to be prosecuted for deaths.  The 
existence of separate legislation or of a provision that deals directly with loss of life caused by 
corporations or through corporate activities results in legal certainty and in the clear protection 
of the right to life. Moreover as it makes it possible for corporations to have at their disposal 
knowledge of actions or omissions that may lead to corporations being held criminally liable 
for loss of life, this may possibly deter corporations from causing deaths. 
 
(b) The basis for liability 
The application of section 332 of the CPA to corporate crimes generally, means that the basis 
for liability even in the case of deaths caused by corporations is derivative liability. There is 
therefore a reliance on the identification of a particular individual who is at fault so that that 
fault can be imputed to the corporation for the corporation’s criminal liability to arise.2193 As 
already mentioned in discussion above,2194 the failure to identify such a person translates into 
the inability to impute fault on the corporation which in turn leads to the inability to prosecute 
                                                          
2192 With changes that were brought about by Bill C-45. 
2193 See Chapter Three III (b) (ii) above. 
2194 See discussion in Chapter Four III (d) above. 
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the corporation. This is problematic and unsatisfactory as it hinders the effectiveness of section 
332 of the CPA by disallowing a prosecution even in circumstances where it is clear that the 
fault originated from somewhere within the corporation, simply because the specific individual 
who is personally responsible cannot be identified.  
 
Under the CMCHA there is a need to prove gross breach by senior management.2195  It must 
therefore be established that management failure was at a senior level. This differs from the 
previous position under the identification doctrine where a corporation’s liability relied on the 
identification of a specific senior individual. It has been observed that in effect the CMCHA 
has moved from the identification doctrine to a point where it allows for the aggregation of the 
fault of several individuals within the corporation.2196 The current position in Canada depends 
on whether the offence requires the prosecution to prove negligence2197 or whether it is required 
to prove fault other than negligence.2198 With regard to proof of negligence there must be a 
senior officer or senior officers collectively who have departed from the expected standard of 
care.2199 Although still referring to seniority of the position it is submitted that this is clearly a 
move from the focus on the identification of a single individual to allowing for collective action 
to lead to the criminal liability of the corporation. Goetz further points out that in this way a 
corporation or organization may be held criminally liable even when there is no identification 
of a specific individual within the corporation or organization who has committed the crime.2200 
The current position is that where the prosecution is required to prove negligence aggregation 
                                                          
2195 The CMCHA (note 36) section 1(3). 
2196 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 251. See also Gobert (note 1411) 318 – 319. 
2197 The Criminal Code (note 1643) Section 22.1. 
2198 Ibid Section 22.2. 
2199 Ibid Section 22.1(b). 
2200 Goetz (note 1735) 4. 
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is possible and the corporation or organization’s liability may be based on the aggregation of 
the fault of several representatives or senior individuals.2201  
 
In both England and Canada there is clearly a move from the strict application of the 
identification doctrine to the aggregation of fault. Prior to the coming into being of the  
CMCHA the application of the identification doctrine was blamed for the failure of the 
prosecution of some companies that were clearly responsible for having caused the loss of 
life.2202 The acceptance of aggregation by both England and Canada is something that South 
Africa ought to consider when trying to find a solution to the basis of liability that relies on the 
identification of a particular individual who is responsible for the loss of life. 
  
 (c) Entities that may be held criminally liable for corporate homicide 
As discussed above in the proposed legal framework for corporate criminal liability the 
inclusion of organisations other than corporate bodies casts the net as wide as is seen in both 
the English and the Canadian law and that is commendable. It is submitted that the separate 
provision for corporate homicide should also include organisations other than corporate bodies. 
Such an inclusion shows that there is an acceptance of the fact that an entity that is not a 
corporation is capable of committing corporate homicide or corporate manslaughter. By 
including entities that are not corporations the English and Canadian law provide systems that 
are more likely to be effective and adequate in the context of corporate homicide as criminal 
liability is not restricted to corporations. It is submitted that South Africa should follow suit. 
                                                          
2201 Ibid. 




(d)  The possibility of individual liability for corporate homicide in addition to the 
criminal liability of the corporation for the same death(s). 
In South African law the criminal prosecution of the corporation for having caused deaths does 
not exclude the possibility of individual liability.2203 The individual within the corporation who 
is personally responsible for having caused the deaths may be prosecuted together with the 
corporation or this may be done through a separate trial.2204 In English law, however, the 
CMCHA prohibits individual liability for corporate manslaughter.2205 The crime may only be 
committed by corporations or organisations.2206 Although the CMCHA does not allow for 
individual liability, it must be noted that “such persons will continue to be subject to the 
common law offence of individual gross negligence manslaughter”.2207 In Canadian law apart 
from holding organisations criminally liable the responsible individual may also be held 
criminally liable for criminal negligence causing death. 
 
It is submitted that the South African and the Canadian approach, of ensuring that in addition 
to the prosecution of the corporation the individuals who are personally responsible for having 
caused death takes place are subject to the same offence, is a positive approach. It is further 
submitted that South Africa should maintain the possibility of individual liability when 
reforming its laws. Ensuring that individual liability is not excluded from corporate homicide 
                                                          
2203 In terms of section 332(2)(d) “the citation of a director or servant of a corporate body as aforesaid, to represent 
that corporate body in any prosecution instituted against it, shall not exempt that director or servant from 
prosecution for that offence…” 
2204 Du Toit in his commentary on section 332(2) observes that “Very often the person who is charged in a 
representative capacity is also charged in his personal capacity”. (Du Toit (note 514) 33-6). 
2205 CMCHA (note 36) Section  20. 
2206 “Therefore there can be no secondary liability for directors, managers or officers of an organization for the 
offence of corporate manslaughter”. (Matthews (note 1403) 17).   
2207 Ibid 17. 
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will make it difficult for individuals, whose negligence has led to the corporation being held 
criminally liable, to hide behind the corporation and escape liability for their own unlawful 
actions.   
 
(e) Applicable punishment 
In South African law the fine is the only punishment that may be imposed on corporations that 
are convicted of crime.2208 A successful prosecution for corporate homicide leads to a 
corporation being sentenced to a fine. In England the fine is the main way in which corporations 
or organisations are punished for corporate manslaughter. Under the CMCHA there are, 
however, additional punishments that the court may possibly impose. Canadian law also relies 
on the fine as its main form of punishment, but has additional forms of punishment. 
  
Both England and Canada have effective systems of corporate homicide and have not shown 
that having the fine as the main form of punishment is problematic. They, however, have the 
added advantage of having other forms of punishment at their disposal.                                                                                                                                                    
It is submitted that for corporate homicide to be more effective in South Africa it is therefore 
important for South Africa, when reforming its laws, to move away from having the fine as the 
sole punishment to a point where there are alternative or additional forms of punishment, which 
may lead to the other purposes of punishment being fulfilled.  
 
                                                          
2208 “…if the said person, as representing the corporate body, is convicted, the court convicting him shall not 
impose upon him in his representative capacity any punishment, whether direct or as an alternative, other than a 
fine in respect of the offence in question, and such fine shall be payable by the corporate body…” (CPA note 16) 
Section 332 (2) (c). 
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VI JUSTIFICATION FOR PROPOSING A SEPARATE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
CORPORATE HOMICIDE 
In the discussion that follows justification for having a separate legal framework for corporate 
homicide is provided. 
 
(a) A separate offence of corporate homicide is necessary because an offence as serious 
as the unlawful causing of the death of other persons cannot adequately be  
 regulated by means of a provision that treats all forms of corporate crimes 
generally. 
Deaths caused by corporations have a significant impact on society.2209 Apart from the fact that 
a single incidence may result in the number of actual deaths caused by a corporation being 
high,2210 there is also the need to prevent future similar occurrences. It is submitted that when 
it comes to the loss of life, it is crucial that the weaknesses brought about by section 332 of the 
CPA are eliminated completely so that corporations can be held properly liable. It is further 
submitted that the criminal liability of corporations for unlawful killings requires special 
attention when it comes to reforming corporate criminal liability in South Africa, hence the 
proposal that reform should be in the form of a new and separate legal framework for corporate 
homicide. 
  
Apart from the fact that death is a serious offence, it will be seen from the proposed offence 
below that the offence of corporate homicide contains several elements that cannot be properly 
accommodated in a general provision. In addition to that, when sentencing a corporation that 
                                                          
2209 “There is an emerging consensus among corporate criminologists, which is that corporate crime and violence 
inflicts (sic) far more damage on society than all street crime combined”. (Singh (note 23)). 
2210 Bucy (note 105) 1437. 
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has been convicted for corporate homicide there are certain factors that the court must take into 
consideration, which may not necessarily be appropriate or applicable to other forms of 
corporate crimes. 
 
(b)  Given the seriousness of unlawful deaths caused by corporations, a separate legal 
framework requires the direct liability of a corporation as opposed to sole reliance 
on a basis of liability that depends on individual fault. 
The application of section 332 results in derivative liability whereby the guilt of the individual 
is imputed to the corporation. Although it has been stated that the imputation of the acts and 
mens rea of these individuals to corporations serves the purpose of removing “the obstacle to 
imposing liability upon an artificial person that could not be found guilty of a crime requiring 
fault since it has no mind”,2211 it is submitted that the derivative liability that is found in section 
332 hampers prosecutions and is not always suitable for a crime as serious as corporate 
homicide. The reason is that as with the identification doctrine, derivative liability makes it 
easy to prosecute small corporations successfully, while it enables larger and more complex 
corporations to escape liability.2212 This is due to the fact that in smaller corporations it is easier 
to pinpoint an individual who is at fault, while in larger and more complex corporations it is 
sometimes not possible to identify a specific individual whose guilt may be imputed to the 
corporation, even if circumstances point to the guilt of the corporation.  
 
It is submitted that section 332’s reliance on derivative liability leads to injustice as it enables 
corporations to escape liability even in circumstances where it is clear that death would not 
have occurred had it not been for the activities of the corporation. This is a clear indication that 
                                                          
2211 Burchell (note 49) 565. 
2212 See discussion in Chapter Four III (d) above. 
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the basis of corporate criminal liability in South Africa needs to be revisited with a view to 
shifting from the derivative approach or to making it possible to have direct or personal liability 
of corporations, in addition to the derivative approach if the corporation is alleged to have 
killed. The solution to these problems could be addressed by applying the principle of 
aggregation,2213 however it is not clear if in its current form section 332 has any room for 
liability to be based on the aggregation of the fault of various individuals.2214  
 
Moreover, unfortunately, section 332 does not leave room for the corporation to be held 
directly or personally liable for its crimes and as it is, under the derivative approach the number 
of prosecutions or convictions of corporations, particularly for corporate homicide is very low. 
Since derivative liability mainly results in the non-prosecution or non-conviction of corporate 
criminals, the possibility of the corporation escaping liability is higher. It is submitted that with 
regard to corporate homicide this serious shortfall of the derivative approach will be rectified 
through the separate legal framework for corporate homicide. 
 
It is submitted that in addition to allowing for the guilt of individuals to be imputed to the 
corporation, there is a need for a separate legal framework that will, in addition to derivative 
liability, make it possible for corporations that kill to be held directly liable without reliance 
on the individual liability of specific individuals. Where it is clear that the corporation is liable 
for the deaths, the basis of liability should not be a hindrance to prosecution.  
 
                                                          
2213 “The principle of aggregation solves this problem by allowing the conduct and fault of more than one 
individual within a corporation to be combined to establish the elements of a crime and to satisfy the standards 
required for criminal liability”. (Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (note 53) 462). 
2214 “The current position relating to the application of aggregation to section 332(1) is uncertain. It has been 
argued that corporate liability cannot be established where fault resides in a different individual from the one who 
performed the unlawful act, but there are different opinions in this regard. It is uncertain whether the mindsets of 
different individuals may be combined when negligence or a particular form of intent is required. It is also 
uncertain whether the conduct of various different individuals may be combined”. (Ibid 462 – 463). 
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It is submitted that having a legal framework that imposes a duty on a corporation with regard 
to deaths caused may provide a solution to this particular challenge. In that case the corporation 
itself would be held directly liable for its failure to comply with the duty imposed on it. This 
would result in a shift of the determining factor from being whether there is an individual whose 
fault can be imputed to the corporation to whether the corporation complied with the legal duty 
that was imposed on it. It is submitted that in this way the prosecution of corporations will not 
be hindered as direct liability entails that the offence can only be committed by the party upon 
whom a duty has been imposed, in this case, the corporation. 
 
(c)  A separate legal framework of corporate homicide that will allow for a defence and 
thus eliminate the possibility of a conviction even in the absence of fault on the part 
of the corporation is necessary.  
Even where due diligence has been exercised in order to avoid the commission of the crime, 
section 332 allows for the corporation to be held criminally liable.2215 As Jordaan notes under 
section 332(1): 
“individual liability establishes corporate liability even if all reasonable precautions have been 
taken to prevent a crime from occurring. In other words, a corporate body may be stigmatized 
by a criminal conviction and punished in the absence of fault”.2216 
 
It is submitted that section 332’s failure to allow the corporation to present its defence is a 
defect that makes it possible to convict even when measures have been taken by the corporation 
to prevent harm. It is a flaw which needs to be rectified in the South African context, especially 
when the corporation is being prosecuted for causing the death of others. It is inconceivable 
that for a crime as serious as causing the death of another the accused would be deprived of an 
                                                          
2215 S v Suid Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie (note 549); Borg- Jorgensen & Van der Linde (53) 458. 
2216 Jordaan (note 42) 67. 
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opportunity to provide a defence. It is submitted that through a legal framework that gives the 
corporation the opportunity to present its defence, the process of prosecution for unlawful 
deaths caused by corporations will be fair and just.  
 
(d)  A separate legal framework of corporate homicide will lead to justice as it will not 
allow for the fault of the employee to be imputed to the corporation in spite of the 
fact that the employee or director has acted beyond his or her powers.  
Section 332 allows for the corporation to be held liable even where the director or employee 
has exceeded his powers or his scope of employment, as long as he committed the offence in 
the process of furthering the interests of the corporation. Because of this the corporation suffers 
heavily. Firstly, the corporation suffers in that it is wronged by an employee or director who 
exceeds his scope of employment or powers. Secondly, the corporation is subjected to criminal 
liability for that offence that the employee or director committed in spite of the fact that he 
acted beyond the scope of employment or powers.  
 
It is submitted that where the servants or directors have acted beyond the scope of their 
employment or authority, the corporation should not be held criminally liable, especially when 
it comes to the serious offence of corporate homicide. This is in line with Barlow’s submission 
that “The real question is whether the company is liable for a criminal act committed when a 
director or servant is engaged in an ultra vires act. It is submitted that it is not so liable”.2217 
Barlow reasons that: 
 
“As far as acts committed by a director in the exercise of his powers or by a servant in the 
performance of his duties are concerned, it is clear that these powers and duties are, by the 
                                                          
2217 Barlow (note 149) 506. 
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essential principles of company law, confined to the acts within the powers conferred on the 
company. The same reasoning, it is submitted, applies to acts done “in furthering or 
endeavouring to further the interests of the company” because, according to the same 
principles, the interests of a company can only be furthered along the lines indicated by the 
memorandum”.2218  
 
It is submitted that Barlow’s reasoning is clear and logical and indeed for the reason provided, 
the corporation should only be held criminally liable in circumstances where the director or 
servant has acted within his or her scope of duties or authority. Moreover, Matzukis points out 
that 
“There are good reasons for the civil-law rule that an employer is liable for the delicts of its 
employees only if they acted within the scope of their employment (and not simply, where 
unauthorized, to the intended advantage of the employer). In the criminal law, where 
punishments can be so much more severe than the compensation awarded in the civil law, 
there is an even greater need for the imposition of these limits to liability”.2219  
 
Under the proposed legal framework of corporate homicide where the employee or director 
acted outside the scope of employment or beyond powers, the corporation will not be criminally 
liable, however, that particular employee or director will be held criminally liable personally. 
In this way when it comes to corporate homicide, corporations will avoid undue criminal 
liability as they would have made the scope of employment and the powers of directors clear 
from the outset.  
 
                                                          
2218 Ibid 507. 
2219 Matzukis (note 592) 216. 
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(e)  Under a separate legal framework of corporate homicide corporate criminal 
liability should not be possible in circumstances where there can be no civil liability 
against the corporation. 
Under normal circumstances the same set of facts gives rise to both criminal liability and civil 
liability. In this way the victim or the aggrieved party has the opportunity to claim 
compensation in addition to the perpetrator being prosecuted. Unfortunately, this is not always 
the case under section 332 of the CPA as it allows for criminal liability in circumstances where 
there can be no civil liability.2220 It is submitted that this is an anomaly. Matzukis explains that 
this anomaly occurs when a corporation is held liable in circumstances where the servant has 
acted beyond the scope of employment, something that will not occur under civil law.2221 
Matzukis avers that 
“Section 332(1) is clearly a very far-reaching provision…This is so because, while an 
employer is civilly liable for his employee’s misdeeds only where the employee acted within 
the scope of his employment, a corporate employer may incur criminal responsibility for its 
employee’s acts as long as the employee was endeavouring to further the interests of the 
company when he acted”.2222 
 
The proposed offence is needed to remedy this anomaly by allowing for a corporation to be 
held directly liable for its offences. In this way, the same set of facts will allow for the 
prosecution of the corporation as well as the opportunity for the aggrieved party to claim 
compensation. This is crucial when it comes to harm as serious as death. 
 
 
                                                          
2220 Kahn emphasizes the observation made by Murray J in R v Bennett that “a company could be criminally liable 
even when it would not be civilly liable for injuries suffered by a complainant”. (Kahn (note 493) 175). 
2221 Matzukis (note 592) 215 – 216. 
2222 Ibid 215. 
454 
 
(f)  A separate legal framework will ensure that knowledge by the corporation of the 
offence is a factor that is considered when determining whether the corporation 
should be held criminally liable or not;  
One of the criticisms of section 332 of the CPA is its failure to take into account the fact whether 
the corporation was aware of the offence or not. Jordaan observes that “whether the corporation 
or its members had knowledge of the exact criminal acts or omissions, is also not a relevant 
consideration in determining criminal liability”.2223 It is submitted that it is not sound law to 
prosecute and even convict where it is clear that the corporation was oblivious of the offence.  
 
It is submitted that where the corporation was unaware of the offence and the prosecution is 
unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the corporation was aware, the corporation 
should not be convicted. The individuals within the corporation who committed the offence 
should, however, be prosecuted. In the proposed offence knowledge of the offence is a factor 
that will be taken into account as it would be unjust not to take such an important factor into 
account when prosecuting for an offence as serious as corporate homicide. 
 
 
(g)  A separate offence of corporate homicide that will allow for alternative sanctions is 
necessary. 
With section 332 only allowing for a fine as punishment, corporations that cause deaths are not 
receiving adequate and effective punishment. This is particularly the case with recidivists. In 
South Africa where the fine is the only available sanction, the likelihood is that in many cases 
other parties also bear the brunt of the punishment.2224 Although those are unintended 
                                                          
2223 Jordaan (note 42) 51.   
2224 In addition to the parties mentioned above, Jefferson points out that there may be additional parties who suffer 
as a result of the fine: “Suppliers may have to reduce costs to the defendant company; freelance workers may have 
their salaries cut or their engagements ended; distributors may be obliged to reduce profit margins. The 
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consequences of the fine, it is submitted that this is not a sufficient reason to abandon the fine 
completely as it still punishes the corporation. Arguments in favour of the fine include the fact 
that it is a sanction that is not problematic in terms of collection and that “they can oblige a 
company ‘to pull up its corporate socks’”.2225 It is submitted that the fine is an acceptable and 
effective form of punishment. The compared jurisdictions serve as testimony that the fine is a 
sentence that is working2226 and there is no need to eradicate it, however, it is submitted that 
even though the fine does punish corporations it is still lacking in terms of deterrence and 
rehabilitation.  
 
It has been submitted above that when it comes to punishment it is best to take all theories into 
account so that in the end the sentence that is imposed is retributive, preventive, deterrent and 
also reformative. To achieve this there is a need to impose various sentences. It is therefore 
submitted that in addition to imposing the fine the court should be allowed to impose additional 
suitable sentences. In this way corporations will be adequately and effectively punished for 
corporate homicide. 
 
Under the separate legal framework of corporate homicide the problem of a fine being the only 
possible punishment will no longer exist as in addition to the fine there will be other other 
sanctions that a corporation may be subject to. These will include adverse publicity orders, 
corporate probation, remedial orders, community service and the corporate death penalty or 
dissolution, which should be reserved for instances where the corporation has become a 
habitual offender and it is clear that the corporation is failing to be rehabilitated. 
                                                          
government may lose tax revenues and may have to provide benefits for those dismissed as a result of the 
company’s efforts to spread the fine”. (Jefferson (note 897) 243). 
2225 Ibid 238. 
2226 As was seen in Chapters Four and Five above England and Canada used to impose the fine prior to changes 




(h)  A new separate legal framework for corporate homicide will ensure that 
corporations do not bear criminal liability for acts of complete outsiders. 
In its current form section 332 makes it possible for a corporation to be held criminally liable 
even in circumstances where the responsible individual is a total outsider who has not been 
mandated by the corporation to perform an act or an omission. This occurs, for instance, where 
an employee, who drives vehicles on behalf of the corporation allows a third party to drive for 
him and that party causes a collision.  
 
The third party is not acting within his scope of employment as he is not employed by the 
corporation. He is a complete outsider and when he agrees to assist the employee of the 
organisation, he should be doing so at the risk of being personally criminally liable for any 
deaths that may occur as a result of his actions. The employee may also be held liable for having 
given the third party the mandate to act on his behalf. The corporation can should only be held 
liable for actions or omissions of those who have been given the mandate to act on behalf of 
the corporation. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
 (i)  The reverse onus that is found in section 332(1), section 332(4) and section 332(7) 
would be eliminated in the new legal framework for corporate homicide in line with 
the Constitutional Court’s decisions on reverse onus provisions.  
In S v Coetzee2227 the reverse onus provision was rejected by the majority and declared 
unconstitutional. As explained above, the Coetzee decisions is in line with the Constitution as 
                                                          
2227 S v Coetzee (note 56). 
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well as with the Constitutional Court’s decisions which have shown that the Constitutional 
Court is loathe to allow reverse onus provisions to continue.2228  
 
The proposed legal framework of corporate homicide is framed in such a way that it does not 
contain any reverse onus provisions. 
 
VII THE WORDING OF THE PROPOSED OFFENCE 
The prosecution of corporations, organisations, directors of corporations and of 
managers of organisations for corporate homicide and corporate murder  
(a) Definitions: 
  “adverse publicity order” refers to an order made by the sentencing court which 
compels the convicted corporation or organisation to publish details concerning the 
conviction against the convicted corporation or organisation. These details are i) 
the name of the corporation or organisation; ii) the fact that the corporation or 
organisation has been convicted of corporate homicide or corporate murder; iii) a 
brief description of the event causing deaths and the number of the deceased; iv) 
the fact that the corporation or organisation was found guilty and the details of the 
convicting court; v) the sentence that the court imposed on the corporation or 
organisation.  
The publication must be made in a local and in a national newspaper that is 
determined by the court and this must be done within a period of three months of 
the sentence having been imposed. The court may also order that the information 
                                                          
2228 See discussion in Chapter Three IV (v) (bb) above. 
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should appear in the website of the corporation or organisation for a specified 
period of time. 
 
 “community service” refers to an order of court which compels the convicted 
corporation or organization to give back to the community where the harm was 
done. The court uses its discretion when it decides what community service should 
entail for each convicted corporation organisation. It must take into account all 
surrounding circumstances. 
 
 “corporate inquiry report” refers to a report compiled by an independent 
investigator who has been appointed by the court to compile information pertaining 
to the corporation or organization that will shed light on the value of the corporation 
or organization, its history with regard to deaths, as well as measures that the 
corporation or organization had in place, at the time of the death(s), to prevent 
unlawful deaths. The court is obliged to look at this report when determining a 
suitable sentence to impose on a convicted corporation or organisation. 
 
 “Corporate probation” refers to a sentence that may be imposed by a court on a 
corporation or organization. It entails various limitations that are placed by the 
court on the corporation or organization. The court may decide on these limitations 
once it has taken into account the corporate inquiry report as well as all aggravating 
and mitigating factors. These factors may include any of the following or any 
combination of the following: the inability to operate outside South Africa for a 
specified period of time; in the event of failure by the convicted corporation or 
organization to comply with any of the terms of the corporate probation, within the 
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period of corporate probation, the convicted corporation or organization shall be 
compelled to re-appear for further sentencing.  
 
 “Corporate death penalty” refers to an order made by the court for the dissolution 
of the convicted corporation or organization. The court may only make such an 
order if the convicted corporation or organization is a recidivist and the court is 
convinced that the corporation or organization is not deterred / dissuaded and there 
are no chances of rehabilitating it. In making such an order the number of lives that 
have been lost each time the corporation or organization has been convicted as well 
as the frequency of the convictions must be taken into account together with all 
other factors. 
 
 “Corporations” refers to corporate bodies vested with legal personality that are 
recognised under South African law, regardless of whether they are profit or non-
profit companies, as well as close corporations. These include public companies, 
state-owned enterprises, personal liability companies as well as private companies. 
 
 
 “Duty of care” refers to the civil-law duty of care. A corporation or organization 
has a duty of care which can be carried out by means of providing safe working 
conditions; to ensure that all who deal with it are safe from any harm that may 
possibly be caused by corporate activity and vehicles and machinery belonging to 
the corporation or organization are operated in a safe manner. 
 
 “Intention” refers to intention in the form of dolus eventualis and is only 




 “Managers of an organization” shall include all people in higher management of 
the organization as well as people in middle management. It also includes anyone 
within an organization who holds a senior position. 
 
 “Organizations” refers to all legally-constituted entities as well as associations of 
persons. These include partnerships, firms, societies, trade unions, public bodies, 
and any other associations of persons which have been formed for a common 
purpose. Where the organization is not vested with legal personality those 
individuals who were responsible for the management of the organization at the 
time of the commission of the corporate homicide or corporate murder shall be 
prosecuted individually or collectively for the corporate homicide or corporate 
murder 
 
 “Remedial orders” refers to an order of court which provides instructions to the 
convicted corporation or organization to provide redress for the harm caused by the 
corporation. 
 
 “Victims” refers to any person who has lost his or her life as a result of the 
activities of the company or organization. This includes, but is not limited to, 
employees, people who are being provided with services by the corporation or 
organization, any other person whose death has been caused by the activities of the 
company or organization, even if the company or organization did not have any 
business with that person. 
 
(b) The wording of the offence 
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(1) A corporation or an organization shall be held liable for the offence of corporate homicide 
or corporate murder if any director of a corporation or manager of an organization or any 
employee or any agent of the corporation or organization has omitted to act or has performed 
an act negligently or intentionally that results in the death of persons in circumstances where 
the corporation or organization has not complied with the duty of care to ensure the safety of 
the victims;  
 
a) The corporation or organization shall be charged with the offence of corporate 
homicide if the death was caused negligently and unlawfully  
(i) as a result of the unlawful act or omission of the director of a 
corporation or manager of an organization or employee or agent 
of the corporation whilst acting within his powers or within his 
scope of employment and in the interest of the corporation or 
organization; or  
(ii) as a result of an aggregate on the unlawful acts or omissions of 
two or more directors of managers or employees or agents of the 
corporation or organization, whilst acting within their powers or 
within their scope of employment and in the interest of the 
corporation or organization. 
 
b) The corporation or organization shall be charged with the offence of corporate 
murder if the death was caused intentionally and unlawfully as a result of the 
act or omission of the director of a corporation or manager of an organization 
or employee or agent of the corporation or organization in circumstances where 
the corporation or organization or the director of a corporation or manager of 
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an organization, the employee or the agent, was individually or collectively, 
conscious of the substantial possibility of death, but proceeded with the risky 
activity in spite of being conscious of the substantial possibility of death;  
unless sufficient proof that all reasonable steps were taken to prevent the unlawful act or 
omission that has resulted in death is provided; 
 
The corporation shall be held liable for corporate homicide or corporate murder if it can be 
shown that the offence was committed while the individuals within the corporation or 
organisation were acting in the interest of the corporation and that the corporation or 
organization benefitted or stood to benefit as a result of the offence. 
 
(2) Any director of a corporation or manager of an organisation, any employee or any agent of 
a corporation or organisation who was personally responsible for the intentional or negligent 
and unlawful act or omission that resulted in death will also be held liable for the offence of 
corporate homicide or the offence of corporate murder if 
 
(i) The omission or act was within that director’s, manager’s, employee’s, or agent’s 
authority or scope of employment and 
(ii) The intentional or negligent and unlawful act or omission that results in death 
occurred in the process of furthering the interests of the corporation. 
 
(3) The corporation, organisation, director of a corporation, manager of an organisation, 
employee or agent against whom allegations of corporate homicide or corporate murder have 
been made may be charged and prosecuted jointly or separately for the same offence. If the 
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corporation, or organisation, director of a corporation, manager of an organisation, employee 
of the organisation or agent are charged and prosecuted separately, the verdict in one trial will 
not have an effect on the outcome of the other trial. 
 
(4) The corporation or organisation, director of a corporation, management of organisation, 
employee or agent will be allowed to rely on defences including the defence that  
(a) there was no knowledge that the act or omission that caused the death unlawfully 
was about to be committed; or 
(b) the directors of a corporation, managers of an organisation, employees or agents 
were specifically prohibited from committing the act or the omission that caused 
the unlawful death;  
 
(5) In any prosecution against the corporation or organisation the corporation or organisation 
itself must be cited as the offender and a representative of the corporation or organisation shall 
stand trial in his representative capacity, on behalf of the corporation or organisation and shall 
make a plea as authorized by the corporation or organisation. 
 
(6) If the corporation or organisation is convicted, upon conviction the court must make an 
order that a corporate enquiry report should be prepared for the court and should be made 
available within a specified period to the court. 
(a) The specified period may not exceed eight weeks.  
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(b) The content of the report must include details pertaining to the activities of the 
corporation or organisation, including previous convictions against the corporation or 
organisation.  
(c)The details contained in the corporate enquiry report must include details pertaining 
to the activities of the corporation within the five years prior to the conviction of the 
corporation or organisation for corporate homicide or corporate murder.  
(d) The court shall not allow sentencing to take place unless the court has taken into 
account the corporate enquiry report.  
(e) During the sentencing stage counsel for the corporation or organisation shall be 
allowed to provide evidence in mitigation of the sentence and counsel for the State shall 
be allowed to provide evidence in aggravation of sentence. 
(f) In addition to evidence provided by counsel in mitigation and in aggravation of 
sentence the sentencing court shall be obliged to take cognizance of all mitigating and 
aggravating factors that may appear in the corporate enquiry report. 
 
 
(7) Sentencing guidelines for corporate homicide and corporate murder 
In addition to the corporate inquiry report and evidence adduced in mitigation and in 
aggravation of sentence the sentencing court is obliged to take into account the following 
factors: 
- The extent of the harm caused. This includes, but is not limited to the number of the 
deceased; the number of people who were seriously injured; damage to property not 
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belonging to the corporation or organisation; illnesses that have arisen and that may in 
future arise as a direct result of the corporate activity that has led to deaths. 
 
- Measures taken by the corporation to prevent the harm prior to its occurrence. 
 
- Measures taken by the corporation to limit the extent of harm.  
 
- Previous convictions for unlawful deaths. 
 
- Any benefits gained by the corporation or organization as a result of the crime. 
 
- Safety measures that the corporation or organisation have in place. 
 
- The amount of money that the State has spent on the case e.g. amount spent on 
investigators. 
- Measures put into place by the corporation or organization to prevent causing similass 
harm in the future.  
 
 
(8) The sentence that is to be imposed on a convicted corporation or organisation is a fine. 
The amount of the fine is unlimited and may be determined by the court having taken into 
account the corporate inquiry report.  
In addition to the fine the court may include any of the following sanctions or a combination 
of the following, as determined by the court:  
(a) Adverse publicity orders; 
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(b) corporate probation;  
(c) corporate death penalty; 
(d) remedial orders;  
(e) community service 
 
(9) In the case of individual liability, the convicted individual may be subjected to 
imprisonment as determined by the court, in accordance with established rules concerning 
sentencing for culpable homicide and murder. 
 
(10) Circumstances when an organisation or corporation will be regarded as having a duty of 
care: 
- organisations or corporations that are employers have a duty of care towards their employees 
to provide safe working conditions. 
- organisations or corporations that provide services have a duty of care towards their clients 
to ensure  that they are not harmed. 
- organisations or corporations that provide transport have a duty of care towards those who 
make use of their transport services. This entails making sure that the vehicles are serviced 
regularly and are in good working condition. 
- organisations or corporations that make use of machinery have a duty of care to ensure that 
the machinery is in a safe working condition. 
 




(a) The elements of the proposed offence 
The crux of the offence is that it should entail 
 the unlawful and  
 negligent (in the event of corporate homicide) or intentional (in the form of dolus 
eventualis or dolus directus in the event of corporate murder). 
 causing of the death of another 
 by a corporation or organization 
 as a result of the act or omission of a director or employee or agent of the corporation 
acting within the scope of employment or within his powers or 
 as a result of the aggregate acts or omissions of two or more directors, managers, 
employees or agents of the corporation or organisation whilst acting within their scope 
of employment or within their powers. 
 The act or omission should have been performed in the interest of the corporation or 
organization. 
 The corporation or organization must have benefitted or must stand to benefit as a 
result of the act or omission. 
 Failure by the corporation to comply with the duty of care. 
 
 
The elements of the crime are therefore (i) unlawfulness (ii) negligence or intention (iii)  
causing the death of a human being (iv) by a corporation through the act or omissions of an 
individual or through the aggregated acts or omissions of two or more individuals within the 
corporations (v) in the exercise of their powers or within the scope of their employment (vi) 




(b) A discussion of the proposed offence 
(i) Corporate homicide 
A corporation or organization will commit the offence of corporate homicide if the acts or 
omissions of an individual within the corporation or the aggregate acts or omissions of two or 
more individuals within the corporation or organization result in the negligent and unlawful 
death of a person and if the corporation or organization has failed to comply with its duty to 
ensure the safety of the deceased person. This resembles the changes brought about by Bill C-
45 to the Canadian Criminal Code.2229  
 
Under the proposed offence where a corporation or organization allegedly committed corporate 
homicide, the corporation or organization shall be held criminally liable due to the collective 
unlawful and negligent acts or omissions of people in management positions. This will be the 
case, provided that they were acting within their scope of employment or within their powers 
and in the interest of the corporation or organization. 
 
In this way the inability to identify a single individual, who is responsible for the unlawful and 
negligent act or omission that has resulted in death, will not lead to the corporation or 
organization escaping liability in circumstances where it is clear that the fault emanates from 
within the corporation or organization. 
 
                                                          
2229 See section 22.1(b) of the Canadian Criminal Code. 
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(ii) Corporate murder 
A corporation or organisation will commit the offence of corporate murder if the acts or 
omissions of an individual within the corporation or the aggregate acts or omissions of two or 
more individuals within the corporation or organisation result in the intentional and unlawful 
death of a person and if the corporation or organisation has failed to comply with its duty to 
ensure the safety of the deceased person.  
 
 (iii) Acting within scope of employment or within powers 
Under the proposed offence the corporation or organization will only be held liable if the 
perpetrator acted within his scope of employment or within his powers. This is important 
because the liability of the corporation or organization ought to be linked with the authority 
given to the person within the organisation who is responsible for the commission of the 
offence. Where the person has acted ultra vires the corporation or organization should not be 
held criminally liable. 
 
By ensuring that the corporation or organization is only held liable in circumstances where one 
has acted within his scope of employment or powers, the proposed offence will be addressing 
the shortfall of section 332 that it is such a broad provision that it even allows for the 
corporation to be held criminally liable even in situations where the responsible individual 




(iv) Acting in the interest of the corporation or organization and the corporation or 
organization benefiting or standing to benefit 
Section 332 of the CPA makes the corporation liable in circumstances where the person whose 
fault is imputed to the corporation was furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of the 
corporation. It is submitted that this part of section 332 is relevant, hence its inclusion in the 
proposed offence. Where the responsible individual acts in furthering his own interests the 
corporation should not be held criminally liable.  
 
Acting in the interest of the corporation implies that the corporation benefits or stands to benefit 
from that. Where the unlawful act does not benefit or stand to benefit the corporation or the 
organization, the corporation or organization should not be held liable for the resulting offence. 
It should be the individual concerned who should be held liable. 
 
 
(v) The duty of care 
The requirement that there must have been a duty of care on the corporation or organisation 
has been drawn from both the English Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 
and the Canadian Bill C-45. Establishing whether there is an existence of the duty of care 
towards the deceased should not be problematic as a list of circumstances when a corporation 




With regard to the duty of care, a corporation will commit the offence of corporate homicide if 
its corporate activities result in death in circumstances where it can be shown that the 
corporation or organisation failed to comply with the duty of care that is expected of 
corporations and organisations and failed to prevent deaths from occurring. Where death is a 
result of the corporation’s failure to avoid a risk when there was a substantial possibility that 
the risk would result in death, the corporation will not have complied with its duty of care and 
commits corporate murder. 
 
(vi) The inclusion of organisations 
In South Africa corporate criminal liability has not been confined to corporations only as 
section 332 includes the criminal liability of members of entities that are not incorporated. 
South Africa has many forms of entities including government-owned entities. Such entities 
are capable of acts and omissions that may result in the unlawful deaths of people. The reason 
is that when it comes to the commission of crime there is a possibility of using an entity’s legal 
personality to divert attention from the actual perpetrators to the legal entity.  
 
Moreover, both the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act and the Canadian 
Bill C-45 amendments resulted in criminal liability being expanded to include all sorts of 
associations and organisations. It is submitted that this is a progressive move and that South 
Africa should also adopt the expansion of liability in such a way that all entities, organisations 
and associations fall under the ambit of the proposed legal framework for corporate homicide. 
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In this way all entities and associations of persons that are involved in corporate criminality, 
particularly corporate homicide and corporate murder should be held criminally liable.2230   
 
In both England and Canada the new legislation has expanded liability to include 
‘organisations’. This is to be commended as it is a fact that unlawful deaths are also caused by 
entities other than organisations. These may occur, inter alia, in the context of workplace 
deaths, non-compliance with safety standards or in the context of the kind of services they 
render. Excluding such entities from the ambit of the proposed framework would mean that 
when they cause deaths they may possibly not be subject to the same treatment as corporations 
in the same positions. It is submitted that by including organisations in the proposed legal 
framework when deaths have been caused by unincorporated entities and government-owned 
entities or government departments, they will be subjected to the proposed homicide 
framework in the same way as corporations would be. 
 
(vii) Liability can be established without reliance on individual liability 
One of the main weaknesses of South Africa’s section 332 of the CPA is that it hinders 
prosecutions by enabling a corporation to escape liability where it is not possible to establish 
individual fault which can be imputed to the corporation. In the proposed legal framework this 
is addressed in two ways:  
(1) The proposed offence allows for the aggregate conduct of two or more individuals to 
establish corporate liability; This eliminates the difficulty of prosecuting corporations in 
circumstances where it is the conduct of various individuals within the corporation that results 
                                                          
2230 Such liability need not exclude the criminal liability of the individuals responsible for the offence that the 
corporation is held liable for. 
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in death. The conduct is considered collectively and is able to give rise to the liability of the 
corporation for that conduct. 
(1) The proposed offence takes into account whether the corporation has complied with its duty 
of care that it owes to people. Failure to comply with the duty of care is a fault borne by the 
corporation. Liability therefore arises if it is proven that the corporation failed to comply with 
its duty of care. This is personal or direct liability which does not require the fault of any other 
party to be established.  
 
(viii) The inclusion of murder 
Although it has been argued with regard to English law that a corporation could, apparently, 
not commit murder “because the only lawful sentence, life imprisonment, can only be inflicted 
upon an individual in his personal capacity”2231 it is submitted that excluding murder, 
particularly in circumstances where facts show clearly that the corporation was fully aware of 
the fact that its conduct would result in a loss of life but still proceeded, is not satisfactory. It 
has been shown that corporations are capable of taking risky decisions which result in loss of 
life and it has to be clear that such conduct will not be tolerated. For that reason, with regard to 
deaths caused through corporate activities it is submitted that it is important to include murder 
in the proposed framework and prescribe a punishment that is suitable for corporations. 
 
                                                          
2231 Pinto & Evans (note 94) 5. 
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In South Africa all crimes have fault as an element that has to be proven2232 and this fault may 
either be intention,2233 also known as dolus, or negligence,2234 also known as culpa.2235 
Culpable homicide is one of the exceptions to the rule that all common-law crimes must have 
fault in the form of intention.2236 Burchell points out that “the law of homicide has provided 
the focal point for debate on the meaning of fault, in particular the nature of the fault in the 
form of intention required for a murder conviction”.2237 The fact that corporations have a 
tendency of conscious risk-taking is something that needs to be seriously considered. Where it 
can be proved that there was intention in the form of dolus eventualis,2238 the corporation should 
face the more serious crime of corporate murder.2239  
 
With regard to corporations it is submitted that this may be applicable for instance where a fire 
breaks out and causes the death of employees who were working on the premises and upon 
investigation it is discovered that it is company policy for management to lock up the premises 
and leave with the keys while workers are inside working at night. When one leaves the 
premises with the keys knowing that there are employees locked up inside who have no way 
                                                          
2232 Burchell (note 195) 353.  
2233 “Intention involves a purposefully chosen course of action, knowing that it was unlawful. The test of intention 
is simply what the accused knew or foresaw. It is an enquiry into the actual state of mind of the actor. The test is 
‘subjective’”. Burchell (note 49) 523. 
2234 “The test of negligence is not necessarily what the actor thought or foresaw but rather what a reasonable 
person would have foreseen and done in the circumstances. The enquiry is thus not as to the actual state of the 





2238 “No distinction is in principle drawn between first and second degree murder in South Africa and dolus 
eventualis is, in fact, sufficient intention for a conviction of any crime based on intention in South Africa”. 
Burchell (note 195) 354. “The nature of this form of intention is illustrated by examples: If X sets fire to a building, 
foreseeing the possibility that someone might be in the building, and someone is burned to death, X can be said 
to have intended the death of that person. Similarly, if X means to kill Z, but the bullet misses and kills Y, although 
X does not mean to kill Y, he or she nevertheless in law intends Y’s death if X foresees it as a possible result of 
shooting at Z.” Burchell (note 195) 364. 
2239 Whiting (note 770) 446. See discussion in Chapter Three IV (b) above. 
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of leaving the premises without the keys, the possibility of the employees perishing in the event 
of a fire breaking out is foreseen. 
 
Whiting proposes a manner in which dolus eventualis can be founded for liability for murder 
and it is submitted that these may be made applicable to corporations:  
 
“(1) A person will have dolus eventualis in relation to a result if he intentionally 
commits an act, foreseeing that it may cause that result. (2) The degree of likelihood 
with which the happening of the result must be foreseen will not be the same in all 
situations. (3) In the great majority of cases, the happening of the result will have to 
be foreseen as a substantial possibility (4) In cases where one or more factors 
militating against a finding of dolus eventualis are present, the happening of the result 
will have to be foreseen as something more than a substantial possibility, unless there 
are countervailing considerations neutralising the effect of such factors. (5) In a case 
where it is the purpose of the person concerned to create the risk, it will be sufficient 
if he foresees the happening of the result only as a remote possibility”.2240 
In making a proposal of a new statutory framework for corporate homicide, it is submitted that 
the inclusion of murder in the form of dolus eventualis will make corporate criminal liability 
an effective tool in dealing with corporations that cause harm to society. Murder is a more 
serious offence and the sentence that will have to be imposed on a convicted corporation is 
more likely to result in prevention, deterrence, retribution as well as rehabilitation. In this way, 
                                                          
2240 Whiting (note 770) 446. 
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it is envisaged that there may be a decline in the number of deaths caused by corporations in 
circumstances where intention in the form of dolus eventualis is present.    
 
(ix) Corporate sentencing 
The fine as a form of punishment for corporate criminals has proved to be a sanction that works 
well for both England and Canada. In both jurisdictions it was used prior to the changes made 
to the laws and after the laws were reformed it was retained. The problem with the fine in South 
Africa is that section 332 of the CPA does not provide for any additional or alternative sentence. 
This limitation makes the fine to be unsuitable as it does not carry with it the stigma that is 
desired for the sentence to have the deterrent effect on the convicted corporation as well as on 
other corporations that may be contemplating corporate homicide. The fine also does not have 
the rehabilitative effect and it is necessary to look at all purposes of punishment when deciding 
on the sentence to be imposed.  
 
Furthermore for companies that are prone to keeping budgets for corporate crime, having 
additional and more stigmatic sentences at the court’s disposal, will lead them to avoid 
committing corporate crime as opposed to budgeting for it. For those that continue to budget 
for it, there is now the added threat of additional and more stigmatic sentences that may even 
lead to the demise of the corporation. It is envisaged that the problems associated with the fine 
being the only form of punishment will be eliminated by the additional forms of punishment 




Both England and Canada under their new corporate homicide and corporate criminal liability 
regimes impose very, very high fines that have the capacity to literally cripple the convicted 
corporation.  It is submitted that as suggested in England’s Consultation Paper on Sentencing 
for Corporate Manslaughter, the fine should be imposed in order to show that loss of life is a 
very serious concern; to see to it that corporations comply with safety standards that have been 
set; and to ensure that the corporations do not gain financially from offences committed by 
them.2241 Where there are aggravating factors the amount of the fine should reflect this. 
 
Letting courts have access to information about the corporation prior to sentencing is intended 
to put the courts in a better position to enable them to impose more suitable sentences on in 
particular convicted corporations. The corporation is thus punished in accordance with the 
information about it that is at the court’s disposal. It is submitted that with the knowledge of 
the circumstances and history of the corporation, the courts are more likely to impose sentences 
that will take into account more than one of the theories of punishment (deterrence, 
reformation, rehabilitation, retribution). 
 
Ensuring that in sentencing courts also take into account mitigating and aggravating factors 
will result2242 in corporate sentences that are ‘tailor made’ for the particular convicted 
corporation. For instance, a corporation which is a habitual offender will receive a harsher 
sentence than a corporation which is a first-time offender, even if their offences are the same. 
In this way a message is sent out that corporate crime, particularly corporate homicide is viewed 
                                                          
2241 Sentencing Advisory Panel, Consultation Paper on Sentencing for Corporate Manslaughter (November 
2007) para 29. 
2242 FL Rush “Corporate probation: Invasive techniques for restructuring institutional behaviour” 1987 Suffolk 
University Law Review 33, 40. 
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in a very serious light and the repetition of such by the same companies will inevitably lead to 
severe punishment.  
It is submitted that the fine should not be imposed on its own. In addition to the fine, the court 
should have at its disposal additional sentences such as adverse publicity orders; corporate 
probation; corporate death penalty; remedial orders; community service etc. Wells states that 
such possible additional sentences 
“Are promising because they increase the variety of deterrent, retributive, and rehabilitative 
measures available against corporations and in so doing circumvent some of the major 
limitations of monetary sanctions”.2243 
 
 (aa) Corporate probation 
This is basically the imprisonment of a corporation as it amounts to “restraining the corporation 
from acting in specified ways”.2244 This may include limiting the corporation’s area of 
operation to South Africa only. Through corporate probation the corporation or organization 
will be regulated and in this way the potential of further corporate homicides being committed 
by the same corporation or organization is limited. Wells states that to corporate probation 
orders  
“are ‘potentially powerful instruments’  which can include punitive as well as rehabilitative 
elements. The costs of probation can be charged to the company and at the same time the 
probation conditions can require corporate decision-making to be restructured”.2245 
 
(bb) Adverse publicity orders 
                                                          
2243 Wells (note 15) 37. 
2244 Ibid. 
2245 Wells (note 15) 37. 
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An adverse publicity order is a sentence that will likely deter future corporate homicide through 
stigmatisation.2246 According to Wells “adverse publicity could also be used as part of the 
strategy to combat corporate disregard of criminal law and as a backup to probation”.2247 
 
(cc) Community service 
With regard to community service it must be noted that Rush observes that “A pervasive 
sentiment exists that corporations "get off easy" when sentenced to community service”.2248 
Rush further points out that in order “to counteract these perceptions, community service must 
be keyed to societal harm”.2249  
Moreover when imposing community service the sentencing court must do it in such a way 
that through community service reparation is effected and that it is the corporation itself that 
does the community service. For instance, “if a corporation pollutes a river, affecting numerous 
businesses and individuals beyond those who are direct victims, it is much more appropriate to 
direct the corporation to detoxify streams than to order corporate employees to work at drug 
halfway houses”.2250 
 
(dd) Corporate death penalty or compulsory dissolution of the company  
The corporate death penalty or the compulsory dissolution of the company is the ultimate 
sentence that can be imposed on a corporation. As Wells correctly states, such “incapacitation 
through compulsory winding up or closures is the most drastic penalty available and is used in 
some jurisdictions against corporations formed for an illegal purpose”.2251 With regard to 
                                                          
2246 Wells observes that “the importance of prestige and status to many corporations is evidenced both by their 
extensive use of brand-image in advertising and by their efforts to regain a ‘clean’ image after a major disaster is 
associated with their name”. (Wells (note 15) 38. 
2247 Ibid. 
2248 Rush (note 2242) 61 
2249 Ibid. 
2250 Ibid 63. 
2251 Wells (note 15) 37. 
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corporate homicide, where a corporation has repeatedly caused deaths2252 and has failed to be 
deterred by previous sentences the sentencing court may impose the corporate death penalty or 
the compulsory dissolution of the company. 
 
 
 (x) The inclusion of individual criminal liability in the proposed legal framework 
Section 332(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act made provision for the individual liability of 
directors and servants; however, the provision contained fatal flaws that led to it being 
constitutionally challenged successfully.2253  Since then these individuals are held liable under 
common law. It is submitted that for the specific proposed offence, it is crucial to make it 
possible for individuals within the corporation to face liability for the same statutory offence 
that the corporation is charged with. The proposed offence must therefore be inclusive of 
individuals within the corporations so that they may also be subject to prosecution together 
with the corporation as “it is increasingly argued that general deterrence as well as retributive 
arguments demand the prosecution of directors and managers as well as of the corporation 
itself”.2254  Including individual criminal liability makes it clear from the outset to individuals 
within the corporations that they will be subject to personal criminal liability if their acts or 
omissions lead to the deaths of people. It is submitted that the possibility of imprisonment for 
convicted individuals will make the individuals within corporations more cautious when it 
comes to decision-making, even where there is a remote possibility of death. This personal 
threat may lead to the reduction of risky decision-making that may possibly result in deaths. 
                                                          
2252 “Greed is at the heart of some of the world's worst tragedies. Corporations are being used as instrumentalities 
for great and unimaginable suffering”. (DM Aman “Capital punishment: corporate criminal liability for gross 
violations of human rights” Hastings International Law Review (2001) 327, 336). 
2253See discussion in chapter two.  
2254 Wells (note 15) 161. 
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The period of imprisonment will be affected by whether the individual has been convicted of 
corporate homicide or corporate murder. 
 
One of the criticisms levelled against the English CMCHA is that individuals may not be 
charged with the offence of corporate manslaughter.2255 Although there is the exclusion of 
individuals from the ambit of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, the 
directors may still be held liable in terms of the Health and Safety at Work Act. It is submitted 
that in drawing from the law in the compared jurisdictions, where criticisms have been made, 
South Africa can learn from those criticisms and avoid exposing the proposed framework to 
the same criticisms. It is submitted that for purposes of the proposed offence excluding these 
people from liability would lead to the untenable situation whereby individuals who are directly 





After examining corporate criminal liability in South Africa, England and Canada this thesis 
concludes with a recommended legal framework for future corporate criminal liability in South 
Africa. In making the recommendations those parts of the current South African provision that 
contribute to making the provision ineffective, inadequate and unjust are removed, while 
relevant  strengths of the provision are included in the recommended legal framework for future 
                                                          
2255 “Controversially, the Act also provides that individuals cannot be liable as a secondary party to an offence of 
corporate manslaughter (s. 18 (1))”. (Ormerod & Taylor (note 1485) 594). 
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corporate criminal liability. Most importantly for recommendations for the legal framework for 
corporate criminal liability in South Africa to be made, valuable lessons have been drawn from 
both the English and the Canadian system. It is envisaged that when reform is eventually made 
to corporate criminal liability in South Africa these recommendations will be of assistance or 
guidance. 
 
Apart from the recommendation of the legal framework for corporate criminal liability in South 
Africa, this thesis concludes with a comprehensive proposal for a separate offence of corporate 
homicide. Under the proposed offence the focus is on corporate activities and the results 
thereof. This is a move away from section 332 which focuses on the guilt of the individual for 
the liability of the corporation. Here the corporation will be held directly liable based on (a) 
the resulting serious injury or death (b) the conduct of an individual or the aggregated conduct 
of two or more individuals (c) non-compliance with a duty to ensure the safety of those who 
deal with the corporation. 
 
It is submitted that the proposed offence is an improvement on the current position as it makes 
it possible for the corporation to be held criminally liable even in the absence of an individual 
whose fault can be imputed to the corporation. This promotes the criminal liability of 
corporations for corporate killings as it holds the corporation liable independently or personally 
for its crimes.  
 
Since this makes it possible for the corporation to be held liable even in circumstances where 
there is no identifiable single individual who was personally liable for death, the proposed 
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offence eliminates quite a number of weaknesses that make section 332 an ineffective, 
inadequate and unjust provision. These include the failure to hold corporations liable for its 
crimes, independent of individual fault and the possibility of a prosecution even in 
circumstances where the corporation could not be held civilly liable. 
 
Regarding the corporation as a corporate actor and holding it liable independently for its 
offences provides a much better state of affairs as compared to derivative liability. Moreover, 
the proposed provision provides a better approach to the criminal liability for corporate killings 
as it takes into account the knowledge by the corporation of the offence when determining 
liability. This is a crucial factor to be considered if prosecutions for corporate killings are to be 
fair and just.  
 
It is envisaged that the placing of a duty on the corporation for ensuring the safety of people 
will not only make it difficult for the corporation to escape liability, but that it will also make 
corporations or organisations become more vigilant when it comes to making sure that there 
are safety measures in place to ensure the safety of all who deal with the corporation or 
organisation.  
 
By engaging in an assessment of the English law and the Canadian law insight has been 
provided into the way corporate criminal liability and particularly corporate homicide has been 
approached by the two jurisdictions. It has assisted in identifying the weaknesses of the 
identification doctrine, which could have been an alternative to the derivative approach. It has 
also highlighted that South Africa really needs to develop further in terms of the manner in 
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which it holds corporations criminally liable for corporate crimes, particularly corporate 
killings. In drafting the proposed offence the weaknesses that have already been identified in 
the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act and Bill C-45 have been avoided and 
in this manner South Africa benefits from the analysis of corporate criminal liability in those 
jurisdictions. The analysis has also brought to light strengths of the corporate criminal liability 
statutes in both jurisdictions which have resulted in concepts such as ‘organisations’ and the 
placing of a duty of care on the corporation being adopted in the proposed offence. The analysis 
further highlighted the availability of sanctions other than the fine that may be meted out to 
corporations that cause harm to society and has also provided examples of sentencing 
guidelines to be followed when sentencing a corporate offender. 
 
It is submitted that the adoption of a separate legal framework for corporate killings in the 
proposed offence together with the adoption of the aggregate doctrine from Canada’s Bill C-
45, where negligence has to be proved, will result in the criminal liability of corporations and 
organisations for corporate killings being more effective and adequate.  
 
The examination of the English and the Canadian positions has been a positive exercise and 
for the most part the proposed offence is influenced by developments in England and Canada. 
It is hoped that the proposed offence will assist in reforming the criminal liability of 
corporations and other organisations for deaths and that South Africa will not wait for public 
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